James B. Cantrelle, in his official capacity as the President of the Parish of Lafourche v. The Lafourche Parish Council ( 2022 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
T6(d--'
FIRST CIRCUIT
2021 CA 0678
JAMES B. CANTRELLE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PARISH OF LAFOURCHE
VERSUS
THE LAFOURCHE PARISH COUNCIL
JUDGMENT RENDERED:
FEB O 12022
Appealed from
The Seventeenth Judicial District Court
Parish of Lafourche • State of Louisiana
Docket Number 137931 • Division D
The Honorable Christopher J. Boudreaux, Presiding Judge
Kristine Russell COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 1
District Attorney DEFENDANT— Parish of
Lisa Orgeron Lafourche
Joseph S. Soignet
Assistant District Attorneys
Thibodaux, Louisiana
Michael G. Gee COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 2
Mallory Fields Maddocks NOMINAL PLAINTIFF— Archie
Thibodaux, Louisiana Chaisson, III, in his official capacity
as the President of the Parish of
Lafourche
Stephen J. Haedicke COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
New Orleans, Louisiana PLAINTIFF— James B. Cantrelle, in
his individual capacity as a former
employee of the Parish of Lafourche,
and in his official capacity as the
former President of the Parish of
Lafourche
Kristine Russell COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
District Attorney INTERVENOR— Kristine Russell,
Lisa Orgeron in her official capacity as the
Joseph S. Soignet District Attorney for the Parish of
Assistant District Attorneys Lafourche
Thibodaux, Louisiana
tBEFORE: MCCLENDON, WELCH, AND THERIOT9 J.T.
WELCH, J.
In this suit for declaratory judgment and mandatory injunction, the
appellants seek reversal of a judgment ordering the payment of past due
compensation. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Lafourche Parish Government, or the Parish of Lafourche ( the
Parish"), is a political subdivision operating in Lafourche Parish and is governed
by a Home Rule Charter (" Charter").' The Charter provides for the office of the
President of the Parish of Lafourche ( the " Parish President").' The Charter sets the
Parish President' s salary as $ 65, 000. 00, effective January 2008. 3 The Charter also
gives the Lafourche Parish Council ( the " Council") the power to change the Parish
President' s salary, subject to two restrictions: the Council may not enact any
salary ordinance during the last year of their terms in office, nor can any salary
change take effect during the terms of office of the Council members who enact
the change.'
James B. Cantrelle was elected Parish President and assumed office on
January 1, 2016, serving until his term ended on December 31, 2019. During his
term, Mr. Cantrelle— in his official capacity as Parish President— filed suit for
declaratory judgment on March 11, 2019, naming the Council as the sole
defendant. Mr. Cantrelle sought a judicial interpretation of Lafourche Parish
Ordinance No. 5444 (" the ordinance"). The ordinance, adopted by the Council on
April 8, 2014, sought to establish a salary for the Parish President, beginning with
1 See Russell v. Cantrelle, 2018- 1762, 2019- 0815 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 5/ 11/ 20), 303 So. 3d 1081,
1083; see also Russell v. Cantrelle, 2019- 0284 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 2/ 21/ 20), 2020 WL 859515, at
1 ( unpublished).
2 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article III, Section 3. The Executive Branch, A. The
President.
3 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article III, Section 5. Compensation.
4 Id.2
the Parish President' s term of office commencing January 1, 2016 ( i.e., Mr.
Cantrelle' s term). The ordinance provided, in pertinent part:
SECTION 2. The compensation of the Parish
President be established based on the prior year average
compensation of the Parish -wide positions of the
Lafourche Parish Sheriff, Clerk of Court[,] and the
Assessor.
In his petition, Mr. Cantrelle averred that a dispute arose between him and
the Council as to the proper interpretation of the term " compensation" as contained
in the ordinance. Mr. Cantrelle argued that " compensation" referred to the
statutory compensation received by the three referenced officials, while the
Council maintained that " compensation" referred to only the base salaries of those
three officials. Accordingly, Mr. Cantrelle sought a declaration of the proper
interpretation of "compensation":
Mr. Cantrelle] prays that this Honorable Court render
judgment declaring that ... the proper interpretation of
Ordinance 5444 requires that the full statutory
compensation paid to each of the three elected offices
Sheriff, Clerk of Court, and Assessor) must be averaged
to determine the Parish President' s compensation for
each year beginning in January 2016 until the amended
version of Ordinance 5444 takes effect.
A month later, on April 10, 2019, Mr. Cantrelle filed a supplemental and
amended petition for declaratory judgment and mandatory injunction against the
Council. He did not name any new defendants. Mr. Cantrelle reiterated his prayer
for a declaration of the proper interpretation of "compensation" as contained in the
ordinance.5 Mr. Cantrelle requested that a mandatory injunction issue consistent
5 Mr. Cantrelle prayed as follows:
Petitioner seeks a declaratory judgment declaring that until the
commencement of the next term of office on January 1, 2020, Ordinance 5444
must be interpreted to include both the base salary and other statutorily authorized
payments as the " compensation" for the three elected offices ( Sheriff, Clerk of
Court, and Assessor). The judgment should provide that proper interpretation of
Ordinance 5444 requires that the full statutory compensation paid to each of these
offices must be averaged to determine the Parish President' s compensation, and
not just the base salaries paid to these offices. The judgment should further
provide that this interpretation of the Ordinance controls the Parish President' s
salary for the years 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019.
3
with the declaratory judgment that ordered " Lafourche Parish" to pay him the
correct salary amount for the year 2019, as well as any back pay owed to him
under the correct interpretation of the ordinance for the years 2016, 2017, and
2018. 6
On April 16, 2019, Kristine Russell, in her official capacity as the District
Attorney for the Parish of Lafourche, filed a petition for intervention, which the
district court granted in an order signed on April 17, 2019. As intervenor, the
District Attorney filed various exceptions to Mr. Cantrelle' s original and amended
petitions, including a dilatory exception raising the objection of lack of procedural
capacity, alleging that the Council was merely the legislative branch of the Parish
and did not have the capacity to sue or be sued under the Charter. She also raised
the objection of prematurity, arguing that because Mr. Cantrelle filed suit in his
official capacity as Parish President, he was bound by the provisions of the Charter
to seek Council approval before initiating litigation and obtaining counsel for
himself. The District Attorney filed a declinatory exception raising insufficiency
of service of process, alleging that Mr. Cantrelle' s petitions had only been served
on the Council' s clerk, who was not a designated agent for service of process and
did not have authority to accept service on behalf of a nonjuridical entity, the
Council. The District Attorney filed a peremptory exception raising the objection
of no cause of action, arguing that a judgment could not be obtained against a non -
juridical entity, the Council. The District Attorney also raised the objection of
prescription, arguing that the three-year liberative prescriptive period set forth in
La. C. C. P. art. 3494 applied to Mr. Cantrelle' s claim for monetary damages raised
6 Mr. Cantrelle' s request that the Parish pay him past due compensation, raised as a request for
mandatory injunction— and brought in conjunction with his declaratory judgment action— was
an appropriate method of demanding " further relief' as provided for in La. C. C. P. art. 1871, in
the event that Mr. Cantrelle prevailed on his demand for declaratory relief. See Fishbein v.
State ex rel. Louisiana State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 2004- 2482 ( La. 4/ 12/ 05), 898 So. 2d
1260, 1272- 73 ( citin Chauvet v. City of Westwego, 599 So. 2d 294, 296 ( La. 1992) ( per
curiam)).
