Fraternal Order of Police, Bluegrass Lodge 4 v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government ( 2023 )

RENDERED: JUNE 23, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0029-MR
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,
BLUEGRASS LODGE #4 APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 21-CI-01972
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT; AMANDA
MAYS BLEDSOE; CHUCK
ELLINGER II; DAVID KLOIBER;
FRED BROWN; HANNAH LEGRIS;
JAMES BROWN; JENNIFER
REYNOLDS; JOSH MCCURN;
KATHY PLOMIN; LINDA GORTON;
LIZ SHEEHANN; PRESTON
WORLEY; RICHARD MOLONEY;
STEVE KAY; SUSAN LAMB; AND
WHITNEY BAXTER APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING, IN PART, REVERSING,
IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CETRULO, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.
GOODWINE, JUDGE: The Fraternal Order of Police, Bluegrass Lodge #4 (FOP)
appeals the Fayette Circuit Court order dismissing its four-count amended
complaint against Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government et al. (LFUCG)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under CR1 12.02.
FOP does not appeal the dismissal of the individual defendants the
circuit court concluded enjoyed qualified immunity. Therefore, we affirm the
order to the extent that it dismisses FOP’s claims against the individual defendants.
However, we conclude that FOP did state claims against LFUCG
upon which relief can be granted. We reverse the order dismissing those claims
and remand for additional proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On June 24, 2021, LFUCG enacted a “no-knock ordinance” banning
the use of no-knock warrants2 in Fayette County, requiring Lexington Police
Department (“LPD”) officers to knock and announce their presence before
executing any search warrant on a private residence. The ordinance was enacted
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
A no-knock warrant is a judicial process authorizing a police officer to enter premises without
prior announcement of his presence or authority for reasons including officer and public safety.
See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421-22, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615(1997). No-knock warrant service makes possible “the avoidance of life-threatening resistance
by occupants of the premises . . . .” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596, 126 S. Ct. 2159,
2166, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006).
-2-
amid a national debate on the propriety of no-knock warrants, which arose after
Breonna Taylor was fatally shot in her home by Louisville police officers
executing a no-knock search warrant on March 13, 2020.3
Approximately one year later, the Kentucky General Assembly passed
a bill limiting the use of no-knock warrants. See 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 202 (S.B. 4)
(eff. Apr. 9, 2021). Among other things, Senate Bill 4 amends KRS4 Chapter 455,
implementing specific limitations on the issuance of no-knock warrants by
Kentucky courts and the execution of said warrants. See KRS 455.180-455.200.
On May 4, 2021, LFUCG proposed the ordinance to ban no-knock
warrants in Lexington. The purpose of the proposed ordinance was to protect “not
only our residents in Lexington but also officers going forward.” LFUCG’s May
4, 2021, Planning and Public Safety Committee – Virtual Meeting at 1:17:35-
1:18:28.
On May 13, 2021, the FOP emailed Mayor Linda Gorton demanding
that LFUCG engage in collective bargaining with the FOP about whether enacting
the ordinance affected LPD officers’ working conditions. LFUCG responded that
it was not obligated to bargain over the legislative decision of whether to enact the
3
On June 11, 2020, Louisville Mayor Greg Fisher signed into law an ordinance known as
“Breonna’s Law,” banning the use of no-knock warrants in Louisville. LOUISVILLE, KY,
ORDINANCE NO. 0-213-20 (2020).
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
ordinance. Although LFUCG offered to meet and confer with the FOP to discuss
the ordinance, the FOP declined. On June 24, 2021, LFUCG passed the
Ordinance.5 The following day the mayor signed it into law.
On June 30, 2021, before the Ordinance became effective, FOP
pursued a different course, initiating the CBA’s grievance procedure which says:
“[a]ny controversy between L.F.U.C.G. and [FOP] concerning the meaning and
application of any provisions of this Agreement shall be adjusted in the manner”
5
As codified in the Code, the Ordinance provides:
Sec. 23-51. - No-knock warrants.
(a) For purposes of this section, “no-knock warrant” means any arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge and executed upon a premises that does not require
those executing the warrant to knock and announce themselves and their purpose
prior to executing the warrant.
