Michael G. Sigur v. Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Louisiana ( 2022 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2021 CA 0790
MICHAEL G. SIGUR
VERSUS
THE MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM
OF LOUISIANA
Judgment Rendered: MAR 0 4 2022
On Appeal from the
19th Judicial District Court
Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 693, 357
The Honorable Michael E. Kirby, Judge Pro Tempore Presiding
Keith R. Credo Attorney for Plaintiff A
- ppellant,
Metairie, Louisiana Michael G. Sigur
Larry M. Roedel Attorneys for Defendant -Appellee,
J. Kenton Parsons Municipal Employees' Retirement
David B. Phelps System of Louisiana
Bradley C. Guin
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
BEFORE: McDONALD, LANIER, AND WOLFE, JJ.
WOLFE, I
Plaintiff, Michael G. Sigur, appeals a summary judgment rendered in favor of
defendant, the Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Louisiana (" MERS"),
and the denial of his cross- motion for summary judgment. For the following
reasons, we reverse and render judgment in favor of plaintiff.
BACKGROUND
The parties jointly stipulated to the relevant facts concerning this matter. Mr.
Sigur was a full-time municipal employee of the City of Kenner and a contributing
member of MERS. Upon his retirement in January 2014, MERS paid Mr. Sigur
normal monthly retirement benefits. In April 2014, Mr. Sigur was elected to the
Kenner City Council, serving as a part-time councilman beginning July 1, 2014. He
was re- elected in April 2018 and will be term -limited from any further re- election to
that particular public servant position at the end of his second term in June 2022. As
a part-time and term -limited elected official, Mr. Sigur is not eligible to be a member
of MERS while serving as a council member! Nevertheless, it is uncontested that
as a retiree during the time -period of July 2014 through September 2018, Mr. Sigur
received $ 44, 629. 45 in retirement benefits from MERS, which MERS now claims
was an overpayment. MERS began to recoup the alleged overpayment by offsetting
Mr. Sigur' s monthly retirement benefits. To date, a total of $14, 000. 00 has been
offset;
however, MERS has suspended the offset pending the outcome of this
litigation.
1 Louisiana Revised Statutes 11: 164, which was effective on June 30, 2011, before Mr. Sigur' s
election, prohibits part-time elected public servants from participating in or receiving credit for
service in any public retirement system such as MERS. Accord La. Const. Art. 10, § 29. 1( A).
Louisiana Revised Statutes 11: 1751. 1, which was effective July 1, 2003, also before Mr. Sigur' s
election, prohibits a term -limited elected official from being eligible to be a member of any
statewide public retirement system such as MERS, when such term limits prevent him from
earning the minimum number of years of creditable service necessary to receive a benefit.
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On January 29, 2020, Mr. Sigur filed a petition against MERS, seeking a
declaratory judgment that MERS had arbitrarily miscalculated an offset of his
retirement benefits contrary to law, such that he is entitled to the return of his
seized" retirement benefits. In its answer, MERS contended that as a public entity
in control of public funds, it has a duty to accurately calculate and adjust a retired
member' s retirement benefits when a retiree is re- employed with a municipal entity.
Mr. Sigur and MERS filed cross- motions for summary judgment regarding the
interpretation of the statutes governing the calculation of Mr. Sigur' s retirement
benefits during his public service as a city councilman. After conducting a hearing
and taking the matter under advisement, the trial court granted MERS' s motion for
summary judgment and denied Mr. Sigur' s motion for summary judgment, signing
a judgment with incorporated written reasons on January 19, 2021. Mr. Sigur
suspensively appealed, primarily arguing that the trial court erroneously interpreted
the statutes affecting his monthly retirement benefits, failed to rule on numerous
constitutional issues, and failed to award attorney fees to him.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo. Vine v. Teachers
Retirement System of Louisiana, 2019- 0106 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 19/ 19), 292
So. 3d 116, 121. Mr. Sigur essentially argues that the trial court erred in interpreting
the relevant statutory provisions as they apply to his retirement benefits. The
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that may be decided by summary
judgment. Louisiana Workers' Compensation Corp. v. Landry, 2011- 1973 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 5/ 2/ 12), 92 So. 3d 1018, 1021, writ denied, 2012- 1179 ( La. 9/ 14/ 12),
99 So. 3d 34. When addressing legal issues, an appellate court gives no special
weight to the findings of the trial court, but exercises its constitutional duty to review
questions of law de novo, after which it renders judgment on the record. Id.Additionally, courts should avoid constitutional rulings when the case can be
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disposed of on non -constitutional grounds, such as statutory interpretation. See
Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 2007- 2432 ( La. 5/ 21/ 08), 982
So. 2d 7951 802. Therefore, if this case can be decided on the basis of a statutory
interpretation argument, this court should do so and pretermit any constitutional
ruling. Id. at 802- 803.
