Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association v. Edna Conley ( 2023 )


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  •                 RENDERED: DECEMBER 8, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2022-CA-0527-WC
    KENTUCKY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION                           APPELLANT
    PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
    v.             OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
    ACTION NO. WC-00-64861
    EDNA CONLEY; DR. SAI GUTTI/PAIN
    MANAGEMENT CENTER; RX DEVELOPMENT;
    HONORABLE JOHN B. COLEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE
    LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
    BOARD                                                              APPELLEES
    OPINION
    AFFIRMING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: ECKERLE, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
    JONES, JUDGE: Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association (KIGA) appeals an
    order of an administrative law judge (ALJ), as affirmed by the Workers’
    Compensation Board (Board), which resolved a medical fee dispute it filed against
    Dr. Sai Gutti/Pain Management Center (Gutti) and Rx Development (RX). Upon
    review, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The underlying medical fee dispute was filed by KIGA in early 2014
    on behalf of its insured, Save-A-Lot;1 and against its insured’s employee, Edna
    Conley, along with Conley’s medical providers, Gutti and RX. Gutti and RX
    operated a physician dispensary and sought reimbursement from KIGA after filling
    several of Conley’s prescriptions that were undisputedly covered under Conley’s
    workers’ compensation award against Save-A-Lot. KIGA filed its post-award
    medical fee dispute to challenge the prices Gutti and RX were billing it for those
    prescriptions. On December 22, 2020, the ALJ entered a final order resolving
    KIGA’s dispute. And, as the breadth of what is set forth below tends to indicate,
    KIGA was disappointed with much of the ALJ’s order.
    KIGA’s appeal raises the following issues: (1) whether the Board
    erred by not sanctioning Gutti and RX for filing an untimely brief at the
    administrative appellate level; (2) whether 803 Kentucky Administrative
    Regulation (KAR) 25:092 (1993), the now-superseded regulation2 that governed
    1
    KIGA identified itself in its pleadings below as “Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association as
    insurer/payment obligor for Save-A-Lot,” but has now shortened its moniker to simply
    “Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association.”
    2
    While 803 KAR 25:092 was amended in 2021 and 2022, only the 1993 version of 803 KAR
    25:092 is relevant to this appeal.
    -2-
    the underlying fee disputes, required Gutti and RX to disclose their “actual
    acquisition costs” for the prescriptions at issue to secure reimbursement from
    KIGA; (3) whether the ALJ’s ultimate determination regarding the applicable rate
    of reimbursement was supported by substantial evidence and otherwise consistent
    with the aforementioned regulation; and (4) whether KIGA was entitled to
    restitution or credit for any amount it may have over-reimbursed Gutti and RX.
    We will address those issues sequentially. Additional facts will be discussed in the
    course of our analysis.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The issues presented by the parties primarily require us to interpret
    statutory and regulatory provisions, which are legal issues we review de novo.
    Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye, 
    415 S.W.3d 631
    , 632 (Ky. 2013). Apart from that, our
    function is to correct the Board only where we perceive that it has “overlooked or
    misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing
    the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 
    827 S.W.2d 685
    , 687-88 (Ky. 1992). If the factfinder held in favor of the party with
    the burden of proof, the burden on appeal is only to show that substantial evidence
    supported the decision. See also Special Fund v. Francis, 
    708 S.W.2d 641
    , 643
    (Ky. 1986). Conversely, if the factfinder held against the party with the burden of
    proof, that party, on appeal, must “show that the ALJ misapplied the law or that the
    -3-
    evidence in her favor was so overwhelming that it compelled a favorable
    finding[.]” Gray v. Trimmaster, 
    173 S.W.3d 236
    , 241 (Ky. 2005).
    III. ANALYSIS
    1. The Board’s refusal to sanction Gutti and RX for filing an untimely brief
    was at most harmless error.
    When Gutti and RX filed their combined responsive brief and cross-
    petition for review before the Board, their brief was untimely by a margin of
    roughly three months. Citing that fact, KIGA moved the Board to sanction Gutti
    and RX by striking their responsive brief and dismissing their cross-petition. The
    Board refused to do so but did not elaborate upon its ruling. KIGA argues the
    Board erred and should be reversed in this respect.
    We disagree. 803 KAR 25:010 § 22(12)3 vests the Board with broad
    discretion to sanction tardy briefs as it deems appropriate. However, there is no
    indication that the posture of the instant appeal would have meaningfully differed
    even if the Board had sanctioned Gutti and RX in the manner KIGA requested.