(b) No police officer of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Division of
Police shall seek or execute no-knock warrant [sic] at any location within
Lexington-Fayette County.
(c) Any Lexington police officer charged with execution of a warrant upon any
premises in order to gain entry shall:
(1) Physically knock on an entry door to the premises in a manner and
duration reasonably expected to be heard by the occupants;
(2) Clearly and verbally announce, in a manner reasonably expected to be
heard by the occupants, as law enforcement having a warrant; and
(3) Absent exigent circumstances, wait a reasonable amount of time after
knocking and announcing before entering the premises.
(d) All Lexington Police Officers present in the initial entry and securing of the scene
of a warrant shall be equipped with and activate a body worn camera.
LFUCG ORD. NO. 056-2021, § 1 (6-24-21).
-4-
described in the CBA. (CBA, Art. 11, Sec. 1.) This provision is consistent with
the Act, which says “urban-county governments . . . are prohibited from . . .
[r]efusing to bargain collectively in good faith[,]” which includes the duty “to
negotiate any question arising under any agreement[.]” KRS 67A.6904(1)(e), (3).
On the same day FOP initiated the grievance procedure, it also filed a
complaint in Fayette Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that LFUCG
was obligated by the Act to bargain collectively with FOP both before unilaterally
prohibiting FOP’s members from utilizing no-knock warrants and after the
decision reached fruition. FOP sought to have the circuit court declare the
Ordinance violated the “home rule” statute, KRS 82.082, KY. CONST. § 156b, and
KRS 67A.070. FOP also asked for injunctive relief while the collective bargaining
process ran its course.
LFUCG responded that it had no duty to bargain the effects of the
Ordinance on LPD Officers collectively. FOP responded, amending its complaint
to allege LFUCG breached the CBAs both by its unilateral decision to ban no-
knock warrants without collective bargaining and by refusing to participate in the
CBA grievance procedure to resolve the “controversy . . . concerning the meaning
and application” of the CBA’s “other conditions of employment” provisions.
-5-
Notwithstanding these allegations of fact, the circuit court granted
LFUCG’s motion under CR 12.02 to dismiss FOP’s complaint for failure to state
any claim upon which relief can be granted. The FOP timely appealed.
On appeal, the FOP argues that in failing to engage in collective
bargaining, LFUCG violated: (1) KRS 67A.6902(1) in enacting the Ordinance; (2)
the same statute in failing to bargain over the effects of the Ordinance; (3) the CBA
in enacting the Ordinance and ignoring the grievance; and (4) KRS 455.180 et seq.
Additionally, the FOP argues it has standing because it suffered a concrete injury
when LFUCG disregarded its statutory bargaining right.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted
is a question of law. Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010). Appellate
review is “de novo, affording no deference to the trial court.” Id. “[T]he pleadings
should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all
allegations being taken as true.” Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky. App.
2009).
ANALYSIS
Relevant to deciding whether FOP’s complaint states any claim upon
which relief can be granted, certain averments of fact therein must be taken as true.
-6-
They say:
• “The No-Knock Ordinance seriously endangers the health and safety of
LPD Officers.” (Amended Complaint, ¶53.)
• “The No-Knock Ordinance prohibits LPD Officers from seeking a lawful
no-knock warrant, even when they objectively establish probable cause that
requiring law enforcement to knock and announce their presence would
increase the danger to officers involved in executing the warrant.” (Id.
¶54.)
• “The No-Knock Ordinance exposes LPD Officers to possible discipline for
insubordination if they disregard a lawful warrant because of the ‘knock and
announce’ policy.” (Id. ¶62.)
• “[FOP] timely requested an arbitration panel from the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service.” (Id. ¶73.)
• “The parties dispute whether the No-Knock Ordinance implicates and
affects conditions of employment and mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining.” (Id. ¶89.)
• “The Parties dispute whether they must engage in collective bargaining over
the No-Knock Ordinance.” (Id. ¶90.)
• “LPD Officers now suffer an immediate and irreparable loss of bargaining
control over their health and safety.” (Id. ¶118.)
• “LPD Officers now suffer an immediate and irreparable loss of bargaining
control over their discipline system.” (Id. ¶119.)
