State of Louisiana v. Andre J. Davis , 2017 La. LEXIS 543 ( 2017 )

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #017
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 15th day of March, 2017, are as follows:
BY WEIMER, J.:
2015-K-1949 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ANDRE J. DAVIS (Parish of Orleans)
That portion of the appellate court's opinion ruling that the elements
of domestic abuse battery involving strangulation were unproven at
trial is hereby reversed. Noting that the defendant did not seek
a writ to challenge the appellate court's opinion, we leave undisturbed
the remainder of the opinion relating to other matters, including
that portion finding that the district court failed to impose mandatory
conditions on the defendant's probation for domestic abuse battery.
This matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
03/15/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2015-K-1949
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
ANDRE J. DAVIS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
WEIMER, Justice.
We granted a writ to determine whether the appellate court erroneously
applied the domestic abuse battery statute, La. R.S. 14:35.3. The appellate court
determined there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant=s conviction
under the statutory provision requiring that an offender and victim be past or present
members of the same household. As interpreted by the appellate court, La. R.S.
14:35.3 requires the state to show the offender and victim engaged in a relationship
comparable to the civil law concept of Aopen concubinage.@
We find that the appellate court=s requirement that the state prove Aopen
concubinage@ between the victim and offender is not grounded in the statute.
Moreover, the appellate court=s requirement of proof of Aopen concubinage@ thwarts
the broader inquiry into the circumstances of the relationship intended by the
legislature. For reasons that follow, we reverse the ruling of the appellate court and
reinstate the trial court=s ruling that the totality of evidence was sufficient to find the
victim and offender were part of the same household and, therefore, was sufficient
to support the conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The defendant was charged by bill of information with one count of domestic
abuse battery involving strangulation, in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3. The
defendant pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a bench trial.
At trial, the state presented the testimony of Eugenia Leonard, who testified
that on January 18, 2012, she was in an apartment she rented, and was caring for her
six-week-old daughter. Also present in the apartment that day was the defendant,
who is the father of Ms. Leonard=s daughter. The defendant was partially clothed
and reclining in the bedroom when Ms. Leonard approached him and asked him to
watch the child while Ms. Leonard took a shower.
According to Ms. Leonard, the defendant refused to help, so she told him to
leave the apartment. The defendant got out of bed and dressed. As the defendant
left the bedroom and walked down the hallway, he pushed Ms. Leonard against the
wall. Ms. Leonard was holding the child in her arms, and ran into the hallway
bathroom. The defendant followed, grabbed Ms. Leonard by the neck and began
choking her until she closed her eyes and fell to the floor, still holding her baby in
her arms. When she opened her eyes, the defendant was standing in the bathroom
doorway, but left the apartment soon afterwards.
Ms. Leonard explained that she and defendant had been involved in an
intimate relationship for three or four years and had been to counseling to try to find
a way to raise their daughter together. She stated that the defendant was a student
at a local university at the time and had moved out of his dormitory to stay with her.
However, when the defendant refused to help take care of their daughter, she told
him to leave because he did not pay any of the bills or contribute to the household.
The defendant took the stand and testified that at the time of the incident he
did not want to have an intimate relationship with Ms. Leonard, but he did want to
be present for his daughter. He stated that he was seeing other women at the time
and Ms. Leonard was aware of this. The defendant claimed that when he tried to
leave the bedroom, Ms. Leonard blocked him and pushed him back with her left arm
as they argued about caring for the child. As he walked past her they continued to
argue. Ms. Leonard then entered the bathroom while screaming at him. As he
tried to enter the bathroom, Ms. Leonard pushed him and fell backwards onto the
floor.
The defendant denied that he choked Ms. Leonard or put his hands on her
neck. He further denied pushing Ms. Leonard and claimed he would never do
anything to hurt her when she had his daughter in her arms. Defendant also disputed
Ms. Leonard=s testimony concerning their living arrangements. He claimed that at
the time of the incident he had returned to living in a university dorm room. The
defendant also testified that while he was not ordered to do so, he provided child
support in the form of a Wal-Mart money card.
The district court found defendant guilty of domestic abuse battery involving
strangulation and sentenced him to two years imprisonment at hard labor, suspended,
and two years active probation.