4
in his supplemental and amended petition.' The District Attorney contended that
all claims for compensation due Mr. Cantrelle that were earned prior to April 10,
2016— three years before he first made the request in his supplemental and
amended petition— were prescribed.'
Mr. Cantrelle answered the District Attorney' s petition for intervention,
entering general denials. He also filed a peremptory exception raising the
objection of no cause of action, arguing that the Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibited the District Attorney from taking a position adverse to the
Parish President, describing himself as the District Attorney' s " purported statutory
client." Mr. Cantrelle further argued that the District Attorney lacked standing to
intervene in this matter because she was an unaffected third party who had no
interest in his declaratory judgment and mandatory injunction suit.'
The district court held a hearing on all exceptions on August 16, 2019. In a
judgment signed on October 23, 2019, the trial court denied Mr. Cantrelle' s
peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action and also denied
the District Attorney' s dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity. As
to the District Attorney' s dilatory exception raising the objection of lack of
procedural capacity, declinatory exception raising the objection of insufficiency of
service of process, and peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of
action— the trial court granted the exceptions as to the request for mandatory
injunction, but denied the exceptions as to the request for declaratory judgment.
The trial court also granted the District Attorney' s objection of prescription for all
7 Louisiana Civil Code article 3494( 1) sets forth that "[ a] n action for the recovery of
compensation for services rendered" is " subject to a liberative prescription of three years[.]"
8 Mr. Cantrelle opposed the District Attorney' s exceptions.
9 The District Attorney opposed Mr. Cantrelle' s exception. Mr. Cantrelle filed a reply to the
opposition, which the District Attorney rebutted.
5
of Mr. Cantrelle' s claims arising before March 11, 2016. 10 The trial court granted
Mr. Cantrelle sixty days to amend his petitions to remove the grounds upon which
the granted exceptions were based.
On October 9, 2019, Mr. Cantrelle filed a second supplemental and amended
petition for declaratory judgment and mandatory injunction. Mr. Cantrelle filed
this petition in both his official capacity as the Parish President and in his
individual capacity as an employee of the Parish. He again named the Council as a
defendant, but also added the Parish of Lafourche a/ k/ a Lafourche Parish as a
defendant. Mr. Cantrelle reiterated his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
raised in his prior petitions. The Parish filed an answer, and re -urged the dilatory
exception raising the objection of lack of procedural capacity as to the Council.
Mr. Cantrelle' s term in office as the Parish President expired on December
31, 2019. Thereafter, the new Parish President— Archie Chaisson, III—was
substituted as party plaintiff in place of Mr. Cantrelle, in his official capacity as
Parish President. The substitution did not affect Mr. Cantrelle' s rights in his
individual capacity as a former employee of the Parish.
On February 11, 2020, the district court held a trial on Mr. Cantrelle' s
1
request for declaratory judgment.' Following the introduction of evidence and
argument of counsel, the district court declared the meaning of "compensation" as
contained in the ordinance to be:
The Court hereby declares the meaning of Lafourche
Parish Ordinance No. 5444, and determines that the
compensation owed to the Lafourche Parish President
pursuant [ to] said ordinance shall include, in the
calculation, all supplemental pay, compensation[,] or
10 Mr. Cantrelle fled his original suit for declaratory judgment on March 11, 2019. Pursuant to
La. C. C. art. 3494( 1)' s three- year prescriptive period, all claims arising three years prior to that
date would be prescribed.
11 See La. C. C. P. arts. 1871, 1879, and 2592; see also Apasra Properties, LLC v. City of New
Orleans, 2009- 0709 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 2/ 11/ 10), 31 So. 3d 615, 626- 27 (" A claim for declaratory
relief is not a summary proceeding; it requires a trial on the merits where each party has an
opportunity to present evidence in a form other than verified pleadings and affidavits.").
0
benefits received by the Sheriff, Clerk of Court, and
Assessor, for whatever reason.
The district court signed a judgment in accordance with its oral ruling on March
23, 2020. 12
On April 16, 2020, the district court granted Mr. Cantrelle leave to file a
third amended and supplemental petition for declaratory judgment, mandatory
injunction, and relief under La. R.S. 23: 631- 32. Therein, Mr. Cantrelle again
asserted his entitlement to monetary damages, specifically past due wages, due to
him during his term of office as the Parish President under the district court' s
declared interpretation of the ordinance. Mr. Cantrelle also sought penalties and
attorney' s fees based on the Parish' s alleged failure to pay what is due him under
the terms of his former employment by the Parish, pursuant to La. R.S. 23: 631-
32. 13 Mr. Cantrelle incorporated by reference all other allegations from his second
supplemental and amended petition.
Mr. Chaisson filed an answer to Mr. Cantrelle' s third amended and
supplemental petition, entering general denials. The Parish also filed an answer to
Mr. Cantrelle' s third amended and supplemental petition. The Parish argued that
La. R.S. 23: 631- 32 did not apply to Mr. Cantrelle' s claims since he held public
office and was thus exempted from the wage payment provisions set forth in those
statutes. 14 In its answer, the Parish also raised the affirmative defenses of accord
and satisfaction and contributory and/ or comparative fault of Mr. Cantrelle, for his
acts in calculating, proposing, certifying, and accepting the compensation he
received during his term in office as Parish President. The Parish argued that to
the extent Mr. Cantrelle' s compensation deviated from the amounts claimed in his
12 See La. C. C. P. art. 1871.
13 At the hearing on the mandatory injunction, Mr. Cantrelle stipulated that this claim was
abandoned.
14 In support of its argument, the Parish cited La. R.S. 23: 1034( B) of the Louisiana Workers'
Compensation Law, which exempts public officials from workers' compensation coverage.
7
amending petitions, it was solely due to his own negligence and lack of due
diligence. The Parish contended that the Parish President proposes a yearly budget
to the Council, which includes a certification of his own salary, for which the
Parish President is solely responsible.
Mr. Chaisson also filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of
prescription as to Mr. Cantrelle' s claims for past due wages arising three years
prior to October 9, 2019. Mr. Chaisson argued that until Mr. Cantrelle filed his
second supplemental and amended petition on October 9, 2019— wherein he
finally named the Parish as a defendant— Mr. Cantrelle had not yet named the
proper party defendant in this litigation. Mr. Chaisson argued that the October 9,
2019 second supplemental and amending petition did not relate back to the original
filing date of the declaratory action on March 11, 2019. Because the Council and
the Parish are not solidary obligors or joint tortfeasors, he argued that suit against
the Council (the originally named defendant) did not interrupt prescription as to the
claims against the Parish. Furthermore, Mr. Chaisson contended that the original
petition did not contain a claim for monetary damages, but merely sought
declaratory judgment. The Parish joined Mr. Chaisson in urging the objection of
prescription.
On March 15, 2021, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Mr.
Cantrelle' s remaining claims for mandatory injunction and monetary damages. 15
At the start of the hearing, the district court sustained Mr. Chaisson and the
Parish' s objection of prescription for all of Mr. Cantrelle' s claims arising more
than three years prior to April 10, 2019, the filing date of the supplemental and
amended petition, wherein Mr. Cantrelle first sought a mandatory injunction and
15 See La. C. C. P. arts. 3601 and 3602; see also Concerned Citizens for Proper Plan., LLC v.
Par. of Tangipahoa, 2004- 0270, 2004- 0249 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 3/ 24/ 05), 906 So.2d 660, 664 (" A
mandatory injunction, so named because it commands the doing of some action, cannot be issued
without a hearing on the merits.... [ T] he party must show by a preponderance of the evidence at
an evidentiary hearing that he is entitled to the preliminary injunction.").
