Charlie A. Campbell Kelly v. Louisiana Department of Veterans Affairs and David Lacrete, in his capacity as Secretary ( 2022 )

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2021 CW 1605
CHARLIE A. CAMPBELL KELLY
VERSUS
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND
DAVID LACERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
Judgment Rendered: SEP 1 4 2022
On Application for Supervisory Writs from the 19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 63 2, 03 1
Honorable Donald R. Johnson, Judge Presiding
Douglas A. Littlejohn Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Charlie A. Campbell Kelly
Jeff Landry Attorneys for Defendants/ Relators,
Attorney General State of Louisiana, through the
Jeannie C. Prudhomme Department of Veterans Affairs, and
Matthew Roth David LaCerte
Assistant Attorneys General
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, CJ., CHUTZ, AND PENZATO, JJ.
PENZATO, J.
In this supervisory writ application, defendants, the State of Louisiana,
through the Department of Veterans Affairs, and David LaCerte ( collectively,
defendants"), seek review of the trial court' s denial of their Motion for Summary
Judgment concerning a claim asserted by plaintiff, Charlie A. Campbell Kelly
plaintiff'), under the Louisiana Whistleblower Act (" LWA") - La. R.S. 23: 967 -
as well as a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the following
reasons, we reverse the trial court' s October 22, 2021 judgment, render summary
judgment in defendants' favor, and dismiss plaintiff' s claims against defendants
with prejudice.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 2011, plaintiff was hired by the Louisiana Department of
Veterans Affairs (" LDVA") as the Long Term Health Care Administrator for the
Southeast Louisiana War Veterans Home (" LDVH" or " the Home"), a long-term
care nursing facility in Reserve, Louisiana. At the time, plaintiff' s supervisors
were David LaCerte (" LaCerte"), LDVA Secretary, and Kevin Butler (" Butler"),
LDVA Deputy Assistant Secretary. As administrator of the facility, plaintiff had
general "
administrative authority and responsibility for the direction, control, and
management of all activities within [ the Home]."
In an April 9, 2013 " Improvement Letter," Butler noted to plaintiff that "[ i] t
is apparent that you have dysfunctional and counterproductive relationships with a
number of key members of your staff[,]" that due to plaintiff' s inability to
communicate with her human resources staff, the Home had " the largest number of
vacant positions of all the LDVA facilities[,]" that plaintiff did not have proper
authorization for various travel expenditures, that she has failed to complete the
required annual ethics training, and that she, generally, is not properly using the
resources available to her to successfully manage the Home. Butler specifically
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stated he " expect[ ed] to see a marked improvement in your job performance and
professional relationships as noted in this letter[,]" but further stated such a letter
was not to be considered disciplinary action.
Despite the expectations noted in the April 9, 2013 " Improvement Letter,"
plaintiff was terminated from her position with LDVA on July 19, 2013.
According to a letter signed by LaCerte and hand delivered to plaintiff, she was
terminated due to her poor performance, including but not limited to failing to
improve staffing levels at the Home, improper activity related to patient safety,
lack of communication with residents, their family members, and community
stakeholders, implementing unnecessary restraints on patients' access to hygiene
supplies, poor supervision of subordinates, lack of professional decision making,
using LDVA funds on expenditures for which she had no approval, and an
apparent ethics violation of La. R.S. 42: 1113 by granting LDVA hospice contracts
to a service in which plaintiff' s mother held a substantial interest.
On July 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a Petition for Damages (" Petition") against
defendants, claiming that she was terminated in violation of " Louisiana' s anti -
reprisal law, [ La. R.S.] 23: 967." Plaintiff further contended that the defendants'
conduct " was extreme, outrageous, sudden, and unexpected, and constituted the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress[.]"
On July 22, 2021, defendants filed the underlying Motion for Summary
Judgment arguing, in general, that "[ p] laintiff' s claims of whistleblower retaliation
and intentional infliction of emotional distress fall far short of establishing a prima
facie case." Defendants contended plaintiff could not show actual violations of
state law or that she " ever even blew a whistle." Further, defendants argued
plaintiff' s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress lacked support, and
were " easily refuted by a breadth of Louisiana [j]urisprudence." In support of their
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motion, defendants submitted plaintiff' s deposition and the affidavit of Dustin
Guy, Deputy Chief of Staff of LDVA, to which was attached contents of plaintiff's
personnel file.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that there existed genuine issues of
material fact in dispute, precluding summary disposition of this matter. She further
argued that " the totality of plaintiffs testimony, pleadings, responses to
discovery[,] and exhibits all show that she can meet her jurisprudential burden at
trial by establishing the prima facie elements of [La. R.S.] 23: 967." ( Emphasis
added.) In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted her deposition; her
Responses to Defendants' Interrogatories, Request for Admission of Facts and
Request for Production of Documents; and a July 3, 2013 e- mail from plaintiff to
Butler. LaCerte was copied on the e- mail, and forwarded it to Robert Hayes and
Guy.