When the appellate court vacated the defendant=s conviction for domestic
abuse battery, the court found there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction. According to the appellate court, the state failed to prove that defendant
3
and Ms. Leonard were household members as required under La. R.S. 14:35.3. The
appellate court noted that domestic abuse battery is defined as Athe intentional use
of force or violence committed by one household member upon the person of another
household member.@ La. R.S. 14:35.3. At the time this crime was committed in
2012, household member was defined as Aany person of the opposite sex presently
living in the same residence or living in the same residence within five years of the
occurrence of the domestic abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse, whether
married or not.@ La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).1
The appellate court analogized the statutory definition of Ahousehold member@
to the civil law concept of Aopen concubinage,@ which the court in Petty v. Petty,
560 So.2d 629 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990), noted has been historically defined as Aa
relationship of sexual content in which man and woman live together as husband and
wife in a state of affairs approximating marriage,@ although they are not legally
married. Petty, 560 So.2d at 631 (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 440 So.2d 879, 881
(La.App. 2 Cir. 1983)). Applying that definition of Aopen concubinage,@ the
appellate court concluded that to prove defendant and the victim were living as
unmarried Aspouses,@ the state must prove:
[S]ome of the indices of a marriage: for example, both parties had
substantially all of their clothing at the same abode, both parties were
receiving regular mail at the same address, both parties acted like they
were actually married or held themselves out to the world as a married
couple, et cetera.
State v. Davis, 15-0456, pp. 18-19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/23/15), 176 So.3d 580, 592.
1
In 2015, the legislature amended the definition of household member to remove the phrase Aor
living in the same residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic abuse battery@ and
replaced it with broader language stating that a household member is Aany person of the opposite
sex presently or formerly living in the same residence with the offender.@ (Emphasis added.)
2015 La. Acts 440, ' 1.
4
The appellate court acknowledged there was an intimate relationship between
the defendant and victim; however, the court found that the defendant was not living
with the victim at the time of the incident. Applying its Aopen concubinage@
standard, the appellate court further found no evidence that the victim and defendant
had lived together as spouses. The court noted that there was no evidence that
defendant kept personal items in the apartment, or had kept them there at any point
in the relationship. The court further noted that the defendant did not contribute to
household expenses. In the appellate court=s view, Athe evidence at trial does not
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims [sic] were living in open
concubinage.@ Davis, 15-0456 at 18; 176 So.3d at 592.2
DISCUSSION
The state contends the appellate court erred by vacating the defendant=s
domestic abuse battery conviction. According to the state, the appellate court
misapplied the Jackson v. Virginia 3 standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the
trial evidence and substituted its judgment for that of the trier of fact. The state
argues that, based on the evidence adduced at trial, a rational trier of fact could have
found that the defendant was a Ahousehold member@ as defined by La. R.S.
14:35.3(B)(2). Central to the state=s argument is that the appellate court equated
Ahousehold member@ with the civil law concept of Aopen concubinage,@ but Aopen
concubinage@ is an outdated concept and is not grounded in the statute.
2
The appellate court was not unanimous in its reasoning. One judge in the three-judge panel
did not ascribe to the opinion, but instead indicated Athat on the facts of this case, the State failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a >household member= within the
meaning of La. R.S. 14:35.3.@ Davis, 15-0456 at 1, 176 So.3d at 600 (Landrieu, J., concurring).
3
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The sufficiency of evidence standard from
Jackson is discussed later in this opinion.
5
For his part, the defendant also points to the element of the crime requiring an
offender to be a Ahousehold member.@ La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). While not directly
arguing in favor of the appellate court=s Aopen concubinage@ interpretation of the
statute, the defendant nevertheless argues the appellate court reached the correct
result. Emphasizing the statute=s use of the phrase Aliving in the same residence,@
the defendant points to repeated instances in the trial record where the victim and
the defendant each testified that the defendant had been Astaying in@ the victim=s
residence. In essence, the defendant argues Astaying in@ is different from Aliving in@
the residence, and evidence of Astaying in@ the victim=s residence is insufficient to
meet the requirement that the offender has attained the status of Ahousehold member@
under La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).
