Town of Sorrento v. East Ascension Consolidated Gravity Drainage District No. 1 ( 2022 )


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  •                                STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2021 CA 1220
    TOWN OF SORRENTO, ET AL
    VERSUS
    EAST ASCENSION CONSOLIDATED GRAVITY
    DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. 1
    Judgment Rendered:       APR 12 2022
    On Appeal from the
    Twenty -Third Judicial District Court
    In and for the Parish of Ascension
    State of Louisiana
    GAl                              No. 129, 239
    The Honorable Jason Verdigets, Judge Presiding
    Jean- Paul Robert                              Attorney for Defendant/Appellant,
    Gonzales, Louisiana                            East Ascension Consolidated Gravity
    Drainage District No. 1
    Robert R. Faucheux, Jr.                        Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee,
    LaPlace, Louisiana                             Town of Sorrento
    Matthew I. Percy                               Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee,
    Anna Q. Skias                                  Michael Lambert
    Jamie S. Thistlethwaite
    Gonzales, Louisiana
    BEFORE:        WHIPPLE, C. J., PENZATO, AND HESTER, JJ.
    PENZATO, J.
    The defendant appeals the trial court' s judgment denying its peremptory
    exceptions of no cause of action and failure to join an indispensable party and the
    judgment granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. For the following
    reasons, we recall our rule to show cause order and maintain the appeal. We affirm
    the judgment denying the defendant' s exceptions and reverse the judgment granting
    the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The Town of Sorrento and Michael Lambert, appearing as Mayor of the Town
    of Sorrento and as a citizen and landowner residing in the Town of Sorrento
    collectively, " the Town"),     filed a petition for declaratory judgment in July 2020
    against   the   East      Ascension   Consolidated Gravity     Drainage    District No.     1.
    According to the petition, the Town lies within the geographical territory of the
    District and its citizens pay taxes specifically collected to fund drainage works
    within the District.        The Town contended that the District has arbitrarily and
    unreasonably refused to clean and maintain roadside ditches and culverts located
    within the Town' s municipal boundaries.'         The Town prayed for judgment declaring
    that the District: ( 1)    owes a continuing duty and obligation to clean and maintain
    roadside ditches and culverts located with its statutory boundaries, including those
    within the Town' s municipal boundaries and ( 2)            owes a continuing duty and
    obligation to treat all property and citizens/ electors located within its statutory
    boundaries equally, including all property and citizens/ electors within the Town.
    The Town' s petition was amended in August 2020 to include an allegation that the District' s
    conduct was arbitrary and unreasonable.
    2
    The District filed an answer in October 2020, admitting the Town is within its
    territory.'   The District denied having a duty to clean and maintain the Town' s
    roadside ditches and culverts or a duty to treat all property and citizens within its
    territory equally. The District also denied that it has refused to clean and maintain
    the Town' s roadside ditches and culverts and, instead, asserted that the Town
    declined to accept the terms of its " offer" to perform work in the Town. The District
    further asserted that it has discretionary authority to perform the work it deems
    necessary to accomplish its duties.
    The Town filed the instant motion for summary judgment in March 2021,
    seeking judgment in its favor regarding the relief sought in the petition for
    declaratory judgment.         To support the motion, the Town relied on evidence to
    establish that, since 1984, the District has exercised its statutory authority to levy
    and collect taxes within its territory, which have been paid by the Town' s citizens
    and property owners.          All voter -approved tax propositions from 1984 to 2018
    provide for the collection of revenue for the purpose of maintaining and operating
    drainage works within the District.             As the Town correctly points out, the tax
    propositions do not exempt and/or bar a municipality within the District, such as the
    Town, from receiving services funded by tax proceeds. Consequently, the Town
    argued, incorporated municipalities should not have limited access to funds collected
    through these taxes and consideration of municipal boundaries should not be a factor
    in any District decision or expenditure of funds.
