State of Louisiana v. Johnny Lee Harris , 2016 La. LEXIS 2062 ( 2016 )

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #057
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 19th day of October, 2016, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2015-K -0995 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JOHNNY LEE HARRIS (Parish of St. Landry)
The primary distinction between Nelson and the present case is
that there was a substantially stronger showing of discriminatory
effect in Nelson. Regarding Batson steps two and three, however,
the cases are indistinguishable. As in Nelson, the district court
here dismissed defendant’s proffered reasons for two strikes
although they were facially race-neutral. As in Nelson, it is
clear the district court merged the steps of the Batson analysis
which improperly shifted the burden of proof to defense counsel—
the proponent of the strike. The record unquestionably
demonstrates the district court never made a finding that the
race-neutral reasons offered by counsel were pretextual. Although
none of the proffered reasons appear to inherently violate equal
protection, the court nonetheless rejected them for no specific
reason (other than that Duplechain indicated she could fairly
serve as a juror). The court erred thus in putting the burden of
persuasion on the defendant. See State v Green, 655 So. 2d 272,
290 (La. 1995). Batson makes clear that the burden is on the
opponent of the strike to show purposeful discrimination. See
Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
10/19/16
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2015-K-0995
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JOHNNY LEE HARRIS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. LANDRY
PER CURIAM:
Johnny Lee Harris was charged with the attempted armed robbery of
Wayne Duplechain committed on May 25, 2009. He pleaded not guilty and
proceeded to trial. During voir dire (and immediately following defense
counsel’s Batson1 challenge), the state opposed counsel’s exercise of a
peremptory challenge to strike juror Joanne Guidroz (a white female) 2 with
the comment: “Since you made one, I’ll make one.” After noting that the
defense used three of five challenges to strike white female jurors, the court
1
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed .2d 69 (1986), the United
States Supreme Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black
jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black
defendant.” Id., 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719.
2
In Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2359, 120 L.Ed.2d 33(1992), the United States Supreme Court held that “the Constitution prohibits a criminal
defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the
exercise of peremptory challenges.” Id., 505 U.S. at 59, 112 S.Ct. at 2359. William and
Ella McCollum, who were white, were charged with committing several counts of assault
and battery on Jerry and Myra Collins, who were African Americans, and the defense
“had indicated a clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory
manner, arguing that the circumstances of their case gave them the right to exclude
African–American citizens from participating as jurors in the trial.” Id., 505 U.S. at 45,
112 S.Ct. at 2351. In State v. Knox, 609 So.2d 803, 806 (La. 1992) (per curiam), this
court found that “the McCollum decision extends to the circumstance at issue in this case
where . . . a black defendant allegedly exercised, or expressed the intention of exercising,
racially based peremptory challenges against white prospective jurors.”
asked counsel to provide reasons for striking Guidroz and counsel
responded, “She has a son who’s convicted of a crime and also her spouse
works for Slemco and I felt that she would be very conservative.” The court
then denied the state’s “reverse-Batson” challenge and voir dire continued.
When the defense exercised a peremptory challenge to strike Carolyn
Duplechain, the state again opposed the strike on the ground that Duplechain
is a white female. Defense counsel immediately volunteered that Duplechain
indicated she knew the assistant district attorney prosecuting the case and
she lived next door to a sheriff’s deputy. The court disallowed the strike:
“[S]he also clearly said it would not affect her at all. In this particular case, I
don’t think that’s sufficient basis for the peremptory challenge.”
The defense then exercised a peremptory challenge to strike Kandace
Quebedeaux (who is also a white female), to which the state objected:
“Same thing.” Counsel, again unprompted, volunteered the following as
race-neutral justification for striking her:
All right; she is—she was bonded with [the prosecutor], she
said she was a runner, [the prosecutor] said, “Oh well, I’m also
a runner” and they had a little laughing, giggling connection
going on there. I figured she was bonding with him as a runner
and I’m exercising that challenge.
The court responded “Denied” and the defense noted its objection to the
denial of its peremptory strikes of Duplechain and Quebedeaux. Duplechain
and Quebedeaux were the eleventh and twelfth jurors.
The jury found Harris guilty as charged of attempted armed robbery
and the district court sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment at hard labor.
The court of appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Harris,
14-0997 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/18/15) (unpub’d). A majority of the panel
rejected Harris’s claim that the trial court erred by granting the state’s
2
“reverse-Batson” challenges regarding jurors Duplechain and Quebedeaux.
