Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Humberto Ramos ( 2023 )

RENDERED: JULY 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-1462-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE MITCH PERRY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CR-001375
HUMBERTO RAMOS APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND KAREM, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing without prejudice the indictment of
Humberto Ramos. It argues that the circuit court exceeded its authority based on
the Separation of Powers doctrine of the Kentucky Constitution and the supportive
case law. After careful review, we conclude that the indictment was improperly
dismissed. We therefore reverse the order on appeal and remand the matter to the
circuit court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 25, 2016, a Jefferson County grand jury indicted Humberto
Ramos on one count of escape in the second degree.1 Ramos was arraigned about
one week after the indictment and appeared before the circuit court for the final
time on September 1, 2016. Thereafter, it appears that Ramos was either in federal
custody or detained by immigration authorities, and could no longer be located
within the Commonwealth.
On September 26, 2022, the Jefferson Circuit Court sua sponte placed
this matter on the docket for consideration of whether the indictment should be
dismissed because no action had been taken on it for about six years. The
Commonwealth argued against dismissal, noting that the delay in the proceedings
resulted solely from Ramos’ failure to appear. Additional hearings were conducted
through November 7, 2022, at which time the circuit court dismissed the
indictment without prejudice. In support of the order, the circuit court determined
that the years-long period of inactivity required the matter’s removal from the
docket. This appeal followed.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 520.030.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a circuit court’s decision to dismiss an indictment for an
abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Grider, 390 S.W.3d 803, 817 (Ky. App.
2012) (citation omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
The Commonwealth argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred in
dismissing the indictment over the Commonwealth’s objection. While
acknowledging the circuit court’s concern that this matter has been on the active
docket for several years, the Commonwealth argues that the delay results from
Ramos being unable or unwilling to appear and that this is not a proper basis for
dismissal. It contends that this Court has previously held that, based on the
Separation of Powers doctrine, Kentucky’s trial courts do not have the authority to
dismiss indictments over the Commonwealth’s objection before trial. Citing
Grider, 390 S.W.3d at 817-18, and related case law, the Commonwealth argues
that the Legislature has the constitutional authority to enact statutes governing
criminal offenses; the Executive branch may prosecute the accused; and the
Judiciary is vested with authority to adjudicate the criminal proceedings. Pursuant
to this scheme, the Commonwealth argues that a trial court may only dismiss an
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indictment in extraordinary circumstances such as insufficiency of the indictment
or prosecutorial misconduct. As these limited exceptions are not present in the
instant case, the Commonwealth argues that the circuit court exceeded its authority
in dismissing the indictment over the Commonwealth’s objection.
A panel of this Court stated in Grider, supra, that:
The Kentucky Supreme Court has stated that the
Kentucky Constitution provides for the separation of
powers:
The power to define crimes and
establish the range of penalties for each
crime resides in the legislative branch. The
power to charge persons with crimes and to
prosecute those charges belongs to the
executive department, and by statute, is
exercised by the appropriate prosecuting
attorney. The power to conduct criminal
trials, to adjudicate guilt and to impose
sentences within the penalty range
prescribed by the legislature belongs to the
judicial department.
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 686, 689-90 (Ky.
2009). Further, “subject to rare exceptions usually
related to a defendant's claim of a denial of the right to a
speedy trial, the trial judge has no authority, absent
consent of the Commonwealth’s attorney, to dismiss,
amend, or file away before trial a prosecution based on a
good indictment.” Gibson, 291 S.W.3d at 690 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
There are a variety of situations which may
result in a dismissal of a criminal case under
circumstances which, against the wishes of
the Commonwealth, preclude further
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adjudication and are, in effect, a dismissal
“with prejudice.” These include the
violations of the right to a speedy trial and
the mistrials that occur after jeopardy
attaches. In Commonwealth v. Baker, [11
S.W.3d 585, 590 (Ky. App. 2000)], our
Court of Appeals recognized that
“outrageous government conduct could taint
evidence irrevocably, or prejudice a
defendant’s case on the merits such that
notions of due process and fundamental
fairness would preclude reindictment.”
Grider, 390 S.W.3d at 817-18 (citation omitted).
Thus, the circuit court has no authority to dismiss an indictment over
the Commonwealth’s objection prior to trial, absent a violation of the right to a
speedy trial, a mistrial that occurs after jeopardy attaches, outrageous
governmental conduct that irrevocably taints evidence or violates due process and
fundamental fairness, or other limited exceptions. Id.The question for our consideration, then, is whether one of these
exceptions is found in the present case. We conclude that no such exception is
present. While it is true that the matter has been languishing for six or seven years,
this delay cannot reasonably be said to violate Ramos’ right to a speedy trial as it is
Ramos who has absented himself from the proceedings. In addition, no mistrial
has occurred and no outrageous governmental conduct has been alleged. Finally,
none of the other exceptions are present, such as a faulty indictment or a defect in
the grand jury proceeding. As such, the general rule set out in Gibson is
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controlling: “the trial judge has no authority, absent consent of the
Commonwealth’s attorney, to dismiss, amend, or file away before trial a
prosecution based on a good indictment.” Gibson, 291 S.W.3d at 690 (emphasis in
original).
Further, and as noted by the Commonwealth, in Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Ky. 2018), the Kentucky Supreme Court
addressed the means for handling fugitive cases so as not to overburden a trial
court’s docket. Kelly noted that the case management system allows for such cases
to be administratively closed, and subsequently reopened when a bench warrant
was served and the defendant was made to appear.
We must also address Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”)
13.03, which Kelly implicitly referenced. It states that,
At least once each year trial courts shall review all
pending criminal actions on their dockets. Notice shall
be given to each attorney of record of every case in
which no pretrial step has been taken within the last year,
that the case will be dismissed in thirty days for want of
prosecution except for good cause shown. The court
shall enter an order dismissing without prejudice each
case in which no answer or an insufficient answer to the
notice is made. This rule shall not apply to cases where
the trial court has issued an arrest warrant based on the
defendant’s failure to appear in the case.
RCr 13.03 is mandatory, although it is not universally utilized
throughout the Commonwealth. It directs courts to review their criminal dockets
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and consider dismissal of inactive criminal cases without prejudice. Permitting
dismissal without prejudice maintains the balance under the Separation of Powers
doctrine noted above. The courts could clear out old cases involving unexplained
delay, but the Commonwealth could still re-indict the defendant.
Since no warrant was issued for Ramos’ arrest, RCr 13.03 required
the circuit court to give notice of an intent to dismiss and give the parties an
opportunity to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Arguably, the
circuit court complied with this requirement.
The circuit court having met this requirement, the burden then rested
with the Commonwealth to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. The
circumstances of this case are that all delay has been due to the consequences of
the defendant’s actions, which made him unavailable for many years. These
circumstances first led to a delay in charging the defendant for an alleged escape,
followed by a separate delay in proceeding with the prosecution of the case. The
Commonwealth showed good cause.
CONCLUSION
A circuit court is vested with broad discretion in managing its own
docket. Smith v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Ky. App. 2016). That
discretion is not without limitation, however, and is subject to the court’s authority
set out in the Kentucky Constitution, Grider, supra, and RCr 13.03. Per Grider
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and English, we conclude that the Jefferson Circuit Court’s dismissal of the
indictment constitutes an abuse of discretion since none of the limited exceptions
are present, and the Commonwealth showed good cause why the indictment should
not be dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal and remand the
matter to the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jason B. Moore
Special Assistant Attorney General
Louisville, Kentucky
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