Although the state and defendant take different approaches, common to both
litigants is that their arguments hinge on the definition of Ahousehold member@ in
La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). We turn, therefore, to the issue of how the term Ahousehold
member@ should be construed.
We begin, as we must, with the language of the statute itself. See La. R.S.
4
1:3 When this crime was committed in 2012, household member was
statutorily-defined, in pertinent part, as Aany person of the opposite sex presently
living in the same residence or living in the same residence within five years of the
occurrence of the domestic abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse, whether
married or not.@ La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).
4
AWords and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the
common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as
may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and
understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.@
6
Before reaching the meaning of these words, we observe that the definition
contains two clauses separated by the word Aor.@ Because the word Aor@ is normally
disjunctive, 5 each clause potentially offers a separate definition of Ahousehold
member.@ It may be possible to construe Ahousehold members@ as either Aany
person of the opposite sex presently living in the same residence@ (relying solely on
the first clause) or, alternatively, as Aany person of the opposite sex ... living in the
same residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic abuse battery
with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not@ (relying solely on the second
clause). That is, if the state relied solely on the first clause, the argument could be
made that the first clause does not require proof of the victim Aliving Y with the
defendant as a spouse, whether married or not,@ because the language just quoted
comes after the word Aor.@ Therefore, if the defendant and the victim were living
together at the time of the domestic abuse battery and the provision is interpreted in
that manner, it may not, in fact, matter whether they were doing so as Aspouses,
whether married or not@ at the time. However, the state has conceded that it is
relying on the second clause, which requires proof of the victim Aliving Y with the
defendant as a spouse, whether married or not.@ La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). Focus,
then, is placed on the meaning of the second clause.
Pursuant to the legislature=s interpretive directions, the first step in our
analysis is to determine if Aliving Y with the defendant as a spouse, whether married
or not@ in La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) refers to a technical term under the law. If La.
R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) refers to a technical term, then that portion of the statute Ashall
5
AUnless it is otherwise clearly indicated by the context, whenever the term >or= is used in the
Revised Statutes, it is used in the disjunctive and does not mean >and/or.=@ La. R.S. 1:9.
7
be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning@
as the technical term to which it refers. La. R.S. 1:3.
AMarried@ and Aspouse@ are technical terms, and there are very specific formal
requirements for a marriage to exist.6 If the defendant and victim had indeed been
married, it seems beyond debate that the relationship element of La. R.S.
14:35.3(B)(2) would be met, as long as the evidence showed that the victim had been
Aliving in the same residence within five years of the occurrence of the domestic
abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse.@
However, the legislature indicated that the relationship element is satisfied
Awhether married or not.@ (Emphasis added.) La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). In
searching for intent, we are bound to give meaning to every word the legislature has
used. See La. R.S. 1:47. Accordingly, from the words Awhether married or not,@
we find that the legislature intended the relationship element in La. R.S.
14:35.3(B)(2) to be satisfied without evidence showing every specific formal
requirement of a marriage. That is, the legislature intended both marriage, and
something akin to but short of marriage.
The appellate court=s ruling that Aopen concubinage@ was intended by the
phrase Awhether married or not@ is not supported by La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) or by the
meaning of Aconcubinage.@ The term Aconcubinage@ itself is a technical term, but
is archaic, as it no longer appears in the Civil Code. Cf. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio,
Roman Sources and Constitutional Mandates: The Alpha and Omega of Louisiana
6
See La. C.C. art. 86 (AThe relationship [of marriage] and the contract are subject to special rules
prescribed by law.@).
7
AWhen the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.@
8
Laws on Concubinage and Natural Children, 56 La. L. Rev. 317, 331 (1995) (AFew
remnants remain of the laws of concubinage and illegitimate children in Louisiana.
The restriction on donations to concubines is no longer a part of Louisiana law.@).
Moreover, when concubinage was a significant concept, concubinage was defined
in opposition to marriage, not consistent with marriage. See id. 56 La. L. Rev. at
323 (AIn Louisiana, [concubinage] is not necessarily a monogamous relationship. Y
[I]t was possible for a man to have a legal wife in one residence and a concubine in
another.@) (Footnote omitted.)
As observed earlier, by employing the phrase Awhether married or not@ in La.
