Derrick Woodberry v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ( 2023 )


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  •                           STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2023 CA 0203
    2023 CW 0099
    DERRICK WOODBERRY
    4vr
    VERSUS
    jr,t')
    LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
    PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
    Judgment Rendered:   SEP 1. 5 2023
    Appealed from the
    19th Judicial District Court
    Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana
    No. C681512
    The Honorable Timothy E. Kelley, Judge Presiding
    Derrick Woodberry                                  Plaintiff/Appellant,
    St, Gabriel, Louisiana                             In Proper Person
    Jonathan Vining                                    Defendant/ Appellee,
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana                             Louisiana Department of
    Public Safety and Corrections
    BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ.
    W OLFE, J.
    Derrick Woodberry, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of
    Public Safety and Corrections ( DPSC), filed a supervisory writ application and an
    appeal of the district court' s judgment that affirmed DPSC' s final decision in
    Administrative Remedy Procedure ( ARP) number LSP -2018- 2482 and dismissed
    his petition for judicial review of that decision. We affirm the judgment and dismiss
    the writ application.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In 1995, Woodberry was convicted of a sex offense and other crimes, and
    sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were ordered to run concurrent with a thirty-
    five -year sentence.'   While incarcerated, he opted to forego earning incentive wages
    in exchange for earning good time credits toward early release.           As a result of the
    good time credits he earned, Woodberry was determined to be eligible for release in
    November 2011.      As a convicted sex offender, DPSC regulations and Louisiana law
    required Woodberry to have an approved residence plan prior to release.               Since
    Woodberry did not have an approved residence, he was advised that he would remain
    incarcerated until he had an approved plan or until he completed the full term of his
    sentence.
    The only proposed residence plan contained in the record was rejected
    due to the residence' s proximity to a playground.
    While he remained incarcerated, a detainer was placed on Woodberry, and he
    was arrested and convicted of additional charges. 2             In January 2014, he was
    sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were ordered to run concurrent with two
    life sentences. In relation to those sentences, DPSC determined that Woodberry was
    eligible to earn incentive wages as of April 20, 2014.
    See Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, Docket Number 371- 742.
    2
    See Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, Docket Number 512- 931.
    2
    Woodberry now contends that he is owed all incentive wages " earned" while
    serving his original sentence— i.e., the incentive wages he bargained away when he
    opted into the good time program.             Woodberry reasons that since he was never
    released from custody, he never " received" the good time credits he earned and is
    alternatively owed the wages.          Woodberry filed an ARP, seeking backpay of the
    incentive wages, alleging he " was deprived of [them] without due process of law."
    DPSC denied the ARP at both the first and second steps.3 In its second step response,
    DPSC explained that Woodberry was not entitled to incentive wages while earning
    good time credits against the original thirty -five-year sentence.
    Unsatisfied with DPSC' s response, Woodberry filed a petition for judicial
    review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court.              The matter was referred to a
    commissioner for screening pursuant to La. R.S. 15: 1178 and La. R. S. 15: 1188. 4
    The commissioner recommended that the district court affirm DPSC' s decision and
    dismiss Woodberry' s petition with prejudice. In her report, the commissioner noted
    that the record contained no indication that Woodberry filed a petition for judicial
    review contesting DPSC' s failure to release him on his scheduled good time release
    date in 2011, nor had any party alluded to such.             The commissioner further noted
    that if Woodberry had not been sentenced on the new convictions, DPSC would have
    been required to hold him in custody until an approved residence plan was submitted
    or until his full-term release date. The commissioner concluded that Woodberry' s
    failure to submit an adequate residence plan so that he could be released on his good
    3
    In its first step response, DPSC denied Woodberry' s claim for backpay of the wages he would
    have received if he had not opted into the good time program, but noted that Woodberry was owed
    a pay supplement for " a few weeks" that were missed after April 20, 2014. The payment of
    incentive wages after 2014 is not at issue in this appeal.
    4
    The office of commissioner for the Nineteenth Judicial District Court was created to hear and
    recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state
    prisoners. La. R.S. 13: 711 and 13: 713( A). The district courtjudge " may accept, reject, or modify
    in whole or in part the findings or recommendation made by the commissioner and also may
    receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the commissioner with instructions." La. R.S.
    13: 713( C)( 5).
