Elizabeth Villanueva and Hugo Villanueva v. Avala Operations, LLC, Avala Physicians Network, LLC, Fairway Medical Center, LLC, Rachael Hollingshead, and Jane Doe ( 2023 )

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2023 CA 0200
ELIZABETH VILLANUEVA AND HUGO VILLANUEVA
VERSUS
AVALA OPERATIONS, LLC, AVALA PHYSICIANS NETWORK,
LLC, FAIRWAY MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, RACHAEL
HOLLINGSHEAD, AND JANE DOE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: SEP 15 2023
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY- SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NUMBER 2022- 11398, DIVISION B,
HONORABLE AUGUST J. HAND, JUDGE
C. Barrett Rice Counsel for Plaintiffs -Appellants
Jennifer David Khouri Elizabeth Villanueva and Hugo
Aaron Broussard Villanueva
Metairie, Louisiana
Guice Anthony Giambrone, III Counsel for Defendants -Appellees
A. Rebecca Wilmore Avala Operations, LLC, Avala
Metairie, Louisiana Physicians Network, LLC, Fairway
Medical Center, LLC, and Rachael
Hollingshead
BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.
Disposition: AFFIRMED.
CHUTZ, J.
Plaintiffs -appellants, Elizabeth and Hugo Villanueva, appeal the trial court' s
grant of an exception raising the objection of prematurity filed by the
defendants/ appellees, AVALA Operations, LLC, AVALA Physicians Network,
LLC, Fairway Medical Center, LLC, d/b/ a AVALA or AVALA Hospital ( these
three entities collectively referred to hereinafter as " AVALA"), Rachael
Hollingshead, and Jane Doe. This exception was raised in response to plaintiffs'
petition that seeks to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained by Mrs.
Villanueva when Hollingshead, a nurse working for AVALA, assisted Mrs.
Villanueva by " grab[ bing]" her knees and " roughly rotat[ ing] and push[ ing] her
legs" into her personal vehicle at the time of her discharge from the AVALA
facility following a surgical procedure.' The issue is whether plaintiffs' claims
constitute an action based in malpractice under the Medical Malpractice Act, La.
R.S. 40: 1231. 1 et seq. (" the MMA"). Because we find plaintiffs' allegations
describe an " unintentional tort ... based on health care or professional services
rendered ... by a health care provider, to a patient, including ... the handling of a
patient, including loading ... of a patient," these allegations are based in
malpractice" as defined in La. R. S. 40: 1231. 1( A)( 13). Thus, plaintiffs are initially
required to submit their claims to a medical review panel before proceeding with a
tort suit. We affirm.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
According to the petition, Mrs. Villanueva underwent a left hip replacement
at AVALA on May 21, 2021. Following surgery, Mrs. Villanueva recovered at
AVALA until her discharge the next day. Mrs. Villanueva contends she was the
last discharge of the day, and " it was clear that the nurse in charge of her
The petition seeks to recover damages for Mrs. Villanueva' s pain and suffering, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and related medical expenses. Mr. Villanueva seeks damages
for loss of consortium.
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discharge, [ Hollingshead], was eager for her to depart the facility so that the
AVALA personnel could leave for the day." Mr. Villanueva had driven his
personal, private vehicle" to pick up Mrs. Villanueva " at the front of the facility
upon her discharge in order to transport her from [ AVALA] to their home ...."
Specifically, the petition further described the alleged injury -causing event as
follows:
7.
In order to enter the personal vehicle, [ Mrs. Villanueva] sat
down backwards onto the passenger front seat of the car. Because of
her recent operation, however, she had difficulty scooting back into
her seat so she could move her legs fully into her ... vehicle.
Annoyed by the time it was taking for [ Mrs. Villanueva] to
maneuver into her ... vehicle, and in a rush to get her off [AVALA' s]
premises so that she and the other staff could go home,
Hollingshead], and/ or Jane Doe, grabbed [ Mrs. Villanueva' s] knees
and roughly rotated and pushed her legs into the ... car.
