State of Louisiana v. Melvin Miguel , 263 So. 3d 873 ( 2019 )

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #005
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 30th day of January, 2019, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2018-KK-0711 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MELVIN MIGUEL (Parish of Orleans)
Finding that the totality of the circumstances present here gave
the detective probable cause to believe the prescription bottle
contained contraband, we find the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement applies. Accordingly, we reverse the court of
appeal, reinstate the district court’s ruling that denied
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, and remand to the
district court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOHNSON, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
GENOVESE, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by the court of
appeal and for the reasons assigned by Chief Justice Johnson.
01/20/2019
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2018-KK-0711
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
MELVIN MIGUEL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
PER CURIAM
Defendant was the driver of a vehicle that was stopped because it had a
cracked windshield. Defendant was driving with a suspended driver’s license and a
fraudulent license plate. In addition, defendant admitted he had been smoking
marijuana. Before asking defendant to exit his vehicle, a detective scanned the
interior and noticed an orange prescription bottle, with the name on the label
peeled off, sitting in the broken driver’s side door handle. Defendant and his
passengers disclaimed ownership of the bottle.
Defendant exited the vehicle, was handcuffed and Mirandized, and placed
inside a police vehicle. The detective then retrieved the pill bottle, opened it, and
discovered five Hydrocodone pills. Defendant was arrested and charged with
possession of a controlled dangerous substance, La.R.S. 40:967. He was also cited
for several traffic violations.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on several grounds, including
that the pill bottle was not immediately apparent as contraband to justify a
warrantless search and seizure. The district court denied the motion to suppress
after conducting a hearing and reviewing the detective’s body camera video. The
court of appeal found the district court erred in denying defendant’s motion to
suppress. State v. Miguel, 18-0233 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/26/18) (on reh’g) (unpub’d).
Relying on State v. Meichel, 290 So. 2d 878 (La. 1974), the majority found the
plain view exception did not apply because the incriminating character of the bottle
was not immediately apparent. The court of appeal erred.
The plain view doctrine renders a warrantless search reasonable: (1) if the
police officer is lawfully in the place from which he views the object; (2) where the
object’s incriminating character is immediately apparent; and (3) the officer has a
lawful right of access to the object. State v. Gray, 13-1326, p. 2 (La. 6/28/13), 122
So. 3d 531, 533 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110
L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990)). The only controversy in the present case is whether the
prescription bottle’s incriminating character was immediately apparent.
The “immediately apparent” aspect of the plain view exception is better
stated as probable cause to believe the item in question is or contains contraband,
as clarified in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502
(1983). In Brown, the United States Supreme Court stated, “Decisions by this
Court since [Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d
564 (1971)] indicate that the use of the phrase ‘immediately apparent’ was very
likely an unhappy choice of words, since it can be taken to imply that an unduly
high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary
for an application of the ‘plain view’ doctrine.” Id., 460 U.S. 741, 103 S. Ct. at
1543. In the present case, the court of appeal similarly required an unduly high
degree of certainty—beyond probable cause—as to the incriminatory character of
the evidence.
Regarding probable cause in the context of the plain view exception, the
United States Supreme Court stated in Brown:
[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely
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requires that the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief,” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), that certain items
may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime;
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more
likely true than false. A “practical, nontechnical” probability that
incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879
(1949). Moreover, our observation in United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981), regarding
“particularized suspicion,” is equally applicable to the probable cause
requirement:
“The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors
as factfinders are permitted to do the same—and so are
law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement.”
Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S.Ct. at 1543.
During oral argument, defendant contended that the fact that the name was
torn from the label alone was insufficient to give the detective probable cause to
believe the bottle contained contraband. That circumstance did not appear in
isolation, however. The officer was also aware that defendant was driving with a
suspended driver’s license, the vehicle had a fraudulent license plate, defendant
and his passengers disclaimed ownership of the bottle, and defendant admitted he
recently smoked marijuana (while claiming he consumed it all and thus implying
none would be found in the vehicle). These circumstances, in conjunction with the
suspiciously torn label, when weighed by an experienced law enforcement officer,
provided probable cause to believe the prescription bottle contained contraband.
Defendant cites State v. Meichel, 290 So. 2d 878 (La. 1974) as being directly
applicable and requiring suppression of the evidence. In Meichel, a town marshal
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approached the defendant’s vehicle as he was having car trouble. According to the
marshal, he observed a pill bottle on the passenger’s seat. The bottle of pills in
question was labeled as being habit forming and that dispensing without a
prescription was prohibited. Two sheriff’s deputies subsequently arrived and
searched the trunk, where they found marijuana. The state argued that the plain
view seizure of the pills established probable cause for a search of the automobile,
but this court disagreed:
In the instant case the testimony of the officer making the seizure is
clearly to the effect that he did not know the nature of the pills until
after he had picked up the bottle and examined it. He did not know at
the time he saw the pills that there was a probability that they were
contraband and probably evidence. This seizure does not fall within
the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. As such the
seizure violated defendant’s constitutional rights and was illegal.
Meichel, 290 So. 2d at 880. In Meichel, however, there were not the additional
circumstances, present here, to justify the seizure and subsequent search of the pill
bottle.
Finding that the totality of the circumstances present here gave the detective
probable cause to believe the prescription bottle contained contraband, we find the
plain view exception to the warrant requirement applies. Accordingly, we reverse
the court of appeal, reinstate the district court’s ruling that denied defendant’s
motion to suppress the evidence, and remand to the district court for further
proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
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01/20/2019
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2018-KK-0711
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
MELVIN MIGUEL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH
CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
JOHNSON, Chief Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.
Because I find the state failed to prove the seizure and search of the
prescription pill bottle was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement,
I find the evidence should have been suppressed.
Detective Terrell’s search and seizure of the pill bottle did not fall within the
plain view exception to the warrant requirement because Det. Terrell did not have
probable cause to believe it contained contraband. In State v. Meichel, 290 So. 2d
878, 880 (La. 1974), this court explained that “a policeman does not have the right
to seize any object in his view in order to examine it and determine if it is or would
be evidence in a criminal prosecution. An object in open plain view may be seized
only where it is readily apparent that the object is contraband or evidence.” Det.
Terrell’s testimony that he observed an orange prescription bottle without a legible
name is not sufficient to constitute probable cause to search that container for
contraband. The majority attempts to distinguish Meichel by finding there were
“additional circumstances” in this case which provided probable cause for Det.
Terrell to believe the prescription bottle contained contraband. I cannot agree. In my
view, the fact that defendant’s license was suspended, that he did not have a valid
license plate, or that he admitted to smoking marijuana earlier are unrelated to
whether Det. Terrell believed the pill bottle contained contraband. As pointed out by
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the court of appeal in this case, Det. Terrell did not testify to any facts or
circumstances that he observed that provided probable cause for him to believe there
was evidence of contraband in the vehicle. State v. Miguel, 18-0233 at *3 (La. App.
4 Cir. 4/26/18). The court of appeal additionally reviewed Det. Terrell’s body
camera footage, which supported its finding that the district court abused its
discretion in determining Det. Terrell had probable cause for his seizure and search
of the pill bottle. Id.
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
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