Tasha Griggs, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Son, Austin Griggs v. Bounce N' Around Inflatables, L.L.C. and Jack Alan Leblanc ( 2019 )

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #005
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 30th day of January, 2019, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2018-C-0726 TASHA GRIGGS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR SON, AUSTIN
GRIGGS v. BOUNCE N' AROUND INFLATABLES, L.L.C. AND JACK ALAN
LEBLANC (Parish of Ascension)
In this case, we are called upon to decide a question we left
unresolved in Mott v. River Parish Maintenance, 432 So. 2d 827
(La. 1983) – namely, whether a minor who is illegally hired and
engaged in a prohibited task at the time of his injury is subject
to the exclusive remedy of the workers’ compensation law. For the
reasons that follow, we hold that the exclusive remedy provisions
are applicable under these facts. The judgment of the court of
appeal is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
JOHNSON, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
HUGHES, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
01/30/19
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2018-C-0726
TASHA GRIGGS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF HER MINOR SON, AUSTIN GRIGGS
VERSUS
BOUNCE N' AROUND INFLATABLES, L.L.C.
AND JACK ALAN LEBLANC
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ASCENSION
PER CURIAM
In this case, we are called upon to decide a question we left unresolved in Mott
v. River Parish Maintenance, 432 So. 2d 827 (La. 1983) – namely, whether a minor
who is illegally hired and engaged in a prohibited task at the time of his injury is
subject to the exclusive remedy of the workers’ compensation law. For the reasons
that follow, we hold that the exclusive remedy provisions are applicable under these
facts.
UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The salient facts of this matter are largely undisputed. Bounce N’ Around
Inflatables (“BNA”) is a party rental business that rents a variety of inflatables for
social events. BNA stored the inflatables in a warehouse on racks approximately ten
feet high and moved them around on dollies, using a battery operated pallet-jack.
BNA hired fourteen-year-old Austin Griggs (“Austin”) as a helper to assist in
the delivering and cleaning of the inflatables. Louisiana law provides that “[m]inors
fourteen and fifteen years of age may be employed in any gainful occupation not
prohibited in this Part, only after school hours and during nonschool days.” La. R.S.
23:166. However, any person who employs a minor is required to procure and keep
on file an employment certificate for the minor. La. R.S. 23:181 et seq. It is
undisputed that BNA did not obtain such a certificate for Austin. Additionally, La.
R.S. 23:163(2) provides, “[n]o minor under the age of sixteen years shall be
employed, permitted, or suffered to work . . . [i]n, or about, or in connection with
power-driven machinery.”
The accident which forms the basis for this litigation occurred when Austin,
then age fifteen, was standing on an inflatable as it was lifted to the rack by a forklift.
Austin fell to the ground from the forklift, and was further injured when the inflatable
fell and hit him on the back.
Following the injury, BNA’s workers’ compensation insurer paid Austin
workers’ compensation and medical benefits. Austin eventually returned to work at
BNA, with his mother’s permission.
The instant litigation arose when Austin’s mother, individually and on behalf
of Austin (hereinafter referred to as “plaintiffs”), filed suit against BNA, its owner
and insurer (collectively referred to hereinafter as “defendants”). The suit sought to
recover tort damages arising out of the injury.
The matter proceeded to a bench trial. At the conclusion of trial, the district
court awarded plaintiffs $125,000 in general damages and $24,517 in special
damages, plus legal interest and costs.1 In written reasons for judgment, the district
court found defendants illegally employed Austin because they failed to obtain an
employment certificate. The court further found Austin was engaged in an illegal
task (working with power-driven machinery) at the time of the accident.
In finding the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation law
did not apply, the district court relied on Ewert v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co.,
548 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1989), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 1339 (La. 1989), and
1
BNA’s workers’ compensation insurer intervened to recover benefits it paid to Austin. The
district court awarded the insurer $25,867.93 in reimbursement.
2
Patterson v. Martin Forest Products, Inc., 34,258 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/00), 774
So. 2d 1148, writ denied, 00-3559 (La. 3/16/01), 787 So. 2d 311, for the proposition
that workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions do not control over child labor
laws, and a minor’s illegal employment does not amount to an election of remedies
under the workers’ compensation law.
Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit reversed in part and
affirmed in part, dismissing plaintiffs’ tort claims with prejudice.2 The court of
appeal found Austin’s claims were subject to the exclusive remedy provision
contained in the workers’ compensation law. In reaching this conclusion, the court
of appeal explicitly declined to follow the holdings of Ewert, supra and Patterson,
supra. The court instead relied on its prior decision in Noble v. Blume Tree Services,
Inc., 94-0589 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/10/94), 646 So. 2d 441, writ denied, 94-2999 (La.