9.
When [ Mrs. Villanueva' s]
legs were roughly rotated and
pushed into the vehicle, she heard a pop and immediately experienced
increased pain in her left hip. She yelled and expressed that she had
heard something " pop" and that she was in increased, severe pain, but
Hollingshead], and/ or Jane Doe, dismissed her concerns. The " pop"
and increased pain experienced by [ Mrs. Villanueva] was in fact, later
confirmed to be a dislocation of her left hip.
12.
At all relevant times ... Hollingshead and/ or Jane Doe was
working within the course and scope of her employment with
AVALA].
The petition further alleged that when Mrs. Villanueva arrived home, she
was in excruciating pain and unable to walk. Emergency services were called, and
she was transported to St. Tammany Parish Hospital, where it was discovered that
she had experienced an anterior hip dislocation. She underwent surgery to reset
her hip, necessitating a three -night stay in the hospital and additional treatment
and rehabilitation.
The plaintiffs additionally alleged that defendants were negligent by
e] xercising unreasonable force and roughly rotating and pushing [ Mrs.
Villanueva] into her personal vehicle while disregarding [ her] yells, expressions
of pain, and feeling of dislocation"; and in failing to keep a proper lookout and to
exercise caution that any average person in a similar situation would have
exercised to prevent the dislocation. Plaintiffs asserted defendants are liable for: 1)
failing to provide, implement, and enforce administrative policies and procedures
for the discharge of patients into their personal vehicles, 2) failing to adequately
train and supervise their employees, Hollingshead and/ or Jane Doe; 3) failing to
keep " due and proper lookout over the area where individuals are picked up by
their private, personal vehicles after discharge"; 4) acting in a negligent, grossly
negligent, inattentive or reckless manner; and 5) other acts and omissions.
Defendants responded by filing a dilatory exception raising the objection of
prematurity, urging the MMA governs the procedural mechanisms by which relief
may be granted and that plaintiffs had not obtained the opinion of a properly
confected medical review panel prior to filing this suit. Defendants prayed for
their exception to be maintained and for plaintiffs' suit to be dismissed without
prejudice.
Following a hearing, the district court sustained the exception and
dismissed this suit without prejudice. Plaintiffs have appealed, urging the district
court erred by sustaining the objection. Plaintiffs generally contend their claims
sound in tort rather than medical malpractice. Defendants urge that because
plaintiffs are alleging a claim based on " the handling ... and the loading of a
patient ...,
as well as a failure by AVALA to train or supervise its staff, this suit
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falls within the scope of the MMA...." However, plaintiffs maintain, "[ T] he
reckless rotating and pushing of Mrs. Villanueva into her private vehicle after she
was discharged from [ AVALA], had exited [ AVALA' s] building, and was placed
into the care of [ Mr. Villanueva] does not constitute medical treatment as
contemplated by the [ MMA]."
ANALYSIS
The dilatory exception of prematurity provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 926( 1)
questions whether the cause of action is ripe for judicial determination. Garner v
Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 2022- 0778 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 3129123), 364 So. 3d
508, 511. Under the MMA, a medical malpractice claim against a qualified health
care provider is subject to dismissal on a timely exception of prematurity if the
claim has not first been reviewed by a pre -suit medical review panel. La. R.S.
40: 1231. 8; 2 Garner, 364 So. 3d at 511. In such situations, an exception of
prematurity neither challenges nor attempts to defeat any of the elements of the
plaintiffs cause of action but instead asserts the plaintiff has failed to take some
preliminary step necessary to make the controversy ripe for judicial involvement.
The burden of proving prematurity is on the moving party who, in a medical
malpractice case, must show entitlement to a medical review proceeding because
the allegations fall within the scope of the MMA. Id. at p. 5. In the instant matter,
it is undisputed that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit prior to the rendition of the
medical review panel opinion; thus, the issue of whether the trial court correctly
applied the law and whether a claim sounds in medical malpractice presents a
2 Louisiana Revised Statutes 40: 1231. 8( A)( 1)( a) provides, in pertinent part, " All malpractice
claims against health care providers covered by this Part, other than claims validly agreed for
submission to a lawfully binding arbitration procedure, shall be reviewed by a medical review
panel established as hereinafter provided for in this Section." Under La, R.S.