MOTION TO STRIKE
At the hearing before this court, counsel for MERS made an oral motion to
strike Mr. Sigur' s reply brief. MERS asserted that Mr. Sigur raised issues regarding
the correct version of the applicable statutes, as well as constitutional arguments,
that he had not previously raised and had not been considered at the trial court level.
We referred the motion to the merits and gave MERS and Mr. Sigur each a separate
deadline for filing additional briefs with this court. MERS asserts that because Mr.
Sigur did not raise the applicable dates and versions of the statutes in the court below,
this court is barred from considering statutes not cited to the trial court.
Louisiana Uniform Rules — Courts of Appeal, Rule 1- 3 provides that an
appellate court " will review only issues which were submitted to the trial court and
which are contained in specifications or assignments of error, unless the interest of
justice clearly requires otherwise." ( Emphasis added.) Furthermore, La. Code Civ.
P. art. 2164 gives an appellate court the authority to " render any judgment which is
just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal." ( Emphasis added.) See Official
Revision Comments —1960, Comment (a) (" The purpose of this article is to give the
appellate court complete freedom to do justice on the record irrespective of whether
a particular legal point or theory was made, argued, or passed on by the court
below.")
Throughout this litigation, Mr. Sigur has consistently challenged the
appropriate version of the applicable statutes and has maintained all along that the
appropriate date to consider the applicable statute is the date of his retirement, not
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the date that MERS adjusted his retirement benefits. We find that these issues are
proper for our consideration even though Mr. Sigur did not specifically mention a
particular statute, La. R.S. 11: 1738, until filing his reply brief in this court. See
Wheeler v. Louisiana Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, 2017-
1335 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 3/ 20), 305 So. 3d 387, 393 n. 10. Courts must give effect
to all parts of a statute and have a duty to review the law in its entirety, as well as all
other laws on the same subject matter. Toomy v. La. St. Empl. Ret. Sys., 2010-
1072 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 25/ 11), 63 So. 3d 198, 202, writ denied, 2011- 1118 ( La.
10/ 21/ 11), 73 So. 3d 383. For these reasons, we deny MERS' s motion to strike.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
MERS was established in 1955. The statutes applicable to MERS were re-
designated by 1991 La. Act 74, § 3, effective June 25, 1991, and are primarily found
in the general provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes Chapter 4, Title 11. See La.
R.S. 11: 1732( 30). Amendments to this Chapter are applicable " only to persons who,
on or after the effective date [ of the amendment], are in service as participating
members, unless the amendatory act specifies otherwise." La. R.S. 11: 1738.
An " employee" as used in this Chapter means " a person including an elected
official, actively employed by a participating employer on a permanent, regularly
scheduled basis of at least an average of thirty-five hours per week [ full-time
employment]". See La. R. S. 11: 1732( 13) ( 2014 version). A participating employer
includes any incorporated city in the state of Louisiana. La. R.S. 11: 1732( 14)( a)( i).
Any member of a city council is " deemed to be [ a] part-time public [ servant] who.
shall not participate in, or receive credit for service in, any public retirement
system." La. R. S. 11: 164( A)(2). Furthermore, an elected official who is subject to
term limits that prevent him from earning the minimum number ofyears of creditable
service necessary to receive a benefit, " shall not be eligible to be a member of the
system. No employee or employer contributions shall be made by such an elected
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official or his employer." La. R.S. 11: 1751. 1( A). An employee shall cease to be a
member when he " withdraws from active service with a retirement allowance[.]"
