Christian Schools, Inc. d/b/a John Curtis Christian School v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association Eddie Bonine and B.J. Guzzardo, Jr. ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                            STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    NO. 2020 CA 0762 R
    r                 CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, INC.
    D/ B/ A JOHN CURTIS CHRISTIAN SCHOOL
    VERSUS
    LOUISIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
    EDDIE BONINE AND B. J. GUZZARDO, JR.
    Judgment Rendered.
    MAY 18 2022
    Appealed from the
    19th Judicial District Court
    In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
    State of Louisiana
    Case No. 654874
    The Honorable Donald R. Johnson, Judge Presiding
    Gilbert V. Andry, IV                       Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    New Orleans, Louisiana                     Christian Schools, Inc. d/ b/ a
    John Curtis Christian School
    Walter M. Sanchez
    Lake Charles, Louisiana
    Everett R. Rineran
    New Orleans, Louisiana
    Mark D. Boyer                              Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees
    Diana L. Tonagel                           Louisiana High School Athletic
    Denham Springs, Louisiana                  Association, Eddie Bonine and
    B. J. Guzzardo, Jr.
    BEFORE:      THERIOT, WOLFE, AND HESTER, JJ.
    THERIOT, J.
    This    appeal,       involving a judgment dismissing the plaintiff' s                         suit    on
    exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no cause of action, is before us
    on remand from the supreme court. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Plaintiff, Christian Schools, Inc., d/ b/ a John Curtis Christian School (" John
    Curtis"),     filed a suit for damages against the Louisiana High School Athletic
    Association, Inc. (" LHSAA"), LHSAA Executive Director Eddie Bonine,                                           and
    LHSAA         employee         Buster     John     Guzzardo,         Jr. (   collectively "     the     LHSAA
    defendants"),       on January 30, 2017. This suit arose from a determination by the
    LHSAA that John Curtis had violated LHSAA rules on recruiting and the resulting
    imposition of penalties.'             In its petition, John Curtis alleged that the LHSAA
    defendants "     intentionally and or negligently punish[ ed],                  defame[ d] and violate[ d]
    the due process and equal protection rights of John Curtis Christian School."                                   In
    addition to monetary damages, John Curtis sought to have the trial court overturn
    the LHSAA' s finding that a recruiting violation occurred and reinstate its forfeited
    football wins.
    The LHSAA defendants raised an exception of lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction      in   their    answer      to    the    petition,     noting     that    under       applicable
    jurisprudence, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
    asserted in John Curtis' s petition, and seeking dismissal of the entire suit with
    prejudice.      The LHSAA defendants also filed an exception of no cause of action
    with regard to John Curtis' s claims for violation of its due process and equal
    protection rights.
    The factual basis for the LHSAA' s conclusion that a recruiting violation occurred was that an athlete was allowed
    to live with a John Curtis assistant football coach while the athlete attended John Curtis and participated on the
    varsity football team. John Curtis alleged that as a result of the LHSAA' s ruling that it committed a recruiting
    violation, John Curtis was forced to forfeit twenty football wins, including the 2013 LHSAA State Championship,
    and a monetary fine was imposed.
    2
    John Curtis filed a supplemental and amending petition, in which it alleged
    that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over its tort claims because the
    LHSAA breached its duty to govern or administer athletic events,            in which its
    members (    such as John Curtis)   participate,   in a reasonably prudent way.     John
    Curtis further alleged that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over
    constitutional issues presented by this fact pattern to the extent that [           the
    LHSAA' s]      actions   or inactions are in violation of Constitutional or statute
    provisions."
    Following the filing of John Curtis' s supplemental and amending petition,
    the LHSAA        defendants   reurged their exceptions     of lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction and no cause of action and moved to have the exceptions set for
    hearing. A hearing was held on the exceptions,          as well as a motion for partial
    summary judgment filed by John Curtis, on December 9, 2019. After taking the
    matter under advisement, the trial court rendered a judgment on January 14, 2020,
    noting that the " LHSAA is a private organization, not a public body, and ...      there
    is no jurisdiction to interfere with the internal proceedings of the LHSAA,"         and
    further that " John Curtis' [ s] pleadings fail to set forth a due process claim under
    color of state action or law, or any fundamental or express constitutional right,
    state or federal, allegedly violated by LHSAA as the basis for a cause of action or
    subject matter jurisdiction upon which this Court may grant relief."      The trial court
    sustained both exceptions and dismissed John Curtis' s suit with prejudice " for lack
    ofjurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action." John Curtis appealed.
