Rhonda Beinlein v. Kidz University, Inc. ( 2023 )

RENDERED: AUGUST 4, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1191-MR
RHONDA BEINLEIN APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CI-005021
KIDZ UNIVERSITY, INC. APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2021-CA-1248-MR
DAVID LEN PITTS; J. DAVID PITTS,
JR.; KIDZ UNIVERSITY, INC.; AND
ROCK COSMOPOLITAN CHURCH,
INC. CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CI-005021
RHONDA BEINLEIN, AS PARENT
AND STATUTORY GUARDIAN ON
BEHLAF OF H.B. AND N.B.,
MINORS CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: Rhonda Beinlein (“Beinlein”) appeals from the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s judgment following a jury trial; Kidz University, Inc. (“Kidz
University”) cross-appeals from the same judgment. For the reasons below, we
affirm both appeals.
Beinlein’s children, H.B. and N.B., ages ten and eight respectively,
attended Kidz University daycare in 2015. In May of that year, H.B. and N.B.
reported to Beinlein that Kidz University Director Carrie Blankenship
(“Blankenship”) and employee Nikoletta Nunley (“Nunley”) were abusing other
children. Allegations included that Blankenship was shoving, hitting, and cursing
at the children. Video footage from the daycare later verified the abuse. Beinlein
reported the allegations to authorities and Blankenship subsequently pleaded guilty
to two counts of fourth-degree assault. As a result of the incident, Kidz University
permanently closed.
On September 22, 2017, Beinlein filed a complaint in Jefferson
Circuit Court against Kidz University, its owners, Nunley, and Blankenship
alleging H.B. and N.B. suffered physical, emotional, and psychological injuries
from witnessing the abuse, and that Kidz University was vicariously liable for its
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employees’ actions.1 Blankenship did not answer the complaint and the trial court
entered a default judgment against her in the amount of $650,000.00. The Kidz
University defendants denied any liability. The parties underwent mediation and
submitted an agreed order dismissing all claims except the vicarious liability claim
pertaining to Blankenship’s actions.
Following the agreed order of partial dismissal, both parties filed
motions for summary judgment on the vicarious liability issue. The trial court
denied both motions, holding that neither party had provided sufficient evidence on
whether Blankenship was acting in the scope of employment when the abuse
occurred. Beinlein then filed a renewed motion for partial summary judgment on
the liability issue,2 along with an affidavit from Blankenship.
The affidavit stated that Blankenship’s actions were not committed
“out of personal bias or ill will toward any child” nor was she “personally
motivated to harm any child[.]” It further claimed that at all times she “was acting
in the course and scope of [her] employment as Director of Kidz University[,]” and
“never intended anything other than accomplishment of my job running a daycare
. . . and disciplin[ing] . . . the children attending the daycare.” According to the
1
The complaint stated claims for assault, negligence per se, negligence, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, failure to hire, train, and supervise, and punitive damages.
2
Kidz University also filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss any vicarious liability
claim relating to employee Nunley’s actions that might potentially remain, pursuant to the agreed
order of partial dismissal.
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affidavit, all of Blankenship’s actions were motivated by her desire to “please the
owners of Kidz University . . . .”
Blankenship conceded she was “overwhelmed by stress, resentment
and anger about my hours, my pay, the poor staffing situation and the lack of input
or assistance from the [owners of Kidz University,]” and “let my frustration and
anger and stress get the better of me . . . .” She acknowledged that she “was ill-
equipped emotionally to handle the stress” of the job. The trial court again denied
the motion, finding that “many of the reasons [Blankenship] provides for her
actions speak of personal reasons disconnected from any interest of her employer.
Thus issues of material fact remain as to vicarious liability . . . .”
A jury trial was held on the issue of vicarious liability. Videos of the
abuse were presented as evidence, but Blankenship did not testify. David Pitts, Jr.
testified he was unaware of the abuse and that the daycare had a posted policy
against abusing children. Video cameras had been installed to protect the children,
and he reviewed surveillance video once a week or every other week.
Following the evidence, both parties moved for directed verdicts on
vicarious liability which were denied. The trial court also ruled Beinlein could not
recover punitive damages because that claim had been dismissed pursuant to the
agreed order of partial dismissal. The jury found Blankenship was acting in the
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course and scope of her employment and in furtherance of Kidz University’s
business when she physically abused children and awarded $26,500.00 in damages.