40: 1231. 8( B)( 1)( a)( i), no action against a health care provider under the MMA, or against his
insurer, " may be commenced in any court before the claimant' s proposed complaint has been
presented to a medical review panel."
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question of law subject to de novo review. Garner, 364 So.3d at 511; Dutrey u
Plaquemine Manor Nursing Home, 2012- 1295 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6117113), 205
So3d 934, 942.
In addition to requiring that a claim against a qualified health care provider
be reviewed by a medical review panel, the MMA also affords a limit on the
amount of damages. La. R.S. 40: 1231. 2( B)3; Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co. LLC,
2015- 1754 ( La. 3115116), 187 So.3d 436, 439. The MMA applies only to
malpractice"; all other tort liability on the part of a qualified health care provider
is governed by general tort law. Coleman v. Deno, 2001- 1517, 2001- 1519, and
2001- 1521 ( La. 1125102), 813 So. 2d 303, 315. 4 Because the MMA' s limitations on
the liability of health care providers are in derogation of the rights of tort victims,
the MMA is to be strictly construed. Dupuy, 187 So. 3d at 439. In brief, plaintiffs
state, in pertinent part, "[ T] he relevant question before this Court is not whether
d] efendants are qualified health care providers but whether the acts and/or
3 A qualified health care provider is liable for malpractice only to the extent provided in the
MMA, namely, a qualified health care provider has no liability for any amount in excess of
100, 000 plus interest. La. R.S. 40: 1231. 2( B)( 2).
41n Coleman, 813 So. 2d at 315- 316, the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth six factors to assist a
court in determining whether certain conduct by a qualified health care provider constitutes
malpractice" as defined under the MMA:
1) whether the particular wrong is " treatment related" or caused by a dereliction of
professional skill;
2) whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the
appropriate standard of care was breached;
3) whether the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the patient' s condition;
4) whether an incident occurred in the context of a physician -patient relationship, or was
within the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform;
5) whether the injury would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment; and
6) whether the tort alleged was intentional.
omissions alleged by [ p] laintiffs constitute medical malpractice as defined under
5
the [ MMA]."
Under the MMA, La. R.S. 40: 1231. 1( A)( 13) defines " malpractice" in
relevant part as:
A]ny unintentional tort ... based on health care or professional
services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health
care provider, to a patient, including failure to render services timely
and the handling of a patient, including loading and unloading of a
patient, and also includes all legal responsibility ... in the training or
supervision of health care providers ....
Health care" is defined as " any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which
should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on
behalf of a patient during the patient' s medical care, treatment, or confinement ...."
La. R. S. 40: 1231. 1( A)(9). " Health care provider" is defined in relevant part as " a
person, ...
limited liability company, ... facility, or institution licensed or certified
by this state to provide health care or professional services as a physician, hospital,
or] registered ... nurse ...." La. R.S. 40: 1321. 1( A)( 10). " Patient" means " a
natural person ... who receives or should have received health care from a licensed
health care provider, under contract, expressed or implied." La. R.S.
40: 123 1. 1 ( A)( I 5 ).
Here, plaintiffs concede that whether Hollingshead' s conduct was intentional
is not at issue; plaintiffs have alleged that Hollingshead' s conduct was grossly
negligent and careless. However, plaintiffs urge that for Mrs. Villanueva to qualify
s Plaintiffs do not dispute the defendants were qualified providers at the time of the alleged
malpractice. See La. R.S. 40: 1231. 2. A certificate of enrollment issued by the State of Louisiana
Patient' s Compensation Fund is competent evidence to establish a prima facie case for the
applicability of the medical malpractice law regarding claims against the party identified on the
certificate. La. R.S. 13: 3712; Ratak v Liberty Healthcare Sys., LLC, 44, 913 ( La. App. 2d Cir.