    True, the Board did not dismiss Gutti’s and RX’s cross-petition. But, it affirmed
    3
    803 KAR 25:010 § 22(12) provides: “Sanctions. Failure of a party to file a brief conforming to
    the requirements of this administrative regulation or failure of a party to timely file a response
    may be grounds for the imposition of one (1) or more of the following sanctions: (a) Affirmation
    or reversal of the final order; (b) Rejection of a brief that does not conform as to organization or
    content, with leave to refile in proper for within ten (10) days of the date returned. If timely
    refiling occurs, the filing shall date back to the date of the original filing; (c) Striking of an
    untimely response; (d) A fine of not more than $500; or (e) Dismissal.”
    -4-
    with respect to their cross-petition. Gutti and RX thereafter filed no appeal; and
    thus, as a practical matter, the same result was ultimately achieved. Furthermore,
    even if the Board had stricken Gutti’s and RX’s response to KIGA’s appeal, doing
    so in and of itself would not have precluded the Board from reviewing KIGA’s
    appeal on the merits – without the assistance of any responsive brief from Gutti
    and RX – and nevertheless affirming the ALJ as it did below.4 In sum, even if the
    Board abused its discretion by failing to sanction Gutti and RX consistently with
    KIGA’s motion, KIGA was not discernably prejudiced. Nothing more than
    harmless error resulted.
    2. The regulation that governed the underlying fee disputes did not require
    Gutti and RX to disclose their “actual acquisition costs” for the prescriptions
    at issue to secure reimbursement.
    On February 2, 2018, KIGA moved the ALJ to compel production of
    the following discovery from Gutti and RX:
    A copy of each actual invoice received and paid by IWP
    [sic] and/or Dr. Gutti (including any discounts, rebates,
    incentives, etc. that comprise the actual price paid) for
    each prescription it is seeking reimbursement for. In the
    KESA v. IWP claim, the Supreme Court established that
    the appropriate reimbursement price for pharmaceuticals
    shall be the actual price paid by the pharmaceutical
    provider plus a $5.00 dispensing fee. In order to
    appropriately determine the amount of the proper
    reimbursement to IWP [sic] and/or Dr. Gutti for the
    4
    Notably, in workers’ compensation appeals before this Court, respondents may but are not
    required to file a brief. See Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 49(F).
    -5-
    prescriptions provided, they must produce this
    information.
    KIGA also sought an order compelling RX to produce a designated
    corporate spokesperson to provide testimony regarding this requested discovery,
    claiming that for purposes of its medical fee disputes, the “correct” pricing for the
    prescribed medications at issue could not be determined unless RX and Gutti
    disclosed the wholesale prices they had actually paid for them.
    RX and Gutti objected, claiming among other grounds that KIGA was
    improperly seeking trade secrets from them, i.e., “privileged business information
    as to RX Development’s business operations, billings and profits”; and that in any
    event “[t]he issues presented are legal not factual.” In resolving KIGA’s motion,
    the ALJ refocused the issue, indicating that the dispositive question was not what
    RX and Gutti had actually paid for the prescriptions, but whether the amount they
    had billed KIGA was “outside of the pharmaceutical fee schedule” set forth in 803
    KAR 25:092 (1993). The ALJ elaborated upon this point in a September 9, 2019
    order overruling KIGA’s motion to compel, explaining in relevant part:
    [T]he burden is on the payment obligor to make out a
    prima facie showing for reopening by delineating what
    the payment obligor believes to be the average wholesale
    price or the average-to-sell price prior to the setting of a
    proof schedule.
    ...
    -6-
    Given the fact that the payment obligor has yet to provide
    what it believes to be the average wholesale price or
    average-to-sell price for any of the contested
    medications, the objections to the motions to compel are
    sustained.
    ...
    The defendant is obligated to pay the outstanding charges
    at what it believes to be the appropriate average
    wholesale price or average-to-sell price as there is no
    justification for withholding the entirety of the payment
    for the outstanding prescriptions which have been filled.
    In other words, the ALJ held that the information KIGA sought to
    discover from RX and Gutti would not satisfy KIGA’s initial evidentiary burden
    on reopening and was thus irrelevant. On appeal, KIGA argues the ALJ erred in
    overruling its motions to compel, claiming the discovery it requested was relevant
    and essential to its medical fee disputes. We disagree.
    The irrelevance of what RX and Gutti actually paid for the
    prescriptions at issue is best illustrated through a hypothetical: Suppose RX and
    Gutti were able purchase all the prescriptions at issue from a wholesaler for
    nothing. How would this impact their right to “reimbursement”? For the answer,
    we turn to 803 KAR 25:092 (1993), which was operative when Gutti and RX
    submitted their reimbursement requests. In relevant part, it provided:
    Section 1. Definitions. . . .
    ...
    -7-
    (6) “Wholesale price” means the average wholesale price
    charged by wholesalers at a given time.