2/17/95), 650 So. 2d 252, which held that an illegally-hired minor was subject to the
exclusivity provisions.
Upon plaintiffs’ application, we granted certiorari to resolve this split in the
circuits.
DISCUSSION
In Mott v. River Parish Maintenance, 432 So. 2d 827, 831 (La. 1983), we
addressed the issue of whether a minor who was legally hired, but performing an
illegal task at the time of his injury, was limited to the workers’ compensation
remedy. We reviewed the history of the workers’ compensation act and concluded
it applied to the minor:
2
Austin’s mother filed a loss of consortium claim, which the district court rejected. The
court of appeal affirmed this portion of the district court’s judgment. This ruling is not at issue in
the current application and will not be discussed further.
3
La. R.S. 23:1035, providing for coverage under the act,
states that the act is applicable to "every person" with no
indication whatsoever that it did not apply to minors,
legally or illegally employed. Furthermore, since the
appellate courts had, between 1948 and 1975, rendered
numerous decisions holding that the act did apply to minor
employees who were below the minimum age prescribed
by law for employment in certain trades or to do certain
jobs, use of the term "every person" in the coverage
provision must have been with the intent that such minors
remain covered under the act.
* * *
We find no merit to plaintiff's argument that he is not
covered by the workers’ compensation act because his
injuries occurred while he was performing a task
prohibited, for a minor his age by the Child Labor Law.
In a footnote, Mott observed there may be some support for a distinction
between a minor hired in violation of the law and a minor legally hired but required
to perform a task in violation of the law. However, Mott ultimately declined to
express any opinion on this issue:
A question has been raised as to whether there is a
distinction between the case where the minor is hired in
violation of law or where, as here, he is legally hired but
required to perform a task in violation of law. While there
may be some support for such a distinction, we are not here
faced with that issue and express no view on it.
432 So. 2d at 832, footnote 5
Over the next few years, the footnote in Mott caused some confusion in the
appellate courts. In Ewert, supra, the Third Circuit addressed a situation involving
a minor who was illegally hired to work in logging operations. The majority of the
court seized upon the Mott footnote and concluded there was a distinction between
an illegally hired minor and a minor who was legally hired but performing illegal
tasks:
It could hardly be argued that there is not a difference,
albeit only one of degree, between the risks likely to be
4
encountered by a minor in illegal employment, as opposed
to those likely to be encountered in legal employment
where there is only an incidental risk of assignment to an
illegal task. The case before us is a prime example of an
illegal employment - a logging operation. Hardly any
aspect of logging can be imagined that is not fraught with
great risk to the inexperienced and immature. On the other
hand there are situations, just as in Mott, where the minor
is employed in a legal operation, but is required - perhaps
innocently - to perform a task in violation of law. We have
no difficulty concluding that there is a distinction between
the two employments.
Ewert, 548 So. 2d at 361.
Having found there was a distinction, the Ewert majority concluded that an
employer who illegally hires a minor should not have the benefit of workers’
compensation tort immunity. The court reasoned that such an interpretation was
necessary to “avoid the anomaly of rewarding an employer for illegally employing a
minor incapable of contracting.” Id. at 362.
Two judges dissented in Ewert. One of the dissenters explained “[t]he majority
here has fashioned a cause of action of a punitive nature which is not authorized by
any law that I know of.” Id. at 548 (Foret, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Several years later, the First Circuit addressed the issue in Noble, supra. That
case involved a minor who was illegally hired but was performing legal work at the
time of his injury.3 The court reviewed prior jurisprudence from its circuit, such as
Matthews v. Buff Hottle Shows, 109 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959), and Messer
v. Bagwell Coatings, 283 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), in which the courts
found the exclusive remedy of a minor hired in violation of the Child Labor Laws was
in workers’ compensation. The court concluded Mott did not overrule these decisions
3
The parties stipulated the minor was hired to operate wood working machinery or as a
commercial driver, occupations which are prohibited under La. R.S. 23:23:161. However, at the
time of the accident, he was flagging traffic, an occupation which is not specifically prohibited.
5
and declined to read the Mott footnote as broadly as the court in Ewert did. Instead,
the court concluded:
As the supreme court noted in Mott, the legislature
intended to provide workers’ compensation coverage for
all minors, whether legally employed or not, when it
deleted the provisions excluding coverage for illegally
hired minors in 1948, and it reaffirmed that intention in
1975. We may not ignore that intent and the long-settled
jurisprudence of this circuit to legislate punishment in this
type case.
