State Of Louisiana v. Chanse Everett Mortenson ( 2023 )

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2022 KA 1047
STATE OF LOUISIANA
11
Q VERSUS
CHANSE EVERETT MORTENSON
DATE OF JUDGMENT- APR 2 6 2023
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY- SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NUMBER 2486- 2020, DIVISION J
HONORABLE ELLEN M. CREEL, JUDGE
Warren L. Montgomery Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Matthew Caplan
Assistant District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
Walter R. Woodruff, Jr. Counsel for Defendant -Appellant
Metairie, Louisiana Chanse Everett Mortenson
BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND RESTER, JJ.
Disposition: CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
CHUTZ, J.
The defendant, Chanse Everett Mortenson, was charged by bill of information
with cruelty to juveniles, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 93, and pled not guilty.
Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of attempted cruelty to juveniles, a
violation of La. R.S. 14: 27 and La. R.S. 14: 93, by unanimous verdict. He was
sentenced to four years at hard labor, suspended, and three years on probation. The
defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. For the
following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
The victim, J. G.,' was born on January 7, 2005. In 2019, he was living with
his mother and the defendant in the defendant' s house. According to J. G.' s
testimony, in May 2019, he was forced to sleep outside for multiple days with no
tent, blanket, or mattress as punishment for being disrespectful. He did not bathe or
change clothes while outside, and the only food he had was either given to him or
thrown on the ground for him by his mother or the defendant. The defendant accused
J.G. of being disrespectful and disobedient because J. G.' s eyes " dart[ ed] around,"
when J. G. looked at the defendant. J. G. indicated he was told to apologize or leave
the house, and although he apologized, he was still forced to leave the house. J. G.
testified his punishment was " terrible" and was " all [ he] thought about." He was
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subsequently hospitalized for suicidal ideations and prescribed Lexapro.
In October 2019, the defendant punished J. G. for fourteen days because he
was disrespectful and told his father about the defendant' s actions. At the beginning
of that punishment J. G. was allowed to sleep on the floor inside, but he was later
forced to again sleep outside. On the thirteenth day ofthe punishment, the defendant
The victim is referenced herein only by his initials. See La. R.S. 46. 1844( W).
z Escitalopram, sold as Lexapro, is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor used to treat depression
and generalized anxiety disorder.
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forced J. G. to " work the floor" with a rag and a bucket of water. After J. G.
completed the work, the defendant made him repeat the task. While J. G. was
cleaning the floor, the defendant struck him with an open hand " too many [ times] to
count," bruising J. G.' s eye and bloodying his nose.' After J. G. reported the incident
to his father, he was again forced to sleep outside. During that time, he was not
allowed into the house to use the bathroom and instead urinated in the woods and
defecated at school.
On October 30, 2019, St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office Detective
Angelica Lopez visited J. G. at the defendant' s house. Detective Lopez and child
protective investigators spent approximately three hours outside the residence,
waiting for J. G.' s mother to return from work. Although it was cold and raining,
J. G., who was fourteen years old, was also outside wearing shorts. J. G. had no
protection from the mosquitos and was actively scratching mosquito bites on his
legs. The defendant repeatedly told J. G. he could only go inside if he apologized for
his actions. J. G. remained outside throughout the time authorities were present and
even after his mother returned. Later that night, authorities removed J.G. from the
home.
Alice Broussard, a guidance counselor at Covington High school, first
counseled J. G. at the end of September 2019. He was fourteen years old at the time
and was upset because of his relationship with his mother and her boyfriend. J. G.
told Broussard that his mother and the defendant removed his bed and everything
else from his bedroom except for a pillow and a blanket. In October 2019, J. G.
reported conditions had worsened, stating that the defendant had hit him four times
and made his nose bleed. Broussard saw bruises under J. G.' s left eye. J. G. also told
Broussard he was being forced to sleep outside and that the only method of bathing
3 In a recorded pretrial interview, J. G. stated the defendant struck him " like five times."
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available to him was to use the garden hose. He stated his mother had made the car
available for him to sleep in, but he was not allowed to sleep in the house. He also
told Broussard that he was given different food than everyone else and was not
allowed to eat dinner with the family.
Dr. Neha Mehta examined J. G. on November 12, 2019. She diagnosed child
physical abuse on the basis of J. G. reporting that he was hit in the head, and the blow
caused a nosebleed and left a mark. Dr. Mehta also diagnosed child neglect on the
basis of J. G. being denied available resources, including food, shelter, heat, sleeping
conditions, and basic hygiene to J. G. Dr. Mehta noted J.G. reported punching
himself in the head and wanting to kill himself after spending two days sleeping on
the grass with bugs and ants and without food or water. Additionally, Dr. Mehta
diagnosed emotional abuse on the basis of isolation, spurning, and lack of self-worth
as a result of feeling unwanted. In Dr. Mehta' s opinion, striking a child in the head
was unreasonable discipline because of the risk of significant injury to the child' s
eyes, teeth, and brain.