    3
    time release date did not void the good time contract. The commissioner found no
    evidence to show that DPSC breached the contract' s terms and no authority to
    support Woodberry' s request for backpay of the incentive wages he forfeited. After
    de novo review, the trial court adopted the commissioner' s reasons as its own,
    affirmed DPSC' s decision, and dismissed the petition for judicial review.
    DISCUSSION
    Judicial review of this matter is governed by La. R.S. 15: 1177, which allows
    a reviewing court to reverse or modify DPSC' s decision only if substantial rights of
    the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative decisions or findings
    are: (   1)   in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; ( 2) in excess of the
    statutory authority of the agency; ( 3) made upon unlawful procedure; ( 4) affected by
    other error of law; ( 5)            arbitrary,   capricious,   or characterized by an abuse of
    discretion;      or (   6)    manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
    substantial evidence on the whole record.                  When reviewing DPSC' s decision, the
    district court functions as an appellate court. Marchand v. Louisiana Department
    of Public Safety & Corrections, 2020- 0747 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2124121), 
    322 So. 3d 269
    , 272, writ denied, 2021- 00457 (La. 9/ 27/ 21), 
    324 So. 3d 104
    . An aggrieved party
    may appeal a final judgment of the district court to the appropriate appellate court.'
    La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)( 10).          On appeal of the district court' s judgment, the appellate
    court reviews the administrative record de novo under the criteria of La. R.S.
    15: 1177( A)( 9).            Marchand, 322 So. 3d at 273.           The appellate court owes no
    deference to the district court' s factual findings or legal conclusions, just as the
    Woodberry filed a supervisory writ application and an appeal, seeking review of the district
    court' s judgment. The writ application was referred to this appellate panel.
    See Woodberry v.
    Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2023- 0099 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 4/ 24123)
    unpublished writ action).       Since the district court' s judgment dismissed Woodberry' s petition for
    judicial review, it is a final, appealable judgment. See La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)(10); Bell v. Louisiana
    Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2019- 0755 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 9117119), 
    2019 WL 4447590
     ( unpublished writ action).Accordingly, we dismiss Woodberry' s supervisory writ
    application and consider the merits of Woodberry' s appeal.                Cf. Anderson v. Laborde
    Construction Industries, L.L.C., 2019- 0356 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 3112120), 
    311 So. 3d 1072
    , 1079
    n. 9.
    91
    Louisiana Supreme Court owes no deference to the factual findings or legal
    conclusions of the appellate court. Marchand, 322 So.2d at 273.
    On appeal, Woodberry argues that he is constitutionally entitled to receive the
    incentive wages he would have been paid if he had not opted to receive good time
    credits, as DPSC lacks authority to withhold the wages when it did not award the
    good time credits earned.              He acknowledges that La. R.S. 15: 574. 4. 3 requires that
    sex offenders have an approved residence plan prior to good time release.6 He states
    that he " does not contest the language or authority of [that] statute with respect to
    his release or any liberty interest." However, he complains that La. R.S. 15: 574. 4. 3
    was not in effect and he was not advised of any such residence plan requirement
    when he waived his incentive wages to earn good time credits. He further complains
    that DPSC has failed to promulgate rules and regulations expressly informing
    inmates that incentive wages would be lost if no residence plan is approved.
    This court has held that the law in effect at the time of release governs the
    terms of release, rather than the law in effect at the time of the commission of the
    underlying offense or at the time the inmate enters into the good time credits
    program. Bancroft v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, 
    635 So. 2d 738
    , 741
    La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).         Further, "[ t]he fact that [ an inmate] has a constitutionally
    6
    Inmates released from custody as a result of diminution of sentence based on good time credits
    are released as if on parole. La. R.S. 15: 571. 5( A); State ex rel. Square v. State, 2015- 1409 ( La.
    1113117),     
    206 So. 3d 872
    ,   872- 73 ( per   curiam);   Bancroft v. Louisiana Department of
    Corrections, 
    635 So. 2d 738
    , 740- 41 (     La. App.          1st Cir. 1994).
    Louisiana Revised Statutes
    15: 574. 4. 3( E)( 1),
    which was designated as La. R.S. 15: 574.4( 5)( 1) prior to its amendment by 
    2010 La. Acts 241
    , § 1 ( eff. Aug. 15, 2010), provides:
    In cases where parole is permitted by law and the offender is otherwise eligible, the
    committee on parole shall not grant parole to any sex offender either by an order of the
    committee on parole or office of adult services pursuant to R.S.            15: 571. 3 until the
    Department of Public Safety and Corrections, division of probation and parole, has
    assessed and approved the suitability of the residence plan of such offender. In approving
    the residence plan of the offender, the department shall consider the likelihood that the
    offender will be able to comply with all of the conditions of his parole.