The matter came for hearing on October 4, 2021 and, after taking the matter
under advisement, on October 22, 2021, the trial court issued Written Reasons for
Judgment and a judgment denying defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Following timely Notice of Intent to Apply for Supervisory Writs, as well as the
setting of a return date by the trial court, defendants timely sought supervisory
review of the trial court' s October 22, 2021 judgment.'
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendants contend the trial court committed error:
1. By denying their Motion for Summary Judgment regarding
plaintiffs LWA claim;
2. By denying their Motion for Summary Judgment regarding
plaintiff s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and
3. By relying on and adopting verbatim plaintiffs Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which included " facts" that were not
Pursuant to the requirements of La. C. C. P. art. 966( H), a Notice of Briefing Schedule was
issued to the parties on April 25, 2022.
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established in plaintiff' s Opposition, and by relying on plaintiff' s
Exhibit D," which was also not submitted with her Opposition.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Motions for Summary Judgment
After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary
judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents
show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3). The summary judgment
procedure is favored and designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(2).
The burden of proof is on the mover. La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1).
Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that
is before the court on the motion, the mover' s burden does not require him to
negate all essential elements of the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense.
Rather, the mover must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual
support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party' s claim, action, or
defense. Thereafter, the adverse party must produce factual support sufficient to
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1). If, however, the
mover fails in his burden to show an absence of factual support for one or more of
the elements of the adverse party' s claim, the burden never shifts to the adverse
party, and the mover is not entitled to summary judgment. Durand v. Graham,
2019- 1312 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 12/ 20), 306 So. 3d 437, 440.
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts
review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court' s
determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Reynolds v. Bordelon,
2014- 2371 ( La. 6/ 30/ 15), 172 So. 3d 607, 610. Because it is the applicable
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substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is
material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case.
Durand, 306 So. 3d at 440.
Improper Consideration ofSummary Judgment Evidence
In their third assignment of error, defendants argue the trial court
impermissibly relied on and adopted verbatim plaintiff' s proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, which included " facts" that were not established in
plaintiff's Opposition, and by relying on " Exhibit D," a document not submitted
with her Opposition, prohibiting defendants the opportunity to object. Though
identified last, we will address this assignment of error first, as it relates to the
evidence presented on motions for summary judgment.
Following the October 4, 2021 hearing on defendants' motion, the trial court
instructed both defendants and plaintiff to submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Plaintiff' s submission included the following sentence: " The
Office of Inspector General did conduct an investigation of LDVA and issued a
finding of fact to the public [ o] n January 29, 2016 stating that then Secretary David
LaCerte ``... engaged in questionable organizational, hiring, and pay practices that
appear to have contributed to an environment of little accountability."' In support
of this statement, plaintiff cited " Exhibit D," Report Highlights, Department of
Veterans Affairs, Joint Investigation issued by the Louisiana Legislative Auditor
and the Office of the Inspector General, dated January 27, 2016. This document
was attached to plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact, yet was not submitted with
plaintiff' s opposition memorandum to defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The report' s notation and inclusion in plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and
attachment thereto was its first appearance as a supporting attachment.
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The only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and
admissions. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4). Comment ( C) to Article 966( A)(4)
specifically notes the list of documents that may be filed in support of or in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is " exclusive." Additionally, Article
966( D)( 2) states the trial court " may consider only those documents filed in
support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and shall consider
any documents to which no objection is made. Any objection to a document shall
be raised in a timely filed opposition or reply memorandum. The court shall
consider all objections prior to rendering judgment. The court shall specifically
state on the record or in writing which documents, if any, it held to be inadmissible
or declined to consider." By considering " Exhibit D," the trial court deprived
defendants the opportunity to object in a reply memorandum, as required by
Article 966( D)( 2), to an exhibit that is not within the exclusive list of documents
which may be filed in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4).
Although the trial court erred in considering and noting Exhibit D in its
Conclusions of Law, given the de novo standard of review used by appellate courts
in reviewing motions for summary judgment, in our review, this court will only
consider the documents actually filed in support of or in opposition to defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment. See Alvin Fairburn & Associates, LLC v. Harris,
2020- 1290, 2020- 1291 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 18/ 21), 2021 WL 4843584, at * 4.