12/ 9/ 09), 26 So. 3d 968, 973- 74, writ denied, 2010- 0390 ( La. 4123/ 10), 34 So. 3d 265. At the
hearing, the defendants introduced certified copies of various certificates of enrollment from the
Louisiana Patient' s Compensation fund, establishing that each AVALA defendant maintained
professional liability coverage of $100, 000 at the time of the alleged malpractice herein and that
Rollingshead, as a registered nurse, was covered as an additional insured while acting in the
course of and within the scope of her duties for AVALA.
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as a " patient" under the MMA, she would have had to still be in the process of
receiving " health care" when the negligence occurred and it would have had to
occur during her " medical care, treatment, or confinement." Here, they urge the
alleged wrong in this case is not treatment related and happened after Mrs.
Villanueva "had been discharged and [ had] exited the AVALA building." Plaintiffs
assert the maneuvering of Mrs. Villanueva into her husband' s vehicle was not
within the scope of activities that defendants were to perform as part of their health
care services. Further, plaintiffs urge that while the conduct complained of was
committed by a registered nurse, this fact is inconsequential because the tasks
performed did not require professional skill and could have been undertaken by
someone without a medical license. Plaintiffs thus assert their claims fall outside of
the MMA, such that they are not required to submit their claims to a medical
review panel.
To support their position, plaintiffs rely, in part, on Hidalgo v Wilson
Certified Express, Inc., 94- 1322 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 5/ 14/ 96), 676 So.2d 114, and
Boudreaux v. Nat' l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2020- 0979 and 2020- 1034 ( La. App. 1 st
Cir. 1217/ 20), 2020 WL 7213510, wherein this court found the plaintiffs' claims
were not subject to the MMA. Further, plaintiffs attempt to distinguish their
allegations from those presented in Andrews v. Our Lady of the Lake Ascension
Community Hasp., Inc., 2013- 1237 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2118/ 14), 142 So. 3d 36,
wherein this court held that the plaintiffs' action was subject to the MMA.
In Hidalgo, plaintiffs, husband and wife, were involved in a vehicle
collision, which necessitated that the wife be taken by ambulance to a hospital for
treatment of injuries she sustained. While in route to the hospital, the ambulance
rear- ended another vehicle, causing the wife additional injuries. The plaintiffs later
filed suit against various defendants involved in both collisions, including the
r..
ambulance company and its driver, who excepted to the petition on the basis of
prematurity. Hidalgo, 676 So. 2d at 115- 16. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial
court' s denial of the exception, finding in pertinent part as follows:
Plaintiffs] have not alleged that any act or omission, related to the
promotion of a patient' s health or to the provider' s exercise of
professional expertise or skill, caused or contributed to her injuries[,]
n] or have they alleged Acadian was negligent in loading [ plaintiff -
patient]
into the ambulance or in failing to properly secure the
stretcher or backboard, or both, once loaded into the ambulance."
Id. at 118.
In doing so, this court noted, " Any such allegations would be covered by the
MMA] and would have to first be brought to a medical review board before any
evidence of such actions could be admitted at the trial of this case." Id. at n. 7.
However, based on the specific factual allegations presented, this court found the
negligence claims against the ambulance company and driver pertained only to the
ambulance driver' s driving skills and that the legislature did not intend to include
negligence in driving an ambulance within the scope of the MMA. Id. at 118- 19.
This court concluded that the plaintiffs' petition stated " a cause of action for
ordinary negligence in driving a motor vehicle, as opposed to a breach of a duty
related to the promotion of a patient' s health or to the provider' s exercise of
professional expertise or skill." Id. at 119. As additional support for its conclusion,
this court turned to the MMA' s definition of malpractice, noting it " specifically
includes the `` handling of a patient, including loading and unloading of a patient,'
yet does not include any reference to transport of a patient." Id.&
In Boudreaux, this court granted relators' applications for supervisory writs
based on a finding that the trial court had erred in sustaining the defendants'
The court further reasoned, " The references to loading and unloading of patients in the
statutory definition of malpractice] clearly refer to activities customarily performed by
ambulance attendants. By including these words, the legislature evidenced its intent to
differentiate these activities from transport, although that is an activity very commonly
associated with ambulances." Id. at 119.