See La. R.S. 11: 1754( 2).
With those basic parameters outlined, we will interpret the revised statutes
that specifically pertain to Mr. Sigur' s retirement. Interpretation of any statute
begins with the language of the statute itself. Vine, 292 So. 3d at 122. Laws on the
same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other. La. Civ. Code
art. 13. All laws pertaining to the same subject matter must be interpreted in pari
materia. Vine, 292 So. 3d at 122. When a statute is clear and unambiguous and its
application does not lead to absurd consequences, the provision is applied as written
with no further interpretation made in search of the Legislature' s intent. La. Civ.
Code art. 9; La. R.S. 1: 4. The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing
meaning. La. Civ. Code art. 11. When the words of a law are ambiguous, their
meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text
of the law as a whole. La. Civ. Code art. 12. In the event the language of a statute
is susceptible of different meanings, the interpretation must best conform to the
purpose of the law. La. Civ. Code art. 10. Further, courts are required to give effect
to all parts of a statute and should not give a statute an interpretation that makes any
part superfluous or meaningless. Landry, 92 So. 3d at 1023. Rendering the whole
or a part of a law meaningless is the last option available to a court when it interprets
a law. Id.Mr. Sigur is a retired member of MERS as of January 2014, when he began
receiving his normal retirement benefits. MERS recalculated his benefit in
September 2018 to account for Mr. Sigur' s re- employment as a paid city councilman
serving the City of Kenner starting in July 2014 after his election in April 2014. An
elected city councilman is a part-time, term -limited public servant position that does
not meet the statutory definition of "employee." See La. R.S. 11: 1732( 13) ( 2014
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version).
It is undisputed that from the time of Mr. Sigur' s election to the city
council in April 2014 until October 2018 when MERS discovered that he was re-
employed, Mr. Sigur received $ 44, 629. 45 in benefits from MERS. It is also
undisputed that to date, MERS has offset a total of $ 14, 000. 00 of the alleged
overpayment of retirement benefits to Mr. Sigur. MERS contends that pursuant to
La. R.S. 11: 1762( A)(2), it has an affirmative duty to correct any overpayment of Mr.
Sigur' s retirement benefits due to his re- employment. Conversely, Mr. Sigur argues
that his re- employment did not affect his benefits, because he was not a contributing
member of MERS during the time period in question ( July 1, 2014 through
September 30, 2018).
The statutory authority relied on by MERS, found in La. R.S. 11: 1762, has
been amended several times since it was re- enacted with an effective date of October
19 1992. At the time of Mr. Sigur' s retirement and re- employment in 2014, the
provision stated:
1762. Reemployment of retirees
A. Whenever a retired member receiving normal retirement benefits
becomes reemployed by an employer such that his monthly earnings
are equal to or less than the difference between his monthly average
final compensation and his monthly retirement benefit, his
retirement benefits shall continue and he shall not be a member of
the system.
B. Whenever a retired member receiving normal retirement benefits
becomes reemployed by an employer such that his monthly earnings
exceed the difference between his monthly average final
compensation and his monthly retirement benefit, his retirement
benefits shall be reduced by the amount his monthly earnings exceed
the difference between his monthly average final compensation and
his monthly retirement benefit for every month of such employment
and he shall not be a member of the system.
Emphasis added.)