Accordingly, consideration will not be given to plaintiff's Exhibit D referenced
above.
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L WA Claim
Defendants' first assignment of error challenges the trial court' s denial of
their Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing plaintiff has not submitted any
evidence showing she can carry her burden of establishing a prima facie case under
the LWA.
The LWA, La. R.S. 23: 967, provides in pertinent part:
A. An employer shall not take reprisal against an employee who in
good faith, and after advising the employer of the violation of law:
1) Discloses or threatens to disclose a workplace act or
practice that is in violation of state law.
2) Provides information to or testifies before any public
body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into
any violation of law.
3) Objects to or refuses to participate in an employment
act or practice that is in violation of law.
B. An employee may commence a civil action in a district court where
the violation occurred against any employer who engages in a practice
prohibited by Subsection A of this Section. If the court finds the
provisions of Subsection A of this Section have been violated, the
plaintiff may recover from the employer damages, reasonable attorney
fees, and court costs.
The LWA protects employees against reprisal from employers for reporting or
refusing to participate in illegal work practices. Derbonne v. State Police
Commission, 2019- 1455 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 14/ 20), 314 So. 3d 861, 870, writ
denied, 2020- 01323 ( La. 2/ 17/ 21), 310 So. 3d 1152. The statute targets serious
employer conduct that violates the law. Causey v. Winn- Dixie Logistics, Inc.,
2015- 0813 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 23/ 15), 186 So. 3d 185, 187, writ not considered,
2016- 0167 ( La. 3/ 24/ 16), 190 So. 3d 1187. To prevail under the statute, the
plaintiff must establish an actual violation of state law; a good faith belief that a
violation occurred is insufficient. Id; see also Hale v. Touro Infirmary, 2004- 0003
La. App. 4th Cir. 11/ 3/ 04), 886 So.2d 1210, 1215 ( the LWA provides a remedy to
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employees for employers whose practices are in actual violation of the law, " and
not simply practices disagreed with or found distasteful by the employee.").
In addition, the plaintiff must establish that the employer, not simply its
employees, violated state law. See Richardson v. Axion Logistics, L.L. C., 780 F. 3d
304, 306 ( 5th Cir. 2015); see also Dillon v. Lakeview Regional Medical Center
Auxiliary, Inc., 2011- 1878 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 13/ 12), 2012 WL 2154346, at * 5 &
n. 8 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2012- 1618 ( La. 10/ 26/ 12), 99 So. 3d 651 ( observing
that " it could be concluded that the employer must be the actor who violated the
law, in order for there to be a cause of action under" La. R.S. 23: 967, and that
there is no indication in the provisions of [La.] R.S. 23: 967, in referencing an `` act
or practice' of the employer, that such would encompass unauthorized acts of its
employees").
Thus, to defeat defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to her LWA
claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists that:
1) defendants violated Louisiana law through a prohibited workplace practice; ( 2)
she advised defendants of the violation; ( 3) she then disclosed or threatened to
disclose the prohibited practice or objected to or refused to participate in the
prohibited practice; and ( 4) she was terminated as a result of the threat to disclose
or because of the disclosure of the prohibited practice or her objection to or refusal
to participate in the prohibited practice. See Melancon v. Town of Amite City,
2018- 0442, 2018- 0443 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 24/ 18), 261 So. 3d 7, 10.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants cite the
following portions of plaintiff' s deposition:
Q: Was it your understanding at that time that all or some of these
discrepancies were a violation of State law?
A: I don' t know the law, so I assume some of them had to have
been, but I' m not a lawyer, so that' s why I reported it to my
supervisor.
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Q: At any point did you ever provide information to or testify
before any public body conducting an investigation, hearing[,] or
inquiry into any violation of State law?
A: Not that I recall....
Q: Did you ever send a report or complaint to any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing[,] or inquiry?
A: No, not that I recall.
Q: Did you ever report any of these perceived violations to any
media outlets?
Defendants contend this testimony establishes an absence of factual support
that plaintiff will be able to prove that defendants violated Louisiana law, she
advised defendants of an actual state law violation, and she made an actual
disclosure to any outside entity, agency, or public body. Defendants further
contend that it is not possible that LDVA retaliated against plaintiff for a
disclosure, or threatened disclosure, it had no knowledge or awareness of.
