State Of Louisiana v. Juan Carlos Pazzuniga ( 2023 )

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
Gov
2023 KA 0085
y r'-44) STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JUAN CARLOS PAZZUNIGA
Judgment Rendered: SEP 15 2023
On Appeal from the
Thirty -Second Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Terrebonne
State of Louisiana
No. 784505
The Honorable David W. Arceneaux, Judge Presiding
Joseph L. Waitz, Jr. Attorneys for Appellee
Amanda L. Mustin State of Louisiana
Houma, Louisiana
Lieu T. Vo Clark Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Mandeville, Louisiana Juan Carlos Pazzuniga
BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ.
HOLDRIDGE, I
The defendant, Juan Carlos Pazzuniga, was charged by grand jury indictment
with three counts of first-degree rape, violations of La. R.S. 14: 42( A)(4), and pled
not guilty. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged by unanimous
verdicts. On each count, he was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with the sentences to run
concurrently with one another. The defendant now appeals, challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support each conviction. For the following reasons,
we affirm the convictions and sentences.
FACTS
Y.S.,' Y.G., and Y.M., are the defendant' s nieces. On August 9, 2018, they
made recorded statements to the Child Advocacy Center ( CAC} alleging the defendant
had raped and committed other sex crimes against them when they were between five
and seven years old. Thereafter, they testified at trial against the defendant.
Y.P. and A.M. are two adult female relatives of the defendant. They testified at
trial that when they were five and under eighteen years old, respectively, the defendant
attempted to rape them, raped them, touched their vaginas, or forced them to touch his
penis.
The defendant testified he was the uncle of Y.S., Y.G., and Y.M. He had no
explanation for why his nieces would come to court and make accusations against him.
He testified when he first heard of the allegations, he told his wife there was " no way
he would] do that to [ Y.S., Y.G., and Y.M.]" The defendant also denied
inappropriately touching Y.P. and A.M. He stated he was a stranger to Y.P. when they
met when she was five years old, and they could not communicate because she spoke
l We reference the victims and their family members by their initials. See La. R.S. 46: 1844( W).
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English and his English was poor. In regard to A.M.' s allegations, the defendant stated
the bed faced the bathroom, so he would not have been able to do anything to A.M. if
his wife was in the bathroom and it was impossible for him to have reached her vagina
from the bed.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant contends the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of three counts of first-degree rape. He argues the State' s
case against him consisted of the testimony and CAC statements of Y.S., Y.G., and
Y.M., but did not include corroborating witnesses, physical evidence, or scientific
analysis.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due
process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, La. Const. art. 1, § 2. In reviewing claims
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and
inadmissible, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ( 1979); State v.
Oliphant, 2013- 2973 ( La. 2121/ 14), 133 So.3d 1255, 1258- 59 ( per curiam); see also
La. Code Crim. P. art. 821( B); State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308- 09 ( La. 1988);
State v, Livous, 2018- 0016 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 24/ 18), 259 So.3d 1036, 1039- 40, writ
denied, 2018- 1788 ( La. 4115119), 267 So. 3d 1130. When circumstantial evidence
forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence, " assuming every fact to be proved that
the evidence tends to prove . . . must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence." La. R.S. 15: 438; Oliphant, 133 So. 3d at 1258; Livous, 259 So. 3d at 1040.
The due process standard does not require the reviewing court to determine
whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes the evidence establishes guilt
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beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mire, 2014- 2295 ( La. 1/ 27/ 16), 269 So.3d 698,
703 ( per curiam). Rather, appellate review is limited to determining whether the facts
established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by
that evidence are sufficient for any rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.
State v. Gardner, 2016-0192 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 9119116), 204 So. 3d 265, 267. The
weight given evidence is not subject to appellate review; therefore, an appellate court
will not reweigh evidence to overturn a factfinder' s determination of guilt. Livous,
259 So. 3d at 1040.
La. R. S. 14: 41, 2 in pertinent part, provided:
A. Rape is the act of anal ... or vaginal sexual intercourse ...
committed without the person' s lawful consent.
B. Emission is not necessary, and any sexual penetration, when
the rape involves vaginal or anal intercourse, however slight, is
sufficient to complete the crime.
La. R.S. 14: 42, in pertinent part, provides:
A. First degree rape is a rape committed ... where the anal ...
or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful
consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or
more of the following circumstances:
4) When the victim is under the age of thirteen years. Lack of
knowledge of the victim' s age shall not be a defense.
