In Re: Justice of the Peace Jeff Sachse Ward 1, Livingston Parish State of Louisiana , 240 So. 3d 170 ( 2018 )

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #012
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 13th day of March, 2018, are as follows:
BY CRICHTON, J.:
2017-O-2008 IN RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE JEFF SACHSE WARD 1, LIVINGSTON PARISH
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the Judiciary
Commission, and considering the record filed herein, we find
respondent has violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and hereby suspend respondent without pay for six
months. Respondent must also pay to the Commission $3,040.02 in
costs.
JOHNSON, C.J., concurs.
03/13/18
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2017-O-2008
IN RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE JEFF SACHSE, WARD 1,
LIVINGSTON PARISH, STATE OF LOUISIANA
JUDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA
CRICHTON, J.
This disciplinary proceeding was instituted by the Judiciary Commission of
Louisiana (“Commission”) against respondent, Justice of the Peace Jeff Sachse,
Ward 1, Livingston Parish, State of Louisiana. The matter arose out of an
anonymous complaint lodged against respondent in April 2013, alleging that he was
arrested on several occasions for domestic abuse and simple battery of his now ex-
wife, Lisa Rabalais. The Commission has alleged that respondent’s conduct violated
Canons 1 (a judge shall personally observe high standards of conduct so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved) and 2A (a judge shall
respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. For the reasons set forth below, we find respondent has violated
the aforementioned Canons as alleged by the Commission, suspend respondent
without pay for six months, and order him to reimburse and pay to the Commission
$3,040.02 in costs.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent, who is not a lawyer, was elected to the office of justice of the
peace in September 1996. He has served continuously since that time. Respondent
and his wife, Lisa Rabalais, were married in 1982 and are the parents of three adult
children. On August 10, 2012, Ms. Rabalais moved out of the matrimonial domicile
in Denham Springs. While Ms. Rabalais was packing her belongings into the car,
the police were summoned to the home in response to complaints by Ms. Rabalais
that respondent had grabbed her by the shirt to prevent her from leaving. On August
17, 2012, Ms. Rabalais filed a Petition for Protection from Domestic Abuse in the
21st Judicial District Court, citing the August 10th incident. She also alleged that
respondent repeatedly contacted her after the incident “by phone[,] email and 3rd
parties to get [her] to talk to him” and that he also made “threats” through her places
of employment “trying to find [her] to talk.” 1
Based on Ms. Rabalais’ petition, Judge M. Douglas Hughes issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) that directed respondent not to, among other
things, “abuse, harass, stalk, follow, or threaten” Ms. Rabalais. The order also
specifically directed respondent not to contact Ms. Rabalais, go within one hundred
yards of her residence or her personally, and to stay away from her places of
employment. The TRO was in effect from August 17, 2012 to November 17, 2012.2
On August 27, 2012, respondent was personally served with a certified copy of the
TRO. Respondent has admitted that he subsequently violated the TRO in the
following instances:
(1) By installing a GPS tracking device on the community owned vehicle, a
2012 Chrysler 200, without Ms. Rabalais’ knowledge or consent, in order to
“aggravate” her;3
1
On August 28, 2012, Ms. Rabalais filed a petition for divorce. The divorce was granted on July
22, 2013.
2
The Petition for Protection from Abuse was ultimately dismissed for lack of proof.
3
The evidence indicates that respondent purchased the GPS device on September 25, 2012. It was
discovered by Ms. Rabalais on her vehicle on or about November 28, 2012.
2
(2) On December 3, 2012, respondent was aware that Ms. Rabalais was
working her second job as a personal care attendant for a handicapped person who
lived in the Collins Place Subdivision, located in unincorporated Livingston Parish.
After Ms. Rabalais left the client’s home, respondent pulled into the subdivision in
front of Ms. Rabalais’ vehicle, got out of his vehicle, and attempted to speak to Ms.
