State Of Louisiana v. Kyron Bourda ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 2023 KA 0124
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
KYRON BOURDA
Judgment Rendered: SEP 15 2023
On Appeal from the
17th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish ofLafourche
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 592931
Honorable F. Hugh Larose, Judge Presiding
Kristine Russell Attorneys for Plaintiff A
- ppellee,
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Greg Stahlnecker
Shaun George
Joseph S. Soignet
Assistant District Attorneys
Thibodaux, LA
Bertha M. Hillman Attorney for Defendant -Appellant,
Covington, LA Kyron Bourda
BEFORE: McCLENDON, WOLFE, AND RESTER, JJ.
RESTER, J.
The defendant, Kyron Bourda, was charged by grand jury indictment with
second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 30. 1, and pled not guilty. After a
trial, a unanimous jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The trial court denied
a motion for new trial and a motion for post -verdict judgment of acquittal filed by
the defendant. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at
hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The
defendant now appeals, assigning error to the sufficiency of the evidence. For the
following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 22, 2018, Deputy Clay Blanchard and Deputy Joe Scorintino,
III, both with the Lafourche Parish Sheriffs Office ( LPSO), began investigating a
missing person' s report initiated by Misty Carr after she was unable to contact her
longtime friend, Rani Pinel ( the victim). Carr indicated that she last spoke to Pinel
over the phone on December 18, 2018, and that she believed Pinel was with the
defendant' at the time.
Pinel' s father, Harry Pinel, informed Deputy Scorintino that he last saw Pinel
on December 17, 2018, and at that time she was driving his white 2014 Chevrolet
Silverado. Mr. Pinel observed that a black male was with her, but he could not
identify him. Assisted by OnStar tracking services, Deputy Blanchard and Deputy
Kendra Danos located the truck in a cane field off of Lasseigne Road in Lafourche
Parish. Pinel' s body was discovered on the passenger side floorboard of the truck.
Pinel had lacerations all over her face and body and appeared to have been badly
beaten.
While the nature of the defendant' s relationship with Pinel was not described at trial, Carr
testified that she was aware of Pinel spending time with the defendant during the months prior to
her death, and while the defendant' s DNA was being collected pursuant to the search warrant, he
referred to Pinel as " his girl."
2
The truck was towed to the law enforcement complex for processing. There
were bloodstains throughout the truck, including the driver' s side and backseat, and
several swabs were collected from the truck. From the rear passenger side
floorboard, detectives discovered three interlocking metal tire jack extension rods
with suspected blood on them. An autopsy was performed on Pinel, during which a
sexual assault kit was utilized to collect DNA evidence that was sent, along with
evidence collected from the truck, to the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab (LSPCL)
for testing.
Shevie Cooley, who lives on Lasseigne Road, saw the truck pass in front of
her trailer, turn into the " head land" and then into the cane field at about 5: 00 p. m.,
on December 18, 2018. Moments later, she heard the engine revving and tires
spinning, as the truck was apparently stuck in the mud. A few minutes later, she saw
two men walking out of the cane field. She briefly spoke to the two men and during
the conversation, she noticed that one of them had tattoos on his neck that reminded
her of a group of music symbols.
LSPCL notified LPSO that DNA obtained from blood collected from the truck
was entered into the CODIS database and matched the defendant' s profile. On
December 28, 2018, Lieutenant Robert Mason, a criminal investigator with LPSO,
obtained and executed a search warrant to photograph and obtain a buccal swab from
the defendant. While executing the warrant, Lieutenant Mason observed and
photographed scrapes on the defendant' s hands and left shoulder.2 Lieutenant
Mason further obtained and executed search warrants for the cellphone records of
Pinel and the defendant. After the results of the LSPCL testing were received, the
defendant was arrested for Pinel' s murder.
2 Lieutenant Mason also observed that the defendant had a large tattoo on his neck as well as less
visible tattoos on his face ( on his forehead and near his eyes). Lieutenant Mason noted that the
defendant' s neck tattoos " especially" stood out.
3
After viewing a news article on the defendant' s arrest, released on September
12, 2019, which contained a photograph of the defendant, Cooley called the LPSO
and identified the defendant as the person with the neck tattoos who she saw exiting
the cane field on December 18, 2018. She again identified the defendant at trial.'
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant avers that the evidence
presented at trial is insufficient to support the verdict. He argues that the evidence
did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or prove his identity as
the killer in this case.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due
process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, La. Const. art. 1, § 2. The standard of review
for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether or not, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could
conclude that the State proved the essential elements of the crime, and the
defendant' s identity as the perpetrator of that crime, beyond a reasonable doubt. See
La. Code Crim. P. art. 821( B); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct.