    Section 2. Payment for Pharmaceuticals. (1) An
    employee entitled to receive pharmaceuticals under KRS
    342.020 may request and require that a brand name drug
    be used in treating the employee. Unless the prescribing
    practitioner has indicated that an equivalent drug product
    should not be substituted, an employee who requests a
    brand name drug shall be responsible for payment of the
    difference between the equivalent drug product
    wholesale price of the lowest priced therapeutically
    equivalent drug the dispensing pharmacist has in stock
    and the brand name drug wholesale price at the time of
    dispensing.
    (2) Any duly licensed pharmacist dispensing
    pharmaceuticals pursuant to KRS Chapter 342 shall be
    entitled to be reimbursed in the amount of the equivalent
    drug product wholesale price of the lowest priced
    therapeutically equivalent drug the dispensing pharmacist
    has in stock, at the time of dispensing, plus a five (5)
    dollar dispensing fee plus any applicable federal or state
    tax or assessment.
    (3) If an employee’s prescription is marked “Do Not
    Substitute,” the dispensing pharmacist shall be entitled to
    reimbursement in an amount equal to the brand name
    drug wholesale price, at the time of dispensing, plus a
    five (5) dollar dispensing fee plus any applicable federal
    or state tax or assessment.
    To review, § 1(6) of this regulation provided that “‘Wholesale price’
    means the average wholesale price charged by wholesalers at a given time.”
    (Emphasis added.) In turn, § 2(1), (2) and (3) each specified that given time:
    According to those provisions, the amount of reimbursement Gutti and RX were
    -8-
    entitled to receive depended solely upon the wholesale price of the drug product
    they dispensed – or “the lowest priced therapeutically equivalent drug the
    dispensing pharmacist has in stock,” whatever the case may be – “at the time of
    dispensing.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, if Gutti and RX paid nothing to acquire the
    drug product, but the average wholesale price charged by wholesalers for that drug
    product – or “the lowest priced therapeutically equivalent drug the dispensing
    pharmacist has in stock,” whatever the case may be – was “X” at the time they
    dispensed it,5 the above regulation would have entitled Gutti and RX to
    reimbursement in the amount of “X,” in addition to “a five (5) dollar dispensing
    fee plus any applicable federal or state tax or assessment.” See § 2(2) and (3).
    KIGA, in maintaining that the discovery it requested was relevant and
    essential to its medical fee disputes, does not discuss any of the regulatory
    language set forth above. Instead, KIGA’s argument appears limited to the
    following proposition: Knowing what RX and Gutti actually paid a wholesaler for
    the prescriptions at issue was relevant because our Supreme Court said so. In
    support, KIGA quotes from our Supreme Court’s interpretation of 803 KAR
    25:092 (1993), as set forth in Steel Creations By and Through KESA, The Kentucky
    Workers’ Compensation Fund v. Injured Workers Pharmacy, 
    532 S.W.3d 145
    ,
    5
    Undisputedly, the actual cost of a given drug product can vary on a daily basis.
    -9-
    156-57 (Ky. 2017); and KIGA emphasizes that our Supreme Court’s interpretation
    repeatedly utilized the words “actual” and “paid”:
    So, how should pharmacy reimbursement rate disputes be
    resolved? The same way all other disputes under KRS
    342 are resolved. The parties present their proof, and the
    ALJ makes a determination. The ALJ may, but is not
    required to, take into consideration the published average
    wholesale price. The ALJ may also take into
    consideration the wholesale acquisition price, which has
    some connection to what a wholesaler would charge a
    retailer. However, unless the ALJ determines that the
    published average wholesale price or the wholesale
    acquisition price is the actual average wholesale price the
    pharmacist paid, the ALJ may not simply adopt either of
    those pricing guides in toto.[FN]
    [FN] For the sake of clarity, we are not
    stating that any of the pricing guides are per
    se admissible. Any such guide must be
    admissible pursuant to 803 KAR 25:010
    Section 14, and the ALJ is free to exercise
    his or her discretion in either admitting or
    excluding a proffered pricing guide within
    the confines of that regulation. Based on the
    record before us in this case, it appears that
    the published average wholesale price
    guides and the wholesale acquisition price
    guide may not be particularly relevant.
    However, none of the parties have sought to
    introduce into evidence any of those pricing
    guides. If a party attempts to do so and
    there is an objection, the ALJ must
    undertake the appropriate analysis before
    admitting or excluding any proffered pricing
    guides.
    The ALJ must determine the actual wholesale price the
    pharmacist paid, which may or may not have a relevant
    -10-
    correlation to either the published average wholesale
    price or the wholesale acquisition price. Regardless, the
    ALJ, by exercising the discretion granted to him or her,
    must determine what the appropriate reimbursement rate
    is under the regulation.
    We recognize that this could, as IWP argues, put a
    considerable strain on the already busy ALJs. That may
    or may not be the case. However, if that occurs, the
    Department can take the appropriate steps to remedy the
    situation by amending the regulation.