Rabalais. Respondent stated that “they needed to talk,” and then Ms. Rabalais drove
away. Respondent’s conduct violated La. R.S. 14:40.2, the statute defining
stalking. 4 As a result of a complaint made to the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office,
respondent was arrested for stalking on December 4, 2012.
(3) On February 6, 2013, respondent took the community owned vehicle, a
2012 Chrysler 200, without the knowledge or consent of Ms. Rabalais, for the
purpose of harassing her,5 in violation of the statute defining stalking.
Respondent is also charged with violating the TRO in the following instances,
which are not admitted:
(1) The Carroll Baptist Church incident – at the time of the issuance of the
TRO, Ms. Rabalais was employed as an instructor and bus driver for the Livingston
Activity Center, a facility for handicapped adults. On September 7, 2012, well after
respondent was personally served with the TRO, Ms. Rabalais drove some of the
4
La. R.S. 14:40.2 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Stalking is the intentional and repeated following or harassing of
another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel alarmed
or to suffer emotional distress. Stalking shall include but not be
limited to the intentional and repeated uninvited presence of the
perpetrator at another person’s home, workplace, school, or any
place which would cause a reasonable person to be alarmed, or to
suffer emotional distress as a result of verbal, written, or
behaviorally implied threats of death, bodily injury, sexual assault,
kidnapping, or any other statutory criminal act to himself or any
member of his family or any person with whom he is acquainted.
5
Ms. Rabalais drove the vehicle to work and parked it in the parking lot, as was her normal practice.
Unbeknownst to Ms. Rabalais, respondent came to the parking lot and took the vehicle. At the
time, respondent was preparing to depart for a trip to Mexico, and he left the vehicle at a friend’s
house while he was out of the country, with the intent to prevent Ms. Rabalais from using the
vehicle during his absence.
3
Center’s clients to the Carroll Baptist Church. While she attempted to unlock the
door to the church, Ms. Rabalais saw respondent slowly drive by in his older model
Chevrolet pick-up truck. Ms. Rabalais ran inside, locked the church doors,
concealed herself, and called the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office. Ms. Rabalais’
co-worker, Karen Watts, testified during the hearing that she was at the church at the
time in question, saw respondent’s truck, and witnessed Ms. Rabalais’ reaction
(though she did not actually see respondent). For his part, respondent denied that he
was intentionally following or stalking Ms. Rabalais. Instead, respondent testified
that he was on the way to his attorney’s office when, by coincidence, he saw Ms.
Rabalais at the church. Though he described the encounter as pure coincidence,
respondent admitted in his sworn statement that he knew that, as a part of her job,
Ms. Rabalais escorts her clients to the Carroll Baptist Church.6
(2) The Los Sombreros incident – on October 25, 2012, as Ms. Rabalais was
leaving the Los Sombreros Mexican Restaurant, located in a strip mall shopping
center in Walker, respondent spoke to her and said, “Hey Lisa, funny seeing you
here.” Ms. Rabalais’ friend and co-worker, Velda Thornton, was present and agreed
with Ms. Rabalais’ version of events. Respondent testified that he saw Ms. Rabalais’
car in the parking lot and, after he thought about it, decided to leave the area because
of the TRO. He then saw Ms. Rabalais and decided to say something to her. He
testified, “I can’t swear to exactly what I said, but I’m going to paraphrase and say,
hey, I’m leaving. Basically, I was letting her know that if she was – you know, had
other things to do here, another little shop to go in or whatever, to tend to it, I’m
leaving, you don’t have to worry about me.” (It should be noted that respondent
purchased the GPS tracking device prior to this incident. Nevertheless, he denied
that he used the GPS device to track Ms. Rabalais to the restaurant.)
6
However, respondent testified that he did not know the actual day of the week when Ms. Rabalais
brought her clients to the church, or the frequency with which she did so.
4
(3) On February 21, 2013, respondent sat in the Chrysler 200 vehicle along Ms.
