Walter C. Dumas v. The Louisiana Board of Ethics ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                             STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    NO. 2022 CA 0994
    WALTER C. DUMAS
    VERSUS
    THE LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS
    Judgment Rendered:       FEB 2 4 2023
    Appealed from the
    19th Judicial District Court
    In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
    State of Louisiana
    Docket No. 698747
    The Honorable Martin E. Coady, Judge Pro Tempore Presiding
    Travis J. Turner                            Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,
    Gonzales, Louisiana                         Walter C. Dumas
    Jeff Landry                                 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee,
    Louisiana Attorney General                  The Louisiana Board of Ethics
    Harry J. Phillips, Jr.
    John P. Murrill
    Special Assistant Attorneys General
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana
    BEFORE:       GUIDRY, C.J., WOLFE, AND MILLER, JJ.
    MILLER, J.
    Walter C. Dumas (" Dumas")            appeals a judgment by the Nineteenth Judicial
    District Court sustaining the peremptory exception of prescription in favor of the
    Louisiana Board of Ethics (" BOE")             and dismissing Dumas' s petition against the
    BOE with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY'
    Southern University and Agricultural &               Mechanical College (" Southern
    University") is a public university managed by its Board of Supervisors. See La.
    Const. art. 8, §     7. The Southern University System Foundation (" Foundation")               is a
    non-profit corporation established to support and promote Southern University and
    is a party to multiple contracts with the university.                To generate revenue for
    Southern University' s athletic department, the Foundation and Southern University
    entered into a contract authorizing the Foundation to sublease suites at A.W.
    Mumford Stadium for Southern University' s home football games and other
    athletic   events.    The Foundation then subleased the suites through a bidding
    process.
    Pursuant to the stadium contract, from 2001 through 2009 the Foundation
    subleased 50 -yard -line stadium suites to Walter Dumas and Associates, Inc., a law
    firm owned solely by Dumas and in which he was its senior attorney. In April
    2006, Dumas became a member of the Board of Directors of the Foundation, and
    in January 2009, he was appointed to the Board of Supervisors.
    Rental payments were made through 2005, then Dumas and the law firm
    made no payments during the 2006, 2007, and 2008 football seasons. The terms of
    the sublease covered those seasons beginning July 1, 2007, and ending June 30,
    1 These facts are taken in part from prior appeals. See Dumas v. Board of Ethics, 2019-0289 ( La.
    App. l' Cir. 11115/ 19),   
    290 So. 3d 1143
    , writ denied, 2019- 02017 ( La. 2110120), 
    294 So. 3d 475
    ;
    and Louisiana Board of Ethics, 2017- 0313 ( La. App. 0 Cir. 11116/ 17),       
    236 So. 3d 593
    , writ
    denied sub nom., Louisiana Board of Ethics in Matter of Dumas, 2018- 0132 ( La. 3/ 9/ 18), 
    238 So. 3d 457
    .
    2
    2009, and required a yearly rental payment of $ 13, 800. 00,           plus   a $   96, 600. 00
    donation to the Foundation, payable over three years. Dumas alleged that in 2006,
    for the millions of dollars in donations to the university for which Dumas was
    responsible, Dr. Ralph Slaughter, then president of Southern University, advised
    Dumas that he did not have to make the remaining payments under the sublease.
    In March 2009, as a member of the Board of Supervisors, Dumas voted to
    terminate Dr. Slaughter. Dr. Slaughter then notified the Foundation that the
    amounts owed under Dumas' s sublease were due and not paid. Subsequently, in
    June 2009, an invoice was sent to Dumas and the law firm demanding payment of
    138, 000. 00 for the suite. However, in August 2009, the Foundation voted to
    forgive any debt for suite rentals owed by Dumas or his law firm for 2006, 2007,
    and 2008.
    These events were disclosed to the BOE by a confidential source.                       In
    December 2010,      charges were filed alleging violations of the Ethics Code: (              1)
    against Dumas, for accepting forgiveness of a debt owed by the law firm to the
    Foundation, while Dumas was a member of the Board of Supervisors;                     and (   2)
    against Dumas and the law firm, because by subleasing a stadium suite, the law
    firm had an interest in the stadium contract between Southern University and the
    Foundation, while Dumas, the law firm' s sole owner, was a member of the Board
    of   Supervisors.   After   a     public   hearing,   the   Ethics   Adjudicatory       Board
    Adjudicatory Board") affirmed the charges and ordered Dumas and the law firm
    to pay $ 138, 000. 00 to the BOE as recovery of an improper economic advantage
    gained by using the stadium suite for three years without payment. Dumas and the
    law firm appealed the Adjudicatory Board' s decision. On November 16, 2017, this
    court affirmed the decision of the Adjudicatory Board.           See Louisiana Board of
    Ethics, 2017- 0313 (   La. App.   I" Cir. 11/ 16/ 17), 
    236 So. 3d 593
    , 603, 
    236 So. 3d
                                          3
    593, writ denied sub nom., Louisiana Board of Ethics in Matter of Dumas, 2018-
    0132 ( La. 319118), 
    238 So. 3d 457
    .