R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2), the legislature intended both marriage and something akin to but
short of marriage. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to rely on the
technical concept, concubinage, which is unrelated to the concept of marriage and,
indeed, is defined in opposition to marriage. See La. R.S. 1:3. Moreover, in Petty,
560 So.2d at 631, on which the appellate court relied, the court indicated: Aalthough
living together is important to a finding of concubinage, it is not absolutely
essential.@ In contrast, under La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2), living together during any
point within five years of the offense is required. This difference between the
technical meaning of concubinage (in which living together is not required) and La.
R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2) (in which living together is required) further highlights the
appellate court=s error in relying on concubinage to interpret La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).
Because the legislature has chosen not to rely on a technical term, it was
appropriate for the factfinder at trial to draw on ordinary experience to determine
whether the household relationship element of the offense had been met. See State
9
v. Stowe, 93-2020 (La. 4/11/94), 635 So.2d 168, 170-72. 8 In turn, an appellate
court=s proper role is:
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Sylvia, 01-1406, p. 2
(La.4/9/03), 845 So.2d 358, 361; State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676,
678 (La. 1984). Therefore, the appellate court must determine that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was
sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of
the crime have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Sylvia,
01-1406 at p. 2-3, 845 So.2d at 361; Captville, 448 So.2d at 678.
State v. Johnson, 03-1228, p. 4 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 995, 998.
The following evidence, germane to the relationship between the defendant
and Ms. Leonard, was adduced at trial. The defendant and Ms. Leonard began a
sexually intimate relationship in 2009. The two met at a local university that both
were attending. Because the defendant did not have a car but Ms. Leonard did, she
often provided the defendant transportation to the university. According to Ms.
Leonard, at some point, the defendant moved out of the university dormitory to stay
with her.
By the time of the incident on January 18, 2012, Ms. Leonard had given birth
to the defendant=s child, who was then about six weeks old. Ms. Leonard and the
defendant attended counseling, which was focused on raising their daughter.
8
In Stowe, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence in a second degree battery case,
contending the state had failed to prove the victim suffered the element of Aextreme physical pain.@
Stowe, 635 So.2d at 170 (citing La. R.S. 14:34.1). This court noted it had determined in an earlier
case that A>extreme physical pain= Y >describes a condition which most people of common
intelligence can understand.=@ Stowe, 635 So.2d at 171 (quoting State v. Thompson, 399 So.2d
1161, 1168 (La. 1981)). Consistent with the determination that Aextreme physical pain@ was
subject to common understanding, this court then found the evidence describing the victim=s
experience of being hit in the face, along with photographs of the victim and testimony of an
eyewitness, sufficiently established the element of Aextreme physical pain@ to support the battery
conviction. See Stowe, 635 So.2d at 171-72.
10
The day of the incident, Ms. Leonard and the defendant were in the apartment
Ms. Leonard rented. Ms. Leonard asked the defendant to help by watching the child
while Ms. Leonard took a shower. The defendant was partially clothed and
reclining in the bedroom. The defendant refused to watch the child, and Ms.
Leonard told him to leave. She explained: AI felt like, if he didn=t want to help me
and he wasn=t working and he didn=t help me out with the baby and I paid all the bills
in the house, then just go. If you are not going to contribute to the household, then
leave.@ The defendant did not promptly leave and, instead, engaged in the violent
encounter for which he stands convicted.9
After enduring the violent encounter with the defendant in the bathroom,
according to Ms. Leonard, she called the defendant=s parents. She explained: AI
thought Y if I told somebodyBif I told his parents, then he would leave.@ According
to the defendant, it was he who called his parents after the incident. By the time of
trial, Ms. Leonard and her child had moved in with the defendant=s family.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution as required by the
Jackson standard, the evidentiary record reasonably supports the conclusion that
Ms. Leonard had been Aliving in the same residence within five years of the
occurrence of the domestic abuse battery with the defendant as a spouse, whether
married or not.@ La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2). The evidence shows an ongoing intimate
relationship for at least three years and that Ms. Leonard and the defendant had a
child together. While the defendant denied Ms. Leonard=s claim that he was staying
in the apartment at the time of the offense, viewed most favorably to the prosecution,
9
The defendant does not challenge the appellate court=s finding that he committed a simple
battery upon Ms. Leonard. The dispute in the present case is confined to whether the household
relationship element was met to support the conviction for domestic abuse battery, a more weighty
offense than simple battery.