Rabalais’ bus route with a large sign in the front passenger window which read,
“Please Call Me.” After Ms. Rabalais drove past, respondent pulled up alongside
her in an effort to ensure that Ms. Rabalais viewed the sign. On February 26, 2013,
only five days later, Ms. Rabalais was traveling on her bus route when respondent
once again pulled in front of her while the bus was idling in the turn lane of Highway
190 at Juban Road. In his testimony, respondent denied either incident ever
happened. Based on the February 21, 2013 incident, Ms. Rabalais signed an
affidavit of probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant for respondent’s
arrest for stalking. Respondent was arrested on February 27, 2013.
On June 20, 2013, respondent was charged with simple battery of Ms.
Rabalais and simple robbery of Ms. Rabalais’ friend, Velda Thornton, based on
events that occurred on August 10, 2012, when Ms. Thornton assisted Ms. Rabalais
in moving out of the matrimonial domicile. 7 Based on these charges, special
conditions were added to respondent’s bond, ordering that he have “no contact” with
Ms. Thornton or Ms. Rabalais. The following incidents occurred after the “no
contact” order was added to respondent’s bond:
(a) On October 9, 2013, respondent blew his horn and was near Ms. Rabalais
when she was driving a client home near Caraway Road.
(b) On October 17, 2013, Ms. Rabalais was once again driving her bus when
she noticed respondent traveling in the same direction.
7
Respondent grabbed Ms. Rabalais by the shirt to prevent her from leaving the home, and he took
Ms. Thornton’s cell phone from her and threw it into a neighbor’s yard. The charge of simple
battery upon Ms. Rabalais was later amended to domestic abuse battery. On July 28, 2014,
respondent was tried before Judge M. Douglas Hughes. At the conclusion of the State’s case, the
court granted a motion for acquittal on the simple robbery charge but denied the motion as to the
domestic abuse battery charge. Following the trial, the court found respondent not guilty of
domestic abuse battery.
5
(c) On November 18, 2013, Ms. Velda Thornton was driving Ms. Rabalais’
bus route when she had to slam her brakes to avoid a collision with a brown
Chevrolet. She identified the driver as respondent.
(d) On January 25, 2014, Ms. Rabalais observed respondent staring at her
while she was putting a package in her vehicle at Nawlin’s Sports.
(e) On February 7, 2014, respondent approached Ms. Rabalais in a Wal-Mart
in Central, Louisiana and said, “I promise I didn’t know you were here and I am
leaving now.”
(f) On February 20, 2014, respondent followed Ms. Rabalais for
approximately two miles while she was driving her regular bus route.
For all of these incidents, Ms. Rabalais made a report to the proper police
department.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
As mentioned previously, an anonymous complaint was lodged against
respondent in April, 2013, and a news report of recent felony arrests was posted on
the website of THE LIVINGSTON PARISH NEWS on July 7, 2013, listing respondent as
a person charged with simple robbery.
After providing the requisite notices of investigation to respondent, the
Commission authorized and issued a Notice of Hearing, containing three counts, on
September 27, 2016. The Commission alleged that respondent’s conduct violated
Canons 1 (a judge shall personally observe high standards of conduct so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved) and 2A (a judge shall
respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The Commission further alleged that respondent engaged in
persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brought
the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C).
6
Judge Terri Love was appointed as a hearing officer to conduct proceedings
in this matter pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 29. The Hearing Officer
convened a hearing on March 21-22, 2017. At the beginning of the second day of
the hearing, respondent entered into the record three written admissions regarding
Counts One and Two of the Notice of Hearing, in which he admitted some, but not
all, of the allegations in those counts. (These admissions relate to respondent’s
violations of the TRO, as set forth above.)
Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer filed findings of fact and
conclusions of law with the Commission. Thereafter, the Commission established a
briefing schedule, as required by Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 29, and ordered
respondent to appear on August 18, 2017, for questioning by the Commissioners.
On December 1, 2017, the Commission filed its recommendation in this court,
finding that the allegations of misconduct were proven by clear and convincing
evidence and recommending that respondent be suspended without pay for six
months. The matter was then set on this Court’s docket for oral argument pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 14.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission generally adopted the factual findings made by the Hearing
Officer, as well as the Hearing Officer’s proposed conclusions of fact and law.
