Rosehill Construction, LLC v. Ted Hebert, LLC ( 2022 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2022 CA 0486
ROSEHILL CONSTRUCTION, LLC
VERSUS
TED HEBERT, LLC
Judgment Rendered: Nov 2 8 2022
APPEALED FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 0676846
HONORABLE DONALD R. JOHNSON, JUDGE PRESIDING
T. Michael Murphy Counsel for Defendant/
G. Steven Duplechain Third -Party Plaintiff/Appellant
Larry Bankston Ted Hebert, LLC
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Anderson O. " Andy" Dotson, III Counsel for Third -Party Defendants/
Parish Attorney Appellees
Michael P. Schillage City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East
Assistant Parish Attorney Baton Rouge and Nathan Cobb
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
BEFORE: McDONALD, McCLENDON, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.
G
f
McDONALD, J.
This is an appeal from a district court judgment granting a motion for
summary judgment and denying a motion for partial summary judgment. After
review, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The history of this case is convoluted. Rosehill Construction, LLC (Rosehill)
was the general contractor on a construction project for the Cube Smart Storage
Project located at 4647 Burbank Drive in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Rosehill entered
into a subcontract with Ted Hebert, LLC ( Hebert) for sewer -related work on the
project for a lump sum of $221, 300. 00. On November 30, 2018, Rosehill filed suit
against Hebert, maintaining that Hebert' s work on the project failed to pass City of
Baton Rouge/ East Baton Rouge Parish ( City Parish) inspections on three occasions,
and after notice and opportunity to cure the defects, Hebert failed to do so and the
contract was terminated. Rosehill averred that it hired Hendrick Construction, Inc.,
to replace and complete Hebert' s work. Rosehill maintained that Hebert was
negligent and breached its contract and that Hebert was liable to it for damages and
attorney fees.
Hebert filed an answer, raised affirmative defenses, and asserted claims for
breach of contract in a reconventional demand. Hebert also filed a third -party
demand, naming as third -party defendants the City Parish, Nathan Cobb ( the City
Parish Engineer III who oversaw the CCTV inspections) and Stantec Consulting
1
Services, Inc. ( Stantec). Rosehill filed a motion for partial summary judgment and
also filed an answer to Hebert' s reconventional demand.' The City Parish, Mr.
Cobb, and Stantec filed answers to the third -party -demand.
In responses to interrogatories, Hebert stated that its claims against the City Parish and Mr. Cobb was a
pass through" claim, and that to the extent Hebert was found liable to Rosehill, Hebert sought to have
Rosehill' s damages assessed to the City Parish and Mr. Cobb.
2 Rosehill' s motion for partial summary judgment was not found in the record before us.
2
On September 30, 2021, the City Parish and Mr. Cobb filed a motion for
summary judgment seeking dismissal ofHebert' s claims with prejudice, maintaining
that there were no genuine issues of material fact that substantiated Hebert' s claim
against the City Parish or Mr. Cobb. In its motion for summary judgment, the City
Parish and Mr. Cobb maintained that: ( 1) Hebert contractually bound itself with
Rosehill to perform its work in compliance with the City Parish camera inspections
as outlined by the sag tolerance table contained within Standard Plan 802- 01; ( 2) the
pipe laid by Hebert, containing crushed portions, separated and detached joints, and
sags twenty-five percent over the tolerance level across the pipeline, would not have
passed any inspection method; ( 3) the City Parish and Mr. Cobb were entitled to
qualified immunity for performing their official duties as City Parish public works
employees; and ( 4) Hebert had no standing to assert a " pass through" claim against
the City Parish regarding the Cube Smart Project because the City Parish was not an
owner of the Project and Rosehill was the proper party to assert that claim.
On November 17, 2021, Hebert filed a motion for partial summary judgment
against the City Parish,' asking the district court to rule that " the Metro Council and
UDC [ Unified Development Code]' s delegation of authority to the Department of
Public Works to ( 1) establish the sag standard for sewer pipe in East Baton Rouge
Parish and ( 2) implement CCTV camera inspections to test sewers for compliance
with that sag standard was illegal and/or unconstitutional." On December 17, 2021,
the City Parish and Mr. Cobb filed an opposition to Hebert' s motion for partial
summary judgment.
On December 13, 2021, the district court signed a judgment denying
Rosehill' s motion for partial summary judgment and adopting Hebert' s findings of
fact and conclusions of law as its written reasons for judgment. In the written
reasons for judgment, the district court found that the City Parish did not have the
3 Mr. Cobb was not named in Hebert' s motion for partial summary judgment.
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authority to implement its sewer sag standard and CCTV sewer inspection policy.