    On August 14, 2020, Dumas filed a petition for damages against the BOE
    alleging that he suffered emotional distress, anxiety, inconvenience, attorney fees,
    costs,   civil   penalties,   and other damages because of the BOE' s discriminatory
    actions, wrongful and malicious actions, and gross negligence. Dumas asserted that
    he was not aware of the alleged racial discrimination by the BOE until August 14,
    2019 when he read a news article that the BOE declined to investigate the
    Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police, Michael Edmonson (" Superintendent
    Edmonson"),        for living on the Department of Public Safety Compound without
    authority from February 2008 to March 2017.                 Dumas also contended that the
    BOE' s decision in 2005 regarding the Chancellor of the University of New
    Orleans,    Gregory O' Brien (" Chancellor O' Brien"), is an example of racial
    discrimination. In 2005, the BOE found that Chancellor O' Brien violated the Code
    of Governmental          Ethics     by   receiving   supplemental     compensation,        business
    advances, and other expenses from foundations affiliated with the University of
    New Orleans but imposed no fine.
    On October 13, 2020, the BOE answered the petition, and on May 11, 2021,
    the BOE filed a peremptory exception of prescription.                  The BOE alleged that
    Dumas' s claim that the BOE discriminated against him based on his race was
    prescribed.      In   opposition,    Dumas     asserted   that   he   learned   of   the   racially
    discriminatory actions of the BOE on August 14, 2019, and he filed his lawsuit on
    August 11, 2020, so his petition was timely filed. A hearing on the exception was
    held on March 7, 2022. At the end of the hearing, the trial court sustained the
    BOE' s exception. On March 16, 2022, the trial court signed a judgment sustaining
    the BOE' s exception and dismissing Dumas' s petition against the BOE with
    prejudice. It is from this judgment that Dumas appeals.
    4
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    Dumas contends that the trial court erred when it sustained the peremptory
    exception of prescription because under the doctrine of contra non valentem his
    lawsuit is not prescribed.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Except in limited instances not applicable here, the exception of prescription
    must be specifically pleaded and may not be supplied by the court. La. C. C. P. art.
    927( B).   Ordinarily,   the exceptor bears the burden of proof at the trial on the
    peremptory exception. Carter v. Uaygood, 2004- 0646 (        La. 1119105), 
    892 So. 2d 1261
    ,   1267. However, if prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings, the
    burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the action has not prescribed. 
    Id.
     The standard.
    of review of a judgment pertaining to an exception of prescription turns on whether
    evidence is introduced at the hearing on the exception. Louisiana Code of Civil
    Procedure article 931 expressly allows evidence to be introduced to support or
    controvert a peremptory exception, when the grounds thereof do not appear from
    the petition.
    If no evidence is submitted at the hearing, the exception must be decided
    upon the facts alleged in the petition with all of the allegations accepted as true. In
    that case, the reviewing court is simply assessing whether the trial court erred as a
    matter of law. Mitchell v. Baton Rouge Orthopedic Clinic, L.L.C., 2021- 
    00061 La. 12110121
    ),   
    333 So. 3d 368
    , 373. When evidence is introduced at the hearing, a
    court need not accept the allegations of the petition as true, and the lower court
    decisions are to be reviewed under a manifest error standard of review. Lomont v.
    Bennett, 2014- 2483 ( La. 6130115),   
    172 So. 3d 620
    , 627. In this case, no evidence
    was introduced at the hearing. Thus, we must determine whether the trial court
    erred as a matter of law. See Mitchell, 333 So. 3d at 373.
    5
    DISCUSSION
    Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year. This
    prescription commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained. La.
    C. C. art. 3492. Prescription runs against all persons unless they are included in
    some exception established by law. La. C. C. art. 3467. In this case, the alleged
    injury or damage was sustained in July 12, 2016 when the Adjudicatory Board
    affirmed the charges against Dumas and ordered him to pay $         138, 000. 00. Thus,
    under Article 3492,     Dumas had one year from July 12,        2016 to file his suit.
    However, the instant suit was not filed until August 11, 2020. Thus, prescription is
    evident on the face of the pleadings.