Briefly, these conclusions may be summarized as follows:
There is clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated the TRO with
respect to the incident at Carroll Baptist Church, the placement of a GPS tracking
device on the vehicle in Ms. Rabalais’ possession, and the incident at the Los
Sombreros Mexican Restaurant. By his own testimony, as well as the numerous
exhibits in the record, respondent was distraught and “desperate” after Ms. Rabalais
left him. The Hearing Officer found the testimony of Ms. Thornton and Ms. Rabalais
to be credible. The fact that respondent placed a GPS tracking device on Ms.
7
Rabalais’ vehicle discounts any claims that his encounter at the restaurant was
merely coincidental. This finding is further supported by the number of e-mails and
communications from respondent to Ms. Rabalais prior to the incidents in question.
By failing to comply with the TRO, respondent failed to personally observe a
high standard of conduct so as to preserve the integrity and independence of the
judiciary, in violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and failed to
respect and comply with the law and to act in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Canon
2A. 8 Respondent also engaged in persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brought the judicial office into disrepute, in violation
of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C).
There is clear and convincing evidence that respondent stalked Ms. Rabalais
as defined by La. R.S. 14:40.2. With respect to the Collins Place Subdivision and
February 6, 2013 Chrysler 200 incidents, respondent has admitted that his actions
constituted stalking as defined by the statute. With respect to the incidents on
February 21 and 26, 2013, the Hearing Officer found the testimony of Ms. Rabalais
to be credible and that the evidence was proven by a clear and convincing standard.
Ms. Rabalais’ testimony was specific and corroborates the facts found in the police
report and arrest warrant.
By violating La. R.S. 14:40.2, respondent failed to personally observe a high
standard of conduct so as to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary,
in violation of Canon 1, and failed to respect and comply with the law and to act in
8
This Court agrees with the Hearing Officer and the Commission that respondent violated Canon
2A, despite the fact that he was never prosecuted or convicted of violating the TRO. This Court
also notes, as did the Hearing Officer and the Commission, that the plain language of the Code of
Judicial Conduct does not require the prosecution or conviction of a crime in order to find judicial
misconduct. Specifically, Canon 2A imposes an affirmative duty upon judicial officers to “respect
and comply with the law,” which respondent failed to do. At a minimum, respondent’s conduct
violates Canon 1, since his harassing behavior fails to uphold “high standards of conduct” and
“fails to promote public confidence in the integrity … of the judiciary.”
8
a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, in violation of Canon 2A. 9 Respondent also engaged in persistent and
public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brought the judicial
office into disrepute, in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C).
According to La. R.S. 14:79(A)(3), the violation of a protective order includes
the “willful disobedience of … (a) An order issued by any state … judge … that a
criminal defendant stay away from a specific person or persons as a condition of that
defendant’s release on bond.”
With regard to the incidents that occurred after the “no contact” order was
added to respondent’s bond, the Hearing Officer acknowledged that although it is
entirely possible that one of these encounters may have been a coincidence, the clear
and convincing evidence shows that respondent had a pattern of following and
approaching his former wife on a frequent basis after the June 27, 2013 “no contact”
order was signed. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer found that respondent violated
La. R.S. 14:79(A)(3)(a).
By violating the special conditions of his bond, respondent failed to personally
observe a high standard of conduct so as to preserve the integrity and independence
of the judiciary, in violation of Canon 1, and failed to respect and comply with the
law and to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Canon 2A.10 Respondent also engaged
in persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C).
Notwithstanding his many denials regarding his conduct, the Hearing Officer
noted that respondent appeared to be remorseful about his actions toward Ms.
9
As mentioned, no prosecution or conviction for the crime of stalking is required for the reasons
discussed in note 8, supra.
10
Again, no prosecution or conviction for the crime of stalking is required for the reasons discussed
in note 8, supra.