    As to this case, the CALJ did not order KESA to
    reimburse IWP based on the published average wholesale
    price that IWP charged. He ordered KESA to reimburse
    IWP pursuant to the statute and regulations, which he
    correctly interpreted to be the actual average wholesale
    price IWP paid. However, the CALJ did not make any
    specific findings regarding the actual average wholesale
    price IWP paid for the medications it dispensed.
    ...
    [T]he regulation states that reimbursement is based on
    what the dispensing pharmacy (IWP) paid for
    medications, not what another dispensing pharmacy
    (Walgreens, Kroger, Meijer, etc.) may have paid.
    Therefore, this matter must be remanded to the
    Department for assignment to an ALJ with instructions to
    make findings regarding what IWP’s actual average
    wholesale price was for the medications at issue.
    (Emphasis added.)
    With that said, we begin with the obvious: The words “actual” and
    “paid” do not appear in 803 KAR 25:092 (1993). It was also never held in the
    above-quoted case that reimbursement under that regulation was based upon what
    -11-
    the pharmacist requesting reimbursement “actually paid” for the drug product; to
    the contrary, our Supreme Court explained that reimbursement was based upon
    “the actual average wholesale price the pharmacist paid.” Injured Workers
    Pharmacy, 532 S.W.3d at 156 (emphasis added). As discussed, “wholesale price”
    was administratively defined as what “wholesalers” (thus, wholesalers in general)
    were charging pharmacists on “average” for the drug product at issue or its lowest-
    priced therapeutic equivalent “at a given time.” See 803 KAR 25:092 § 1(6)
    (1993). That “given time” – critical for ascertaining the average wholesale price
    for reimbursement purposes – was not when the pharmacist paid for the drug
    product at issue; it was “the time of dispensing.” See id. at § 2(1), (2) and (3).
    Taken in context, our Supreme Court’s statement that reimbursement was based
    upon “the actual average wholesale price the pharmacist paid” meant nothing more
    than this: The price that a pharmacist is deemed to have paid for a drug product,
    for purposes of reimbursement under 803 KAR 25:092 (1993), is the average price
    for which the drug product could have been purchased from a wholesaler when the
    pharmacist dispensed the drug product. 532 S.W.3d at 156.
    Apart from that, two other salient points about Injured Workers
    Pharmacy, id., underscore that what the pharmacist requesting reimbursement
    actually paid is irrelevant. First, our Supreme Court emphasized – at length in
    what is quoted above – that an ALJ may resort to general pricing guides to
    -12-
    ascertain the applicable “wholesale price.” Second, the pharmacists requesting
    reimbursement in Injured Workers Pharmacy similarly never divulged what they
    actually paid for their dispensed drug products. Id. at 152. To be sure, our
    Supreme Court ultimately vacated and remanded that matter for the ALJ to
    “determine what [the pharmacist’s] actual average wholesale price was for the
    contested medications.” Id. at 158. But, our Supreme Court did not require the
    ALJ to “reopen proof” to make that determination – tacitly indicating that no proof
    of what the pharmacist actually paid was required. Id. In short, the ALJ and Board
    committed no error in this respect.
    3. The ALJ’s ultimate determination regarding the applicable rate of
    reimbursement was supported by substantial evidence and otherwise
    consistent with 803 KAR 25:092 (1993).
    KIGA begins this part of its appeal by arguing the Board incorrectly
    stated in its affirming opinion that “KIGA did not present any evidence setting
    forth the amounts it believed appropriate under the fee schedule.” KIGA is correct
    that, to the contrary, it did eventually present this type of evidence. Moreover, the
    evidence it eventually presented was, by all measures, substantial. Specifically, it
    submitted a November 10, 2019 report from a pharmo-economics expert, Dr. T.
    Joseph Mattingly, II, that provided several different estimates, based upon several
    different sources and methodologies, of the average wholesale prices applicable to
    each of the various prescriptions at issue during the relevant time frames.
    -13-
    In his dispositive order, the ALJ began his summary of Dr.
    Mattingly’s report as follows:
    The report included clear definitions of terms such as
    average wholesale price (AWP), national average drug
    acquisition cost (NADAC) and wholesale acquisition
    costs (WAC). The AWP is defined as an estimate of the
    price retail pharmacies pay when purchasing from a
    wholesale distributor. The NADAC is a drug cost
    calculation developed through a national sample of drug
    acquisition cost estimated by CMS[6] using actual
    pharmacy invoices representing what the pharmacist paid
    to the wholesaler from the previous 30 days. The WAC
    represents the manufacturer’s “list price” for a drug to
    wholesalers or other direct purchasers that does not
    include discounts or rebates.