On December 17, 2021, Hebert filed its opposition to the City Parish and Mr. Cobb' s
motion for summary judgment. On December 13, 2021, Rosehill filed a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of its motion for partial summary judgment.' On
December 30, 2021, the City Parish and Mr. Cobb filed their answer to Hebert' s
supplemental and amended third -party demand.
On January 3, 2022, a hearing was held on the motion for partial summary
judgment filed by Hebert and the motion for summary judgment filed by the City
Parish and Mr. Cobb. On February 3, 2022, the district court signed a judgment
granting the City Parish and Mr. Cobb' s motion for summary judgment' and denying
Hebert' s motion for partial summary judgment. However, that judgment did not
dismiss Hebert' s claims against the City Parish and Mr. Cobb. The district court
adopted the City Parish and Mr. Cobb' s findings of fact and conclusions of law as
its written reasons for judgment. The reasons for judgment by the district court
concluded that the City Parish had the authority to implement its sewer sag standard
and CCTV sewer inspection policy, and that the City Parish and Mr. Cobb had
qualified immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798. 1.
On February 22, 2022, the district court granted Rosehill' s motion for
reconsideration and vacated its December 13, 2021 judgment. On March 16, 2022,
Hebert filed a motion for an appeal from the February 3, 2022 judgment granting the
a The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for a motion for reconsideration with respect to
any judgment; instead, such a motion is generally treated as a motion for new trial. Lexington Land
Development, L.L.C. v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 2020- 0622 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5125121), 327 So. 3d 8, 17,
writ denied, 2021- 01194 ( La. 11 / 17121), 327 So.3d 966. A motion for new trial can betaken from a final
judgment. The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment. The denial of a motion
for summary judgment is reviewable by supervisory writ. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mohamadian, 2009- 1126
La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 17/ 10), 35 So.3d 1118, 1121. Thus, if Rosehill and Mr. Cobb sought review of the denial
of their motion for summary judgment, they should have filed for supervisory writs. See Allstate Ins. Co.,
35 So. 3d at 1121.
5 The trial court' s earlier ruling denying Rosehill' s motion for partial summary judgment, and finding in its
reasons for judgment that the City Parish did not have the authority to implement its sewer sag standard
and CCTV sewer inspection policies, was an interlocutory ruling; therefore, the trial court could later
change its mind and grant the motion for summary judgment in favor of the City Parish and Mr. Cobb,
finding that the City Parish did have the authority to implement its sewer sag standard and CCTV sewer
inspection policies. See La. C. C. P. art. 1841.
4
City Parish and Mr. Cobb' s motion for summary judgment and denying Hebert' s
motion for partial summary judgment.
This court issued an interim order on August 4, 2022, to the district court to
issue an amended judgment in accordance with La. C. C.P. art. 1951 to correct
deficiencies in the February 3, 2022 judgment. On August 10, 2022, the district
court signed an amended judgment granting the summary judgment filed by the City
Parish and Mr. Cobb and dismissing all claims against them with prejudice. Further,
the judgment denied Hebert' s motion for partial summary judgment. Hebert
appealed that judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no
genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant. A
summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo, with the appellate court using the
same criteria that govern the trial court' s determination of whether summary
judgment is appropriate; i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and
whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Schultz v. Guoth,
2010- 0343 ( La. 1/ 19/ 11), 57 So. 3d 1002, 1005- 1006.
The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not
bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion
for summary judgment, the mover' s burden on the motion does not require him to
negate all essential elements of factual support for one or more elements essential to
the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense. The burden is then on the adverse party
to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.
C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1).
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Hebert makes four assignments of error on appeal. First, it maintains that the
trial court erred in considering new arguments not made in the original motion for
summary judgment, but first raised by the City Parish and Mr. Cobb in their reply
memorandum.
Second, Hebert maintains that the trial court erred in finding that the
City Parish had the authority to implement the sewer sag standard and the CCTV
sewer inspection policy without any formal adoption of the standard and inspection
policy by the Metro Council. Third, it maintains that the trial court erred in finding
that the City Parish and Mr. Cobb were immune from civil liability. Fourth, Hebert
maintains that the trial court erred in adopting all of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law first raised in a reply memorandum in its written reasons for
judgment.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In assignment of error number one, Hebert maintains that the trial court erred
in considering new arguments not made in the original motion for summary
judgment but first raised by the City Parish and Mr. Cobb in their reply
memorandum.