9
Rabalais and embarrassed by his behavior. Although not in any way an excuse for
his actions, respondent’s conduct appeared to stem from his difficulty in moving on
from his marriage and his desire to spark a reconciliation process. On the other hand,
some of respondent’s actions were calculated to “aggravate” and, more troubling,
harass Ms. Rabalais. Furthermore, respondent’s repeated claims that his encounters
with Ms. Rabalais were just a coincidence do not extend to every encounter in this
case, as shown by the placement of the GPS device on Ms. Rabalais’ vehicle.
Finally, respondent’s pattern of harassment of Ms. Rabalais during the course of
over a year and a half shows a pattern of conduct that clearly and unequivocally rises
above the threshold of actionable judicial misconduct despite the lack of any judicial
findings of criminal liability.
The Hearing Officer also noted that petitioner made admissions that
significantly shortened the hearing, thereby decreasing the expenses associated with
the hearing. The admissions show that respondent has taken responsibility for some
of his most egregious conduct, despite also denying the seriousness of some of his
behavior.
At his appearance before the Commission, respondent continued to
acknowledge that some of his actions were improper and expressed remorse for this
behavior:
When one goes through a divorce or something of that nature, I think
they are subject to do things they otherwise normally would not do. At
the time, you know, I didn’t look at it from the same perspective that
I’m looking at it now. ... I do regret those things with the tracking
device, so forth. I mean, I have to take blame for doing that. ... It was
a voluntary act. But I knew in my mind I wasn’t, I wasn’t looking at it
like I was violating anything. Looking back now, I see that. ...
Anyway, I’d just ask for mercy and maybe if you could just understand
to some degree that I was desperately trying to reconcile our differences
in our marriage. Looking back, obviously, it didn’t work and wasn’t
the proper way to do it, that I am sorry for my actions.
10
Respondent also testified that at some point he gained closure regarding the
dissolution of his marriage and that he has not communicated with or had any
encounters with his ex-wife for several years, except for a memorial service for his
son in May of this year, during which they were cordial with one another. This
comports with Ms. Rabalais’ testimony at the hearing before the Hearing Officer
that she and respondent no longer communicate.
The Office of Special Counsel urged the Commission to recommend to the
court that respondent be removed from office. Respondent opposed removal and
requested that the Commission recommend a public censure. Although the
Commission regarded respondent’s misconduct as very serious, the Commission did
not consider it to be the type of conduct for which a recommendation of removal is
warranted.
In recommending discipline, the Commission looked to the factors set forth
by this court in In re: Chaisson, 549 So. 2d 259 (La. 1989), and concluded:
(a) and (b) Respondent’s actions in stalking and harassing his ex-wife,
coupled with his failure to abide by court-ordered protective orders, constitute
serious misconduct. Respondent’s acts of harassment, stalking, and violations of the
law relative to protective orders occurred repeatedly over a substantial period of
time, from September 2012 through February 2014, approximately eighteen months.
Although respondent’s actions within this timeframe plainly evidenced a pattern of
very troubling conduct, the Commission did not find that such conduct was part of
a larger pattern that extended to other times during respondent’s life or judicial
career. Rather, the Commission found that respondent’s conduct was directly
attributable to the emotional distress caused by the break-up of his marriage of thirty-
plus years, his difficulty in accepting the dissolution of the marriage, and his desire
for reconciliation. It appears that once he accepted the end of his marriage, his
11
pattern of harassment and stalking of his ex-wife ended, with the last reported
incident being in February of 2014, over three and a half years ago.
(c) and (d) Respondent’s misconduct occurred outside of the courtroom and
in his private life.
(e) and (f) Although coming at a somewhat late stage in the proceedings,
respondent filed into the record significant written admissions on the second day of
the hearing. As noted by the Hearing Officer, “the admissions show that JP Sachse
has taken responsibility for some of his most egregious conduct.” In his brief to the
Commission, respondent also agreed with the Hearing Officer’s conclusions of law
regarding some of the violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Louisiana
Constitution. Although respondent did not admit to all of the factual allegations or
all the violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Louisiana Constitution as
alleged in the Notice of Hearing, the Commission recognizes that respondent has a
right to defend himself against the allegations against him.