    On appeal, John Curtis raised two assignments of error, both of which
    concern the trial court' s conclusion that John Curtis failed to state a cause of
    action.   In its first assignment of error, John Curtis argued that the trial court erred
    in sustaining the exceptions because John Curtis " state[ d] a cause of action based
    on the arbitrary and capricious, bad faith conduct of the LHSAA that was ultra
    3
    vires under its own rules, and which fell below the standard of care for its
    members."      In its second assignment of error, John Curtis alleged that the trial
    court erred in finding that it had " failed to state a cause of action against the
    individual defendants, Eddie [ Bonine] and B. J. Guzzardo, Jr., for breach of their
    fiduciary duties under the Louisiana Non -Profit Act and for defamation."                John
    Curtis failed to raise or brief any assignment of error with respect to the trial
    court' s sustaining of the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Christian
    Schools, Inc.       v.   Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 20- 0762, pp. 3- 
    4 La.App. 1
     Cir. 2/ 19/ 21), 
    320 So.3d 1164
    , 1166, reh' g denied (Apr. 16, 2021).
    Noting that this court only reviews issues raised on appeal, and further
    noting that all assignments of error and issues for review must be briefed, this court
    concluded that the propriety of the trial court' s ruling on the exception of lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction was not properly before us.          Furthermore, as a result of
    John Curtis' s failure to seek reversal of the sustaining of the exception of lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction, we concluded that its assignments of error concerning
    the exception of no cause of action have been deprived of any legal significance
    and   are   moot.        For these reasons, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
    Christian Schools, Inc.,        20- 0762 at p. 5, 320 So. 3d at 1167. John Curtis filed an
    application for a writ of certiorari,        which   was   granted,   and the   supreme court
    remanded the matter "         with instructions to address whether the district court erred
    in sustaining the defendants' ...        exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction
    and no cause of action."         Christian Schools, Inc. v. Louisiana High School Athletic
    Association, 21- 00686 ( La. 10/ 05/ 21), 
    325 So. 3d 359
     ( per curiam).
    DISCUSSION
    Subject Matter Jurisdiction
    Subject matter jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear
    and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of
    M
    the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted.                               La. C. C. P.
    art. 2.     Subject matter jurisdiction is created by the constitution or by legislative
    enactment; the parties cannot confer or waive it. See La. C. C. P. art. 3; Firestone
    Polymers, LLC v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, 19- 0283, p. 
    4 La.App. 1
     Cir. 11/ 15/ 19),         
    291 So. 3d 228
    , 232, writ denied, 20- 00131 ( La. 3/ 9/ 20),
    
    294 So. 3d 482
    .        Generally, a district court shall have original jurisdiction over all
    civil and criminal matters and shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.
    La. Const, art. V, § 16.
    An objection to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is raised by a
    declinatory exception.           La. C. C. P. art. 925A( 6).         At the hearing on the declinatory
    exception,        evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the objection,
    when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. See La. C. C. P. art. 930.
    Where,       as in the present case, no evidence is introduced at the hearing on the
    exception,        the court must accept the allegations of the petition as true for the
    purpose of ruling on the exception.                  However, this rule applies only to properly
    pled material allegations of fact;               the court is not required to accept conclusory
    allegations or allegations of law as true for purposes of the exception. Beasley v.
    Nezi, LLC,        16- 1080, p. 4 ( La.App.          1 Cir. 9/ 8/ 17), 
    227 So. 3d 308
    , 311- 12.                  The
    district court' s determination of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a
    case is subject to de novo review. Louisiana Environmental Action Network, Inc.
    v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, 2019- 1551, p. 8 ( La.App.                                         1
    Cir. 9/ 23/ 20), 
    314 So. 3d 841
    , 848.