In 2016, the provision was amended by 2016 La. Act 649, § 1, effective June
17, 2016, to re -number the pertinent paragraphs from " A" and " B" to "( A)( 1) and
2)" and change the term " retired member" to " retiree." The new paragraph ``B" of
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the Act was only applicable to retirees first re- employed on or after July 1, 2016. In
20175 the provision was amended again and re- enacted by 2017 La. Act 314, § 1,
effective June 30, 2017, to change the heading of La. R.S. 11: 1762 to " Part-time
reemployment of retirees" and to insert " but he does not meet the definition of an
employee" to the description of a retiree at the beginning of each paragraph. In other
words, if the retiree was only re- employed for part-time work, he would not meet
the definition of an employee, but MERS would still be compelled to reduce his
monthly retirement benefits by any amount that his monthly earnings from the re-
employment exceeded the difference between his monthly average final
compensation and his monthly retirement benefit. Finally, the provision was
amended and re- enacted again by 2019 La. Act 416, § 1, effective June 20, 2019, by
adding a sentence at the end of paragraph ( A)(2), stating, " The calculation of
monthly earnings shall not include income attributable to service as a part-time
elected official listed in [ La. R.S. 11: 164]." ( Emphasis added.)
MERS applied the 2017 version of La. R.S. 11: 1762, finding that Mr. Sigur' s
monthly earnings as a city councilman from July 2014 through the end of September
2018, exceeded the earnings limits as set forth in the statute by $ 44, 629. 45 and,
consequently, MERS was required to adjust the retirement benefit amount. Mr.
Sigur first argues that MERS used the wrong version of La. R.S. 11: 1762, because
the relevant date was the date of his retirement in January 2014, not the date that
MERS discovered he was re- employed. Mr. Sigur further maintains that because
each version of the statute provides that re- employed retirees in his situation " shall
not be a member" of MERS, then his compensation from his re- employment cannot
be included in his earnings.
The statutory definition of "earnings" in La. R.S. 11: 1732 ( 12)( a) is " the full
amount of compensation earned by a member for service rendered as an employee."
Additionally, Mr. Sigur points out that the statutory scheme does not allow eligibility
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as a " member"
to a part-time, term -limited city council member. See La. R.S.
11: 164( A)(2) and La. R.S. 11: 1751. 1( A). Finally, in his reply brief to this court, Mr.
Sigur urges us to consider La. R.S. 11: 1738, which prohibits application of statutory
amendments to any persons who are not participating " members" on or after the
effective date of the particular amendment.
We agree with Mr. Sigur that MERS applied the wrong version of La. R.S.
11: 1762. The proper version was the one in effect at the time Mr. Sigur was elected
and became re- employed as a part- time city councilman in 2014. In this case, there
is no need to analyze whether the 2019 amendment to § 1762 applies retroactively.
Moreover, our interpretation of the pertinent version of the statute, along with all of
the laws on the same subject matter concerning " re- employment," " members," and
earnings," leads us to conclude that Mr. Sigur' s public service as a part-time, term -
limited, elected city councilman did not require MERS to adjust his normal
retirement benefits. Actually, we find this to be true under any version of the statute,
because when applying the pertinent statutes in pari materia, Mr. Sigur did not
receive qualified monthly " earnings" as an elected official that exceeded his monthly
retirement benefits. The parties stipulated that " a term -limited elected official is `` not
eligible to be a member of the system[,)"' which is a correct statement per all of the
pertinent definitions and versions. If Mr. Sigur is no longer eligible to be a member,
it follows that he could not have qualified earnings that affect MERS' calculation of
his monthly retirement benefits.
In conclusion, we find that the trial court incorrectly interpreted La. R.S.
11: 1762 in favor of MERS, determining that MERS was entitled to recoup an
overpayment of $ 44, 629. 45 from Mr. Sigur. There was no overpayment of
retirement benefits in this case. As a part-time, term -limited elected official who
was not eligible for MERS membership, Mr. Sigur' s compensation as a councilman
does not constitute earnings and has no effect on his continued receipt of retirement
0
benefits. Since MERS did not overpay retirement benefits to Mr. Sigur, MERS had
no authority to recoup previously paid benefits. Thus, we reverse the trial court' s
grant of summary judgment in favor of MERS and reverse the trial court' s denial of
Mr. Sigur' s motion for summary judgment. Additionally, we hereby grant summary
judgment in favor of Mr. Sigur and order MERS to reimburse Mr. Sigur the offset
amount of $ 14, 000.00 that has been withheld from Mr. Sigur' s regular monthly
retirement benefits to date. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2164 ([ A]ppellate courts may
render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal.")
