Phoebe Crum v. Benjamin Crum ( 2023 )

RENDERED: JULY 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-1449-MR
PHOEBE CRUM APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE KIMBERLY BLAIR WALSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CI-50536
BENJAMIN CRUM APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND KAREM, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Phoebe
Crum (“Appellant”) appeals from an order of the Madison Circuit Court finding
that she agreed with Benjamin Crum (“Appellee”) to divide the cost of a vehicle
for the use of the parties’ children including reasonable maintenance expenses.
Appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering the parties
to divide the cost of the vehicle, as the decision is not supported by evidence of
record. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order on appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties were married on April 13, 2002, and divorced by way of a
decree of dissolution entered on September 25, 2017. Shortly before the decree
was entered, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement (“the Agreement”)
which resolved various custody, support, and property issues. The Agreement was
incorporated into the decree. The marriage produced two children.
On March 15, 2021, the parties entered into an agreed order on
timesharing, support, and the children’s expenses. The agreed order was read into
the record at a case management conference on that date, and subsequently filed
into the record on May 12, 2021. It stated at Paragraph 10,
[t]hat the parties shall equally divide the reasonable cost
of the automobile insurance premium for the minor child,
[Son’s1] Lexus ES 350 after such time as he has obtained
his intermediate license. The parties shall also equally
divide the reasonable cost of the automobile insurance
premium for their minor child, [Daughter], at such time
as she obtains her intermediate license. This is limited to
the coverage of the children’s portion of the automobile
insurance coverage.
Sometime thereafter, Son wrecked the Lexus automobile and
Appellee purchased a replacement vehicle for him. On June 9, 2022, Appellee
filed a motion for contempt, in which he sought reimbursement from Appellant for
one-half of the cost of the replacement vehicle. The motion was heard on July 11,
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We will redact the children’s names because they are minors.
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2022, at which time the court reviewed the video record from the March 15, 2021
case management conference to determine if an agreement had been reached as to
the costs of the children’s vehicle. After reviewing the March 15, 2021 video, the
court determined that the parties had agreed to split the cost of the children’s
vehicle. Appellant would later assert that she never agreed to split the cost of the
vehicle, either orally or memorialized in writing.
An additional hearing was conducted on August 22, 2022, after which
the court made a docket entry that the parties had agreed to split the cost of Son’s
vehicle and should discuss a vehicle for Daughter. On November 29, 2022, the
circuit court entered an order finding that the parties had agreed to divide the cost
of a vehicle for the children, including maintenance and damage repair if any. This
appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the terms of a settlement
agreement are enforceable as contract terms. Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)
403.180(5). “The construction and interpretation of a contract is a matter of law
and is reviewed under the de novo standard. Absent an ambiguity in the contract,
the parties’ intentions must be discerned from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence.” Cagata v. Cagata, 475 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Ky.
App. 2015), review denied (Dec. 10, 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations
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omitted). When a contract is not ambiguous, a court will interpret its terms “by
assigning language its ordinary meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence.”
Frear v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky. 2003) (footnote and citation
omitted).
As to the agreed order, we review the trial court’s findings of fact
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01, and will not disturb
those findings unless clearly erroneous. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.
Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). Findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous if supported by substantial evidence. Kentucky State Racing
Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972). Substantial evidence is
that evidence which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Id.ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the Madison Circuit Court erred in finding that
she agreed to divide with Appellee the cost of a vehicle for the children, including
maintenance and repairs. She asserts that this finding is not supported by the
record; therefore, it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Appellant contends that the
circuit court made an unsupported oral finding that she agreed to divide the cost of
a vehicle, but that Appellant never assented to this conclusion and the court
effectively imposed it on her. She also argues that the trial court’s decision is
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unreasonable based on the fact that automobiles for minor children are not a
fundamental right. The focus of Appellant’s argument is that the record does not
support the circuit court’s conclusion that Appellant agreed to divide the cost of a
vehicle for the children; that absent any support in the record for this finding, it is
arbitrary; and, that the order on appeal containing the erroneous finding must be
reversed.
Pursuant to KRS 403.180(5), Cagata, and Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corporation, supra, we will consider de novo the question of whether Appellant
agreed to divide the cost of a vehicle for the children. Paragraph 6 of the agreed
order states that “the parties shall equally divide the children’s expenses[.]” This
paragraph does not expressly address the children’s vehicles. The question then
becomes whether the parties contemplated a vehicle for the children as a children’s
expense as included in Paragraph 6. We must answer this question in the
affirmative. Paragraph 10, quoted above, provides that the parties shall equally
divide the cost of automobile insurance for the children. Since the parties
contemplated automobile insurance for the children, and expressly addressed
“[Son’s] Lexus ES 350” in Paragraph 10, we believe the agreed order is properly
interpreted to include a child’s vehicle as a children’s expense.
Appellant correctly notes that neither the Agreement nor the agreed
order expressly addresses the purchase of a vehicle for the children nor the
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associated maintenance costs. This is her strongest argument in favor of her
contention that the circuit court improperly interpreted the agreed order as binding
her to half the costs associated with the vehicle. However, since the children’s
vehicles were expressly addressed in Paragraph 10, and as Paragraph 6 is broadly
worded to include an equal division of the children’s expenses, we cannot conclude
that the Madison Circuit Court erred in finding that Appellant agreed to a division
of costs associated with a child’s vehicle. Ultimately, Appellant’s Agreement to
“equally divide the children’s expenses” resolves the matter in favor of Appellee
on this issue. The Madison Circuit Court properly so concluded.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Madison Circuit
Court finding that Appellant agreed to divide the cost of a vehicle for the children.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James A. Baechtold Nanci M. House
Richmond, Kentucky Winchester, Kentucky
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