    The Amateur Sports Act, 
    36 U. S. C. § 220501
    ,      et seq., provides that an
    amateur sports organization that conducts amateur athletic competition shall have
    exclusive jurisdiction over that competition if participation is restricted to a
    z The Amateur Sports Act defines " amateur sports organization" as " a not- for-profit corporation, association, or
    other group organized in the United States that sponsors or arranges an amateur athletic competition."   
    36 U. S. C. § 220501
    ( b)( 3).
    5
    specific class of amateur athletes, such as high school students, college students,
    members of the Armed Forces,           or   similar   groups    or   categories.    36 U.S. C.
    220526( a).    The LHSAA is an amateur sports organization as provided for in the
    Amateur Sports Act.       See Menard v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association,
    09- 0800, pp. 4- 5 ( La.App.   1 Cir. 12/ 23/ 09), 
    30 So. 3d 790
    , 793, writ denied, 10-
    0169 ( La. 4/ 5/ 10), 
    31 So. 3d 370
    .
    The LHSAA is a private, nonprofit corporation, whose membership consists
    of high schools within Louisiana.           The member high schools apply and are
    approved      for   membership    in   accordance      with    the   LHSAA' s      articles    of
    incorporation, constitution, and bylaws.          Each school that joins the LHSAA does
    so voluntarily and is not compelled to join by any state law.                Louisiana High
    School Athletic Association, Inc. v. State, 12- 1471,         p. 2 ( La. 1/ 29/ 13), 107 So. 3d
    John Curtis challenges the LHSAA' s investigation of the alleged recruiting
    violation, its finding that a violation occurred, and its imposition of penalties.            The
    trial court has no subject matter jurisdiction to address these issues, which clearly
    relate to the internal affairs of a voluntary association. See Menard, 09- 0800 at pp.
    4- 5, 
    30 So. 3d at 793
    .   The LHSAA' s actions in investigating and enforcing its own
    internal regulations are clearly not conducted under color of state law.           
    Id.
     Further,
    as this Court has previously noted, 36 U.S. C. §        220526( a) serves to preempt John
    Curtis' s state law claims for damages and deprives the trial court of subject matter
    jurisdiction regarding the merits, interpretation, and enforcement of the LHSAA' s
    internal rules and regulations.    See Menard, 09- 0800 at pp. 4- 5, 
    30 So. 3d at 793
    .
    The exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction was properly sustained with
    regard to these claims.
    The holding in Menard did distinguish the plaintiff' s claims for damages for
    deprivation of constitutional rights,       holding that subject matter jurisdiction did
    n
    exist for the trial court to determine the viability and merits of those claims raised
    in Menard' s petition.        Thus, the trial court may have subject matter jurisdiction in
    this matter to the extent the properly pled material allegations of fact in John
    Curtis' s original and amending petitions allege a deprivation of constitutional
    rights.
    In its original petition,        John Curtis made only a conclusory allegation,
    unsupported by any allegations of fact, that Guzzardo and Bonine violated its due
    process and equal protection rights.                Following the filing of the exceptions, John
    Curtis' s First Supplemental and Amending Petition added the following allegation
    regarding " constitutional issues":
    Also, this     Honorable Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
    constitutional issues presented by this fact pattern to the extent that
    this association[' s] ( LHSAA['         s])   actions or inactions are in violation
    of Constitutional or statute provisions. . . .                In fact, in Menard v.
    LHSAA, 
    30 So. 3d 790
     ( La. 1 Cir. 2009)[,] the Louisiana First Circuit
    Court of Appeal          stated that "[ t]he trial court was                incorrect   in
    concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine those
    issues, which clearly relate to the internal affairs of a voluntary
    association."      Distilled, this       Honorable Court has subject matter
    jurisdiction.
    We are compelled to note John Curtis changed the language of this direct
    quote from Menard in order to suit its purposes.                   The actual language used by this
    court in Menard was that "[          t]he trial court was correct in concluding that it lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction to determine those issues, which clearly relate to the
    internal affairs of a voluntary association." Menard, 09- 0800 at p. 4, 
    30 So. 3d at 793
     ( Emphasis added).            Nevertheless, the misquoted language was taken out of
    context (
    it actually referred to Menard' s tort claims rather than constitutional
    claims) and is of no consequence to our consideration of whether the trial court has
    subject matter jurisdiction over John Curtis' s constitutional claims.3
    With regard to the merits of the exception of lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction, John Curtis' s minimal allegations referencing "                    constitutional issues"
    s John Curtis again misquoted Menard in opposition to the LHSAA defendants' reurged exceptions.