11
the evidence supports Ms. Leonard=s claim. Ms. Leonard testified to an expectation
that the defendant would contribute to their common household, and the defendant
testified that he was intent on contributing to their child=s welfare, in terms of both
parenting activities and finances. Immediately prior to the battery incident, the
defendant was partially clothed and reclining in the bedroom, which demonstrates
he was very familiar with and comfortable within the household. Furthermore, the
argument between Ms. Leonard and the defendant just prior to the battery incident
was premised on Ms. Leonard=s view that the defendant was not meeting his
obligations to the household. With both Ms. Leonard and the defendant claiming
to have called the defendant=s parents about the incident, it is reasonable to infer that
both recognized their relationship was akin to a marriage in that both Ms. Leonard
and the defendant were part of a larger family.
Although the appellate court erroneously latched onto the archaic concept of
Aopen concubinage,@ the general approach of looking to the civil law was sound. It
is true that at trial, the factfinder could draw on ordinary experience to ascertain
whether the evidentiary record established a household arrangement that was similar
to marriage. See Stowe, 635 So.2d 168,170-72. However, to the extent any
further guidance was necessary, either at trial or on appeal, it would have been
appropriate to also consider the record in light of the civil law on marriage, while
bearing in mind that the legislature required only a relationship similar to marriage.
Here, providing resources for living, bringing a child into the world, and sharing
child rearing responsibilitiesBas Ms. Leonard and the defendant are depicted when
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutionBare also
described in the Civil Code as some of the incidents of marriage. See La. C.C. art.
98 (describing mutual duties of married persons, including Afidelity, support, and
12
assistance@) and La. C.C. art. 99 (ASpouses mutually assume the moral and material
direction of the family, exercise parental authority, and assume the moral and
material obligations resulting therefrom.@).
As a final point in our analysis, we return to the defendant=s argument that,
because both Ms. Leonard and the defendant described their relationship in terms of
Astaying with@ each other, the definition of Ahousehold@ contained in La. R.S.
14:35.3(B)(2) is unmet. The crux of the defendant=s argument is that La. R.S.
14:35.3(B)(2) defines household in terms of a couple Aliving in the same residence@
with each other, rather than Astaying with@ each other.10 This argument lacks merit.
There is no requirement that witnesses use the exact language in a statute for a court
to determine that the conditions in the statute have been met. The defendant does
not argue, and we do not find, that Aliving in the same residence@ is a technical term.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 1:3, in the absence of technical terminology, statutory A[w]ords
and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the
common and approved usage of the language.@ Similarly, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:3,
Aall of [the] provisions [of the Criminal Code] shall be given a genuine construction,
according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection
with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.@ Following the
principles of La. R.S. 1:3 and La. R.S. 14:3, we have no difficulty in determining
10
The defendant supports his grammatical argument with a dictionary definition, of uncertain
attribution, by which Astay@ means to Alive somewhere temporarily as a visitor or guest.@
However, noting the defendant testified that he was Astaying on campus@ in Aa dorm room at the
time@ of the incident, the defendant=s grammatical argument is self-defeating. [R 71] By the
defendant=s reasoning, he would have been a mere visitor or guest in his own dorm room.
Relatedly, even though Ms. Leonard testified the defendant had no dorm room at the time, but the
defendant testified he did, under the Jackson standard, we resolve their dispute in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, i.e., that the defendant had no dorm room at the time of the incident.
13
that the witnesses= testimony that they were Astaying with@ each other is synonymous
with Aliving in the same residence@ under La. R.S. 14:35.3(B)(2).
DECREE
That portion of the appellate court=s opinion ruling that the elements of
domestic abuse battery involving strangulation were unproven at trial is hereby
reversed. Noting that the defendant did not seek a writ to challenge the appellate
court=s opinion, we leave undisturbed the remainder of the opinion relating to other
matters, including that portion finding that the district court failed to impose
mandatory conditions on the defendant=s probation for domestic abuse battery. This
matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
14