2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 ( 1979); State v. Laue, 2020- 0225 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
12130120), 326 So. 3d 267, 273, writ denied, 2021- 01329 ( La. 11117121), 327 So. 3d
993, cert. denied, U. S. , 142 S. Ct. 2659, 212 L.Ed.2d 612 ( 2022). When
analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15: 438 provides that the fact finder must
be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably
rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls,
and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a
3 The defendant did not testify at trial.
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reasonable doubt. State v. Dyson, 2016- 1571 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 612117), 222 So. 3d
220, 228, writ denied, 2017- 1399 ( La. 6115118), 257 So. 3d 685.
Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as " the killing of a human
being: [ w] hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm[.]" La. R. S. 14: 30. 1( A)( 1). Specific intent is that state of mind which exists
when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14: 10( 1); State v.
Coleman, 2017- 1045 ( La. App. Ist Cir. 4113118), 249 So. 3d 872, 877, writ denied,
2018- 0830 ( La. 2118119), 263 So. 3d 1155. Though intent is a question of fact, it
need not be proven as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the
transaction. Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by
a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant' s
actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal
conclusion to be resolved by the fact finder. Id.The State bears the burden of proving those elements, along with the burden
to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. Id. When the key issue is
the defendant' s identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was
committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of
misidentification. A positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to
support a conviction. Id. at 877- 78.
Carr testified at trial that she and Pinel became friends during childhood and,
prior to Pinel' s death, they communicated weekly. At the time of Pinel' s death, Carr
lived in Texas and Pinel lived in Louisiana. Carr testified that Pinel told her about
the defendant and that Carr had a five-minute phone conversation with the defendant
in mid- October 2018, but she never met him. When Pinel called Carr in November,
Pinel told Carr she was with the defendant, and Carr heard the defendant' s voice in
the background.
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Around 9: 00 a. m., on December 18, 2018, after Pinel' s father called Carr
looking for Pinel, Carr called Pinel and told her that her father was worried about
her. Pinel told Carr that she would call her father. Carr testified that during that
phone call, Pinel was speaking softly and slowly, and nearly whispering, which was
opposite from her usual cadence. Carr also testified that during that phone call she
heard the defendant' s voice in the background, and as Pinel was telling Carr that she
would call her back, the phone disconnected. Carr never heard from Pinel again.
The next day, Pinel' s father called Carr and told her that Pinel did not come
home. He asked Carr to call Pinel again. Carr was unable to make contact with
Pinel and observed that Pinel had not even checked her messages. Carr believed
something was wrong because Pinel normally checked her messages and " always
responded to [ her] no matter what." Carr called the Sheriff' s Office and they opened
the missing person' s investigation. Carr further testified that she was aware that
Pinel struggled with cocaine use, but she had never seen Pinel use cocaine and had
never met any of her contacts for procuring drugs.
Cooley, the Lasseigne Road resident who saw two people coming out of the
cane field on December 18, 2022, testified that after the two males walked out of the
cane field, she observed them stomping their feet to remove the mud from their
shoes. She asked them if their truck was stuck and they indicated that they ran out
of gas and were walking to the home of a nearby relative. Cooley asked them where
they were coming from, and they continued to walk briskly as they conversed,
Cooley noted that her interaction with them lasted only a " few seconds."
Based on Cooley' s statement and the defendant being the last person known
to be with Pinel, Detective Chris Eagan with the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff' s Office,
compiled a black and white photographic lineup that included a photograph of the
defendant. Cooley was shown the photographic lineup, but she did not select the
defendant. Rather, the person selected by Cooley was deceased at that time and
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could not have been the perpetrator. Cooley testified that she was looking for
someone with similar neck tattoos when she spent five minutes making a selection
from the lineup. Cooley' s subsequent identification of the defendant took place after
she saw an LPSO article on Facebook that featured a color photograph of the
defendant.' At trial, Cooley again positively identified the defendant as one of the
individuals who walked passed her house from the cane field that day.
Lieutenant Mason testified that while photographing and collecting DNA
from the defendant, the defendant said that Pinel was his girl, that he would not hurt
her, and that he last saw her Monday or Tuesday morning ( December 17, or
December 18, 2018), when she dropped him off at Johnson Ridge in the Schriever,
South Thibodaux area. Lieutenant Mason explained the phone location data at trial.'
The records show that between approximately 9: 01 a.m. and 11: 30 a. m., on
December 18, 2018, the defendant' s phone and Pinel' s phone were at the same
general location. At approximately 1: 53 p.m., both phones were located in
Raceland, and entered the Houma area about twenty minutes later. Pinel and the
defendant' s phones continued to travel towards Thibodaux until approximately 4: 12
p.m. Thereafter, the defendant' s phone became inactive while Pinel' s phone
continued to travel towards Thibodaux and ultimately to the cane field on Lasseigne
Road after 6: 00 p. m. Pinel' s last outgoing call, estimated at about 2: 00 p.m. that
day, was with Marylynn Helmer, Pinel' s friend of twenty years.