After examining the jurisprudence, and in particular State v. Nelson, (La.
3/13/12), 85 So.3d 21, the majority found no error in those rulings:
After a thorough review of the record, we find no error by the
trial court. Regarding Duplechain, the trial court stated reasons
for ruling as it did. Further, despite only stating one word, the
trial court clearly considered and rejected Defendant’s stated
reasons for attempting to strike juror Quebedeaux. The trial
court’s rulings are entitled to deference, and we cannot say that
its rulings were unreasonable.
Harris, 14-0997, p. 7. Chief Judge Thibodeaux dissented:
A trial court’s ruling is not entitled to deference if there is legal
error. The legal error is transparent in this case, and the
majority does not recognize it. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
106 S.Ct. 1719 (1986), has existed for nearly thirty years, and
courts are still struggling to properly apply its procedural
dictates. This case is such an example.
The majority recognizes what is clear in the jurisprudence—that
the first two steps of the Batson analysis can be conflated. Since
the trial court instructed defense counsel to provide race-neutral
reasons for the strikes at issue, it can be treated as having found
prima facie discrimination. However, the trial court’s analysis
skipped the third stage of Batson. The majority likewise does
so. It is clear from State v. Bourque, 12-1350 (La.App. 3 Cir.
6/5/13), 114 So.3d 642, writ denied, 13-1598 (La. 3/14/14), 134
So.3d 1187, and State v. Nelson, 10-1724 (La. 3/13/12), 85
So.3d 21, that an omission of the third stage is error.
The trial court did not conduct the third step of the Batson
analysis and, thus, did not comply with the requirements
explained in Nelson and Bourque. Pursuant to those cases, the
conviction and sentence should be vacated and the case
remanded for a new trial.
The majority conveniently oversimplifies the legal application
of Batson, Nelson, and Bourque by relying on the trial court’s
rejection of Defendant’s proffered race-neutral reasons for
strking juror Quebedeaux. However, the trial court’s
observations and credibility assessments are not at issue. The
problem is that the third step of the Batson analysis was omitted
in this case. In focusing on the trial court’s rejection of
Defendant’s reasons, the majority improperly shifts the burden
of proof to Defendant “without conducting an analysis of any of
the considerations indicative of purposeful discrimination.”
State v. Nelson, 10-1724 (La. 3/13/12), 85 So.3d 21, 33. That is
3
exactly what happened in this case. Why that is not recognized
is inexplicable.
Harris, 14-0997, pp. 8–9 (Thibodeaux, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
The dissent’s assessment of the law and application here is correct.
Therefore, we grant the appellant’s application to reverse the court of appeal,
and we find for the reasons that follow that the district court erred in its
handling of the state’s “reverse-Batson” challenge. The conviction and
sentence are vacated and the matter is remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, provided a three-step process for
determining when a strike is discriminatory. This year the court reiterated
those steps in Foster v. Chapman, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 195
L.Ed.2d 1 (2016):
First, [the opponent of the strike] must make a prima facie
showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the
basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, [the
proponent of the strike] must offer a race-neutral basis for
striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the parties’
submissions, the trial court must determine whether [the
opponent of the strike] has shown purposeful discrimination.
Id., 136 S.Ct. at 1747 (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476–77,
128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) with internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted). The court in Foster engaged in a record-intensive
inquiry into the prosecution’s proffered race-neutral reasons for striking
black jurors to determine whether the state court erred in Batson’s step three.
In the present case, the district court never reached step three. After
defense counsel volunteered reasons for striking Duplechain, 3 the district
3
The United States Supreme Court in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111
4
court found them to be inadequate justifications for dismissing a juror,
particularly one the court found had been questioned and rehabilitated on the
defense’s concerns, and thus the court essentially treated the challenge like
one for cause. The court, however, made no determination whether the state
had carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. In State v.
Nelson, 10-1724 (La. 3/13/12), 85 So.3d 21, this court was presented with a
similar problem. The district court there rejected the co-defendants’ race-
neutral reasons for nine strikes, finding that the co-defendants had not
overcome the strong numerical prima facie showing made by the state. The
court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the co-defendants’ claim that the district
court erred in shifting the burden to them to prove a lack of discriminatory
intent in Batson’s step three:
While the [court of appeal] pointed out defendants reasons for
exercising their peremptory challenges were facially race-
neutral, the court found no manifest error in the trial court’s
determination of discriminatory intent. The court found the trial
judge’s decisions were carefully considered, and despite an
“occasional misstatement” by the trial judge during the course
of the lengthy argument, the record did not support defendants’
assertion that the trial judge placed on them the burden of
proving a lack of discriminatory intent. The court reasoned that
nearly all of the proffered reasons for excusing the re-seated
jurors had no basis in the record, and the State ably pointed this
out to the trial court, thus satisfying their burden of proof under
the third step of the Batson analysis.