    To further highlight the District' s allegedly disparate treatment, the Town
    produced evidence that the District offered to clear the Town' s roadside ditches in
    June 2019 in exchange for, among other things, the Town' s acknowledgment that
    the District has no duty to perform the work and its agreement to indemnify the
    Prior to filing an answer, the District filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action, asserting
    that the Town' s petition impermissibly sought to mandate decisions within the District' s
    discretion. The exception was denied on October 6, 2020.
    k]
    District and to limit the contract' s term to one year.    Conversely, the District clears
    roadside ditches in unincorporated areas within its territory and does not require
    those   citizens to   agree to   similar terms.     The Town argued that its evidence
    established that the District' s refusal to perform work within the " invisible
    boundaries"   of the municipality was arbitrary and unreasonable, thereby justifying
    the court' s interference with the District' s discretion. The Town cites Chiro v.
    Fourth Jefferson Drainage District, 
    159 La. 471
    , 477- 78, 
    105 So. 556
    , 559 ( 1925),
    which   provides, "   It is well settled that, unless a public board' s discretion is
    unreasonably or arbitrarily or fraudulently exercised, the courts will not undertake
    to control it, or to substitute their discretion"   for that of the public body charged by
    law with the doing of the work. See also Lake Terrace Property Owners Association
    v. City ofNew Orleans, 
    567 So. 2d 69
    , 74 ( La. 1990) ( In reviewing the decisions of
    public bodies, the courts will not interfere with the functions of these bodies in the
    exercise of the discretion vested in them unless such bodies abuse this power by
    acting capriciously or arbitrarily.)
    Finally, the Town requested expedited consideration of its motion pursuant to
    La. C. C. P. art. 1878, " as this matter concerns the constitutionality of the expenditure
    of State funds."   Pursuant to Article 1878( B),    in a proceeding seeking a declaratory
    judgment as to the constitutionality of the expenditure of state funds, the court shall
    set the matter with preference and proceed to hear and determine the matter as
    expeditiously as the ends of justice may require.
    The District opposed the motion for summary judgment, asserting that the trial
    court may not "    override"   its discretion concerning the drainage work it chooses to
    perform.   It also produced evidence to demonstrate that it has appropriated money
    to upgrade pumping stations in the Town, for a total expenditure that " far       exceeds
    the tax revenue collected" in the Town.
    The District also filed exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action,
    failure to plead supplemental relief," and    failure to join an indispensable party (i.e.,
    the Louisiana Attorney General).     The District interpreted the Town' s reliance on
    Article 1878 as a " constitutional claim" under La. C. C. P. art. 1880 and maintained
    that a claim challenging the constitutionality of a statute must be set forth in the
    petition and served on the Attorney General.          Thus, the District argued that the
    Town' s constitutional challenge was improperly asserted for the first time in a
    motion for summary judgment in a proceeding wherein the Attorney General was
    not a party.   In response to the exceptions, the Town expressly denied asserting a
    constitutional challenge to any statute or ordinance and explained that it relied on
    Article 1878 as a procedural device to obtain a hearing on the motion for summary
    judgment as quickly as possible.
    The trial court heard argument on the District' s exceptions and the Town' s
    motion on May 4, 2021. The exceptions were denied in open court, and a judgment
    confirming the ruling was signed on May 13, 2021. After taking the motion under
    advisement, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Town, finding the Town
    satisfied its summary judgment burden of proving no genuine issue of material fact
    remains as to the duty owed by the District to the Town to clean and maintain
    roadside ditches and culverts within the municipality.      The court concluded that the
    District acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in failing to perform this duty and by
    requiring the Town to sign an agreement before the work is performed, a requirement
    not based in law or jurisprudence and which sets a different standard for the Town.
    A written judgment granting the motion was signed on June 4, 2021.
    The District filed the instant appeal, seeking reversal of the judgment denying
    its exceptions of no cause of action and failure to join an indispensable party, as well
    as the judgment granting the Town' s motion for summary judgment.