8
monetary damages. Thereafter, the district court heard witness testimony and
entered exhibits into evidence, including an exhibit proffered by Mr. Chaisson.
Following the hearing, the district court gave oral reasons for ruling and took
the matter under advisement to prepare a judgment. Thereafter, the district court
rendered judgment on March 30, 2021, in favor of Mr. Cantrelle and against the
Parish16 for past due compensation in the following amounts: $ 46, 272. 00 for 2016
prorated from April 10, 2016); $ 49, 555. 00 for 2017; $ 54, 749. 00 for 2018; and
30, 662. 00 for 2019. The district court assessed legal interest on $ 150, 576. 00 for
the years 2016- 2018 ( commencing April 10, 2019), and on $ 30, 662. 00 for the year
2019 ( commencing January 1, 2020). 17
The Parish" and Mr. Chaisson now appeal. 19
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of the declaratory judgment articles of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to rights, status, and other legal relations, and they are to be liberally
construed and administered. La. C. C. P. art. 1881; Blanchard v. Blanchard, 2012-
0106 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 12/ 31/ 12), 112 So. 3d 243, 255, writ denied, 2013- 0488 ( La.
4/ 12/ 13), 111 So. 3d 1013. We review a trial court' s decision to grant or deny a
declaratory judgment under the " abuse of discretion" standard of review. Mai v.
Floyd, 2005- 2301 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 6/ 06), 951 So. 2d 244, 245, writ denied,
16 The district court' s March 30, 2021 judgment referred to the Parish as the " Lafourche Parish
Consolidated Government."
17 The district court showed its calculations set forth in its March 30, 2021 judgment in an exhibit
attached to the judgment labeled, " Exhibit A." We have attached the judgment, Ex. A to the
judgment, and an " Explainer" of Ex. A to this court' s opinion.
18 The Parish of Lafourche filed a motion for a suspensive appeal of the district court' s March
30, 2021 judgment. The district court signed an order of appeal on April 15, 2021, notice of
which was transmitted by the Clerk of Court on April 16, 2021.
19 Mr. Chaisson filed a motion for a suspensive appeal of the district court' s March 30, 2021
judgment. The district court signed an order of appeal on April 30, 2021, notice of which was
transmitted by the Clerk of Court on May 3, 2021.
0
2007- 0581 ( La. 5/ 4/ 07), 956 So. 2d 619. The scope of appellate review under the
abuse of discretion" standard is confined to a determination of whether or not the
trial court abused its discretion by granting or refusing to render a declaratory
1St
judgment. Roper v. E. Baton Rouge Metro. Council, 2015- 0178 ( La. App.
Cir. 11/ 6/ 15), 183 So. 3d 550, 553, writ denied, 2015- 2231 ( La. 2/ 5/ 16), 186 So. 3d
1166.
A mandatory injunction is one that commands the doing of some action, and
cannot be issued without a hearing on the merits. The jurisprudence has
established that a mandatory preliminary injunction has the same basic effect as a
permanent injunction, thus, it may not be issued on merely a prima facie showing
that the party seeking the injunction can prove the necessary elements. Instead, the
party seeking a mandatory injunction must show by a preponderance of the
evidence20 at an evidentiary hearing that he is entitled to the preliminary
injunction. City of Baton Rouge/ Par. of E. Baton Rouge v. 200 Gov' t St., LLC,
2008- 0510 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 9/ 23/ 08), 995 So. 2d 32, 36, writ denied, 2008- 2554
La. 1/ 9/ 09), 998 So. 2d 726. The issuance of a mandatory preliminary injunction
addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed
on review unless a clear abuse of discretion has been shown. Concerned Citizens
for Proper Plan., LLC v. Par. of Tangipahoa, 2004- 0270, 2004- 0249 ( La. App.
1St Cir. 3/ 24/ 05), 906 So. 2d 660, 663. Where the standard of review is an abuse of
discretion, the role of the reviewing court is not to determine what it considers to
be an appropriate award, but rather it is to review the exercise of discretion by the
trier of fact. Covington v. McNeese State Univ., 2012- 2182 ( La. 5/ 7/ 13), 118
So. 3d 343, 351.
21 Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence, taken as a whole, shows
that the fact or cause sought to be proven is more probable than not. Crowell v. City of
Alexandria Through Snyder, 558 So. 2d 216, 218 ( La. 1990).
10
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Parish' s Assignment of Error 1: Interpretation of Ordinance 5444
In its first assignment of error, the Parish contends that the district court
erred in its interpretation of the term " based on" contained in the ordinance. The
Parish argues that the trial court interpreted " based on" to mean that the ordinance
guarantees the President a specific salary. The Parish avers that the ordinance
should be interpreted to mean that the Parish President' s salary be " based on" the
average salaries of Sheriff, Clerk of Court, and Assessor as a starting point, subject
to the mandatory budgetary process outlined in the Charter.
The statutory and jurisprudential rules for statutory construction and
1St
interpretation apply to ordinances. See Varner v. Day, 2000- 2104 ( La. App.
Cir. 12/ 28/ 01), 806 So. 2d 121, 125. The function of statutory interpretation and
the construction given to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the
government. Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 95- 2895 ( La. 5/ 20/ 97), 694 So. 2d
184, 186. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce
the intent of the legislative body. See Succession of Boyter, 99- 0761 ( La. 1/ 7/ 00),
756 So. 2d 1122, 1128. Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and,
thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative
intent. Id. The paramount consideration in statutory interpretation is
ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted
the legislative body to enact the law. See Theriot, 694 So. 2d at 186.
The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the
statute itself. Id. " When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does
not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature." La. C. C. art.
9. However, " when the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it
must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the
law." La. C. C. art. 10. When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning
must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the
law as a whole, and laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in
reference to each other. La. R.S. 1: 3; La. C. C. arts. 12 and 13; Pumphrey v. City
of New Orleans, 2005- 0979 ( La. 4/ 4/ 06), 925 So. 2d 1202, 1210. The meaning
and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other
laws on the same subject matter and placing a construction on the provision in
question that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious
intent of the legislature in enacting it. Pumph rey, 925 So.2d at 1210.
A legislative body is presumed to enact each statute with deliberation and
with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. See State v.
Campbell, 2003- 3035 ( La. 7/ 6/ 04), 877 So. 2d 112, 117. Thus, legislative
language will be interpreted on the assumption the legislative body was aware of
statutes and ordinances, well- established principles of statutory
existing
construction, and with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view.
Id. Where it is possible, courts have a duty in the interpretation of a statute or
ordinance to adopt a construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with other
provisions dealing with the same subject matter. See La. C. C. art. 13; see also
City of New Orleans v. Louisiana Assessors' Retirement and Relief Fund,
2005- 2548 ( La. 10/ 1/ 07), 986 So. 2d 1, 15.