Hebert cites Melton v. Horton, 10- 496 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 12/ 14/ 10), 55 So. 3d
897 and Wilson v. Two SD, LLC, 2015- 0477 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 23/ 15), 186 So. 3d
159, writ denied, 2016- 0306 ( La. 4/ 8/ 16), 191 So. 3d 588, as support for its position
that new substantive arguments contained in reply memorandum should be
considered as a new motion for summary judgment.
In Melton, this court reversed the grant of a motion for partial summary
judgment finding that mover initially sought dismissal of the plaintiff' s claim against
a co- defendant via partial summary judgment, but later sought new relief in the form
of dismissal of plaintiffs claims against the movant for the first time via its reply
memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment. Melton, 55 So. 3d at
6
901. The district court had also dismissed the plaintiffs separate and subsequent
personal injury claim added to the case via amended petition that was not addressed
by the movant through its motion or brief. Melton, 55 So. 3d at 901- 902.
In Wilson, the movant, an insurance carrier, sought summary judgment on the
basis that its policy did not provide coverage for the plaintiffs' claims because the
damage did not manifest during the policy period. Wilson, 186 So. 3d at 160. The
movant, in its reply memorandum, for the first time asserted that work product
exclusions were additional reasons to grant the summary judgment. The district
court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims against the insurance carrier,
finding that the work product exclusions precluded coverage. Wilson, 186 So. 3d at
161.
This court reversed the district court, finding that the motion did not directly
or indirectly assert that the issues under consideration included whether the work
product exclusions applied to the claims of the plaintiffs. Wilson, 186 So. 3d at 162.
Unlike Melton and Wilson, herein the City Parish and Mr. Cobb sought
summary judgment against all claims raised against them by Hebert and all of the
issues pertinent to the claims were addressed by the City Parish and Mr. Cobb' s
memorandum and evidence submitted in support of the motion. The City Parish and
W. Cobb' s memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment notes, in
part, that Mr. Cobb had the authority to use camera inspections, that Mr. Cobb
merely executed directives from his department officials, and that both the City
Parish and Mr. Cobb had qualified immunity for such actions. Further, the City
Parish and Mr. Cobb stated that Hebert was contractually bound to pass the City
Parish' s camera inspections for the project, as Hebert' s contract with Rosehill
required it to pass camera inspections and comply with all City Parish standards and
specifications, including City Parish Standard Plan No. 802- 01, which outlines sag
tolerance levels, which were applicable only to camera inspections.
7
The City Parish and Mr. Cobb' s memorandum in support of their motion for
summary judgment maintained that Hebert had to perform its own acceptance tests
prior to seeking final acceptance of its work in accordance with Section 802 of the
City Parish' s Standard Specifications, and pass the City Parish' s final inspection per
the UDC Section 4. 102( G). Further, the City Parish and Mr. Cobb asserted that as
part of Hebert' s obligation to pass final inspection, the City Parish highlighted its
own use of camera inspections for final inspection by adding the Sanitary Sewer
Grade Tolerance/ Acceptable Sag Limits table to Standard Plan No. 802- 01 in June
2017, and that there was no other testing mechanism for sanitary sewer pipe that
involves tolerance or sag limits.
After review, we find no merit to the contention that the district court relied
upon new arguments made in a reply memorandum rather than the arguments raised
in the original memorandum in granting the City Parish and Mr. Cobb' s motion for
summary judgment.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In assignment of error number two, Hebert maintains that the trial court erred
in finding that the City Parish had the authority to implement the sewer sag standard
and the CCTV sewer inspection policy without any formal adoption of the standard
and inspection policy by the Metro Council.
In response, City Parish and Mr. Cobb maintain that the City Parish Plan of
Government and the UDC set forth the parameters of the duties for each City Parish
department and the authority vested in the department directors and chiefs. They
note that Exhibit E attached to their motion for summary judgment included the
deposition testimony of Adam Smith, Interim Director of the City Parish Department
of Environmental Services, and Mr. Cobb, as well as the City Parish' s Standard
Specification 802, the City Parish UDC Section 4, the City Parish Plan of
Government Section 5, and the project' s Subdivision Permit issued to Hebert.
8
Hebert cites Krielow v. Louisiana Dept. of Agriculture and Forestry, 2013-
1106 ( La. 10/ 15/ 13), 125 So. 3d 354, Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v.
McCrory, 112 So. 2d 606 ( La. 1959), and Mid -City Automotive, L.L.C. v. Dept.
of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 2015- 0056 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 7/ 18), 267 So. 3d 165as support for its arguments.