    Woodberry correctly argues on appeal that the Commissioner' s report cited an incorrect statute
    for this requirement.         Since we conduct do nova review of the administrative record while
    performing our review, that error is inconsequential. See Marchand, 322 So. 3d at 273.
    5
    protected interest in good time does not deprive the legislature of the right to enact
    legislation that possibly has the effect of impacting that statutorily created interest."
    Kozlowicz v. State, Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2008- 1806 ( La.
    App. 1st Cir. 3/ 27/ 09), 
    9 So. 3d 1000
    , 1006. Any conditions imposed on an inmate
    eligible for release as a result of diminution of sentence are valid so long as they are
    lawful on the proposed date of release. Kozlowicz, 
    9 So. 3d at 1007
    ; Bancroft, 
    635 So. 2d at 741
    . "    The fact that those conditions may not have been required at the time
    the [ inmate] chose to earn good time credit is not legally relevant."              Kozlowicz, 
    9 So. 3d at 1007
     ( citing Bancroft, 
    635 So. 2d at 741
    ); see also Thompson v. Louisiana
    Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2016- 0545 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
    2/ 17/ 17), 
    2017 WL 658734
    , * 3 ( unpublished) ( finding that the               imposition of an
    approved residence requirement prior to a sex offender' s release does not result in
    an ex post facto application of law or violation of the Louisiana or United States
    Constitution).
    Additionally, this court has recognized that the result of an inmate opting to
    earn good time credits is that the inmate becomes eligible for early release.                    See
    Kozlowicz, 
    9 So. 3d at 1007
    ; Bancroft, 
    635 So. 2d at 741
    .               There is no dispute that
    Woodberry became eligible for early release based on his good time credits.
    However, he could not be released without an approved residence plan. We find no
    constitutional violation by DPSC for its compliance with the mandates of La. R. S.
    15: 574. 4. 3.     This court has previously recognized that DPSC takes no action to
    deprive an inmate of his good time when it is statutorily prohibited from releasing
    the inmate because the inmate failed to comply with the approved residency
    requirement.       Kozlowicz, 
    9 So. 3d at 1006
    .
    Woodberry raises arguments that DPSC bore the responsibility of obtaining an approved
    residence plan for him and that its failure to do so breached its contractual obligation to him. We
    find no merit to these arguments. See Thompson, 
    2417 WL 658734
    , * 3 ( recognizing that it was
    the obligation of the inmate to obtain an approved residence plan prior to his early release).
    31
    In support of his contention that his good time option should be considered
    voided,   Woodberry argues that the good time form he signed provides that the
    contractual agreement may be voided.                   The form requires that the inmate
    acknowledge that he may fail to earn good time through disciplinary actions or other
    means as provided by law and also " that [ DPSC] may void this option at any time,
    in the event that it is determined that [ the inmate is] ineligible to receive good time
    at this particular rate."        However,      by signing the form the inmate explicitly
    recognizes that the inmate cannot revoke his option during the sentence or term for
    which he is incarcerated. Thus, rather than supporting Woodberry' s claims, the good
    time option form actually confirms that he is not entitled to recoup the wages he
    bargained away to earn the good time credits.
    Essentially, after being convicted of additional crimes and sentenced to life
    imprisonment, Woodberry realizes he made a bad choice in opting into the good
    time program while serving his original sentence.' We find no authority that would
    entitle him to the relief he seeks.
    CONCLUSION
    After thorough review of the record in this matter in accordance with La. R.S.
    15: 1177( A), we find no error in the district court' s judgment that affirmed DPSC' s
    decision.   Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Supervisory
    writ application 2023 CW 0099 is dismissed. All costs of this appeal are assessed
    to Derrick Woodberry.
    JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; WRIT DISMISSED.
    8
    Although the record does not contain the details of the crimes that resulted in the life sentences,
    it does establish that Woodberry has been incarcerated since 1995.        The commissioner' s report
    indicates that the offenses occurred in 1992— before the original sentence was imposed and before
    Woodberry signed the good time option form.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2023CA0203

Filed Date: 9/15/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/15/2023