    7
    are merely conclusory allegations of law, which are not accepted as true for
    purposes of an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.          See Beasley, 16-
    1080 at p. 4, 227 So. 3d at 311- 12.     To the extent that John Curtis' s petition and
    amending petition may state a claim for violation of its constitutional rights to due
    process and equal protection, subject matter jurisdiction would presumably exist
    for the court to consider the merits of those claims. However, since we conclude
    herein that John Curtis' s petition and amending petition failed to state a cause of
    action for violation of its due process and equal protection rights, any such claims
    were properly dismissed.
    Cause ofAction
    The purpose of an exception raising the objection of no cause of action is to
    determine the sufficiency in law of the petition by determining whether the law
    affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. Calloway v. Lobrano,                16-
    1170, p. 4 ( La.App 1 Cir. 4/ 12/ 17),    
    218 So. 3d 644
    , 648.      For purposes of the
    exception, the well -pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true. Dodson
    Hooks,     APLC v.    Louisiana Community Development Capital Fund,                    Inc.
    Capfund, "   19- 1516, p. 7 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 12/ 30/ 20),   
    318 So. 3d 939
    , 944; see La.
    C. C. P. arts. 927 and 931.   Furthermore, the facts shown in any documents annexed
    to the petition must also be accepted as true.     Dodson & Hooks,        19- 1516 at p. 7,
    318 So. 3d at 944; see also La. C. C. P. art. 853 ("   A copy of any written instrument
    that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof."). The burden of demonstrating
    that no cause of action has been stated is on the party raising the objection.
    Dodson &    Hooks, 19- 1516 at p. 7, 318 So. 3d at 944.
    In ruling on an exception of no cause of action,              the   trial   court   must
    determine whether the law affords any relief to the claimant if he were to prove the
    factual allegations in the petition and annexed documents at a trial.              Adams v.
    Owens- Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 04- 1296, p. 3 ( La.App.             1 Cir. 9/ 23/ 05),
    8
    
    921 So. 2d 972
    , 975, writ denied, 05- 2501 ( La. 4/ 17/ 06), 
    926 So. 2d 514
    .               An
    exception of no cause of action is triable solely on the face of the petition and any
    annexed documents thereto. See La. C. C. P. art. 931; Dodson & Hooks, 19- 1516 at
    p. 8, 318 So. 3d at 945. The only documentary evidence that may be considered on
    an exception of no cause of action is that annexed to the petition, unless the
    evidence is admitted without objection to enlarge the petition. Calloway, 16- 1170
    at pp. 4- 5, 
    218 So. 3d at 648
    .
    In reading a petition to determine whether a cause of action has been stated,
    it must be interpreted, if possible, to maintain the cause of action instead of
    dismissing the petition.       Adams,    04- 1296 at p.    3,   921 So. 2d at 975- 76.    Any
    reasonable doubt concerning the sufficiency of the petition must be resolved in
    favor of finding a cause of action has been stated. Adams, 04- 1296 at p. 3, 921
    So. 2d at 976.     The petition must set forth material facts upon which the cause of
    action is based. La. C. C. P. art. 891( A);   Lambert v. Riverboat Gaming Enforcement
    Div.,   96- 1856, p. 4 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 12/ 29/ 97),   
    706 So. 2d 172
    , 175. The correctness
    of conclusions of law is not conceded for the purposes of a ruling on an exception
    of no cause of action.
    CamSoft Data Systems, Inc. v. Southern Electronics Supply,
    Inc.,   15- 1260, p. 12 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 9/ 23/ 15),   
    182 So. 3d 1009
    , 1016.
    When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception
    may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the
    exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court.              If the
    grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, or if
    the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand,
    issue, or theory shall be dismissed.      La. C. C. P. art. 934.