    5
    RULE TO SHOW CAUSE ORDER
    This court, sua sponte, issued a rule to show cause order on November 19,
    2021, noting defects in the June 4, 2021 judgment. After receiving briefs on the
    show cause order from both parties, this court issued an interim order on January 18,
    2022, remanding the matter for the limited purpose of instructing the trial court to
    sign an amended judgment correcting the cited deficiencies, particularly, the absence
    of specific declarations and/ or the denial of relief sought and the lack of certainty on
    the face of the judgment indicating whether all claims between the parties were
    resolved, citing La. C. C. P. art. 2088( A)( 12)       and La. C. C. P. art. 1951, as amended
    by 2021 La. Acts, No. 259, §    2.
    Pursuant to the interim order, the appeal record was supplemented with an
    amended judgment signed on February 2, 2022. The amended judgment expressly
    states that the motion for summary judgment is granted in favor of the Town and
    against the District and specifically provides:
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
    the relief awarded to the [ Town] is a continuing duty and obligation is
    owed by [ the District] to clean and maintain the roadside ditches and
    culverts that are located within the statutory boundaries, which includes
    the municipal boundaries of the Town of Sorrento.      This continuing
    duty and obligation includes treating all property and citizens/ electors
    located within the statutory boundaries equally.
    The February 2, 2022 amended judgment also states that it is a final judgment that
    adjudicates all outstanding issues. Considering this, we find the amended February
    2, 2022 judgment cured the identified deficiencies in the original June 4, 2021
    judgment. The rule to show cause order is recalled and the appeal is maintained.
    EXCEPTIONS
    We find no merit in the District' s assertion that the Town is challenging the
    constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.        The purpose of the peremptory exception
    of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading by determining
    whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. Palowsky v.
    31
    Cork, 2019- 0148 (     La. App.    1st Cir. 5/ 20/ 20), 
    304 So. 3d 867
    , 872.          The District
    acknowledges the Town has not asserted a constitutional challenge in its original or
    amended petition.      Additionally, the Town refutes the District' s contention that it
    has raised or attempted to raise a constitutional challenge at any time in this
    proceeding.       This express denial is supported by the allegations in the Town' s
    pleadings and its motion for summary judgment, as well as those made within the
    context of the request for expedited consideration. It is evident the Town relied on
    3
    Article 1878 solely to obtain an expedited hearing date on its motion.                    For these
    reasons, we also find the Louisiana Attorney General is not an indispensable party
    and there is no requirement that his office be served with a copy of the proceeding
    and provided an opportunity to be heard. See La. C. C. P. arts. 641 and 1880.                   See
    also Goodwin v. Louisiana Department of Health, 2018- 1405 ( La. App.                       1 st Cir.
    5/ 31/ 19), 
    277 So. 3d 816
    , 821 (    A party is indispensable only when the facts clearly
    establish that no complete and equitable adjudication ofthe controversy can be made
    in his absence.)    Thus, the May 13, 2021 judgment denying the District' s exceptions
    of no cause of action and failure to join an indispensable party is affirmed.4
    MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment
    shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that
    there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law.' La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3).         If the party moving for summary
    judgment will bear the burden of persuasion on the subject issue at trial, as here, that
    3 The trial court denied the Town' s request for expedited consideration and set the motion as a
    regular fixing.
    4 This court denied the District' s writ application taken from the May 13, 2021 judgment and
    request for a stay of the proceedings. Town of Sorrento v. East Ascension Consolidated Gravity
    Drainage District No. 1, 2021- 0610 ( La. App. I st Cir. 7/ 30/ 21) ( unpublished).
    In its opposition filed with the trial court, the District asserted the Town' s motion was premature
    because the District " had no opportunity for discovery." The trial court rejected this argument,
    which the District does not raise on appeal. Therefore, it is not addressed by this court.
    7
    party must support its motion with credible evidence that would entitle it to a
    directed verdict if not controverted at trial.         Hines v. Garrett, 2004- 0806 ( La.