In opposition, plaintiff contends that she articulated and identified violations
of state law in her responses to defendants' formal discovery requests. She cites
her following response to defendants' interrogatory regarding her allegation of
Veteran Abuse and Neglect by LDVH employees":
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9:
Upon information and belief, [ Kelly] noted the following conduct in
support of her allegations:
1. October 2011 — Failure to properly care Veteran 334
by Yvette Joseph;
2. October 2011 — Failureto properly care Veterans 0497
and 0441 by Bertha Joseph;
3. December 2011 — Failure to properly care of patient by
Tracey Cook.
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In other discovery responses, plaintiff identified the following conduct:
1) purchases from the Recreation Fund that were suspicious with
checks written directly to the Activity Director for large amounts
without receipts;
2) 6. 5gs given with insufficient verification of employment; an
application that the signature was completely differently than any
signature we had on file; the contact person on employee reference
checks were now current employees that did not list that place of
employment on their application; and, applications completely
missing from files. Additional findings included, but were not
limited to, nurses and/ or other staff members promoted to
administrative nurse positions or higher paid positions, but then
found to be demoted and still retain the same salary;
3) an employee who served as a direct care worker had lied on her
employment application regarding any criminal offenses or
convictions. The employee' s criminal background check reflected
that she had a charge of aggravated battery with a dangerous
weapon;
4) discrepancies between what was being reported by several
employees and the time actually worked;
5) the Activities Department was engaged in fraudulent conduct with
the respect to the utilization of vendor information in connection
with the entertainment for patients at the facility;
6) unethical
hiring practices including without limitation, the
restricted circulation of available positions at the facility and
preferential consideration and treatment for applicants of family
members.
Furthermore, citing a specific portion of her deposition testimony, plaintiff claims
she informed her supervisors of these alleged violations of state law:
Q: What discrepancies can you recall about Ms. Sonya
Aucoin' s department?
A: Ms. Aucoin' s activities, she would go into the resident
funds and get money addressed to her without receipts,
so I questioned that. Her timecard, same with the hour
calculations[,] were off. Vacation time with Sonya
Aucoin, she had exceeded the amount of days she was
allowed to take through the year and I questioned that.
That' s about all I can recall at the moment.
Q: And you brought this up with her?
A: I brought it up with her and I brought it up with my
supervisor.
Q: That being Kevin Butler?
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A: Correct, and the HR Director, Brad and DVA.
Q: Who is that?
A: Dustin Guy.
Q: What was their response?
A: It seems like as far as Sonya went with the vacation days,
Kevin told me to overlook it, basically to let her have the
days off. The calculations I was told to give to Brad
Lemoine who is the auditor, which I did, and I also let
David LaCerte know that I had given him the
calculations for payroll. And her employment file, her
pay grade, the way it increased it looked very suspicious,
so I gave it to Brad Lemoine.
Q: What do you mean it looked suspicious?
A: She went from making close to $ 10 an hour to close to
20 -something in a short period of time. I think it was 10
when she started, but don' t quote me on the 10. It was
like a big difference.
Additionally, plaintiff claims she informed the Office of the Inspector General of
the existence of workplace acts or practices at the Home allegedly in violation of
Louisiana law:
Q: Okay. Now earlier I think you had testified, if I' m not
mistaken, that you had made a report to the Office of the
Inspector General regarding the activities that you
witnessed at the facility that you believe were violations
of State law; is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Were those the same activities that you listed in
your lawsuit against the department, substantially?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you know whether or not an investigation ever took
place by the Inspector General?
A: Not while I was there. I know Brad — I had also — Brad
Lemoine was our auditor and I had provided the
information to him also, but the Inspector General, no,
not since I left. Maybe it has.
Plaintiff argues that the above discovery responses and deposition testimony
create genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants violated state law
and whether she took steps to report the violations to third parties.
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Based upon our de novo review of the summary judgment evidence, we find
plaintiff failed to provide sufficient information from which we can determine
which, if any, of the above -identified conduct violated Louisiana law, rather than
company policies and/ or Civil Service guidelines. Moreover, plaintiff does not
name LaCerte, the LDVA, or defendants in general as the ones committing these
alleged violations; rather, each of her claims are pointed to co-workers and/ or her
subordinates at the Home. Thus, we find that with regard to any of the above
identified conduct, plaintiff failed to establish that she will be able to meet her
burden of proof at a trial on the merits, i.e., that defendants violated Louisiana law
through a prohibited workplace practice. Accordingly, as to the requirement that
defendants violated Louisiana law through a workplace practice and that plaintiff
advised defendants of said violation, plaintiff fails to satisfy these requirements of
her LWA claim. There is also no evidence of a threat to disclose to outside
authorities. While plaintiff contends her July 3, 2013 e- mail contains such a threat,
our review of the e- mail indicates it does not.