    He provided an explanatory diagram depicting a
    manufacturer charging a wholesaler by utilizing the
    WAC of $100.00. The wholesaler then sells to the
    pharmacy utilizing the AWP of $120.00. The pharmacy
    then sells to the patient utilizing the usual and customary
    charge plus a dispensing fee for $150.00. Along each
    step in the supply chain, the charge is increased.
    He provided documentation regarding the gross profits of
    independent pharmacy operations between 2017 and
    2018 to include the difference between cost of goods sold
    and sales. The cost of goods sold range between 76%
    and 77.9% of the sales. Gross profits range between
    22.1% and 24%. He went on to explain that AWP is not
    defined federally, but is instead a list of drug prices
    published in commercial publications such as Medi-Span,
    First Data Bank and Redbook. He noted that sometimes
    the AWP is supplied by the drug manufacturer (e.g.
    Pfizer, Merck) to the companies by calling it the
    suggested wholesale price (SWP). The AWP is then
    6
    Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
    -14-
    estimated by multiplying the WAC by 1.2 to assess a
    standard 20% markup.
    He noted that Kentucky Medicaid reimburses at the
    lowest of NADAC, WAC, the federal upper limit,
    maximum allowable costs or usual and customary price.
    Gutti’s and RX’s reimbursement requests at issue below were made
    between 2013 and 2019, and were made pursuant to 803 KAR 25:092 § 2(2)
    (1993). KIGA paid Gutti and RX the full amount of each billing until the start of
    January 2018. Thereafter, KIGA reduced its payments to what it believed the
    regulation permitted it to pay Gutti and RX instead, i.e., an amount equivalent to
    “M. Joseph pricing.”7 KIGA, for its part, asserted that what it paid Gutti and RX
    for prescriptions filled before January 2018 had been grossly in excess of what it
    should have paid them under a proper application of the regulation. Gutti and RX,
    on the other hand, claimed that what KIGA paid them for prescriptions filled after
    January 2018 was insufficient. With that in mind, the ALJ summarized Dr.
    Mattingly’s opinion regarding KIGA’s dispute over Conley’s medical fees relative
    to what KIGA paid Gutti and RX after January 2018. Discussing and applying the
    7
    During the pendency of its medical fee dispute, KIGA had an arrangement with M. Joseph
    Medical, a company that specializes in helping workers’ compensation payment obligors such as
    KIGA establish prices with prescription drug suppliers. Under this arrangement, M. Joseph
    negotiates with pharmacy benefits managers (“PBMs”) to secure prices and terms with various
    pharmacies. KIGA pays M. Joseph for the prescription drugs, M. Joseph pays the PBMs, and the
    PBMs pay the pharmacies. This arrangement supposedly allowed KIGA to secure prescription
    drugs at a lower price than what was required by the workers’ compensation regulatory fee
    schedule set forth in 803 KAR 25:092 (1993).
    -15-
    regulation and the substance of our Supreme Court’s holding in Injured Workers
    Pharmacy, the ALJ then explained:
    [O]n the issue of reimbursement, the ALJ must look at
    the actual wholesale price paid, which may or may not
    have a relevant correlation to either the published
    average wholesale acquisition price or the wholesale
    acquisition price. The ALJ must exercise the discretion
    granted to him or her to determine what the appropriate
    reimbursement rate is under the regulation. The court
    noted the ALJ might not simply adopt either the AWP or
    the wholesale acquisition price paid by a pharmacist.
    The court went on to state that KESA could not
    unilaterally impose its M. Joseph agreement on IWP.
    A review of the entirety of the evidence, not only as
    summarized above, but as contained in the entire record,
    reveals the medical provider was utilizing the wholesale
    price closely resembling that published by Redbook. Dr.
    Mattingly explained that publications such as Redbook
    publish the AWP price, which he explained was jokingly
    referred to as “ain’t what’s paid.” Rosalie Ferris[8]
    explained the AWP in publications such as Redbook do
    not include rebates obtained in purchasing. She
    explained the use of PBMs allowed KIGA to obtain
    additional discounts so that pharmaceuticals could be
    purchased at levels below AWP or the average-to-sell
    price.
    Based upon the information contained in the report of Dr.
    Mattingly, I am convinced the method for determining
    the reimbursable amount under the Kentucky schedule of
    fees is to utilize the WAC multiplied by 1.2, which is
    then added to the $5.00 dispensary fee per prescription.
    The method takes into account the standard industry
    markup of 20% from the manufacturer to the wholesaler.
    8
    Rosalie Faris provided expert testimony below regarding drug pricing. At that time, she was a
    registered nurse and Vice President of Managed Care for Occupational Managed Care Alliance.