Lafourche Parish Ordinance 5444 provides, in pertinent part:
ORDINANCE No. 5444
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING AND RE-
ENACTING CHAPTER 2— ADMINISTRATION,
ARTICLE III - PROVISIONS GOVERNING
OPERATIONS OF PARISH GOVERNING BODY,
DIVISION I - GENERALLY, SECTION 2- 68
PARISH PRESIDENT' S SALARY) OF THE
LAFOURCHE PARISH CODE OF ORDINANCES,
AS IT PERTAINS TO ESTABLISHING THE
SALARY OF THE LAFOURCHE PARISH
12
PRESIDENT, EFFECTIVE WITH THE NEXT
TERM OF OFFICE, YEAR 2016.
WHEREAS, the Parish President' s salary was last
established in 2005 by Ordinance No. 3545[,] which
increased the annual salary to $ 65, 000. 00; and
WHEREAS, Chapter 2, Article II1, Division 1,
Section 2- 68 ( Parish President' s Salary) of the Lafourche
Parish Code of Ordinances allows the Council to change
the annual salary of the Parish President by ordinance;
and
WHEREAS, the compensation rates for the
Parish -wide positions of the Sheriff, Clerk of Court[,]
and Assessor are established on an annual basis in
accordance with a predetermined formula approved by
the State Legislature; therefore
BE IT ORDAINED, by the Lafourche Parish
Council, which convened in regular session on April 8,
2014, that:
SECTION 1. This Ordinance
hereby does
establish the Parish President' s salary effective with the
next term of office, Year 2016.
SECTION 2. The Compensation of the Parish
President be established based on the prior year average
compensation of the Parish -wide positions of the
Lafourche Parish Sheriff, Clerk of Court[,] and the
Assessor.
SECTION 3. The Human Resources Director
shall annually certify the compensation of each of these
elected positions ( Sheriff, Clerk of Court, Assessor)
beginning in August 2015 and each August thereafter to
average and set the compensation of the Parish President
taking office in January 2016 and each year thereafter.
SECTION 4. All Ordinances or parts of
Ordinances by the Lafourche Parish Council conflicting
with or inconsistent with the provisions of these
regulations are hereby repealed.
SECTION 7. This Ordinance shall become
effective January 1, 2016.
By a vote of 7- 1 ( with one Council member absent), the Council approved the
ordinance on April 14, 2014.
13
The Parish argues that the district court failed to reconcile its interpretation
of the ordinance with the provisions of the Charter. In prior versions of ordinances
setting the salary of the Parish President, the ordinances set forth a specific dollar
amount for the salary. In contrast, Ordinance 5444 adopted a formula to be used in
calculating the Parish President' s salary (" based on the prior year average
compensation of the Parish -wide positions of the Lafourche Parish Sheriff, Clerk
of Court[,] and the Assessor"). The Parish contends that the ordinance' s adoption
of a formula involves the appropriation of funds, making the Parish President' s
salary subject to legislative deliberation under the mandatory budgetary process set
forth in the Charter. The Parish avers that the mandatory budget adoption and
amendment procedure contained in the Charter is the " exclusive method for
21
appropriation of the Parish' s funds."
The Parish further argues that the use of the term " based on" rather than the
mandatory term " shall" in the ordinance indicates that the drafters intended that the
Parish President' s salary be determined through the deliberative, mandatory
budgetary process set forth in the Charter. The Parish contends that the formula
averaging the salaries of the three officials is " the starting point for, and not the
final determination of, the Parish President' s salary." The Parish argues that the
President as part of his annual budget proposal submits his salary to the Council.
The Council then has a duty to adopt a balanced budget and may thus amend or
adopt any line item. The Parish argues that this is " essentially a constitutional
function reserved to the Council, which cannot be removed or modified by mere
ordinance."
The Charter mandates that the Parish must adopt an annual operating budget
and an annual capital budget.22 Article VI, Section I of the Charter outlines the
21 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets.
22 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article III, Section 7. Budget.
14
procedure for the proposal and adoption of the annual budgets. 23 Under Article VI,
Section 1( A), the Parish President has the " mandatory duty to prepare the proposed
Parish budgets," which must be balanced.24 The Parish President must submit a
line item operating budget and capital budget to the Council at least ninety days
before the beginning of each fiscal year."
Thereafter, the Council has " a mandatory duty to take action on each budget
no later than thirty ( 30) calendar days prior to the commencement of the ensuing
fiscal year. ,26 The Council may amend a budget, which must be balanced as
amended. A budget is enacted " when it is voted upon favorably by at least a
majority ( 5) of the voting members of the Council. If the Council fails to timely
enact a budget, it shall be finally adopted as submitted by the President." 27
The Parish President then has a mandatory duty— no later than ten days after
the expiration of the Council' s thirty -day period to act on a budget— to either sign
the budget or veto any line item and sign approval of the remainder of the budget. 18
Any line item veto by the Parish President affects only an amendment made by the
Council to a budget, not any line item as originally submitted by the President. 29
The President must note any action taken on each budget, and return it to the
Council. If the President vetoes any item, he must prepare written reasons to attach
to the budget prior to returning it to the Council. If the President fails to timely act
23 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets.
24 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article Vl, Section 1. The Annual Budgets, A.
Budget Preparation; Balanced Budget.
25 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets, B.
Submittal of Budgets.
26 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets, E.
Council Action on the Submitted Budgets, 4. Enactment of the Budgets by the Council.
27 Id.28 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets, F.
Action of the President on an Enacted Budget, 1.
29 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets, F.
Action of the President on an Enacted Budget, 1( b).
15
on a budget, it shall be finally adopted as enacted by the Council.30
The Council may then reconsider any vetoed line item at its next meeting,
provided that such meeting take place prior to the beginning of the ensuing fiscal
year.
If the Council successfully overrides a Presidential veto ( by a two-thirds
majority, i.e., six voting members), the Council must ensure that the resulting
budget is balanced. 31
A budget is adopted when: ( 1) the Council fails to timely enact ( as outlined
above); ( 2) the President fails to timely act ( as outlined above); ( 3) the President
signs a budget; ( 4) the President exercises line item veto power, and the Council
fails to hold a meeting to override; or ( 5) the President exercises line item veto
power, and the Council holds a meeting to override the veto, either succeeding or
failing to do so. 32 A finally adopted budget becomes executory on the first day of
the ensuing fiscal year.33
At the hearing on Mr. Cantrelle' s mandatory injunction, the following
exchange occurred:
Counsel for the Parish]
Let me rephrase. [ The ordinance] doesn' t say that
the [ P] arish [ P] resident salary is guaranteed to be the
average of the compensation paid to the [ C] lerk,
S] heriff, [ A] ssessor, right? It doesn' t say it is
guaranteed.
The District Court]
But that' s the way I interpret it, counsel.
Counsel for the Parish]
True.
The District Court]
30 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets, F.
Action of the President on an Enacted Budget, 2.
31 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets, G.
Council Action to Override a Presidential Veto.
32 Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets, H. Final
Adoption of the Budgets, 1- 5.
33 Id.16
So you don' t need to play those word games based
on it' s clear. It' s a clear directive. That' s what he' s
entitled to.
To adopt the Parish' s suggested interpretation of the " based on" language
would ignore the plain language of the ordinance and its structure as whole and
would render the ordinance discretionary, despite the mandatory language
contained therein. The ordinance provides that the " Lafourche Parish Code of
Ordinances allows the Council to change the annual salary of the Parish President
by ordinance...." ( Emphasis added). Section 1 of the ordinance states "[ t] his
Ordinance does hereby establish the Parish President' s salary...." ( Emphasis
added). The plain language of the ordinance establishes that the ordinance is the
exclusive method by which the Parish President' s salary be set. If the drafters of
the ordinance intended that the Parish President' s salary be set according to the
budgetary process outlined in the Charter, it could have included that language in
the ordinance; it did not.