Moreover, there is no evidence that plaintiff was terminated as a result of the
threat to disclose or because of the disclosure of any prohibited practice. In her
deposition, plaintiff testified that she made an anonymous report to the Louisiana
Office of the Inspector General. However, she specifically testified that she did
not recall when she sent the letter, other that it was sent in 2013, as she did not
send it by certified mail because she " didn' t want to be tracked." Further, plaintiff
testified she did not keep a copy of the letter, that she did not name LaCerte or any
of her supervisors in the letter, and that it addressed the questionable transactions
and activities occurring at the Home she " felt were illegal." An essential element
of an LWA claim is disclosure to " outside authorities," Mabry v. Andrus, 45, 135
La. App. 2nd Cir. 4/ 14/ 10), 34 So. 3d 1075, 1079, writ denied, 2010- 1368 ( La.
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9/ 24/ 10), 45 So. 3d 1079, and plaintiff has produced no evidence showing that the
letter disclosed an alleged violation of state law, when it was sent to the Office of
the Inspector General, or that the alleged retaliation from defendants occurred after
she sent the letter. Further, plaintiff provided no evidence to show that defendants
knew of this alleged anonymous letter and, as argued by defendants, " since the
letter was sent anonymously, there was no reason for [ defendants] to retaliate
against [ plaintiff] because the identity of the sender would have been unknown to
everyone, including [ defendants]." Finally, plaintiff has not identified any instance
in which she was asked or instructed but refused to participate in an employment
act or practice that was in violation of state law.
For these reasons, we find the plaintiff has not identified a genuine issue of
material fact or that defendants are otherwise not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law concerning her LWA claim.
Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress Claim
In their second assignment of error, defendants contend the trial court erred
in denying their Motion for Summary Judgment concerning plaintiff' s claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, especially as plaintiff offered no
argument or evidence in support thereof.'
In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff
must establish: ( 1) that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous;
2) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and ( 3) that the
defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional
distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct. White
v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209 ( La. 1991). The conduct must be so
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible
2 We note that plaintiff presented no evidence or argument in her Opposition, either to the trial
court or with this court, to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding her claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community. Id. Disciplinary action and conflict in a pressure -packed
workplace environment, although calculated to cause some degree of mental
anguish, is not ordinarily actionable. Id. at 1210. Recognition of a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a workplace environment has
usually been limited to cases involving a pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment
over a period of time. Id. The actions of the disciplinary review, the assigning of
difficult tasks, and the reassigning of employees to more stressful positions in and
of themselves do not rise to the level of outrageous conduct under White. Northern
v. State, ex rel. Louisiana Dept. ofRevenue, 2015- 0226 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 6/ 15),
2015 WL 6839998, at * 6( unpublished). Additionally, mere insults, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities are not enough to trigger
liability; rather, persons must necessarily be expected to be hardened to a certain
amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate
and unkind. Perrone v. Rogers, 2017- 0509 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 18/ 17), 234 So. 3d
153, 158, writ denied, 2018- 0101 ( La. 3/ 2/ 18), 269 So. 3d 709.
When questioned in her deposition about her claims of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, plaintiff states defendants " fired [ her] from a job [ she] truly
loved and felt [ she] was good at[,]" though this did not cause her to visit any
therapists or counselors, seek medical treatment, or obtain any medication.
Though plaintiff states and recounts in her deposition a number of allegedly unkind
interactions and statements made to her by subordinates and co- workers, the only
stated adverse effect of her termination specifically by defendants is that she " was
up throughout the night crying, upset." In fact, when expressly asked whether
any person in a supervisory role [] directly harassed [ her]," plaintiff responded, " I
don' t know —or I really don' t recall, not that I don' t know."
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Based upon our de novo review of the writ application, and noting the lack
of any Opposition by plaintiff concerning her claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, we find that plaintiff has not shown that defendants' conduct
was extreme or outrageous to a degree calculated to cause severe emotional
distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities, or that defendants desired to inflict
severe emotional distress or that severe emotional distress would be certain or
substantially certain to result from their conduct. See White, 585 So. 2d at 1211.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the writ and reverse the district court' s
October 22, 2021 judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment is entered in favor
of defendants, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Veterans Affairs,
and David LaCerte, dismissing the claims of plaintiff, Charlie A. Campbell Kelly,
against defendants with prejudice.
WRIT GRANTED. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RENDERED.
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