    -16-
    The WAC represents the wholesale acquisition costs as
    published by each pharmaceutical company at a point in
    time. I find it is more appropriate to use the WAC rather
    than the NADAC, which is determined after the fact by
    looking backward at amounts paid for acquisition,
    inclusive of discounts. Utilization of the NADAC would
    be completely unworkable as the pharmacy or dispensary
    would be unable to determine the NADAC amount at the
    time the medication is dispensed, as the information is
    based upon a future determination.
    ...
    The Supreme Court made it clear that KIGA cannot
    impose M. Joseph pricing on the medical provider.
    Further pricing, which is “customary under the fee
    schedule for the medications paid to other local
    pharmacies” is not the requirement of 803 KAR 25:092,
    Section 2(2), which allows reimbursement at the
    wholesale price of the lowest priced therapeutically
    equivalent drug the dispensing pharmacist has in stock, at
    the time of dispensing, plus a five dollar dispensing fee,
    along with taxes. KIGA’s request to reimburse with M.
    Joseph pricing or pricing paid to other local pharmacies
    is simply an attempt to provide KIGA the benefit of
    lower prices negotiated by their PBMs, which were not
    negotiated with the pharmacy in question. It has little to
    do with the average wholesale price, which must be
    reimbursed. Instead, I am directed to look at the
    acquisition costs and the published wholesale pricing to
    make a determination as to the reimbursable amounts
    while utilizing my discretion.
    Dr. Mattingly has provided us with the information
    necessary to determine the amount owed. KIGA
    requested allowance to make payment as if they were
    doing so under the Kentucky Medicaid schedule.
    However, this is not a Medicaid claim, but is instead a
    workers’ compensation claim governed by KRS Chapter
    342. Dr. Mattingly has provided average acquisition
    -17-
    costs and the wholesale acquisition costs for each of the
    medications in question. Those amounts are set forth in
    the summary of evidence. Dr. Mattingly explained that
    each step of the supply chain has a markup, which is
    generally 20%, in addition to a dispensary fee. Here, the
    acquisition costs can best be determined by utilizing the
    WAC, which provides the listed wholesale price for a
    drug to a wholesaler or other direct purchaser. It does
    not include discounts, which may be negotiated by a
    PBM or available under KIGA’s current managed care
    plan. However, they do not enjoy the benefit of those
    discounts across the board. To allow KIGA the benefit
    of implied discounts would have the effect of imposing
    the Medicaid rule on workers’ compensation providers.
    The ALJ then resolved the underlying fee dispute – relative to what
    KIGA paid Gutti and RX after January 2018 – by applying the WAC method for
    ascertaining wholesale prices as set forth in Dr. Mattingly’s report:
    Therefore, I find the acquisition cost for the medications
    dispensed between January 2018 and February 2019 to
    be $15,633.81, by utilizing the WAC set forth in
    Appendix II of Dr. Mattingly’s report. The amount billed
    by the medical provider is the amount published as the
    average wholesale price without consideration of likely
    discounts. The defendant requests the ALJ interpret the
    Injured Workers Pharmacy case to mean the provider can
    only charge a $5.00 dispensary fee above the wholesale
    acquisition costs. However, this is not my interpretation.
    Instead, I interpret the case to mean I must utilize the
    acquisition costs and the published wholesale prices to
    determine the amount available for reimbursement under
    the regulation, to include the $5.00 dispensary fee.
    In this instance, the testimony of Rosalie Ferris indicates
    the bills were paid at 30% below what would typically be
    the average wholesale price and the opinion of Dr.
    Mattingly would indicate the acquisition price or WAC
    -18-
    would be multiplied by 1.2 to obtain the average
    wholesale price for a standard markup when explaining
    that each step in the supply chain has a standard markup.
    The $15,633.81 acquisition cost multiplied by 1.2 reveals
    an average wholesale price of $18,760.57, which is
    below the amount billed by the provider, but above the
    amount paid by KIGA. KIGA paid $18,275.84 (see
    KIGA’s Notice of Filing payments), which leaves
    $839.73 owing to the medical provider, once the $355.00
    for 71 dispensary fees ($5.00 x 71) is added to the
    average wholesale price of $18,760.57. Therefore, the
    balance due is $839.73.
    On appeal, KIGA emphasizes in its brief that “Dr. Mattingly’s report
    clearly explains that NADAC provides the most appropriate estimate” for
    determining the average wholesale price applicable to drug products, and that it
    made “very clear in all of its briefs that it is of the position that NADAC must
    serve as the benchmark for determining what [Gutti and RX were] charged for the
    medications at issue.” But, KIGA stops short of arguing that the methodology
    selected by the ALJ was unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise
    inconsistent with 803 KAR 25:092 § 2(2) (1993).