In Krielow, rice producers challenged the constitutionality of statutes that
obligated them to pay an assessment on rice produced in Louisiana. The assessment
would not be imposed unless the rice producers approved it by majority vote. The
assessment was found unconstitutional in part by the trial court. Krielow, 125 So. 3d
at 386- 387. The supreme court amended and affirmed as amended, finding the
statutes unconstitutional in their entirety. Krielow, 125 So. 3d at 398. In
Schwegmann, a milk retailer sought an injunction against the Commission of
Agriculture and Immigration restraining enforcement of provisions of the Orderly
Milk Marketing Act and attacking its constitutionality on various grounds.
Schwegmann, 112 So. 2d at 607. The trial court found the Act was constitutional,
and the supreme court affirmed. Schwegmann, 112 So. 2d at 619. In Mid -City
Automotive, L.L.C., a towing company filed suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief alleging provisions of the Louisiana Administrative Code were invalid and
requesting an injunction against further fines, suspensions, and revocations under
those provisions. The district court ruled against the towing company and dismissed
the suit. Mid -City Automotive, L.L.C., 267 So. 3d at 165- 169. On appeal, this
court found the provisions unconstitutional, and reversed in part and rendered, and
vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. Mid -City Automotive,
L.L.C., 267 So. 3d at 178.
We do not find these cases to be analogous to the case before us. Chapter 4,
Section 4. 102, Part G( 1)( b) of the UDC provides that the Department of Public
Works " shall check the visual appearance of curbs and medians, street pavements,
9
and sidewalks, and shall reserve the right to perform general inspections of the
following: ( 1) Excavations; ( 2) Subsurface drainage; ( 3) Inlets, junctions, and
manholes; ( 4) Sanitary sewer collection lines; ( 5) Sanitary sewer manholes; ( 6)
Public sanitary treatment sewage treatment facilities; ( 7) Sanitary sewage lift
stations/ pump stations .... ( 13) Manufacture and installation of all drainage and
sanitary sewer pipe." It further states that " The Department of Public Works shall
notify the applicant' s appropriate licensed design professional of record of any
defects in materials or workmanship, failed independent quality assurance tests, any
noncompliance with the required DPW standards based on general inspection, or
any discrepancy found between field observations and the approved construction
plans." The Interim Director of the Department of Environmental Services for the
City Parish, Adam Smith, testified in his deposition that it was his decision to
implement CCTV inspections, which were allowed under Chapter 4 of the UDC. He
testified that Section 802 of the City Parish specifications, sometimes referred to as
the master specifications, outlines what types of inspections can be performed by
contractors, but not what kind of inspections can be performed by the City Parish.
Smith testified that the UDC states that the City Parish is to inspect the sewer
visually, among other things, but it does not get into specifics.
Mr. Smith testified that another way to identify a sag in a pipe is with a lamp
test, which utilizes a light in one manhole and looking in the other manhole to see if
the shape was circular, which meant the pipe didn' t have sags and wasn' t crushed.
However, he testified that the CCTV was a better test, because it also revealed other
defects, such as separated joints, a rolled gasket, or an issue at the service line. Be
noted that more comprehensive testing meant better pipes, with less maintenance
costs for the sewer pipe for the City Parish. Mr. Smith testified that after video or
CCTV testing, if necessary, an AMP test would follow. The AMP test would give
more information as to what the problem was.
10
After review, we find no genuine issue of material fact that the UDC provides
the City Parish Department of Public Works the authority to inspect the sewer pipes
and afforded the Department of Works director the authority to choose the methods
of inspection, which included the authority to implement the sewer sag standard and
the CCTV sewer inspection policy. This assignment of error has no merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
In assignment of error number three, Hebert maintains that the trial court erred
in finding that the City Parish and Mr. Cobb were immune from civil liability.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2798. 1 provides:
A. As used in this Section, " public entity" means and includes the state
and any of its branches, departments, offices, agencies, boards,
commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, employees, and
political subdivisions and the departments, offices, agencies, boards,
commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, and employees of
such political subdivisions.
B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or
employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such
acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.
C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not applicable:
1) To acts or omissions which are not reasonably related to the
legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or
discretionary power exists, or
2) To acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent,
malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant
misconduct.
D. The legislature finds and states that the purpose of this Section is not
to reestablish any immunity based on the status of sovereignty but
rather to clarify the substantive content and parameters of application
of such legislatively created codal articles and laws and also to assist in
the implementation of Article II of the Constitution of Louisiana.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2798. 1 exempts public entities from liability for
their employees' discretionary or policy- making acts. Specifically, under La. R.S.
9: 2798. 1, public entities and their officers and employees are immune from tort
claims based on their policy-making decisions or discretionary acts carried out
31
within the course and scope of their employment. Aucoin v. Larpenter, 2020- 0792
La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 16/ 21), 324 So. 3d 626, 636- 637, writ denied, 2021- 00688 ( La.