The defendant testified that J. G. was not his biological child, his stepchild, or
his adopted child, but that he was dating J. G.' s mother. When asked about J. G.' s
disobedience or disrespect requiring discipline, the defendant stated J. G. did not
speak to his mother very nicely and frequently remained silent. The defendant also
claimed J. G. would do his chores " halfway and not all the way." According to the
defendant, he and J.G.' s mother disciplined J. G. by taking away his cell phone, TV
privileges, movie theater privileges, and pool privileges. The defendant stated,
pretty soon, [ J. G.] had everything taken away from him, including his toothbrush
and his bed."
According to the defendant, the incident in May occurred after J. G. cussed at
his mother and she decided he could stay outside in a chair on the screened -in porch.
The defendant claimed J. G. spent only one night on the porch and was provided with
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a blanket and a towel to use as a pillow. The defendant denied making J. G. sleep on
the grass. He also claimed J. G. was given chips, sandwiches, and bottled water.
According to the defendant, J.G. kicked the screen porch door and punched the
window, but pulled his punches " because he didn' t want to get cut." The defendant
did not deny that J. G. was taken to the hospital the next day when he said he was
going to hurt himself.
In regard to corporal punishment, the defendant stated he had slapped J. G. on
two occasions. The first occasion was when J. G. " stepp[ ed] forward" toward his
mother. The second occasion was when J. G. " stepp[ ed] forward" toward the
defendant. In regard to this incident, the defendant claimed he warned J. G. several
tunes and backed up twice before slapping him. The defendant stated on another
occasion J. G. " chested up" to him in the middle of the driveway. The defendant
claimed J.G. swung at him, and he moved his head out of the way before taking J. G.
down to the ground without hitting him or slapping him. According to the defendant,
J. G. was the aggressor in the incidents and his " chest was puffed up and his fists
were doubled." However, the defendant admitted that when he saw J. G. was angry,
he told the fourteen -year-old boy: " You want to hit me, don' t you[?] ... " Well you
go right ahead. See how that works out for you." The defendant denied acting with
any intention to be cruel or to mistreat J. G.
In regard to the October incident, the defendant claimed J. G. falsely reported
to his father that the defendant had hit him four or five times and bloodied his nose.
The defendant denied striking J. G. during the incident, stating instead that his finger
accidentally went into J. G.' s nose while he was trying to draw J.G.' s attention to the
parts of the floor he had missed while cleaning. The defendant stated he told J. G.
either to tell the truth and apologize for getting his mother yelled at and threatened
by his father, or to leave the house. The defendant stated that J. G. walked to the
unscreened front porch and remained there for approximately three hours. The
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defendant claimed J.G. then repeatedly refused his mother' s offers to come back
inside, and she eventually gave him a blanket and a pillow and opened the car for
him.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the State failed to adduce
evidence sufficient to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that he intentionally
committed the offense of attempted cruelty to juveniles. He argues the record is
devoid of any evidence that his completed actions caused the victim any unjustifiable
pain or suffering and, without sufficient evidence of this essential and necessary
element, his conviction cannot stand.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due
process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, La. Const. art. I, § 2. In reviewing claims
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether
any rational trier -of f-act could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and
inadmissible, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ( 1979); State v.
Oliphant, 2013- 2973 ( La. 2/ 21/ 14), 133 So. 3d 1255, 1258- 59 ( per curiam); see also
La. Code Crim. P. art. 821( B); State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308- 09 (La. 1988).
State v. Livous, 2018- 0016 (La. App. I st Cir. 9/24118), 259 So.3d 1036, 1039- 40, writ
denied, 2018- 1788 ( La. 4/ 15/ 19), 267 So. 3d 1130. When circumstantial evidence
forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence, " assuming every fact to be proved that
the evidence tends to prove . . . must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence." La. R.S. 15: 438; Oliphant, 133 So.3d at 1258; Livous, 259 So.3d at 1040.
The due process standard does not require the reviewing court to determine
whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes the evidence establishes guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mire, 2014- 2295 ( La. 1127/ 16), 269 So. 3d 698,
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703 ( per curiam). Rather, appellate review is limited to determining whether the facts
established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by
that evidence are sufficient for any rational trier -of f-act to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.
State v. Gardner, 2016- 0192 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 9119116), 204 So. 3d 265, 267.
In this case, the defendant was charged with cruelty to a juvenile, but the jury
returned a verdict of guilty of attempted cruelty to a juvenile. The offense of cruelty
to juveniles includes the " intentional or criminally negligent" mistreatment or
neglect by anyone 17 years of age or older of any child under the age of 17 whereby
unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused to the child. La. R.S. 14: 93( A)( 1). Thus,
cruelty to a juvenile can be committed either when a person has general intent to or
is criminally negligent in mistreating or neglecting the child, regardless of whether
the person had an intent to cause the child unjustifiable pain and suffering. See State
v. Barnett, 521 So. 2d 663, 665 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 1988). In contrast, a person may
be found guilty of attempted cruelty to a juvenile under La. R.S. 14: 27( A) only if,
having a specific intent" to commit the offense, he does or omits an act for the
purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object. Thus, while
general intent or criminal negligence is sufficient for the commission of cruelty to a
juvenile, specific intent is an essential element for the commission of attempted
cruelty to a juvenile. La. R.S. 14: 27( A); La. R.S. 14: 93.