    Regardless, while the ALJ did not select the methodology favored by
    Dr. Mattingly, the ALJ did select a methodology Dr. Mattingly acknowledged as a
    recognized means of ascertaining the applicable wholesale price of prescriptions,
    and the ALJ provided a reasonable explanation for doing so. The ALJ may choose
    not only which expert to believe, but also what parts of the evidence or witness’s
    testimony to believe or disbelieve. See Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560
    -19-
    S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1977). Furthermore, the ALJ’s analysis was consistent with the
    operative regulation and Injured Workers Pharmacy. Accordingly, to the extent
    KIGA is suggesting this aspect of the ALJ’s order was erroneous, its suggestion
    lacks merit.
    4. KIGA was not entitled to restitution or a credit for any amount it may have
    over-reimbursed Gutti and RX.
    The ALJ did not resolve the merits of KIGA’s medical fee dispute
    insofar as it concerned what KIGA may have overpaid Gutti and RX before
    January 2018. Essentially, the ALJ held that this aspect of KIGA’s medical fee
    dispute was moot because he lacked authority under the circumstances to either
    order Gutti and RX to refund any overpayment to KIGA, or to grant KIGA any
    kind of offsetting credit against what remained outstanding. The Board affirmed.
    On appeal, KIGA maintains the ALJ erred in denying this aspect of its medical fee
    dispute because, in its view, the ALJ was either: (1) estopped from denying it
    reimbursement or a credit; or (2) authorized to grant it that relief.
    We disagree. Regarding its first argument, the ALJ could not have
    granted KIGA relief based solely on equity or a common law principle such as
    estoppel. Rather, the ALJ was required to find, within the ambit of the Workers’
    Compensation Act, warrant for the exercise of any authority he could have
    claimed. See Dep’t for Nat. Res. and Envt’l Prot. v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co.,
    
    563 S.W.2d 471
    , 473 (Ky. 1978). “Workers’ compensation is a creature of statute,
    -20-
    and the remedies and procedures described therein are exclusive.” Williams v.
    Eastern Coal Corp., 
    952 S.W.2d 696
    , 698 (Ky. 1997).
    Before leaving this point, we pause to note that much of KIGA’s
    estoppel argument is based upon what KIGA believes was the ALJ’s inequitable
    conduct during the proceedings below. Specifically, KIGA notes that in June
    2014, near the beginning of its underlying medical fee dispute, it filed a motion for
    interlocutory relief asserting that it would suffer irreparable harm “if it were
    required to pay [Gutti’s and RX’s] inflated prices”; and that in a July 29, 2014
    order, the ALJ denied its motion, stating as follows:
    After a review of the motion, same is hereby overruled as
    there is no showing the defendant will suffer irreparable
    harm during the proceedings. The defendant shall pay
    the outstanding charges pursuant to the current medical
    fee schedule. Any issue of overpayment can be dealt with
    at the conclusion of the claim.
    (Emphasis added.)
    KIGA asserts it reasonably interpreted the above-emphasized
    language of the ALJ’s order to mean that any overpayment it thereafter made to
    Gutti and RX would be reimbursed at the conclusion of the proceedings; that in
    reliance upon this language, it then reimbursed the full amount of each invoice
    Gutti and RX thereafter submitted to it until January 2018; and that when the ALJ
    ultimately did not direct Gutti and RX to reimburse any of its alleged
    -21-
    overpayments “at the conclusion of the claim,” the ALJ effectively went back on
    his word.
    There are at least two flaws in that proposition, both of which emanate
    from KIGA’s misreading of the ALJ’s order. First, the ALJ only required KIGA to
    pay Gutti and RX “pursuant to the current medical fee schedule,” not the full
    amount of Gutti’s and RX’s invoices. Second, the ALJ stated that “Any issue of
    overpayment can be dealt with at the conclusion of the claim” – not that any
    overpayment would be refunded at the conclusion of the claim, irrespective of the
    legislative constraints on the ALJ’s authority.
    This leads to KIGA’s second argument. KIGA contends that two
    statutory provisions – by themselves or in conjunction with one another –
    authorized the ALJ to grant it restitution representing its alleged overpayments.
    The first provision is KRS 342.990(11), which KIGA asserts “allows for restitution
    to be ordered by an ALJ, without any showing of misconduct.” (KIGA’s
    emphasis.) However, KIGA’s assertion ignores the plain language of that
    provision. KRS 342.990(11) states in relevant part that “any administrative law
    judge . . . may order restitution of a benefit secured through conduct proscribed by
    this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) Unless KIGA overpaid for prescriptions because
    -22-
    Gutti and RX engaged in conduct forbidden or prohibited9 by KRS Chapter 342,
    KRS 342.990(11) could not have authorized restitution.