    6/ 25/ 04), 
    876 So. 2d 764
    , 766 ( per curiam); Aucoin v. Larpenter, 2020- 0792 ( La.
    App. 1 st Cir. 4/ 16/ 21),   
    324 So. 3d 626
    , 632, writ denied, 2021- 00688 ( La. 9/ 27/ 21),
    
    324 So. 3d 87
    .      A motion for directed verdict is appropriately granted when, after
    considering all evidentiary inferences in the light most favorable to the party
    opposing the motion, it is clear the facts and inferences are so overwhelmingly in
    favor of the moving party that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict.
    LAD Services ofLouisiana, L.L. C. v. Superior Derrick Services, L.L. C.,         2013- 0163
    La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 7/ 14),   
    167 So. 3d 746
    , 751, writ not considered, 2015- 0086 (La.
    4/ 2/ 15),   
    162 So. 3d 392
    . Such an affirmative showing shifts the burden of production
    to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and requires that party to
    produce evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence of a "          genuine issue"
    for trial. Aucoin, 324 So. 3d at 632.     However, if there is any evidence in the record
    from any source from which a reasonable inference in the nonmoving party' s favor
    may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment. Hines,
    876 So. 2d at 766.
    Appellate courts review evidence de novo using the same criteria that govern
    the trial court' s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate.          Thus,
    appellate courts ask the same questions:          whether there is any genuine issue of
    material fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.
    C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3);    Georgia-Pacific Consumer Operations, LLC v. City ofBaton
    Rouge, 2017- 1553, 2017- 1554 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 7/ 18/ 18),       
    255 So. 3d 16
    , 22, writ
    denied, 2018- 1397 ( La. 12/ 3/ 18), 
    257 So. 3d 194
    .
    The District is a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana. Ascension
    Parish Ordinance Sec. 18- 30, Section 2.       It may incur debts and contract obligations,
    sue and be sued, and do and perform all acts in its corporate capacity and in its
    corporate name necessary and proper for the carrying out of the purpose and objects
    for which the drainage district was created.         La. R. S. 38: 1764( A); Ordinance Sec.
    18- 30, Section 2.     The District is governed by a board of commissioners, which
    shall have the power to open all natural drains in the district, to cut and open new
    drains, and such other work of drainage as they may deem necessary."                 Ordinance
    Sec. 18- 30, Section 5.    Similarly, La. R.S. 38: 1767 pertinently states, " The       board of
    drainage commissioners may open all natural drains which they deem necessary in
    their respective districts and perform all work connected therewith, which they may
    deem necessary to make the opening of the natural drains effective. They may cut
    and open new drains, ditches, and canals wherever deemed necessary...."               The board
    is further empowered to " perform all other acts necessary" to fully drain all the land
    in its district and maintain the drainage when established.6 La. R.S. 38: 1767.
    When used in a statute, the word " may" is permissive. La. R. S. 1: 3; Pierce
    Foundations, Inc. v. daroy Construction, Inc.,          2015- 0785 ( La. 5/ 3/ 16), 
    190 So. 3d 298
    , 304 ( recognizing that a "     cardinal rule"    of statutory interpretation is that the
    word "   may" is permissive).     It is evident from the provisions cited above that the
    District has the authority to perform the drainage works, which it deems necessary,
    but it has no duty to carry out specific drainage projects.              The District has the
    discretion to determine how, when, and where to exercise its authority to properly
    carry out the function for which it was created, subject only to judicial intervention
    if this discretion is unreasonably, arbitrarily, or fraudulently exercised. Lake Terrace
    Property Owners Association, 567 So.2d at 74.
    6 We find the District' s reliance on La. R.S. 33: 1236( 2)( c) is misplaced, because this statute
    pertinently states that police juries may, upon request of the governing authority of any
    incorporated municipality, perform all or any part of the repair, maintenance and care of culverts
    and other drainage facilities, situated within and under the jurisdiction of such incorporated
    municipality, and may expend for such purposes any funds made available to them for road
    purposes.