Noble, 646 So. 2d at 444 (emphasis in original).
In resolving these conflicting opinions, we turn, as we did in Mott, supra, to
the language of La. R.S. 23:1035. That statute, entitled “Employees covered,”
provides, in pertinent part:
A. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to every
person performing services arising out of and incidental to
his employment in the course of his own trade, business, or
occupation, or in the course of his employer's trade,
business, or occupation . . . (emphasis added).
The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the
statute itself. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, pp. 13-14 (La. 7/1/08),
998 So. 2d 16, 27. "When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not
lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature." La. Civ. Code.
art. 9.
We find the reference to “every person” in La. R.S. 23:1035 is clear and
unambiguous. As we explained in Mott, there is “no indication whatsoever that it did
not apply to minors, legally or illegally employed.” Mott, 432 So. 2d at 831.
Despite this clear language, plaintiffs ask us to interpret the statute to exclude
minors who are injured while performing tasks not permitted by the law, as in the
case at bar. Plaintiffs reason that although there are situations where a minor can be
6
legally employed, the legislature has determined, obviously for safety reasons, that
a minor cannot be employed to perform certain jobs. According to plaintiffs, when
an employer places a minor in the position of working in a prohibited position, the
employer should not benefit when the child is injured.
Although the courts are obliged to construe the law so as to effectuate its
purpose, this duty does not include license to ignore the law's clear and unambiguous
terms or to refrain from enforcing the law in accordance with its plain meaning. Bank
of New York v. Parnell, 10-435 (La. 11/30/10), 56 So. 3d 160, 165, cert. denied, 565
U.S. 817 (2011) (citing In re Mourer, 309 B.R. 502, 505 (W.D. Mich. 2004). While
we are not unmindful to the policy considerations advanced by plaintiffs, we cannot
ignore the plain language of the statute.
In the absence of any legislative exemption of minors from the exclusivity
provisions of the workers’ compensation provisions, we are powerless to recognize
any action in tort for minors who are negligently injured while illegally employed or
engaged in illegal tasks. Indeed, La. R.S. 23:1020.1(D)(3) explicitly provides that the
sole authority to liberalize or broaden the workers’ compensation statutes rests
exclusively with the legislature:
(3) According to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
of Louisiana, the legislative powers of the state are vested
solely in the legislature; therefore, when the workers'
compensation statutes of this state are to be amended, the
legislature acknowledges its responsibility to do so. If the
workers' compensation statutes are to be liberalized,
broadened, or narrowed, such actions shall be the
exclusive purview of the legislature. [emphasis added].
As we explained in Vidrine v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 263 La. 300,
336, 268 So. 2d 233, 246 (1972) (on rehearing), there may be instances where
concepts of equity and/or socioeconomic reasons justify a change to the statutory law.
7
However, “this is not a matter for the Court; it addresses itself solely to the legislative
department of our government.”
Accordingly, we must affirm the judgment of the court of appeal insofar as it
reversed the judgment of the district court and held plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy is
under the workers’ compensation law. Any jurisprudence to the contrary is hereby
overruled.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the court of appeal is affirmed.
8
01/30/19
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2018-C-0726
TASHA GRIGGS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR
SON, AUSTIN GRIGGS
VERSUS
BOUNCE N' AROUND INFLATABLES, L.L.C. AND JACK ALAN
LEBLANC
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ASCENSION
JOHNSON, Chief Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.
I am deeply troubled by the majority opinion which holds that a minor child
who is both illegally hired and working in violation of the Child Labor Law, is
denied the right to seek tort compensation against the employer when that child is
injured during the course of employment. I recognize our workers’ compensation
statute applies to “every person performing services arising out of and incidental to
his employment in the course of his … employer's trade, business, or occupation.”1
However, unlike the majority, I find an exception must be made for illegally hired
minors who are injured while performing an illegal task.
In Mott v. River Parish Maintenance, 432 So. 2d 827 (La. 1983), this court
held that a minor who was legally hired, but performing an illegal task at the time
of his injury, was limited to the workers’ compensation remedy. However, this court
also acknowledged some support for a distinction where a minor was illegally hired
as opposed to legally hired but required to perform an illegal task. 432 So. 2d at 832,
n. 5. Noting this distinction, both the Third Circuit in Ewert v. Georgia Casualty &
1
La. R.S. 23:1035(A) (emphasis added).
1
Surety Co., 548 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1989), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 1339 (La.