Beinlein filed a motion to set aside the $26,500.00 damage award and
enter a new judgment for damages in the amount of $650,000.00, consistent with
the trial court’s default judgment entered against Blankenship. She also filed a
motion for a new trial on punitive damages. Kidz University also filed a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, as it did on directed verdict, that
it was not vicariously liable for Blankenship’s abuse as a matter of law. The trial
court denied all motions. These appeals followed.
Turning first to Beinlein’s appeal, she argues the trial court erred in
denying summary judgment and a directed verdict on the issue of Kidz
University’s vicarious liability for Blankenship’s actions. As the jury found in
favor of Beinlein on her vicarious liability claim, we find these arguments moot.
Beinlein next argues the trial court erred in having the jury determine
damages rather than setting damages at $650,000.00 pursuant to the default
judgment entered against Blankenship. Beinlein claims to have preserved this
error in both her motion for partial summary judgment and in her motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In both instances, we find this argument
waived. While Beinlein requested the trial court enforce the default judgment
damage award against Kidz University in her motion for partial summary
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judgment, Beinlein subsequently filed a renewed motion for partial summary
judgment asking the trial court to “enter an order setting the matter for a one-day
jury trial on damages.”
As to her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Beinlein
argues the trial court erred in submitting the issue of compensatory damages to the
jury. However, Beinlein did not object to the trial court’s instruction on damages
and in fact submitted her own damages construction. Therefore, she has waived
this issue. Further, “[o]bjections to jury instructions in a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict are ‘too late’ to preserve the argument for appeal.” See
Morris v. Boerste, 641 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Ky. App. 2022) (citation omitted).
Even if this issue were properly before us, we find no error. “As a
general rule, in an action for unliquidated damages, a defaulting party admits
liability but not the amount of damages.” Howard v. Fountain, 749 S.W.2d 690,
693 (Ky. App. 1988) (citations omitted). And here, the default judgment was
entered against Blankenship, not Kidz University. Kidz University denied
vicarious liability in its answer to the complaint and requested a jury trial. As long
as the issues are raised by its pleadings, an employer “is entitled to try the issues of
negligence, respondeat superior and the amount of damages.” United Salt Corp. v.
McKee, 628 P.2d 310, 313 (N.M. 1981).
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Beinlein next argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the
jury on punitive damages. The trial court held that Beinlein’s punitive damages
claim was precluded by the agreed partial order of dismissal. We agree. The
construction and interpretation of a contract are questions of law and are reviewed
de novo. Hazard Coal Corp. v. Knight, 325 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Ky. 2010) (citations
omitted).
The agreed order dismissed all claims except “the alleged vicarious
liability claims relating to co-defendant Carrie Blankenship with respect to
defendant Kidz University . . . .” Beinlein argued to the trial court, as she does on
appeal, that punitive damages are simply an element of her vicarious liability
claim, and therefore, not part of the agreed order of dismissal. However, in
Kentucky “punitive damages [are] a separate claim and not merely an additional
remedy along with compensatory damages.” Chesley v. Abbott, 524 S.W.3d 471,
480 (Ky. App. 2017) (citing MV Transp., Inc. v. Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d 324, 327
(Ky. 2014)). Here, Beinlein’s complaint stated a separate claim for punitive
damages; the agreed order of partial dismissal dispensed with all claims except the
vicarious liability claim. The language of the agreement is clear. Therefore, we
find no error.
Beinlein next argues the trial court erred in excluding three video clips
of Nunley’s alleged abuse. Before trial, Beinlein requested to play five video clips
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of Nunley committing acts of alleged abuse against children. Beinlein argued that
because Blankenship was responsible for training and supervising Kidz
University’s employees, evidence of Nunley’s misdeeds was evidence of
Blankenship’s negligence and, thus, relevant to vicarious liability and damages.
The trial court agreed but limited Beinlein to two video clips, finding more to be
unduly prejudicial.
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000)
(citations omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s
decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Id. at 581 (citation omitted).
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. Hall v.