Count I
Y.S. was eleven years old when she testified at trial.' She identified the
defendant in court as the man who raped her in a shed. In her CAC statement, Y.S.
indicated that when she was six years old, the defendant touched her vagina when they
2 Prior to amendment by 2022 La. Acts No. 173, § 1.
3 Y.S. testified on August 11, 2022.
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were in a car together and vaginally and anally raped her on a motorcycle in a shed.
She also alleged the defendant had squeezed and touched inside her vagina and
bottom."
Count II
Y.G. was eleven years old when she testified at trial. She identified the
defendant in court as her uncle Juan. She identified herself in the CAC video played
for the jury.
In the video, Y.G. stated, when she was seven years old, the defendant tickled
and touched her vagina and touched her buttocks and chest in the shower. Y.G. also
alleged the defendant vaginally raped her while her aunt was taking a bath. Y.G.
further alleged the defendant put her on a chair in the shed and vaginally raped her.
At trial, Y.G. confirmed that everything she said in the video was true. She
testified that the defendant had vaginally raped her in the bathroom and vaginally and
anally raped her against the bed in the room next to the bathroom.
Count III
Y.M. was nine years old when she testified at trial. She identified the defendant
in court as her uncle Juan. She identified herself in the CAC video played for the jury.
In the video, Y.M. stated the defendant licked her vagina on a bed at her aunt' s
house. She also testified that the defendant had anally raped her in the bathroom and
had vaginally raped her in the shed and the pool.
La. Code Evid. art. 412. 2( A) Evidence
Y.P. was twenty- seven years old when she testified at trial. She identified the
defendant in court. She testified that when she was five years old, her mother left her
alone with the defendant because he was a relative. The defendant tricked her into
undressing and then touched her vagina while playing "the little spider" game with her.
Thereafter, the defendant forced Y.P. to touch his penis and tried to vaginally rape her.
Wi
Y.P. testified that when she was nine years old, the defendant tried to make her touch
his penis and " stuck it in ... one time."
A.M. was twenty-nine years old when she testified at trial. The defendant was
her older sister' s husband. A.M. testified that when she was less than eighteen years
old, the defendant touched her vagina while her sister took a bath and while she was
sleeping on the floor and the defendant was in bed with her sister.
Any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence presented in this case in the
light most favorable to the State, could find the evidence proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the
elements of first-degree rape and the defendant' s identity as the perpetrator of that
offense against Y.S., Y.G., and Y.M. While the trial testimony of Y.S., Y.G., and
Y.M. was less specific than their CAC statements, this was a matter of the weight,
rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence. The verdicts returned indicate the jury
found Y.S., Y.G., and Y.M. credible. That testimony was sufficient to prove the
elements of the offense. Despite the defendant' s claim of a lack of corroborating
witnesses, physical evidence, or scientific analysis, it is not necessary that these
forms of evidence exist or be presented to prove the defendant committed first-
degree rape. The testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to prove the elements of
the offense. See State v. Cutrer, 2012- 2128 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 9117113), 2013 WL
5299918, * 3 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2013- 2509 ( La. 6120114), 141 So. 3d 278and State v, El -Amin, 2011- 0030 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 6110111), 2011 WL 3570012,
7 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2011- 1532 ( La. 2117112), 82 So. 3d 281, cert. denied,
568 U.S. 835, 133 S. Ct. 128, 184 L.Ed.2d 61 ( 2012) (" It is well settled that if found
to be credible, the testimony of the victim of a sex offense alone is sufficient to
establish the elements of the offense, even where the [ S] tate does not introduce
medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove commission of the offense by the
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defendant."). This court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the
evidence to overturn a fact finder' s determination of guilt. The trier of fact may accept
or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Johnson, 2013-
0372 ( La. App. lst Cir. 12127113), 2013 WL 6858334, * 3 ( unpublished), writ denied,
2014- 0254 ( La. 11126114), 152 So.3d 895. Further, in reviewing the evidence, we
cannot say that the fact finder' s determination was irrational under the facts and
circumstances presented. See State v. Ordodi, 2006- 0207 ( La. 11129106), 946 So. 2d
654, 662. The State urged the jury to reject the defendant' s claim that Y.S., Y.G.,
and Y.M. had been coached and to " listen to how [ Y.S., Y.G., and Y.M.] describe
things and ... listen to details[.]" Rather than reciting " coached" identical versions of
the offenses, Y.S., Y.G., and Y.M. each recounted different acts and incidents of sexual
abuse.
An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and
credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict
on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally
rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 ( La. 1121109), 1 So. 3d 417,
418 ( per curiam).
This assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the
defendant, Juan Carlos Pazzuniga.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
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