• “LPD Officers now face an enhanced risk of serious physical injury and
death caused by the No-Knock Ordinance.” (Id. ¶120.)
The order dismissing does not begin by examining the sufficiency of
the allegations and whether they state a claim. Instead, it starts by focusing on
LFUCG’s “home rule” powers and its authority to enact local legislation on
-7-
matters of public policy. Despite FOP’s allegations and argument to the contrary,6
the court presumed “[t]he soundness of the Ordinance as a matter of public policy
is not at issue.” (R. 454.)
The circuit court’s touchstone of local government’s power to enact
ordinances it declares as public policy or as being in pursuit of a public purpose,
coupled with a legal conclusion LFUCG was freed thereby from contractual and
statutory duties, is reflected early in its order when it finds FOP lacks “standing to
challenge the constitutional validity of the No-Knock Ordinance.” (R. 453,
footnote 2.) This ruling appears intended to apply to all four counts. We will
address standing as to each count.
A. Count 1: FOP’s breach-of-contract claim
We hold that FOP has statutory standing to pursue its breach of
contract claim. KRS 67A.6908(3) (“Suits for violation of agreements between an
urban-county government and a labor organization representing police officers . . .
6
FOP challenged LFUCG’s assertion in its motion to dismiss that “‘elected officials cannot be
required to bargain’ policy decisions.” FOP argued that such a “position radically undercuts
KRS Chapter 67A” and empowers municipal governments to “subvert the CBAs” simply by
using an ordinance to make unilateral changes to public employees’ working conditions.
(Response by Plaintiff [to] Renewed Motion to Dismiss, pp. 14-15.) FOP repeats the argument
before this Court. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
-8-
may be brought by the parties to the agreement in the Circuit Court of the urban-
county government.”).7
The FOP alleges the CBAs created LFUCG’s duty to bargain
collectively, and it also alleges LFUCG breached that duty. The injury, as the
circuit court said, is that FOP “was denied the ability to bargain[.]” (R. 453,
footnote 2.) Of course, whether there was a breach remains, even now, an
unresolved question of fact for a jury, assuming the answer cannot be resolved by
motion practice under CR 56 or otherwise. A.A. By & Through Lewis v. Shutts,
516 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. App. 2017) (“breach question is generally a fact issue
for a jury”).
The order dismissing does not indicate that FOP’s Count 1 fails to
allege all elements of a contract breach claim. We, too, conclude that Count 1
alleges facts which, if proven, justify relief.
However, the circuit court dismissed Count 1 for different reasons
than FOP’s failure to state a claim. Passing over the discussion of the allegations
of duty and breach, the circuit court said, “LFUCG did not violate Article 1 of the
CBA by enacting the No-Knock Ordinance.” (R. 460.) The circuit court found
that LFUCG did not commit a breach – generally a question of fact for the jury.
7
Although Kentucky provides for an administrative process to cure a government’s failure to
bargain, KRS 67A.6906, the General Assembly carved out this unique direct route to the court
system, KRS 67A.6908(3).
-9-
Because the claim was dismissed on the pleadings, the circuit court’s
ruling of no breach cannot be based on factfinding; it must be based on the circuit
court’s legal conclusions. FOP’s arguments challenge the circuit court’s
conclusions. We do not reach the merits of the circuit court’s conclusions given
that we are reversing and remanding to allow the parties to flesh out the merits of
the arguments and, after doing so, allow the circuit court to rule accordingly. The
parties must have ample opportunity to explore discovery if desired and then
present their arguments to the circuit on what constitutes conditions of
employment, effects of employment, “home rule,” administrative versus legislative
action, whether the Ordinance disturbs a comprehensive scheme of legislation, and
whether injunctive relief is warranted.
B. Count 2: FOP’s Declaration of Rights under KRS 67A.6901 et seq.
The circuit court did not expressly rule that FOP failed to state a claim
for a declaration of its rights under KRS 67A.6901 et seq. However, the order says
it “addresses all claims of all parties,” and that language subsumes Count 2. (R.
462.) We conclude that FOP’s Count 2 did not fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Therefore, we reverse the order dismissing Count 2.