Two days later, on December 20, 2018, the defendant' s phone was reported
to his provider as stolen with a request for the services to be deactivated. Pinel' s
a
Regarding her identification of the defendant, Cooley testified, " So I scrolled back and ... I read
the article ... And at that point, I could fell [ sic] the spidy little sensors or whatever ... but
whenever I looked at his face again ... It was like everything just all clicked. Like the light bulb
went off."
s Pinel' s phone was recovered from her father' s truck where her body was found. Lieutenant
Mason obtained search warrants for the call detail records and GPS data from the cell phones of
both Pinel and the defendant.
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phone records showed that on December 22, 2018, the day the police found the truck
and Pinel' s body, she received text messages from someone who identified
themselves as " Nooney," a nickname known to be used by the defendant.'
Lieutenant Mason observed that there was no delay between messages ( to allow time
for a response) and seemingly no response was received. Lieutenant Mason
confirmed that he never found and was therefore unable to search the defendant' s
phone that was reported stolen.
Dr. Ellen Connor, an expert in forensic pathology who performed the autopsy
in this case, testified that Pinel had abrasions, lacerations, contusions, and bruises,
some of which were inflicted postmortem.' Dr. Connor compared Pinel' s injuries
to the tire jack extension rods recovered from the truck and found that some of her
injuries were consistent with being inflicted by the metal rods.' Dr. Connor testified
that Pinel' s cause of death was asphyxia due to suffocation and strangulation and
multiple blunt force injuries.
Elizabeth Hamilton, an expert in DNA analysis, processed the DNA evidence
in this case, including the evidence collected at the scene, the defendant' s DNA
swabs, and the sexual assault kit. Based on her testing, the defendant could not be
excluded as a contributor of DNA profiles obtained from suspected blood collected
from the steering wheel and blinker knob of the truck. The defendant further could
6
Specifically, the following five messages were sent within forty seconds: ( 1) " Wya sis this
nooney I need u I' m stuck no ride[;]" ( 2) " Call me please[;]" ( 3) " HMU asap I tried calling[;]" ( 4)
Still tricking huhn[;]" and ( 5) " Smh[.]"
7 Dr. Conner also performed a toxicology report on Pinel and testified that her blood showed
benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite, amphetamine, methamphetamine, and citalopram, an
antidepressant medication. These substances were not attributed to Pinel' s cause of death.
8 Dr. Connor' s testimony was consistent with Detective Terry Poiencot' s testimony that he seized
the rods because he believed they were used to beat Pinel, based on his observation of her injuries,
which he stated appeared to have been caused by blunt force trauma.
8
not be excluded as a contributor to DNA profiles obtained from the key fob, both
ends of the tire jack handle, Pinel' s hands, and Pinel' s left-hand fingernail.'
In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the
physical evidence,
one witness' s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is
sufficient to support a factual conclusion. Further, where there is conflicting
testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of
the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Alexander, 2014- 1619 ( La. App. lst Cir.
9118115), 182 So. 3d 126, 131, writ denied, 2015- 1912 ( La. 1/ 25/ 16), 185 So. 3d 748.
Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or
reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder' s determination of guilt. State v.
Lavy, 2013- 1025 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3111114), 142 So. 3d 1000, 1006, writ denied,
2014- 0644 ( La. 10131114), 152 So. 3d 150.
Herein, the defendant challenges Cooley' s identification and hypothesizes
that Pinel' s killing could have been related to her drug use or committed by a person
who stole his cell phone. However, the verdict indicates that the jury rejected the
defendant' s hypotheses of innocence. In reviewing the evidence presented at trial,
we cannot say that the jury' s determination was irrational under the facts and
circumstances presented. See State v. Ordodi, 2006- 0207 ( La. 11129/ 06), 946
So. 2d 654, 662. Regarding her lineup selection being inconsistent with her
subsequent identification of the defendant, Cooley explained that since the lineup
photograph was darker, the prominent neck tattoos that she remembered from the
day in question were more visible on the defendant' s in -color booking photograph.
During the trial, she again positively identified the defendant as one of the persons
she saw walking out of the cane field after the truck got stuck in the field with Pinel' s
Pinel could not be excluded as a DNA contributor from suspected blood and non -blood samples
from the tire jack handle.
E
body therein. Considering the testimony that the defendant was the last known
person with Pinel, cell phone records showing that the defendant' s phone was with
Pinel' s phone the day that the truck was seen entering the cane field, the
identification by Cooley, and the defendant' s blood and DNA being found in the
truck, on the believed murder weapon, and under Pinel' s fingernail, we find that the
jury could have rationally concluded that the defendant murdered the victim in this
case.
An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and
credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict
on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally
rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21109), 1 So.3d 417,
418 ( per curiam). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we find that based on the record before us, a rational trier of fact could
have found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of
second degree murder and the defendant' s identity as the perpetrator of the offense.
Thus, the sole assignment of error lacks merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
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