It is also clear that the drafters of the ordinance intended that the ordinance
establish a formula by which the Parish President' s salary could be determined
with certainty each year. The ordinance provides that " the compensation rates for
the Parish -wide positions of the Sheriff, Clerk of Court[,] and Assessor are
established on an annual basis in accordance with a predetermined formula
approved by the State Legislature[.]" This clearly shows that the purpose of the
ordinance was to establish a similar " predetermined formula" to calculate the
Parish President' s salary— specifically, "[ t] he compensation of the Parish President
be established based on the prior year average compensation of the Parish -wide
positions of the Lafourche Parish Sheriff, Clerk of Court[,] and the Assessor." The
ordinance' s use of the term " based on" here conforms to a practical understanding
that the " predetermined formula approved by the State Legislature" used to
establish, with certainty, the salaries of the three referenced officials may change
17
year to year. Accordingly, the salary of the Parish President may change year to
year using the formula set forth in the ordinance.
Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of the trial court' s discretion in its
interpretation of the ordinance. See Concerned Citizens for Proper Plan., LLC,
906 So. 2d at 663.
Parish' s Assignment of Error 2: Negligence/ Accord & Satisfaction
In its second assignment of error, the Parish argues that the district court
erred in calculating the compensation owed to Mr. Cantrelle by failing to recognize
that two affirmative defenses raised by the Parish in its answer to Mr. Cantrelle' s
third amended and supplemental petition precluded Mr. Cantrelle' s recovery. The
Parish argues that because Mr. Cantrelle set forth specific figures for his salaries in
his annual budget proposals that were submitted to the Council, any negligence in
the calculation and certification of those proposed salaries is entirely the fault of
Mr. Cantrelle. The Parish further argues that the salaries Mr. Cantrelle received
for his service in office were exactly what he proposed to the Council in his annual
budget proposals, therefore, a form of accord and satisfaction occurred, and the
received salary payments were tendered in full settlement of this dispute. Every
year Mr. Cantrelle served in office— except for the year 2018 when the Council
exercised its line item veto power to reduce the amount— Mr. Cantrelle received
34
the salary he proposed.
Louisiana courts have adopted a duty -risk analysis in determining whether to
34 When Mr. Cantrelle began his term in 2016, his compensation had already been set for the
year 2016 by the prior administration. The Parish President salary proposed for the year 2020 by
Mr. Cantrelle was the first year of the Chaisson administration. The Parish contends that Mr.
Cantrelle was paid the exact amounts he submitted in his budget proposals for the years 2017 and
2019.
18
35
impose liability under general negligence principles. Lemann v. Essen Lane
Daiquiris, Inc., 2005- 1095 ( La. 3/ 10/ 06), 923 So. 2d 627, 632- 33. A negative
answer to any of the inquiries of the duty -risk analysis results in a determination of
no liability. See Bellanger V. Webre, 2010- 0720 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 5/ 6/ 11), 65
So. 3d 201, 207, writ denied, 2011- 1171 ( La. 9/ 16/ 11), 69 So. 3d 1149.
The doctrine of accord and satisfaction estops a creditor from suing on a
compromised debt. For there to be a valid accord and satisfaction of a debt or
claim, there must be: ( 1) a disputed claim; ( 2) a tender of a check for less than the
amount of the claim by the debtor, and ( 3) an acceptance of the tender by the
creditor. Complete Med. Sys., L.L.C. v. Health Net Fed. Servs., L.L.C., 2013-
0367 ( La. App. Pt Cir. 11/ 1/ 13), 136 So. 3d 807, 810- 11. Essential to finding that a
valid accord and satisfaction occurred is a showing that the creditor understood
that the payment was tendered in full settlement of the dispute. Thus, an accord
and satisfaction is not present if there is no evidence that the creditor was fully
informed of the nature of the compromise offer by the debtor. Id. at 811. Accord
and satisfaction is an affirmative defense, and the party who asserts this defense
shall be held to the strict proof thereof. See La. C. C. art. 1005. The party who
pleads the defense has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence.
In cases where its applicability is in doubt, it will not be applied. See Reily Elec.
Supply, Inc. v. Hollenberg, 535 So. 2d 1321, 1323 ( La. App. 5" Cir. 1988), writ
denied, 540 So. 2d 331 ( La. 1989).
Section 3 of the ordinance provides that the " Human Resources Director
35 For liability to attach under a duty -risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove five separate elements:
1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard of care ( or the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff) (the duty element); ( 2) the defendant failed to
conform his conduct to the appropriate standard ( or breached the requisite duty) ( the breach
element); ( 3) the defendant' s substandard conduct was a cause -in -fact of the harm or the
plaintiff' s injuries ( the cause -in -fact element); ( 4) the risk of harm was within the scope of
protection afforded by the duty breached ( the scope of the duty, scope of protection, or legal
cause element); and ( 5) actual damages ( damages element). See Bellanger v. Webre, 2010-
0720 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 6/ 11), 65 So. 3d 201, 207, writ denied, 2011- 1171 ( La. 9/ 16/ 11), 69
So. 3d 1149; see also Lazard v. Foti, 2002- 2888 ( La. 10/ 21/ 03), 859 So. 2d 656, 659.
19
shall annually certify the compensation of each of these elected positions ( Sheriff,
Clerk of Court, Assessor) beginning in August 2015 and each August thereafter to
average and set the compensation of the Parish President taking office in January
2016 and each year thereafter." At the evidentiary hearing, Thomas Lynn
Lasseigne testified that he served as Mr. Cantrelle' s Human Resources Director in
2016 and 2017. Mr. Lasseigne officially participated in certifying the Parish
President' s salary one time— in 2016, for the proposed 2017 budget.
When Mr. Cantrelle began his term in 2016, his compensation had already
been set for the year 2016 by the prior administration. The 2016 proposed and
enacted salary for the Parish President was $ 122, 341. 00. During that first year in
office, Mr. Lasseigne began reviewing public reports from the Office of the
Louisiana Legislative Auditor showing the compensation of the Sheriff, Clerk of
Court, and Assessor to be used to average and establish the compensation of the
Parish President for the upcoming 2017 fiscal year, since Mr. Lasseigne " was
going to have to figure it out as HR director[.]" In reviewing the legislative auditor
reports, Mr. Lasseigne discovered that Mr. Cantrelle' s 2016 enacted salary was too
low pursuant to the formula set forth in the ordinance. Mr. Lassigne testified that
two reasons accounted for the inaccurate salary amount: 1) the then -unresolved
dispute as to what amounts were included in " compensation;" and 2) timing of the
receipt of the legislative auditor reports containing the compensation of two of the
referenced officials ( specifically, the Sheriff and the Clerk of Court, whose fiscal
years run from July 1 to June 30, instead of the Parish and Assessor' s January 1 to
December 31 fiscal years).
The 2017 proposed and enacted Parish President salary was $ 142, 502. 00.
Mr. Lassigne testified that after enacting the 2017 budgets, the Parish President' s
compensation would have to be adjusted to account for the six- month delay of
receipt of the enacted salaries of the Sheriff and Clerk of Court needed to
20
accurately calculate the Parish President' s compensation. Mr. Lasseigne testified
that he believed the proper way to fix the discrepancy was through a budget
amendment. Mr. Lasseigne spoke to the district attorney as to how to go about this
process and later emailed the Parish' s Director of Finance, Carrel F. Hymel, III,
indicating that adjustments needed to be made to the Parish President' s salary.