1989), and the Second Circuit in Patterson v. Martin Forest Products, Inc., 34,258
(La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/00), 774 So. 2d 1148, writ denied, 00-3559 (La. 3/16/01), 787
So. 2d 311, have found withholding tort immunity in the case of illegal employment
justified as a matter of policy. Importantly, minors do not have the ability to contract.
La. C.C. art. 1918. A contract made by a person without legal capacity is relatively
null. La. C.C. art. 1919. To hold that an illegally employed minor only has the right
to recover for injuries through workers' compensation rewards the employer and
penalizes the minor who is unable to legally contract for the employment. However,
as recognized by the courts in Ewert and Patterson, if we allow the minor to elect
whether to recover in workers’ compensation or in tort, the minor is given the right
to either enforce the relatively null contract by seeking recovery under workers’
compensation, or rescind the relatively null contract by seeking a tort remedy. I
wholly agree with the underlying policy decisions in these cases:
A rule which allows the employer of an illegally employed minor to
interpose the exclusive remedy defense to a tort suit is the very opposite
of the principles announced in the above civil code articles. It allows
the employer to benefit from a contract that has been legislatively
condemned. It allows the policy of the worker’s compensation
immunity provisions to triumph totally over the policy of the Child
Labor Law.
This is a case where the workers’ compensation policy of employer tort
immunity clashes head-on with the policy underlying the Child Labor
Law. If one must give way to the other, we believe the Child Labor Law
should prevail. Such a result would conform to the principle stated in
the above code articles. It would avoid the anomaly of rewarding an
employer for illegally employing a minor incapable of contracting. It
would give meaning to the legislative prohibition against certain types
of employment of minors, while at the same time continuing the
protection of exclusivity to employers in those legal employment
situations where the minor is merely assigned a prohibited task. Such a
rule would not be a burden to employers. All that prospective
employers would have to do to avoid tort exposure is exercise simple
care to ascertain the age of their employees.
Ewert, 548 So. 2d at 362. See also, Patterson, 774 So. 2d at 1152.
2
To allow the employer of an illegally employed minor to avoid tort liability
allows the employer to circumvent the policy behind the Child Labor Law and to
exploit the minor by enforcing the equivalent of an unenforceable employment
contract. I cannot support such a holding. I respectfully dissent.
3
01/30/19
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2018-C-0726
TASHA GRIGGS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR
SON, AUSTIN GRIGGS
VERSUS
BOUNCE N’ AROUND INFLATABLES, L.L.C. AND JACK ALAN
LEBLANC
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ASCENSION
Hughes, J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent. The hiring of the minor child was illegal and the work
assigned was illegal. Although workers’ compensation by statute applies to “every
person,” presumably including minors, this one statute conflicts with two other
statutes, one with criminal penalties. I would reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
1
01/30/19
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2018-C-0726
TASHA GRIGGS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF HER MINOR SON, AUSTIN GRIGGS
VERSUS
BOUNCE N' AROUND INFLATABLES, L.L.C.
AND JACK ALAN LEBLANC
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ASCENSION
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion in this case that the statutory language
of La. R.S. 23:1035 in the Workers’ Compensation Act dictates the result of tort
immunity for this employer, and provides for the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy in
workers’ compensation. However, I write separately to note that the employer here
engaged in illegal conduct by hiring a minor without a proper certification, and
allowed the minor to engage in illegal activity by riding on a forklift. I find it
troublesome that despite this illegal activity by the defendant employer, it will still
receive the benefit afforded by workers’ compensation provisions. The per curiam
appropriately notes that the legislature maintains the sole authority to broaden the
statutes to include exemption of minors from the exclusivity of workers’
compensation provisions, but in light of the unfair result mandated in this case, I
emphasize the importance of legislative amendment in this area of the law. I echo
the thoughts of Professor H. Alston Johnson, III in light of the fact that there is no
statutory guidance on this issue and the jurisprudence has been divided:
The legislature should decide whether loss of tort immunity is the
proper sanction for an employer who violates the Child Labor Law. If
so, this sanction should be specifically stated. If not, an appropriate and
specific sanction should be provided. In that process, one should not
1
lose sight of the concept that if a penalty is regarded as too harsh, it
might never be applied, even though some penalty of a lesser nature
would be. In other words, the sanction should fit the violation, or else
the violation might go unpunished.
H. Alston Johnson, III, 13 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Workers’ Compensation
Law and Practice §53 (5th Ed.)
As mentioned, our result today is necessary in light of the plain language of the
statute, but, in my view, gifts the defendant employer - who engaged in illegal
activity - an unfair benefit.
2