    Dumas contends that pursuant to the doctrine of contra non valentem, the
    prescriptive period did not begin to run until August 14, 2019 when he first learned
    of the alleged racial discrimination by the BOE.       The doctrine of contra non
    valentem provides that prescription does not run against one who is ignorant of the
    facts upon which his cause of action is based and applies an exception to the
    statutory prescriptive period where in fact and for good cause a plaintiff is unable
    to exercise his cause of action when it accrues. Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 2003- 
    1030 La. 216
    / 04), 
    865 So. 2d 49
    , 55. Louisiana courts have recognized four limited
    situations where the doctrine applies. See Wells v. Zadeck, 2011- 1232 ( La.
    3130/ 12), 
    89 So. 3d 1145
    , 1150. The four instances where contra non valentem can
    be applied to prevent the running of prescription are: (   1)   where there was some
    legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of
    or acting on the plaintiff' s action; ( 2) where there was some condition coupled with
    the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from
    suing or acting; ( 3)   where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to
    prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action; and ( 4) where the
    cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though
    M
    this ignorance is not induced by the defendant. 
    Id.
     Each situation allows the courts
    to weigh the "   equitable nature of the circumstances in each individual case"     to
    determine whether prescription will be tolled. Carter, 892 So. 2d at 1268.
    The sole argument raised on appeal by Dumas relates to the fourth
    jurisprudentially recognized    situation known    as the "   discovery rule,"   which
    provides that prescription commences on the date the injured party discovers or
    should have discovered the facts upon which his cause of action is based. Eastin,
    865 So. 2d at 55. Under the discovery rule, prescription begins to run when a party
    has "   actual or constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person
    that he or she is the victim of a tort." Babineaux v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp.
    and Development, 2004- 2649 ( La. App. I'     Cir. 12122105), 927 So. 2d l l21, 1123.
    An injured party has constructive notice when he possesses information
    sufficient to incite curiosity, excite attention, or put a reasonable person on guard
    to call for inquiry. Id. The prescriptive period commences when enough notice to
    call for an inquiry of a claim exists, not when an inquiry reveals the facts or
    evidence to sufficiently prove the claim. Id. at 1125. The doctrine will not exempt
    a plaintiff' s claim from the running of prescription if his ignorance is attributable
    to his own willfulness or neglect; that is, a plaintiff will be deemed to know what
    he could have learned by reasonable diligence. Renfroe v. State ex rel. Dept. of
    Transp. and Development, 2001- 1646 ( La. 2/ 26/02),   
    809 So. 2d 947
    , 953.
    Dumas contends that the BOE discriminated against him based on his race in
    July 2016 but he was not aware of the alleged racial discrimination until August
    14, 2019 when he read a news article about a case the BOE investigated involving
    Superintendent Edmonson. However, in his petition, Dumas discusses the BOE' s
    treatment of Chancellor O' Brien in comparison to his case. On March 10, 2005,
    the BOE found that Chancellor O' Brien violated the Code of Governmental Ethics
    but     imposed no   fine. Dumas   alleges that Chancellor O' Brien' s    situation is
    7
    comparable to his situation, but Chancellor O' Brien' s matter had a more favorable
    outcome than Dumas' s matter because Chancellor O' Brien is white. The BOE' s
    opinion regarding Chancellor O' Brien occurred more than ten years before the
    BOE' s decision in the Dumas matter. The opinion is published by the BOE on its
    website,    which allows the public to quickly and easily review opinions and
    decisions rendered by the board.'              See La. R.S. 42: 1159.
    Nothing prevented Dumas from asserting his claim of racial discrimination
    within one year from the BOE' s decision against him. Dumas alleges no facts
    which show that his delay in filing suit is reasonable. Dumas may not neglect to
    investigate        an   unfavorable      decision    and     expect     his        actions    to   be   deemed
    reasonable. See Eastin, 865 So. 2d at 56. Under the facts of the instant case, where
    Dumas alleged no inquiry to determine if the BOE' s decision was for unlawful
    reasons nor made an inquiry into the reasons for the BOE' s decision, Dumas' s
    delay in filing suit was not reasonable and does not merit the application of the
    doctrine      of    contra    non    valentem.      This     case     does     not    present      exceptional
    circumstances that warrant application of the doctrine. Thus,                                in sustaining the
    exception, the trial court did not err as a matter of law. Dumas' s assignment of
    error is without merit.
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court sustaining the
    peremptory exception of prescription in favor of the Louisiana Board of Ethics and
    dismissing Walter C. Dumas' s petition against the Louisiana Board of Ethics with
    prejudice is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Walter C. Dumas.
    AFFIRMED.
    Rulings,    advisory      opinions,   and    consent    opinions   of     the    BQE      can   be   found   at
    ethics. I a.gov/ ethicsopinion.
    F