At some point in 2017, an attempt was made to reimburse Mr. Cantrell for
the salary discrepancies via an internal budget amendment, as opposed to a formal
budget amendment, since " there was money in the budget," and the ordinance was
not properly followed. The Parish issued Mr. Cantrelle two checks in an agreed-
upon total amount of $ 22, 775. 70 for the 2016 and 2017 salary discrepancies;
however, the Parish requested that Mr. Cantrelle pay that amount back, which he
r
The 2018 proposed Parish President salary was $ 157, 255. 00. After the
Council received the proposed 2018 budgets, it amended the proposed Parish
President' s salary to $ 124, 376. 00. The President exercised his line -item veto
power of the Council amendment; the Council then overrode the Parish President' s
veto. The 2018 enacted amount for the Parish President' s salary was $ 124, 376. 00.
The 2019 proposed and enacted Parish President' s salary was $ 160, 536. 00.
Then in 2019, Mr. Cantrelle initiated his suit for declaratory judgment, and
amended his petition to request a mandatory injunction, alleging that he was
underpaid pursuant to the ordinance establishing the Parish President' s
compensation.
Following the conclusion of evidence at the hearing, the district court
reasoned:
The Court does not accept the argument that because our
P] arish is governed by a Home Rule Charter[,] which
has the equivalency of a constitution[,] which I agree
with..., but I don' t think it defeats the claim here. The
Court cannot accept that as a prohibition against paying
21
what is owed. The issue really would be is it owed[,] or
is the plaintiff guilty of some sort of[,] whether you want
to call it contributory negligence, failure to do due
diligence, such things, the Court will not find that any
failures on the part of the plaintiff constituted a defense
to the amount owed. This was clearly [ an ordinance] that
needed interpretation. It was not clear....
The [ Council] itself denied the proposal that was
submitted based upon an attempted interpretation of this
ordinance]. So the Court does not fault the [ P] arish
P] resident or [ his] administration from not properly
calculating it clearly. It was not the fault of the [ P] arish
P] resident in 2016.That was a budget submitted by the
previous administration[,]and the [ C] ourt can clearly
understand that the difficulties in attempting to calculate
it as testified to by Mr. Lasseigne because of the
difference in the fiscal years between the parties and the
clear confusion because of the various benefits [ enjoyed
by the three referenced officials].
It' s my understanding the ordinance was amended. The
Court cannot ... fault the administration for not knowing
how to calculate it. In fact, I think the administration did
the right thing in returning the payment when it was
called into question and submitting this petition for
declaratory judgment to try to resolve these matters.
We agree with the district court that Mr. Cantrelle is not at fault for the
discrepancies in the Parish President' s compensation contained in the budgets he
submitted to the Council for the years in question. The record clearly demonstrates
that calculating the Parish President' s salary in actual practice posed significant
problems since the compensation for two of the referenced officials essential for
use in the ordinance' s formula were either not available or not finalized in a public
report format at the time the Parish President was required to submit his proposed
budgets to the Council as required by the Charter ( at least ninety days before the
latest36).
beginning of each fiscal year, i.e., by September 1 at the This is further
evidenced by the fact that the Council ultimately amended Ordinance 5444 to
36 See Lafourche Parish Home Rule Charter, Article VI, Section 1. The Annual Budgets, B.
Submittal of Budgets.
22
address the problem in the ordinance' s practical application. 37 We would not
deprive the Parish President of his compensation because he did not have all the
information at the time to calculate the exact amount. For these reasons, we do not
find that the district court erred in its determination that the affirmative defenses
raised by the Parish precluded Mr. Cantrelle' s recovery.
Chaisson' s Assignments of Error 1- 3: Interpretation and Application of
Ordinance; Proffered Exhibit
In his first three assignments of error, Mr. Chaisson argues that the district
court erred in its interpretation and application of the ordinance. Mr. Chaisson
contends that while the district court ruled that the compensation owed to the
Parish President pursuant to the ordinance included all supplemental pay,
compensation, or benefits, the district court actually failed to consider all
supplemental pay, compensation, or benefits when performing its calculation.
Specifically, Mr. Chaisson proffered an exhibit of excerpts from the legislative
auditor reports showing the amounts received by the Parish President during his
term in office, which Mr. Chaisson argues the district court should have used in
calculating any back pay owed to Mr. Cantrelle. Mr. Chaisson contends that the
district court erred in excluding his proffered exhibit as not relevant.
Mr. Cantrelle argues in response that the district court did consider all
relevant information from the proffered exhibit as is evidenced by the district
court' s oral reasons for ruling and Exhibit A attached to the district court' s final
judgment in this matter. In fact, Mr. Chaisson himself admits in his appellant brief
that " even though the Court felt that the Legislative Auditor' s report regarding the
total compensation paid for Mr. Cantrelle was not relevant to his calculation, the
Court did take a look at and rely on the proffer when trying to make a
determination regarding retirement and/ or deferred compensation plan."
37 That amendment to the ordinance is not a part of this record, nor is it at issue in this appeal.
23
The purpose of a proffer is to preserve excluded testimony or evidence for
appellate review. See La. C. C. P. art. 1636; see also Magee v. Pittman, 98- 1164
La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 12/ 00), 761 So. 2d 731, 742, writs denied, 2000- 1684, 2000-
1694 ( La. 9/ 22/ 00), 768 So. 2d 31, 602. It is well- settled that a trial court is
afforded vast discretion with regard to evidentiary rulings, and the court' s decision
to admit or deny evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
that discretion. Danna v. Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co., L.L.C., 2020- 0116, 2020-
0187, 2020- 0318 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 3/ 24/ 21), So. 3d 5,
2021 WL
1159726, at * 7, writs denied, 2021- 00713, 2021- 00714 ( La. 10/ 1/ 21), 324 So. 3d
1053 and 1059; see also Pittman v. Flanagan, 2019- 0038 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
9/ 27/ 19), 287 So. 3d 721, 728. Based on our review of the record and the proffered
exhibit, we cannot find that the district court abused its vast discretion in excluding
the proffered exhibit as alleged by Mr. Chaisson. These assignments of error are
without merit.
Chaisson' s Assignment of Error 4: Prescription
In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Chaisson contends that Mr. Cantrelle' s
claims to compensation arising three years prior to October 9, 2019 are prescribed
because Mr. Cantrelle did not name the Parish as a defendant until he filed his
second supplemental and amended petition on that date.
Mr. Cantrelle argues in response that he filed a supplemental and amended
petition for declaratory judgment and mandatory injunction in his official capacity
as the Parish President on April 10, 2019. Therein, Mr. Cantrelle' s request for
mandatory injunction specifically demanded that " Lafourche Parish" pay him what
he was owed. Because Mr. Cantrelle filed the supplemental and amended petition
in his official capacity, he argued that the Parish had sufficient notice of the suit,
including his demand against the Parish. Mr. Cantrelle also argued that any
amendments made in his October 9, 2019 second supplemental and amended
24
petition relate back to the filing of his supplemental and amended petition on April
10, 2019.