Nelson, 10-1724, p. 6, 85 So.3d at 27 (citations omitted). This court
disagreed:
In a procedure that confounded steps two and three of Batson,
we find the trial court erred in two respects. First, the trial court
refused to accept the race-neutral reasons offered by
defendants, and instead placed the burden on the defendants to
S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), found that “[o]nce the [proponent of a
peremptory strike] has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge
and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the
preliminary issue of whether the [opponent of the strike] had made a prima facie showing
becomes moot.”
5
rebut the State's prima facie showing of discrimination. Second,
and most significantly, the trial court declined to find that
defense counsel engaged in purposeful discrimination but
instead found that discriminatory effect alone constituted
Batson error.
Nelson, 10-1724, p. 9, 85 So.3d at 29. This court further noted:
In step three of the Batson analysis, the court must then
determine whether the objecting party has carried his burden of
proving purposeful discrimination. Miller–El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2331–32, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005);
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. This final step involves
evaluating “the persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by
the striking party, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion
regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from,
the opponent of the strike.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct.
1769.
In Purkett, the Supreme Court warned against “combining
Batson’s second and third steps into one, requiring that the
justification tendered at the second step be not just neutral but
also at least minimally persuasive.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768,
115 S.Ct. 1769. Instead, the Court noted “[i]t is not until the
third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes
relevant—the step in which the trial court determines whether
the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving
purposeful discrimination.” Id. The Court explained that
blurring the Batson stages can impermissibly shift the burden
onto the proponent of the strike:
But to say that a trial judge may choose to
disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step
three is quite different from saying that a trial
judge must terminate the inquiry at step two when
the race-neutral reason is silly or superstitious. The
latter violates the principle that the ultimate burden
of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests
with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the
strike.
Id.Nelson, 10-1724, pp. 15–16, 85 So.3d at 32.
The primary distinction between Nelson and the present case is that
there was a substantially stronger showing of discriminatory effect in
Nelson. Regarding Batson steps two and three, however, the cases are
6
indistinguishable. As in Nelson, the district court here dismissed defendant’s
proffered reasons for two strikes although they were facially race-neutral.4
As in Nelson, it is clear the district court merged the steps of the Batson
analysis which improperly shifted the burden of proof to defense counsel—
the proponent of the strike. The record unquestionably demonstrates the
district court never made a finding that the race-neutral reasons offered by
counsel were pretextual. Although none of the proffered reasons appear to
inherently violate equal protection, the court nonetheless rejected them for
no specific reason (other than that Duplechain indicated she could fairly
serve as a juror). The court erred thus in putting the burden of persuasion on
the defendant. See State v. Green, 655 So.2d 272, 290 (La. 1995). Batson
makes clear that the burden is on the opponent of the strike to show
purposeful discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
4
Cf. State v. Scott, 04-1312 (La.1/19/06), 921 So.2d 904 (State’s justification for striking
a prospective African-American juror, that she had a son the same age as defendant and
would feel sympathy for defendant’s mother, was sufficiently neutral to survive a Batson
challenge), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 858, 127 S.Ct. 137, 166 L.Ed.2d 100; State v. Wilson,
40,767 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/06), 938 So.2d 1111 (Prosecutor offered legitimate, race-
neutral reason for striking African-American juror when it argued that juror was a
minister’s wife and might hesitate to impose the death penalty), writ denied, 06-2323 (La.
4/20/07), 954 So.3d 159, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 917, 128 S.Ct. 275, 169 L.Ed.2d 201;
State v. Parker, 04-1017 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/29/05), 901 So.2d 513 (When accepted by the
trial judge, the lodging of a peremptory challenge based on a juror’s body language does
not violate Batson), writ denied, 05-1451 (La. 1/13/06), 920 So.2d 235; State v. Woods,
97-0800 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1231 (Prospective juror’s mistaken belief
that prosecutor had represented prospective juror in a lawsuit was a legitimate, race-
neutral justification for state’s peremptory strike), writ denied, 98-3041 (La. 4/1/99), 741
So.2d 1281.
7