Count 2 is the vehicle, and KRS Chapter 418 is the authority by which
FOP “appl[ies] for and [seeks to] secure a declaration of [its] right” under the Act
legislating collective bargaining. KRS 418.040 (“In any action in a court of record
-10-
of this Commonwealth having general jurisdiction . . . the plaintiff may ask for a
declaration of rights . . . and the court may make a binding declaration of rights
. . . .”). FOP sought from the circuit court the relief the General Assembly
expressly authorized the circuit court to grant, as stated in KRS 418.055 and KRS
418.070. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 96, 97.)
To the extent the circuit court’s ruling that FOP lacks standing applies
to Count 2, we reverse that ruling. FOP has statutory standing to bring the claims
stated in Count 2, and as just summarized.
We agree with FOP that, absent proof of its clear and convincing
waiver of the right to collectively bargain with LFUCG over this subject,
LFUCG’s argument will not justify dismissing either Count 1 or Count 2. And at
this stage of the litigation, proof sufficient to satisfy the standard for a waiver
stated in Greathouse v. Shreve, 891 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Ky. 1995), is not a part of
the circuit court’s analysis.
LFUCG argues FOP’s waiver of rights in two other places. First is
the implication that waiver can be found in FOP’s refusal of LFUCG’s invitation to
“meet and confer.” LFUCG’s invitation was meaningless because it was
accompanied by LFUCG’s express denial of its obligation to bargain collectively.
Second, LFUCG cites KenAmerican Resources, Inc. v. Potter
Grandchildren, LLC, for the idea that “filing this action in the Fayette Circuit
-11-
Court was a clear and irrefutable renouncement of the arbitration provision.” 916
F. Supp. 2d 799, 801 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (quoted in Appellees’ brief, p. 22). This
case is distinguishable by its facts and the law.
The burden of proof is upon the person relying upon
waiver. Waiver requires proof of a “knowing and
voluntary surrender or relinquishment of a known right.”
Because this is a right with both constitutional and
statutory underpinnings, proof of waiver must be clear
and convincing. As such, while no formal or written
waiver is required, statements and supporting
circumstances must be equivalent to an express waiver to
meet the burden of proof. Greathouse v. Shreve, Ky.,
891 S.W.2d 387, 391 (1995).
Pangallo v. Kentucky Law Enf’t Council, 106 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Ky. App. 2003).
We examined these pleadings carefully, including the CBAs incorporated in the
complaint and amended complaint. There is nothing that supports LFUCG’s claim
of waiver.
A close reading of the order dismissing reveals it does not dismiss
Count 2 for failing to state a claim. It could be interpreted as the circuit court
having adjudicated the claim in favor of LFUCG.
On its face, Count 2 states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
When reviewing denials of claims for declaratory judgment, “[t]he appellate court
in its consideration of the case, shall not be confined to errors alleged or apparent
in the record. When, in its opinion, further pleadings or proof is necessary to a
final and correct decision of the matters involved, or that should be involved, it
-12-
shall remand the case for that purpose . . . .” KRS 418.065. Because the
Declaratory Judgment Act is “to be liberally interpreted and administered[,]” KRS
418.080, we believe it appropriate to follow the mandate of KRS 418.065.
Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of Count 2 and remand for further proceedings.
C. Count 3: FOP’s Declaration of Rights under KY. CONST. § 156b,
KRS 82.082, and KRS 67A.070.
The circuit court dismissed this claim by granting LFUCG’s motion
under CR 12.02(f) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count 3 alleges FOP’s right to challenge the Ordinance as void under the law of
“home rule.” We conclude that the allegations do state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. However, as with Count 2, it is this Court’s opinion that “further
pleadings or proof is necessary to a final and correct decision of the matters
involved, or that should be involved,” and we “shall remand the case for that
purpose” with the following observation. KRS 418.065.
Under “home rule,” LFUCG is empowered to “enact and enforce
within their territorial limits such tax, licensing, police, sanitary and other
ordinances not in conflict with the Constitution and general statutes . . . .” KRS
67A.070(1). However, “ordinances shall be deemed to conflict with general
statutes of this state . . . (a) [w]hen the ordinance authorizes that which is expressly
prohibited by a general statute; or (b) [w]hen there is a comprehensive scheme of
legislation on the same subject embodied in a general statute.” KRS 67A.070(2).