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exception of prematurity. Boudreaux, 2020- 0979 and 2020- 1034 at p. 1.' Therein,
a patient, who had been discharged from a behavioral hospital, and her husband
filed suit, alleging she was injured as a result of the hospital employees' actions of
failing to provide a safe means of entering and exiting a transportation van while
on her trip home. In her petition, plaintiff alleged that when she initially boarded
the transport vehicle, " it was noted that the step stool normally used in assisting
patients in entering and exiting the van was missing." Because plaintiff was unable
to enter the van on her own, two employees of the behavioral hospital assisted her
by lifting her onto the first step of the transport van' s entrance; one employee was
driving the van and the other was assisting him as a " technical support assistant."
While travelling to plaintiffs home, the hospital employees decided to stop for
lunch. After exiting the van and eating lunch, plaintiff attempted to re- enter the
transport van " by crawling onto the first step and crawling up the stairs without
success." Thereafter, the employee who had been driving the van directed plaintiff
to reposition herself on her buttocks on the ledge of the doorway with her feet
dangling towards the ground." The defendant driver then allegedly got behind
plaintiff and " attempted to perform a bearhug [ sic] and pull her up and forward"
causing injury to plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a personal injury suit, alleging
negligence by the behavioral hospital, the driver of the transport van, and the other
assistant.
The defendant hospital filed an exception of prematurity, arguing plaintiffs'
claims arose out of medical malpractice, rather than general tort liability, and
plaintiffs' claims were required to first be reviewed by a medical review panel.
Plaintiffs contended that defendants' alleged misconduct did not constitute medical
Because a court may take judicial notice of its own proceedings, see Horrell v. Alltmont, 2019-
0945 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 7131120), 309 So. 3d 754, 760- 61 n. 10, in conducting our analysis, we
have reviewed the writ application filed in Boudreaux.
10
malpractice,
because it was not treatment-related or caused by a dereliction of
professional skill, and the incident did not occur in the context of a physician -
patient relationship. The hospital' s professional liability insurer, who intervened in
this matter, also opposed the exception, asserting that plaintiffs' claims fell under
general tort law because plaintiff was not a " patient" at the time of the incident,
there was no " health care provider," and the alleged injuries arose after her
discharge from the hospital; thus, the claims were outside the scope of the MMA.
This court concluded plaintiffs' claims sounded in tort and did not fall within the
provisions of the MMA. Boudreaux, 2020- 0979 and 2020- 1034 at p. 1.
In Andrews, 142 So. 3d at 36, this court considered the plaintiffs' appeal of
the trial court' s grant of an exception raising the objection of prematurity filed by
the defendant/hospital in response to the tort suit filed by the patient and her
husband. The plaintiff/patient had been admitted to a hospital for an apparent
seizure suffered earlier that day. Andrews, 142 So.3d at 37. " Following treatment
and at the time of her discharge" from the hospital, the plaintiff was " unconscious
and/ or asleep, and unable to ambulate on her own." Id. According to plaintiffs'
allegations, the hospital staff attempted to move plaintiff/patient from her bed to a
hospital wheelchair, but the " hospital staff dropped [ plaintiff/patient] on the
ground, causing [ her] to shatter her foot and ankle." Id. at 37- 38. In response to
plaintiffs' contention that the alleged acts did not constitute " malpractice" for
purposes of the MMA, this court concluded, " We ... find no ambiguity in [ the
MMA' s definition of malpractice] and any claims involving ``handling of a patient,
including loading and unloading,' are covered by the MMA and must be submitted
to a medical review panel." Id. at 39. This court additionally found, " It is
immaterial that [ plaintiff] may have been discharged at the time hospital staff
attempted to move her." M.