9/ 27/21), 324 So. 3d 87.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has devised a two-step test
to determine whether a public entity is entitled to immunity under Section
9: 2798. 1B. First, if a statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a particular course of
action, there is no choice or discretion involved, and the immunity does not apply,
However, when discretion is involved, the court must then determine whether that
discretion is the kind that is shielded by the statutory immunity, that is, discretion
grounded in social, economic or political policy. Section 9: 2798. 1 protects the
government from liability only at the policy making or ministerial level, not at the
operational level. Doe v. ABC School, 2019- 0983 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12117120), 316
So. 3d 1086, 1099, writ denied, 2021- 00098 ( La. 319121), 312 So. 3d 582.
The City Parish Plan of Government sets forth the duties of the departments
of the City Parish. The UCD establishes the Department of Environmental Service' s
authority to determine how the City Parish will inspect the public sewer pipelines.
The DPW permit for the project required that the work be performed in accordance
with the current City Parish standard specifications and UDC requirements as well
as the approved construction plans and East Baton Rouge Parish code ordinances.
Interim Director Smith chose to use CCTV inspection to be measured against the
sag tolerance table contained within the City Parish' s Plan Sheet 802- 01 which was
made a part of the project. Interim Director Smith also utilized Accurate Mapping
Probe ( AMP) as a follow up inspection to confirm the CCTV inspection results as
needed. Interim Director Smith used his discretion to determine which type of
testing would be done to inspect public sewer pipelines, and directed Mr. Cobb, and
Engineer III, to oversee the day to day process of inspections.
Mr. Hebert maintains that Mr. Cobb was not certified or trained to review
CCTV camera footage and make decisions based on the CCTV results. However,
12
Hebert' s expert, Murray L. McCullough, P. E., testified in his deposition that
licensed civil engineers such as Mr. Cobb do not need to be trained or certified
beyond their experience in sewer pipe work to review CCTV camera footage and
make decisions about the footage.
After review, we find no genuine issue of material fact that the City Parish
and Mr. Cobb are immune from civil liability for their discretionary or policy-
making acts in determining how the City Parish will 'inspect public sewer pipelines
and implementing those. inspections. This assignment of error has no merit,
CONCLUSION
After de nova review, we determine that the district court judgment correctly
granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the City Parish and Mr. Cobb,
dismissed all claims against them, and denied the motion for partial summary
judgment filed by Hebert.' Thus, the judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are
assessed against Ted Hebert, LLC.
AFFIRMED.
6 In assignment of error number four, Hebert maintains that the trial court erred in adopting all of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law first raised in a reply memorandum in its written reasons for
judgment. Appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment. Further, judgments are often
upheld on appeal for reasons different than those assigned by the trial court. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2009-
0571 ( La. 4/ 1/ 11),
61 So. 3d 507, 572. Because we have determined the judgment correctly granted the
motion for summary judgment tiled by the City Parish and Mr. Cobb, dismissed all claims against them,
and denied the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Hebert, we pretermit this assignment of error.
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ROSEHILL CONSTRUCTION, LLC STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL
TED HEBERT, LLC FIRST CIRCUIT
2022 CA 0486
HOLDRIDGE, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with that part of the majority opinion that
affirms the trial court' s finding that the City -Parish and Mr. Cobb were immune from
liability. There are genuine issues of material fact and a question of law as to
whether La. R.S. 9: 2798. 1 provides immunity from liability for the City -Parish and
Mr. Cobb. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2798. 1 only protects the government and
governmental employees from liability " at the policy making or ministerial level,
not at the operational level." Doe v. ABC School, 2019- 0983 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
12117/ 20), 316 So. 3d 1086, 1099, writ denied, 2021- 00098 ( La. 319/ 21), 312 So. 3d
582. There is a question as to whether the actions of Mr. Cobb were ministerial or
operational that precludes the granting of a motion for summary judgment.
I write further to state that a motion to reconsider may be used to ask the trial
court to reconsider, vacate, or revise a prior interlocutory order or partial judgment
that has not been certified under La. C.C. P. art. 1915 ( B)( 2). See e. g., Zapata v.
Seal, 2020- 01145 ( La. 9/ 30/ 21), 330 So. 3d 175, 179. However, if a court denies a
motion for summary judgment, a party may only take a supervisory writ to allow the
appellate court to grant the motion. A party cannot file a motion to reconsider a
denial of a summary judgment but must file a new or re -urged summary judgment
motion that complies with all of the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 966. See
Magallanes v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 2009- 0605 ( La. App. 4 Cir.
10114109), 23 So. 3d 985, 988.