-13-
FOP is not arguing for reversal of the circuit court’s dismissal of
Count 3 because Senate Bill 4 expressly prohibits the Ordinance. Rather, FOP
argues that the Ordinance disturbs a comprehensive scheme of legislation.
FOP claims Kentucky laws, including Senate Bill 4, “left no room for
local regulation[,]” (Appellant’s brief, p. 25), and argues the “General Assembly
has enacted a broad and detailed scheme regulating[,]” in this case, no-knock
warrants. Whitehead v. Est. of Bravard, 719 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Ky. 1986).
Senate Bill 4 does not “merely amend[] KRS 455, which concerns
‘miscellaneous criminal practice provisions.’” (R. 456.) It is more comprehensive.
Senate Bill 4 also amended KRS 523.020 (relating to perjury in procuring a
warrant not requiring notice) and created a new rule of evidence, KRE8 410A,
making inadmissible the fruits of a search under a warrant that does not comply
with KRS 455.180.
Furthermore, in addition to Senate Bill 4, KRS 95.019(1) says, “all
members of the police force in urban-county governments . . . shall possess all of
the common law and statutory powers of constables and sheriffs.” KRS 95.019(1).
The General Assembly did not abolish the power of all Kentucky sheriffs to utilize
no-knock warrants, and LFUCG lacks the authority to do so. This seems to create
8
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
-14-
a conflict between the Ordinance and KRS 95.019 that may affect the analysis of
“home rule” as the authority for the Ordinance.
Granted, “[t]he simple fact that the state has made certain regulations
does not prohibit local government from establishing additional requirements so
long as there is no conflict between them.” Lexington Fayette Cnty. Food &
Beverage Ass’n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 131 S.W.3d 745, 750
(Ky. 2004). LFUCG argues it has concurrent authority under “home rule” to enact
the Ordinance. FOP cites Lexington Fayette County Food & Beverage for the
proposition that “[t]he true test of the concurrent authority of the state and local
government to regulate a particular area is the absence of conflict.” Id.We have carefully considered LFUCG’s argument that the laws can
be harmonized and see a glaring flaw in its presentation. LFUCG argues Senate
Bill 4 does not “establish a comprehensive system of state regulation that excludes
any local regulation [because] ‘[w]hen the legislature seeks to expressly preempt
entire fields of local regulation and ordinance, it does so by clear and unmistakable
language.’” (Appellees’ brief, p. 25 (quoting Lexington Fayette Cnty. Food &
Beverage Ass’n, 131 S.W.3d at 752).) This inappropriately blends the measure of
conflicting legislative schemes set out in KRS 67A.070(2)(a) and (b). In plainer
terms, LFUCG is saying implied preemption by a conflicting comprehensive
scheme of state law under KRS 67A.070(2)(b) requires the same express
-15-
prohibition as required by KRS 67A.070(2)(a) for preemption to be found. If that
were true, implied preemption would not exist but be swallowed up by a rule
recognizing only express prohibitions against local legislation.
Again, the circuit court appears to have adjudicated the merits of
FOP’s Count 3. (R. 455-56.) For this and the other reasons stated, we must
reverse the dismissal of Count 3 and remand for further consideration.
D. Count 4: FOP’s claim for injunctive relief.
The circuit court failed to rule on the merits of FOP’s Count 4, a claim
for injunctive relief. This is understandable, given the court’s dismissal of Counts
1 through 3. Because we are reinstating those claims, we are remanding FOP’s
claim in Count 4 for further consideration.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, and
remand, the Fayette Circuit Court’s December 8, 2021 Order dismissing the
Amended Complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.
ALL CONCUR.
-16-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
FOR APPELLANT:
Jason P Renzelmann
Scott A. Crosbie Jennifer L. Bame
Nicholas A. Oleson Louisville, Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
Alexander L Ewing
West Chester, Ohio
Keith Horn
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Jason P Renzelmann
Jennifer L. Bame
Louisville, Kentucky
-17-