Christopher Mark Johnson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2023 )

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 15, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0440-MR
CHRISTOPHER MARK JOHNSON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY KALTENBACH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CR-00631
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: In 2020, Appellant, Christopher Johnson (Johnson), was
indicted by a McCracken County grand jury for second-degree assault. With the
advice of counsel, Johnson pleaded guilty to an amended charge of first-degree
wanton endangerment. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23
L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Thereafter, he retained new counsel and filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. An evidentiary hearing was conducted during which
multiple witnesses testified, including Johnson. Having carefully considered the
evidence, the trial court denied Johnson’s motion, and sentenced him to two-years’
imprisonment in accordance with his plea agreement. The court issued the
following written findings:
a. [D]efendant discussed his case with at least two
attorneys and an investigator at the Department of Public
Advocacy prior to entering his plea. He and his counsel
discussed his case both during a lengthy telephonic
conference and in person.
b. The defendant reviewed the evidence in his case
provided in discovery with his attorney.
c. His attorneys investigated whether entry of the plea
would violate the terms of his probation and he was
advised that entry of a guilty plea could result in
violation of his probation.
d. His attorneys were informed about the possibility of a
video recording on the events leading to his charge and
the defendant made an informed decision to accept a
favorable plea without obtaining the video.
3. The Court finds there was no coercion. No evidence
of coercion was presented.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
When determining whether a guilty plea was entered
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, trial courts
must consider the totality of the circumstances. This
inquiry is inherently fact-sensitive and we review for
clear error.
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Commonwealth v. Patton, 539 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
If, however, the trial court determines that the guilty plea
was entered voluntarily, then it may grant or deny the
motion to withdraw the plea at its discretion. This
decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. A trial court abuses its discretion when it
renders a decision which is arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by legal principles.
Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (footnotes
omitted). In support of his argument on appeal, Johnson recites the allegations
raised in his motion to withdraw, and cites extensively to testimony presented
during the hearing. Johnson specifically alleges deficient performance of counsel
and that he “felt coerced into entering the plea.”
To successfully establish the invalidity of a guilty plea
based upon the allegedly deficient performance of
defense counsel, the movant must satisfy both prongs of
the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)
and restated by this Court in Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58
S.W.3d 482, 486-487 (Ky. 2001). The movant must
demonstrate that: (1) defense counsel’s performance fell
outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance; and that (2) a reasonable probability exists
that, but for the deficient performance of counsel, the
movant would not have pled guilty, but would have
insisted on going to trial. In making that determination,
the trial court must indulge the strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.
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Commonwealth v. Rank, 494 S.W.3d 476, 481 (Ky. 2016) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2070.
Having reviewed the arguments and record presented, Johnson’s
assertions either lack specificity, or are otherwise unpersuasive. In consideration
of the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court
committed clear error, or that it ultimately abused its discretion in denying
Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, we AFFIRM.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sarah D. Dailey Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Melissa A. Pile
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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