    G'
    The Town concedes that the District has the discretion to determine which
    drainage works to undertake but argues that it exercised this discretion in an arbitrary
    or unreasonable manner, particularly considering the Town' s citizens pay taxes
    collected for the precise benefit they are not receiving.      The trial court agreed and
    found that the District acted arbitrarily and unreasonably by treating the Town
    differently from others within its territory. However, the February 2, 2022 amended
    judgment does not simply order the District to cease exercising its authority in
    carrying out the functions for which it was created in an arbitrary and unreasonable
    manner. Instead, the judgment declares that the District has an affirmative duty and
    obligation to perform certain drainage works, i.e.,      clear    and   maintain   roadside
    ditches and culverts.    This finding is contrary to the legal authorities cited above,
    which clearly provide the District with discretion to determine which drainage
    projects to undertake.
    The same is true regarding the portion of the February 2,            2022 amended
    judgment, which declares that the District must treat all property,          citizens,   and
    electors located within its territory equally. The trial court' s ruling does more than
    ensure that the District gives the same consideration to drainage projects within the
    Town' s municipal boundaries as it does to those beyond the Town' s borders.
    Instead, this broad declaration creates an obligation on the District to allocate funds
    equally and to give equal priority to all drainage projects.    Neither Ascension Parish
    Ordinance Sec. 18- 30 nor the applicable statutes, which set forth the powers of the
    District and board of commissioners, impose this requirement.
    Additionally, we disagree with the Town that the collection of taxes alone
    creates an obligation for the District to clean and maintain the Town' s roadside
    ditches and culverts or otherwise dictates that all property, citizens, and electors must
    be treated equally. The proceeds of any special tax shall constitute a trust fund to be
    used exclusively for the objects and purposes for which the tax was levied.        La. R.S.
    10
    39: 704. Tax revenues obtained from a special tax must be used for no other purpose
    than that stated in the proposition submitted to and approved by the electorate.
    Central Community School Board v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 2008-
    0036 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 6/ 08), 
    991 So. 2d 1102
    , 1109- 10, writs denied, 2008- 1480,
    2008- 1538 ( La. 12/ 12/ 08), 
    997 So. 2d 561
    .    Louisiana Revised Statutes 47: 338. 168
    authorizes the District to levy and collect taxes; subpart ( D) states, "   The proceeds of
    the tax shall be used and expended solely for the purpose or purposes set out in the
    proposition approved by the electors at the election authorizing said tax."
    The first tax proposition at issue, approved by voters in 1984, provides for the
    collection of a sales tax in the District for ten years " dedicated for the purpose of
    constructing, acquiring, maintaining and operating gravity and/ or forced drainage
    facilities to drain lands" in the District. In 1998, voters approved a tax proposition
    for the collection of an ad valorem tax on all property subject to taxation in the
    District for ten years " to be dedicated and used for the same purposes of maintaining
    and operating said District' s drainage works."      Finally, in 2008 and 2018, voters
    approved similar ten-year tax propositions, which stated that the property taxes
    collected   are "   to be used entirely and exclusively to provide funds to pay the
    operation and maintenance costs and expenses of the drainage works of the District."
    None of these tax propositions expressly require the District to maintain roadside
    ditches and culverts, either broadly within the District or specifically within the
    Town, nor do these propositions mandate " equal" treatment for all property, citizens,
    or electors.   Instead, these propositions dictate the purpose for which the funds must
    be used, leaving the District with the discretion to determine how to fulfill this
    purpose.