    On appeal, the reviewing court conducts a de novo review of a trial court' s
    ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of action, since the exception raises a
    question of law. Adams, 04- 1296 at p. 4, 921 So. 2d at 976.
    9
    John Curtis' s allegations regarding the alleged violation of its constitutional
    rights were merely the conclusory allegations that Guzzardo and Bonine "            took it
    upon themselves, individually and in their official capacities within the LHSAA, to
    intentionally and or negligently ...        violate the due process and equal protection
    rights of John Curtis Christian School, all in the manner set forth herein."
    As this court noted in Menard, in order to prevail on a due process claim, a
    plaintiff must show the existence of some property or liberty interest that has been
    adversely affected by state action. Menard, 09- 0800 at p. 5- 6, 
    30 So. 3d at 794
    .
    To have a property interest protected by due process, a person must have more than
    an abstract need or desire for it; he must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it
    rather than a unilateral expectation of it.        This court has held that there is no
    procedural or substantive due process right to participate in interscholastic athletics
    regulated by the LHSAA.             Menard, 09- 0800 at pp.   5- 7,   
    30 So. 3d at
    794- 95;
    Johansen v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 04- 0937, p. 9 ( La.App. 1
    Cir. 6/ 29/ 05), 
    916 So. 2d 1081
    , 1088.     Thus, John Curtis did not allege any property
    or liberty interest that was adversely affected by state action, and has failed to state
    a cause of action for violation of its due process rights. The exception of no cause
    of action was properly sustained as to these claims.      Because no property or liberty
    interest is at stake, no amendment of the factual allegations of John Curtis' s
    petition could cure this fundamental flaw in the purported cause of action.            See
    Menard, 09- 0800 at p. 7, 
    30 So. 3d at 795
    ; Johansen, 04- 0937 at p. 9, 916 So. 2d at
    1088; La. C. C. P. art. 934.
    Likewise, John Curtis provided no material facts upon which it based its
    conclusory allegation that its right to equal protection of the law was violated.
    John Curtis made no allegations of any fundamental or express constitutional right
    or " suspect"   class or other enumerated class as the basis for discrimination.       See
    Menard,   09- 0800 at p.       8,   
    30 So. 3d at 795
    .   As such, the use of any other
    10
    classification as the basis for discrimination is subject to the minimal or lowest
    level of scrutiny under the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.                 
    Id.
    Such a classification is unconstitutional only if proven to not be rationally related
    to any legitimate state interest. 
    Id.
    The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that prevention of " the evils of
    recruiting" high school athletes is a legitimate state interest.           Chabert v. Louisiana
    High School Athletic Association, 
    323 So. 2d 774
    , 780 ( La. 1975).                The LHSAA' s
    rules on recruiting prohibit " the use of undue influence and/ or special inducement
    by anyone connected directly or indirectly with an LHSAA school in an attempt to
    retain a student at a school for the purpose of participating in interscholastic
    athletics."'
    Evidence of undue influence or special inducement specifically
    includes offer or acceptance of room and board, residence, or free transportation,
    when such is not made available to all applicants who apply to or enroll in the
    school. 5      The good intent of this rule is evident.            The rule is not arbitrary or
    inherently suspect, nor does it encroach on a fundamental constitutional right.               See
    Chabert, 
    323 So. 2d at 779
    .              As such, the plaintiff' s petition fails to set forth any
    factual basis for a violation of its equal protection rights, and the exception of no
    cause of action was properly granted.             See Menard, 09- 0800 at pp. 8- 9, 
    30 So.3d at 795
    .    Further, we conclude, in our considered discretion, that the grounds for the
    objection of no cause of action for violation of John Curtis' s equal protection rights
    cannot conceivably be removed by amendment of the petition under La. C. C. P. art.
    934.    Accordingly, we affirm the trial court' s judgment sustaining the exception of
    no cause of action and dismissing John Curtis' s suit with prejudice.
    a LHSAA Handbook, Recruiting, Rule 2. 1.
    5 LHSAA Handbook, Recruiting, Rule 2. 2. 1.
    11
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth herein, the January 14, 2020 judgment of the trial
    court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff, Christian Schools,
    Inc., d/ b/ a John Curtis Christian School.
    AFFIRMED.
    12