Respondent appeared remorseful about his actions, apologized for them, and
testified that he should have acted differently. Nonetheless, respondent did not
appear to fully understand the seriousness of his misconduct, especially his
violations of criminal law and court-ordered protective orders. Respondent appeared
to overly rely on his distressed emotional state as an explanation (but not a
justification) for his actions. Although the Commissioners recognized that divorce
and marital issues can cause an individual to engage in conduct that he or she might
not otherwise engage in, it did not appear that respondent fully appreciated that as a
judicial officer, he is held to a higher standard than an average individual and that
his violations of the law and court orders are especially damaging to the respect for,
the integrity of, and the public’s confidence in this state’s judiciary.
(g) Respondent has served as justice of the peace since 1996. At the time of
his unethical conduct, respondent was not a new justice of the peace and should have
12
been more familiar with his ethical obligations pursuant to the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Louisiana Constitution, as they relate to his out-of-court conduct.
(h) Respondent has no reportable history of prior judicial misconduct.
(i) Respondent’s actions have negatively impacted the integrity of and respect
for the judiciary. Respondent, a long-serving judicial officer, admitted that he
violated the criminal prohibitions against stalking and violation of protective orders.
It is especially damaging to the judiciary when a member of the judiciary ignores the
law and duly issued court orders. The public is expected to fully comply with the
law or suffer serious consequences. Members of the judiciary are no exception;
rather, they are held to a higher standard and expected to set the example. A failure
to duly comply with the law and court orders by a member of the judiciary simply
cannot be countenanced.
The Commission pointed to this Court’s language in In re: Ellender, 04-2123,
pp. 8-9 (La. 12/13/04), 889 So. 2d 225, 231: “It is widely understood that judges
symbolize the law, and, accordingly, their actions reflect favorably or unfavorably
on the judicial system. As a public official, a judge’s behavior both on and off the
bench must comply with the highest of standards delineated in the Canons.”
Accordingly, “[a] criminal act for which any citizen may be punished by
imprisonment is much more serious when the conduct is that of a judge,” and such
conduct “is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice and brings the judicial
office into disrepute.” In re: Whitaker, 463 So. 2d 1291, 1303 (La. 1985)
(suspending judge for one year without pay for, among other things, smoking
marijuana on two occasions after becoming a judge and associating with prostitutes
and users and sellers of illegal drugs); see also In re: Soileau, 502 So. 2d 1083
(suspending a judge for six months without pay for, among other things, committing
a battery on a law enforcement official and disturbing the peace at a crawfish
festival).
13
(j) Although respondent, in his personal desire to reunite with his former wife,
seriously violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Louisiana Constitution, the
evidence does not indicate that he exploited his position in doing so.
Based on these considerations, some of which the Commission regarded as
aggravating and some as mitigating, the Commission recommended that respondent
be suspended without pay for six months. The Commission also recommended that
respondent be ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission $3,040.02 in costs.
In his brief to this Court, respondent accepted the recommendations of the
Commission, and agreed to abide by any sanctions imposed by this Court.
DISCUSSION
Article V, § 25(C) of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution provides the substantive
grounds for disciplinary action against a judge. The Code of Judicial Conduct
adopted by this court under its supervisory authority supplements the constitution's
substantive grounds for disciplinary action against a judge. In re Justice of the Peace
Franklin, 07-1425, p. 14 (La. 11/27/07), 969 So.2d, 591, 600. The Code is binding
on all judges, including justices of the peace. In re Justice of the Peace Myrty
Alfonso, 07-0120, p. 7 (La. 5/22/07), 957 So. 2d 121, 122, citing In re: Wilkes, 403
So. 2d 35, 40 (La.1981). “Violations of the Canons contained in the Code of Judicial
Conduct can serve as a basis for the disciplinary action provided for by Article V, §
25(C) of the Constitution.” Id., citing In re: McInnis, 00-1026, p. 1 (La.10/17/00),
769 So. 2d 1186, 1188 n. 2. This Court has stated:
The Code of Judicial Conduct was enacted by this court pursuant to its
constitutionally-granted supervisory authority over all lower courts.