    Similarly, the tax propositions at issue in La. Atty. Gen. Op. No.          15- 0100
    2015) asked voters, in part, whether an Allen Parish Road District shall continue to
    levy a tax on all property subject to taxation within the Road District "for the purpose
    11
    of constructing, improving and maintaining Parish roads and bridges within the
    Road] District...."'     The Attorney General concluded that this language did not
    direct the Parish to maintain municipal roads within the Parish; thus, the Parish was
    not obligated to perform this task.              Specifically, the Attorney General stated,
    A]bsent explicit language mandating or directing the Parish to maintain municipal
    roads, the determination as to which roads will be maintained with ad valorem tax
    funds rests with the governing authority of the Parish."
    In La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 20- 0056 ( 2021), the Attorney General examined the
    language of three tax propositions to determine what, if any, obligation the Parish
    Police Jury had regarding streets and drainage within a municipality.                 The first tax
    proposition asked voters whether West Carroll Parish shall continue to levy a tax on
    all property subject to taxation within the Parish " for the purpose of acquiring,
    constructing,      improving,       maintaining        and/ or       operating   drainage    works,
    improvements and facilities within and for the Parish...."              Another proposition asked
    whether West Carroll Parish shall continue to levy a tax on all property subject to
    taxation within the Parish "      for the purpose of improving and maintaining roads and
    bridges in the Parish...."      Finally, the third proposition asked whether West Carroll
    Parish shall continue to levy and collect a sales tax within the Parish, with one- half
    of the proceeds of the tax to be dedicated and used for general operating expenses of
    the Parish and one- half for constructing and maintaining drains and drainage
    facilities and for constructing and maintaining roads and bridges in the Parish.                 The
    Attorney General concluded that, pursuant to the language of each, the taxes shall
    be utilized for the enumerated purposes, but the Parish is not obligated to fully fund
    repair, maintenance, and materials for roads, culverts, and other drainage facilities
    7 While an Attorney General opinion is merely advisory and not binding authority, we recognize
    its persuasive authority, particularly where there is no jurisprudence on point. Dipaola v.
    Municipal Police Employee' Retirement System, 2014- 0037 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 25/ 14),    
    155 So. 3d 49
    , 53, writ denied, 2014- 2575 ( La. 2/ 27/ 15), 
    159 So. 3d 1071
    .
    12
    within the corporate limits of a municipality, which itself lies within the Parish
    boundaries. 8
    Considering the language of the tax propositions at issue here and,
    specifically, the stated purpose of the tax revenue, we find the Town failed to satisfy
    its burden of showing it was entitled to the relief sought in its motion, particularly,
    the declarations prayed for and granted by the trial court. Therefore, the February
    2, 2022 amended judgment granting the Town' s motion for summary judgment is
    reversed.
    CONCLUSION
    For the above and foregoing reasons, the November 19, 2021 rule to show
    cause order is recalled and the appeal is maintained.              The May 13, 2021 judgment
    denying the peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and failure to join an
    indispensable party filed by the East Ascension Consolidated Gravity Drainage
    District No. 1 is affirmed.        The February 2, 2022 amended judgment granting the
    motion for summary judgment in favor of the Town of Sorrento and Michael
    Lambert, in his capacity as Mayor of the Town of Sorrento and as a citizen and
    landowner residing in the Town of Sorrento,                   and against the East Ascension
    Consolidated Gravity Drainage District No. 1 is reversed.                      The costs of these
    proceedings in the amount of $2, 440. 50 are assessed against the Town of Sorrento
    and Michael Lambert, in his capacity as Mayor of the Town of Sorrento and as a
    citizen and landowner residing in the Town of Sorrento.
    RULE TO SHOW CAUSE ORDER RECALLED; JUDGMENT DENYING
    EXCEPTIONS            AFFIRMED;           JUDGMENT            GRANTING           MOTION          FOR
    SUMMARY JUDGMENT REVERSED.
    8 We have already noted that La. R.S. 33: 1236( 2)( c), the pertinent statute at issue in La. Atty. Gen.
    Op. 15- 0100 and Op. 20- 0056, does not apply here. Nevertheless, we find the Attorney General' s
    consideration of the language of the tax propositions to determine whether a duty exists is
    instructive.
    13