11
After thorough review of plaintiffs' allegations, we find the factual scenario
presented here to be more like Andrews than Hidalgo or Boudreaux. In the instant
case, we conclude that the factual allegations fall squarely within the definition of
malpractice. La. R.S. 40: 1231. 1( A)( 13). When a law is clear and unambiguous and
its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature. La. Civ. Code art. 9. We find no ambiguity in La. R.S.
40: 1231. 1( A)( 13). Claims involving " any unintentional tort ... based on health care
or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered by a health
care provider to a patient, ... and the handling of a patient, including loading and
unloading of a patient," are covered by the MMA and must be submitted to a
medical review panel. See Andrews, 142 So. 3d at 39, citing former La. R.S.
40: 1299. 41 and McMillian v Westwood Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 2012- 54
La. App. 3d Cir. 5130112), 92 So.3d 623, 635, writ denied, 2012- 1857 ( La.
11/ 9/ 12), 100 So. 3d 839. 8
Here, Hollingshead, in her capacity as a registered nurse and Mrs.
Villanueva' s discharge nurse, was providing " health care," as defined under the
MMA, as she directly assisted Mrs. Villanueva' s transfer from AVALA, a health
care facility, to her car. The act of facilitating Mrs. Villanueva' s transfer to her car
was an " act ... performed, or which should have been performed ... by any health
care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient' s medical care."
La. R.S. 40: 1231. 1( A)(9). As such, Hollingshead was rendering professional
services to a patient; Hollingshead provided this service as part of the health care
8 Although the Andrews court cited La. R.S. 40: 1299. 41 et seq., this section was redesignated as
La. R.S. 40: 1231. 1 by H.C. R. No. 84 of the 2015 Regular Session.
Because we find no ambiguity in the application of La. R.S. 40: 1299.41. 1( A)( 13) to the factual
allegations of this case, we pretermit an analysis of the Coleman factors. However, if we were to
apply the Coleman factors, we would reach the same result. See Andrews, 142 So. 3d at 39 n.3.
12
administered to Mrs. Villanueva, as a result of the treatment she received at
AVALA. " Malpractice" as set forth in La. R.S. 40: 1231. 1( A)( 13) specifically
includes the " loading and unloading of a patient...." In this instance, the alleged
injuries occurred specifically as Hollingshead was loading Mrs. Villanueva into her
vehicle so that she could leave AVALA premises. She had not yet departed from
the premises as the plaintiff had in Boudreaux. As in Andrews, the alleged injury -
causing event occurred on the health care provider' s premises. Also as in Andrews,
we find it insignificant that Mrs. Villanueva had either been discharged or was in
the process of being discharged at the time the alleged injuries occurred,
particularly in light of the fact that she remained on AVALA premises while she
was being loaded into her vehicle. Andrews, 142 So. 3d at 39. Although plaintiffs
allege the " loading" could have been performed by someone other than a " health
care provider," in this case it was not.
Conversely, in Hidalgo, the plaintiff/patient' s injuries arose from the
ambulance driver' s driving skills and how the plaintiff/patient was transported
rather than from how she was " load[ ed] or unload[ ed]." In Boudreaux, although
plaintiff was being loaded off premises into a van when the alleged injuries
occurred, the writ application in that case establishes that the " loading or
unloading" did not involve a " health care provider."
Therefore, we find defendants have shown that plaintiffs' claims fall within
the purview of the MMA, and must first be presented to a medical review panel.
Thus, until such time as plaintiffs' complaints have been reviewed by a medical
review panel, plaintiffs' suit is premature. Accordingly, the district court correctly
sustained defendants' dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity.
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DECREE
For these reasons, the October 27, 2022 judgment of the district court,
maintaining defendants' dilatory exception
of prematurity and
dismissing
plaintiffs' claims without prejudice is affirmed. Appeal costs are assessed to
plaintiffs, Elizabeth and Hugo Villanueva.
AFFIRMED.
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