    The second provision of KRS Chapter 342 that KIGA relies upon is
    KRS 342.035(2), which states in relevant part:
    No provider of medical services or treatment required by
    this chapter, its agent, servant, employee, assignee,
    employer, or independent contractor acting on behalf of
    any medical provider, shall knowingly collect, attempt to
    collect, coerce, or attempt to coerce, directly or
    indirectly, the payment of any charge, for services
    covered by a workers’ compensation insurance plan for
    the treatment of a work-related injury or occupational
    disease, in excess of that provided by a schedule of fees,
    or cause the credit of any employee to be impaired by
    reason of the employee’s failure or refusal to pay the
    excess charge. . . .
    (Emphasis added.)
    However, the ALJ held that Gutti and RX did not engage in conduct
    forbidden or prohibited by KRS 342.035(2), and that restitution or reimbursement
    therefore could not be ordered through KRS 342.990(11). In that regard, the ALJ
    explained:
    Given the fact the medical provider relied on a trusted
    publication (Redbook) to determine pharmaceutical
    charges, I find the medical provider did not knowingly
    collect, attempt to collect, coerce, or attempt to coerce,
    directly or indirectly, the payment of any charge, for
    9
    See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “proscribe” as “To outlaw
    or prohibit; to forbid.”).
    -23-
    services covered by workers’ compensation in excess of
    that provided by the medical schedule of fees.
    .
    (Emphasis added.)
    KIGA maintains that KRS 342.035(2) permitted the ALJ to award it
    restitution for any amount it may have overpaid Gutti and RX. But, KIGA fails to
    address the ALJ’s finding that Gutti and RX lacked the requisite mens rea and thus
    did not violate that provision. KIGA has accordingly conceded that this part of the
    ALJ’s judgment was correct. See, e.g., Osborne v. Payne, 
    31 S.W.3d 911
    , 916
    (Ky. 2000) (“Any part of a judgment appealed from that is not briefed is affirmed
    as being confessed.”).
    Lastly, KIGA insists that two published cases indicate it should have
    been granted reimbursement under the circumstances of this case. The first of
    these cases is Yocum v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
    502 S.W.2d 520
     (Ky. 1973). However,
    if KIGA is citing Yocum for the proposition that specific statutory authorization for
    reimbursement is unnecessary, Yocum undermines KIGA’s position. There, the
    employer voluntarily paid income benefits for which the Special Fund was
    ultimately held liable. The Special Fund argued that it was not required to
    reimburse the employer because the payments made by the employer were
    voluntary, and also because the “old” Board had not expressly provided for
    reimbursement of the employer by the Special Fund in its decision. The Special
    -24-
    Fund’s argument was rejected by our former High Court, however, because
    “reimbursement [was] required by KRS 342.120(4)[.]” 
    Id. at 522
    .
    The second case KIGA cites is Triangle Insulation and Sheet Metal
    Co. v. Stratemeyer, 
    782 S.W.2d 628
     (Ky. 1990). There, our Supreme Court held
    an employer is allowed a dollar-for-dollar credit for past temporary total disability
    (“TTD”) benefits where the employer voluntarily pays an injured employee prior
    to a workers’ compensation award. It further explained:
    It is important to encourage employers to make voluntary
    payments to injured employees. Employers are not
    obligated to pay benefits until a claim has been litigated
    and an award entered. Such payments are voluntary.
    The circumstances involved in each specific case must be
    carefully evaluated so that the employee is not unduly
    harmed and the employer is encouraged to make
    voluntary payments.
    Id. at 630.
    However, the case at bar did not involve a circumstance where an
    employer, prior to the entry of an award, voluntarily paid benefits to an injured
    employee. Rather, it involved an obligor, KIGA, contesting post-award medical
    expenses. And in that circumstance, KIGA did not have the luxury of a voluntary
    choice, but rather faced a binary one: Either pay the bills within the time allotted
    by statute; or reopen the underlying award, shoulder the burden of contesting the
    appropriateness of the bill, and risk sanctions if its contest is deemed frivolous.
    -25-
    See Kentucky Associated Gen. Contractors Self-Ins. Fund v. Lowther, 
    330 S.W.3d 456
    , 459 (Ky. 2010).
    Because KIGA was not entitled to be reimbursed any amount, it
    follows that KIGA was not entitled to indirect reimbursement through a credit or
    offset, either; indeed, KIGA cites no statutory authority to the contrary, and we are
    aware of none. The ALJ committed no error in this respect.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    When it affirmed the ALJ’s underlying order, the Board did not
    overlook or misconstrue controlling statutes or precedent, or commit an error in
    assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice. See Kelly, 827
    S.W.2d at 687-88. Thus, we likewise AFFIRM.
    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEES DR. SAI
    GUTTI/PAIN MANAGEMENT
    Christopher M. Mayer                       CENTER AND RX
    Thomas L. Ferreri                          DEVELOPMENT:
    Louisville, Kentucky
    Ched Jennings
    Louisville, Kentucky
    -26-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022 CA 000527

Filed Date: 12/7/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/15/2023