Commonwealth, 645 S.W.3d 383, 391 (Ky. 2022) (citing KRE3 402). However,
relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice . . . or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.” KRE 403. “Evidence is unduly prejudicial if it is
harmful beyond its natural probative force, meaning that it appeals to the jury’s
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise
may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established
3
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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propositions in the case.” Hall, 645 S.W.3d at 391 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Whether relevant evidence should be excluded as unduly
prejudicial or needlessly cumulative is also a matter we leave to the trial court’s
sound discretion.” Gaither v. Commonwealth, 521 S.W.3d 199, 205 (Ky. 2017)
(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court allowed Beinlein to introduce two video clips of
Nunley’s alleged abuse in addition to video clips showing Blankenship’s abuse.
The jury saw ample evidence of Blankenship’s acts and omissions to judge
whether they were in the scope of employment and to assess damages. Any
additional video clips would have little probative value. See Hall v.
Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 814, 823-24 (Ky. 2015) (citation omitted) (“The
probative force of a particular item of evidence is . . . inherently dependent upon
the overall probativeness of other available evidence on that point.”). Further, the
acts of alleged abuse were committed against children, evidence particularly prone
to arouse the jurors’ sympathies and provoke their instinct to punish. We find no
error.
Turning to Kidz University’s cross-appeal, it argues the trial court
erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Specifically,
it argues there is no evidence Blankenship’s intentional abuse of students was in
the scope of her employment.
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“When this Court reviews a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we apply the same standard of review that
we use when reviewing a lower court’s decision to deny a motion for a directed
verdict.” Radioshack Corp. v. ComSmart, Inc., 222 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Ky. App.
2007) (citation omitted). “[T]he trial court may only grant judgment
notwithstanding the verdict where ‘there is a complete absence of proof on a
material issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact exists upon which
reasonable men could differ.’” Id. (citation omitted). On appellate review, we will
reverse the trial court’s ruling only if we find that the jury could not have
“reasonably . . . reached its verdict on the basis of the evidence before it[.]”
Ellison v. R & B Contracting, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Ky. 2000).
An employer is only liable for an employee’s actions committed in the
scope of employment. Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Ky. 2005). To be
within the scope of employment, “the conduct must be of the same general nature
as that authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized[,]” or “calculated to
advance the cause of the principal[.]” Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Ky.
2000) (citations omitted). “[Generally,] the master is held liable for any intentional
tort committed by the servant where its purpose, however misguided, is wholly or
in part to further the master’s business.” Papa John’s Intern., Inc. v. McCoy, 244
S.W.3d 44, 52 (Ky. 2008) (citation omitted). However, “if the servant acts from
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purely personal motives . . . which [are] in no way connected with the employer’s
interests, he is considered in the ordinary case to have departed from his
employment, and the master is not liable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Thus, “the focus is consistently on the purpose or motive of the
employee in determining whether he or she was acting within the scope of
employment.” Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
In denying both parties’ motions for summary judgment on vicarious
liability, the trial court relied upon Blankenship’s affidavit which provided both
employment-related and personal reasons for her actions and found that genuine
issues of material fact existed for trial. For example, Blankenship said her intent
was never to harm any child but only to accomplish her job in running the daycare
and disciplining children. However, she conceded she let her “frustration and
anger and stress get the better” of her.
While this affidavit was not introduced into evidence at trial, and
Blankenship did not testify, Beinlein introduced video evidence of the incidents
and the circumstances surrounding them. In one video, a child can be seen taking a
seat between two other children on a long bench. Blankenship grabs the child by
the arm and pushes him to the floor, saying “I’m tired of you doing that type of
stuff – sitting right on top of kids.” She then asks the child if he needs a nap and
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tells him to apologize to the other children. He refuses and she pulls him up by the
arm and says “ok then, take a nap, that’s all there is to it. Now you’re done.”
From this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that
Blankenship believed she was disciplining children as part of her job. As noted
above, a master is generally liable “for any intentional tort committed by the
servant where its purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to further the
master’s business.” Papa John’s Intern., Inc., 244 S.W.3d at 52 (citation omitted).
While Kidz University argues abusing children does not further its business, the
relevant issue is Blankenship’s motive, “however misguided.” The question on
appeal is whether the jury could not have “reasonably . . . reached its verdict on the
basis of the evidence before it[.]” Ellison, 32 S.W.3d at 75. We find no error.
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS- BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSS-
APPELLEE: APPELLANTS:
Jeffrey Allan Sexton Robert T. Watson
Michael R. Mazzoli Louisville, Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky
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