Louisiana Civil Code article 3494( 1) sets forth that "[ a] n action for the
recovery of compensation for services rendered" is " subject to a liberative
prescription of three years[.]" An objection of prescription is a peremptory
exception, which a defendant may raise at any time. La. C. C. P. arts. 927( A)( 1) and
928( B). A party urging an exception raising the objection of prescription has the
burden of proving facts to support the exception unless the petition is prescribed on
its face. Dunn v. City of Baton Rouge, 2007- 1169 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 2/ 8/ 08), 984
So. 2d 129, 130. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 931 provides that at the
trial of a peremptory exception of prescription, " evidence may be introduced to
support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the grounds thereof do
not appear from the petition." In the absence of evidence, an exception of
prescription must be decided on the facts alleged in the petition, which are
accepted as true. Bailey v. Loewe, 2019- 0915 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 8/ 3/ 20), 310 So. 3d
746, 748. If evidence is introduced at the hearing on the peremptory exception of
prescription, the district court' s findings of fact are reviewed under the manifest
error standard of review. Sanders v. Petrin, L.L.C., 2019- 1625 ( La. App. 1St Cir.
7/ 24/ 20), 309 So. 3d 388, 390. If the findings are reasonable in light of the record
reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse even though convinced
that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently. Oil Ins. Ltd. v. Dow Chem. Co., 2007- 0418 ( La. App. 1St Cir.
11/ 2/ 07), 977 So. 2d 18, 23, writ denied, 2007- 2319 ( La. 2/ 22/ 08), 976 So. 2d 1284.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1153 provides that "[ w] hen the
action or defense asserted in the amended petition or answer arises out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of filing the original
25
pleading." The criteria for determining whether La. C. C.P. art. 1153 allows an
amendment, which changes the identity of a party sued, to relate back to the filing
date of the original petition ( in our case, the supplemental and amended petition
filed on April 10, 2019, wherein Mr. Cantrelle first requested the mandatory
injunction) are:
1) The amended claim must arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence set forth in the original petition;
2) The purported substitute defendant must have
received notice of the institution of the action such that
he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the
merits;
3) The purported substitute defendant must know or
should have known that but for a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party defendant, the action would
have been brought against him;
4) The purported substitute defendant must not be a
wholly new or unrelated defendant, since this would be
tantamount to assertion of a new cause of action which
would have otherwise prescribed.
Renfroe v. State ex rel. Dep' t of Transp. & Dev., 2001- 1646 ( La. 2/ 26/ 02), 809
So. 2d 947, 950- 51.
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing on the mandatory injunction, the
district court heard the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription
filed by Mr. Chaisson. The district court discussed its prior ruling on an objection
of prescription raised in this matter. The district court stated that " Mr. Cantrelle
got it right from day one. He filed in his official capacity as the [ P] resident of the
P] arish of Lafourche." The district court further stated that " Lafourche Parish has
been joined since the initial filing ...as far as the declaratory judgment is
concerned...." The district court then found that in " April when he files his first
amended petition, he clearly asks for a mandatory injunction.... And he refers to
the [ P] arish in it. So whether or not he names them as a defendant at that time, I
think is irrelevant." The district court then sustained Mr. Chaisson' s exception
26
that the three year back pay calculation would run from the filing of the first
amended petition where [ Mr. Cantrelle] formally asked for the [ mandatory]
injunction.... So we should be going three years back from the April [ 10,] 2019
filing date."
No evidence was introduced at the hearing on the objection of prescription;
thus, the objection must be decided on the facts alleged in the petition, which are
accepted as true. See La. C. C. P. art. 931; see also Bailey, 310 So. 3d at 748. Mr.
Cantrelle filed a supplemental and amended petition for declaratory judgment and
mandatory injunction in his official capacity as the Parish President on April 10,
2019. Therein, Mr. Cantrelle named the Council as the sole defendant. In Mr.
Cantrelle' s request for mandatory injunction, he specifically demanded that
Lafourche Parish" pay him what he was owed. Mr. Cantrelle requested service on
the Clerk of the Lafourche Parish Council and the District Attorney, who is
counsel for the Parish.
Mr. Cantrelle' s amended claim against the Parish for mandatory injunction
and back pay raised in his October 9, 2019 second supplemental and amended
petition arises out of the same trans action/ occurrence set forth in his April 10, 2019
supplemental and amended petition. See Renfroe, 809 So. 2d at 950. When Mr.
Cantrelle requested service of process of his April 10, 2019 supplemental and
amended petition on the District Attorney, the attorney for the Parish, the Parish
received notice such that it would not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense in
this matter. Id. at 951. Furthermore, the Parish knew that but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party defendant, the action would have been
brought against the Parish. Id. In fact, the District Attorney responded to Mr.
Cantrelle' s supplemental and amended petition by intervening and filing various
exceptions on April 16, 2019, which indicates that the Parish was " on notice"
regarding Mr. Cantrelle' s claims for back pay raised in his April 10, 2019
27
supplemental and amended petition. Finally, the Parish was not a wholly new or
unrelated defendant to this suit. Id. Thus, under the criteria for relation back
under La. C. C. P. art. 1153, the claims made by Mr. Cantrelle in his October 9,
2019 second supplemental and amended petition for declaratory judgment and
mandatory injunction against the Parish relate back to the April 10, 2019 filing
date of his supplemental and amended petition.
Accordingly, we find no error in the district court' s ruling on the objection
of prescription.
Any claims made against the Parish by Mr. Cantrelle for back pay
arising more than three years prior to April 10, 2019 are prescribed.
DECREE
We affirm the district court' s March 30, 2021 judgment. Costs of this
appeal, in the amount of $2, 271. 36 are assessed against defendant/ appellant, Parish
of Lafourche. Costs of this appeal, in the amount of $2, 243. 36 are assessed against
nominal plaintiff/appellant, Archie Chaisson, II1, in his official capacity as the
President of the Parish of Lafourche.
AFFIRMED.
28
0 0
Lafourche Parish Clerk of Court C -137931 ' i
Filed Mar 30, 20214:22 PM D
Rita Bernard
Deputy Clerk of Court
JAMES B. CANTRELLE, IN HIS 17T" JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE
PARISH PRESIDENT OF THE
PARISH OF LAFOURCHE PARISH OF LAFOURCHE
VS. NO. 137931
STATE OF LOUISIANA
THE LAFOURCHE PARISH COUNCIL
JUDGMENT
This matter came before the court for a hearing on the 150, day of March, 2021.
Present were:
Stephen J. Haedicc ke. on behalf of the Petitioner, James B. Cantrelle;
Michael G. Gee, on behalf of Archie Chiasson, 111; and
Joseph S. Soignet and Lisa Orgeron, Assistant District Attomeys on behalf of the
Parish of Lafourche.
Pursuant to the pleadings, evidence and arguments presented, and for oral reasons
provided in open court, and as shown by the calculations in Exhibit A, attached, the court
renders the following judgment:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is rendered
in favor of James B. Cantrelle and against the Lafourche Parish Consolidated Government
for unpaid salary for the following years in the following respective amounts:
2016 (prorated from April 10, 2016) $ 46,272. 00
2017 $ 49,655. 00
2018 $ 54, 749-00
2019 $ 30, 662.00
Court costs are assessed against the Lafourche Parish Consolidated Government
Legal interest is also assessed againstthe Lafourche Parish Consolidated Government as
follows:
On amount owed for years 20I 8 through 2018 ($150,576.00), commencing on April
10, 2019.
Page I of 2
453
29
0 9
On amount owed for year 2019 ($ 30,662.00), commencing on January 1, 2020.