4 La. R.S. 14: 10(2) defines general criminal intent as follows:
General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when
the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human
experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as
reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.
Specific criminal intent is that " state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that
the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to
act." La. R.S. 14: 10( 1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may
be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. Specific intent may be proven by direct
evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such
as a defendant' s actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal
conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. State v. Coleman, 2021- 0870 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
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The defendant' s testimony presented a version of events in which he denied
any wrongdoing and offered as a hypothesis of innocence that he acted to reasonably
discipline J. G. Citing La. R.S. 14: 18( 4), he contends on appeal that a defendant' s
conduct is justifiable, although otherwise criminal, when the defendant' s conduct
consists of reasonable discipline of a minor by a parent. La. R.S. 14: 1$( 4). Viewed
in the context of the cruelty to juveniles statute, La. R. S. 14: 93, " unjustifiable pain
and suffering" are words of limitation. In a parent' s case, the application of the
statute is limited to mistreatment causing pain and suffering exceeding the bounds
of reasonable discipline. See State v. Comeaux, 319 So. 2d 897, 899 ( La. 1975);
Barnett, 521 So. 2d at 666.
We express no opinion on whether La. R.S. 14: 18( 4) is applicable under the
circumstances herein, where the defendant is not the minor' s parent but the minor
and his mother, the defendant' s girlfriend, are living in the defendant' s home and
the defendant may have acted with the mother' s consent. Regardless, the jury
observed the defendant' s appearance and demeanor during his testimony, and its
verdict indicates it did not find his claim that his conduct was merely reasonable
disciplining of J. G. to be credible. The jury obviously rejected this testimony. A
determination of the weight to be given evidence is a question of fact for the trier -
of f-act and is not subject to appellate review. State v. Morrison, 582 So. 2d 295,
303 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 1991).
A review of the record reveals any rational trier -of -fact, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, could have concluded beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant acted with the specific intent to mistreat or abuses J. G. to
an extent sufficient to result in unreasonable pain and suffering and performed acts
4/ 8/ 22), 342 So. 3d 7, 12.
s As used La. R.S. 14: 93, " mistreatment" is equated with abuse. State v. Booker, 2002- 1269 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 2114103), 839 So. 2d 455, 459, writ denied, 2003- 1145 ( La. 10131/ 03), 857 So. 2d 476.
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in furtherance of that intent. In May 2019, the defendant forced J. G. to remain
outside, sleeping on the grass, for multiple days. According to J. G.' s testimony,
while he was given some food during this time, he was deprived of adequate food.
The defendant' s own testimony established that the May 2019 " discipline" of J. G.
resulted in J. G. threatening to harm himself, ultimately leading to his hospitalization
for suicidal ideations and being prescribed anti -depressant medication. Further, the
defendant admitted that shortly thereafter, he and J. G.' s mother had a discussion
with someone from the Department of Family Services, who advised them that J. G.
should not be left outside except for a cooling -off period no longer than three hours.
Nevertheless, despite being aware ofthe deleterious effect being forced to stay
outside in May had on J.G., the defendant again banished J. G. from his home in
October 2019, after first making him sleep on the floor for several nights. The
defendant forced J.G. to remain outside exposed to cold weather, rain, and biting
insects for days. During this time, J. G. was not allowed to use the facilities in the
house for any purpose, including to relieve himself or for hygiene purposes. J. G.
resorted to using a hose pipe to wash himself
When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the trier -of f-act reasonably
rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant' s own testimony, that
hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that
raises a reasonable doubt. Morrison, 582 So. 2d at 303. Based on its credibility
determinations, the jury rejected the defendant' s claim that, rather than mistreating
or abusing J. G., he was reasonably disciplining J.G. and teaching him to apologize.
The defendant' s testimony was directly contrary to J. G.' s testimony regarding the
mistreatment he was subjected to and the fact that he did apologize but was still not
permitted inside the house. Once the jury rejected the defendant' s reasonable
discipline defense, there was no other hypothesis of innocence raising a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant' s guilt. The defendant' s conduct evidenced his active
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desire to mistreat and abuse J. G. to an extent causing unjustifiable pain and suffering
and supports the verdict returned by the jury. See State v. Freeman, 409 So. 2d 581,
587 ( La.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 845, 103 S. Ct. 100, 74 L.Ed. 2d 90 ( 1982) ( jury
properly charged with attempted cruelty to a juvenile on the basis of evidence the
defendant intentionally mistreated the juvenile).
This court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to
overturn a factfinder' s determination of guilt. The testimony of the victim alone is
sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. The trier o
- f f-act may accept or reject,
in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Johnson, 2013- 0372 ( La.
App. 1 st Cir. 12127113), 2013 WL 6858334, * 3 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2014- 0254
La. 11126114), 152 So. 3d 895. Further, in reviewing the evidence, we cannot say the
factfinder' s determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented.
See State v. Ordodi, 2006- 0207 ( La. 11129106), 946 So.2d 654, 662. An appellate
court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses
for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an
exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the
factfinder. See State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 ( La. 1121109), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 ( per
curiam).
This assignment of error is without merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
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