See also Waterworks Dist. No. 1 of DeSoto Parish v. Louisiana Dept. of Pub.
Safety & Corrections, 2016- 0744 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 17/ 17, 214 So. 3d 1, 3 n. l,
writ denied, 2017- 0470 ( La. 5/ 12/ 17), 219 So. 3d 1103 ( Where there are cross-
motions for summary judgment raising the same issues, this court may review the
denial of a summary judgment in addressing the appeal of the granting of the cross-
motion for summary judgment.)
As requested, we find that Mr. Sigur is entitled to the full amount of any and
all sums offset by MERS, together with legal interest from the date each monthly
offset was withheld until the date it is paid. See La. Civ. Code art. 2000 ( Damages
for delay in performance are measured by the interest on that sum from the time it is
due, at the rate of legal interest as fixed by La. R.S. 9: 3500.) See also La. Code Civ.
P. art. 1921 ( The court shall award interest in the judgment as prayed for or as
provided by law.) Mr. Sigur specifically requested legal interest in his original
petition; thus, he is entitled to an award of interest. Ballex v. Municipal Police
Employees' Retirement System, 2016- 0905 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 18/ 17), 218 So. 3d
1076, 1088, writ denied, 2017- 00822 ( La. 9/ 22/ 17), 228 So. 3d 743.
We deny, however, Mr. Sigur' s request for attorney fees. Under Louisiana
law, attorney fees are not permitted except where authorized by statute or by
contract. Dipaola v. Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System, 2014-
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0037 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 25/ 14), 155 So. 3d 49, 52, writ denied, 2014- 2575 ( La.
2/ 27/ 15), 159 So. 3d 1071. Mr. Sigur contends that he is entitled to an award of
attorney fees pursuant to La. R.S. 11: 264. 7( A)(3) and ( C) ( If a person who can
demonstrate a personal interest in the retirement system brings an enforcement
proceeding such as a declaratory judgment and prevails, he shall be awarded
reasonable attorney fees and other costs of litigation.) Louisiana Revised Statutes
11: 264. 7 does not apply in this situation, because it is contained within the subpart
of the provisions that specifically address the governing of fiduciary responsibilities
and investments ofthose who exercise discretionary authority or control with respect
to the asset management of public retirement systems. Dipaola, 155 So. 3d at 52-
53. In order for La. R.S. 11: 264.7 to authorize an attorney fees award in this case, it
must be shown that Mr. Sigur brought a civil action to enforce the provisions of the
referenced subpart. Mr. Sigur' s petition seeks a declaration that he is entitled to
reimbursement because MERS arbitrarily miscalculated an offset of his retirement
benefits contrary to law. There is no allegation that MERS, or any individual
associated with MERS, breached any fiduciary duty related to the investment or
management of MERS' s funds and/ or assets. Therefore, Mr. Sigur' s claim for
attorney fees is without merit.2
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, the January 19, 2021 judgment of the trial court is
reversed. We hereby grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellant,
Michael G. Sigur, and against defendant -appellee, the Municipal Employees'
Retirement System of Louisiana. We further order the Municipal Employees'
2 Mr. Sigur also requested additional attorney fees for having to respond to MERS' s " frivolous"
motion to strike. We decline this request as it is not apparent that MERS' s motion to strike was
taken solely for the purpose of delay or that MERS' s counsel did not sincerely believe in the view
of the law advocated. See Cordon v. Parish Glass of St. Tammany, Inc., 2014- 0457 ( La. App.
1st Cir. 12/ 23/ 14), 168 So. 3d 633, 640.
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Retirement System of Louisiana to reimburse Michael G. Sigur the $ 14, 000. 00 offset
amount withheld from his regular monthly retirement benefits to date, together with
legal interest from the date each monthly offset was withheld until the date it is paid.
Additionally, costs of this appeal in the amount of $1, 490. 00 are assessed against
defendant/ appellee, the Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Louisiana.
MOTION TO STRIKE DENIED; JANUARY 19, 2021 JUDGMENT
REVERSED; AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT RENDERED IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF.
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