This constitutional grant of supervisory authority is plenary, unfettered
by jurisdictional requirements, and exercisable at the complete
discretion of the court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(A); Unwired Telecom v.
Parish of Calcasieu, 03–0732, p. 8 (La.1/19/05), 903 So. 2d 392, 400
(on reh'g). As explained above, the Code requires all judges, including
justices of the peace, to comply with its requirements. Additionally, in
La. R.S. 42:1167, the legislature has recognized that all judges, as
defined by the Code of Judicial Conduct, shall be governed exclusively
14
by that Code. This statute, which became effective April 1, 1980,
acknowledges this court's authority to provide the exclusive means by
which judges' conduct is governed. See In re: Ellender, 04–2123, p. 6
(La.12/13/04), 889 So. 2d 225, 230 (“The legislative statement in La.
R.S. 42:1167 codifies our jurisprudence which provides that judges are
governed exclusively by the Code, and the Code is not contrary to the
Constitution's exclusive grant of authority to this Court in the realm of
judicial misconduct.”).
In re Justice of the Peace Larry Charles Freeman, 08-1820, p. 13-14
(La. 12/2/08), 995 So. 2d 1197, 1206 (internal cites omitted).
Furthermore, “a justice of the peace is governed by the same constitutions and
laws that govern all courts and judges of this state, and is bound to apply the law as
written by the legislature and construed by the various courts.” Alfonso, supra, citing
Wilkes, 403 So. 2d at 44. The charge against a judge must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence before this court can impose discipline. In re Hunter, 02-1975,
p. 4 (La. 8/19/02), 823 So. 2d 325, 328.
Justice of the Peace Sachse was charged with violations of Canons 1 and 2A
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 1, “A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and
Independence of the Judiciary,” provides:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in
our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and
enforcing, and shall personally observe, high standards of conduct so
that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.
The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further
that objective. As a necessary corollary, the judge must be protected in
the exercise of judicial independence.
Canon 2A, under the title “A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of
Impropriety in All Activities, provides that “[a] judge shall respect and comply with
the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
Based upon our review of the record before us, we find there is clear and
convincing evidence that respondent has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct as
alleged herein. Respondent engaged in a repeated pattern of stalking and harassing
his ex-wife, resulting in numerous violation(s) of court protective orders, including
15
a 2013 “no contact” order. Although respondent was never convicted, he was
arrested for these transgressions, and prosecution or conviction is not required to
find judicial misconduct.11 As the Commission duly noted, it is troublesome and
particularly damaging to the judiciary when a member of the judiciary ignores the
law and duly issued court orders. Furthermore, notwithstanding the emotional
turmoil of a divorce, his cumulative behavior over approximately 18 months is
inexcusable and unbecoming of the judiciary. While we acknowledge respondent
expressed remorse for his actions and he has had no further contact with his ex-wife
since 2014, this Court must hold him accountable for his actions, which fell below
the standard set forth in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
CONCLUSION
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the Judiciary
Commission, and considering the record filed herein, we find respondent has
violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and hereby suspend
respondent without pay for six months. Respondent must also pay to the
Commission $3,040.02 in costs.
11
As discussed in n. 8, supra, the plain language of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct does
not require an actual conviction to find a violation of the same. See also In re Kuehnel, 49 N.Y.2d
465 (1980); In re Young, 522 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1988); and In re Fowler, 593 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.
1992).
16
03/13/18
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2017-O-2008
IN RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE JEFF SACHSE, WARD 1,
LIVINGSTON PARISH, STATE OF LOUISIANA
JUDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA
JOHNSON, C.J., concurs.
1