JUDGMENT RENDERED AND SIGNEDwithin Chambers in Thibodaux,
this 3001 day of March, 2021.
171" JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DIVISION "D"
Clerk, please mail Notice of Judgment
to all parties.
Page 2 of 2
NIM
30
afourche parish Cterk_WC7oliji
Filed Mar 30, 20214: 22 PM D I
Rita Bernard
Repuily " te of Court
JAMES B. CANTRELLE, IN HIS V" JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE
PARISH PRESIDENT OF THE
PARISH OF LAFOURCHE PARISH OF LAFOURCHE
VS. NO. 137931
STATE OF LOUISIANA
THE LAFOURCHE PARISH COUNCIL
gMIBIT A
2015 20``16 2017 2018 2019
Assessor 185,458.00 $ 192, 876.00 $ 171, 446,00 $ 171, 445.00 N/A
Clerk 182, 046.00 $ 189, 589.00 $ 166.604.00 $ 208,863-00 NIA
Sheriff 190,720.00 $ 193, 707,00 $ 199,235. 00 $ 195, 287. 00 NIA
Average Salary of
Assessor, Clerk N/A $ 186, 075.00 $ 192,057-00 $ 179.125.00 $ 191, 198-00
and Sheriff
Amount Parish
N/A $ 122, 341. 00 $ 142, 502-00 $ 12076-00 $ 160,536-00
President Was Paid
AmountAmount ParishParish
$ $ 64749,64749, 0000$ $ 30,30, 662,662, 0000
46,46, 272.272. 00*00*$ $ 49,49, 555-555- 0000$ $
PresidentPresident IsIs OwedOwed
46,46, 272-272- 0000 IsIs thethe proratedprorated amountamount thatthat isis owedowed toto thethe ParishParish presidentpresident forfor 2016.2016. TheThe formulaformula
isi:s(: ( daysdays subjectsubject toto paymentY(paymentY( totaltotal daysdays inin aa year)year) x(x( everageeverage salarysalary ofof assessor,assessor, clerkclerk andand sheriffsheriff
= . = . 726726 xx$$ 53,53, 734.734. 0000= $= $
forfor 2015).2015). 26613852661385 46,46, 272-272- 0000
455455
3131
EM!lgintr: LAft A to the Mrch 341. 2021 jiftment
Accowdmg to the record on appeal (specifically Ex, Ca le 3 and Vol- 3, pp. 612-613), the * surct cam included the folJoiving
ansommus in its calculwftow
2015 199 2017 2018 2019
Assessor Salary 152,
2, 640 159, 746 158; 746 158, 745
lleoefitr rezmmmA IUM MAN IzapQ IZ-"
IO-Q
TOTAL 185, 4M 192,376 171, 444 171, 445
Clark Salary 115,685 Un"312 94.231 122-671
Saury-mmiamemw 21, 600 21 -M 2-1,800 23,400
S31my- stawory allowance 13, 7 29
' 14, 221 12,080 14,607
Salary-deMoneiptuse 2A00 2,50D 2,400 12. 400
Beftefits' leureuxur t1&633 Rm 35-183 43_185
TOTAL lvo" l"' m 166i6!!4
Sberiff Salary 153, 9W 154,099 160- 3$ 9 160,338
Bemebts-retrement AM 19-0,19 AV7 1ay,4,9
TOTAL 1,", 720 193,7" l"' m 145, 237
AVGE 196,075 192. 057 179, 123 Igi, igg
Salary Actually Paid to Parish President 122, 341 142' 502 124.124. 376376 160, 536
Amount owed toParte president 43r' 4MS5 54, 749 30, 662
46,2721
prosimad santnust for 2016 buM on euepoom of prescnptww
days mb)W tape} i( toust days in a y*11) s( amwage salary for 20 15)
2651365= 0, 726x63, 734= 46.5 2
32
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CII2CUIT
NO. 2021 CA 0678
JAMES B. CANTRELLE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PARISH OF LAFOURCHE
VERSUS
THE LAFOURCHE PARISH COUNCIL
THERIOT, J., assigning additional reasons.
1, write separately to emphasize that the use of the word " compensation" in
Lafourche Parish Ordial-Ince 5444 governing d-je Parish President' s salary creates
ambiguity in the application of the ordinance. Compensation is defined as the
remuneration and other benefits feceived in return for services rendered."
I"'raphasis added.) Blacks La,w Dictionary, 301 ( 8" ed. 2004).
The ordinance provides that the Parisl,. President' s " compensation" will be
based on the prior year average compensation" of the sheriff, clerk of court, and
issessor, each of ,vhich are " estabij shed, 0i) annual basis in accordance with a
predetermined .[6rrwuta approved bl, the, SIa?e Lcgis4ature."
7
However, the formulas
set forth by the legislature for these ibree positions contain a number of
components that together make LIP trtc total compensation for the respective
positions. See, La. R.S. 13: 782, 11552 1, an(] 47, 1907. For example, under La.
R.S. 13: 5521. 1, a sheriff who compictes the Uraining,,, certification., or education
requirement or attains tlit,-requisae enCorcen-ient experience shall be granted a
seven percent increase m coni P ensinon, 10 his annual salan. I
Louisiana Revised
Statutes 13: 78.2( A)(2) pr o vldes that a cle- 1,N. r:-
J I court is eligible to receive a salary
increase if the clerk completes the annual certification updates and renewal
courses. Under La. K.S. 47: 1907( J), ars assessor, in addition to all other forms of
compensation allowed by law, may ino.z se his annual compensation by an
amount not to exceed seven thousand dollars. All of the various components
added to the base salary of the sheriff, clerk of court, and assessor do fall within
the definition of compensation.
Considering the ordinance uses the term " compensation" rather than " salary"
and is based on the convoluted predetermined formulas enumerated by the
legislature, I cannot find that the trial court erred in its application of the ordinance
in this matter.
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2021 CA 0678
JAMES B. CANTRELLE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PARISH OF LAFOURCHE
VERSUS
THE LAFOURCHE PARISH COUNCIL
cw
PM 4
McClendon, J., dissents in part.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the retirement benefits of the
Sheriff, Clerk of Court, and Assessor were properly included in the calculations upon
which the Lafourche Parish President's salary was based. At all times relevant hereto,
Lafourche Parish Ordinance 5444 specified that "'the compensation rates for the Parish -
wide positions of the Sheriff, Clerk of Court and Assessor are established on an annual
basis in accordance with a predetermined formula approved by the State Legislature."
The ordinance further provided that the " Compensation" of the Parish President was to
be established based on the prior year average compensation" of the Sheriff, Clerk of
Court, and Assessor. However, nothing in the predetermined statutory formulas for the
three parish -wide positions contains any reference to retirement benefits. See LSA- R. S.
13: 782, 13: 5521, and 47: 1907. Therefore, based on the plain language of the
statutory formulas, retirement benefits should not have been included in the
calculations to determine the salary of the Lafourche Parish President.' Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
1 I note that in the March 23, 2020 judgment, the trial court declared the meaning of Lafourche Parish
Ordinance 5444 and determined that the compensation owed to the Lafourche Parish President pursuant
to said ordinance ' shall include, in the calculation, all supplemental pay, compensation or benefits
received by the Sheriff, Clerk of Court, and Assessor, for whatever reason." This declaratory judgment
may have had finality as a final judgment under LSA- C. C. P. art. 1871, but the judgment was not
appealed. The parties have not raised this issue, and therefore, I decline to address same.