Robert Talley v. Byron Baum and Priscilla J. Baum ( 2023 )


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  •                              STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2022 CA 1329
    ROBERT TALLEY
    VS.
    BYRON BAUM AND PRISCILLA J. BAUM
    Judgment Rendered:        SEP 0 7 2023
    On Appeal from the
    Eighteenth Judicial District Court
    In and for the Parish of Pointe Coupee
    State of Louisiana
    Docket No. 50275
    The Honorable Elizabeth A. Engolio, Judge Presiding
    Robert Talley                         In Proper Person
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana
    Heather Crabtree                      Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellees
    Cy J. D' Aquila, Jr.                  Byron Baum and Priscilla J. Baum
    New Roads, Louisiana
    BEFORE: McCLENDON, HOLDRIDGE, AND GREENE, JJ.
    J
    t-61, a;.
    HOLDRIDGE, J.
    The plaintiff, Robert Talley, appeals a judgment of the trial court sustaining a
    peremptory exception raising the objections of no right of action and prescription
    and dismissing the plaintiff' s claims against the defendants, Byron Baum and
    Priscilla J. Baum, with prejudice. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On April 19, 2021, the plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment, for
    damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, for revendicatory action, for
    an accounting and disgorgement of sums received, and for partition.'                  The plaintiff
    stated in his petition that the defendants were the owners and lessors of recreational
    property located in Pointe Coupee Parish.             The plaintiff alleged that in 1998, he
    negotiated the purchase of all interests of Mrs. Daisy Holden, the [ l] essee of the ...
    property,"   who had leased the property for decades. Mrs. Holden had previously
    leased the property from the owner/lessor, Mrs. Verna Jarreau.                  Mrs. Holden and
    Mrs. Jarreau allegedly had an oral agreement for a month-to-month lease of the
    property for monthly rental payments in the amount of $200. 00.
    The plaintiff confirmed with Mrs. Jarreau that the monthly lease payment of
    200.00 " would continue for as long as [ the] [ p] laintiffpossessed the ... property[.]"
    In 20001 the plaintiff was notified that Mrs. Jarreau had died and that her daughter,
    Priscilla Baum,     succeeded her mother' s interest in the property.                  Mrs. Baum
    instructed the plaintiff to send the monthly payment to her post office box in New
    Roads, Louisiana.
    In April of 2005, the plaintiff received notice from Mrs. Baum informing him
    that the monthly lease payment would be increased.               The plaintiff wrote a letter to
    The plaintiff also filed a notice of lis pendens on April 19, 2021 for the property at issue.
    2
    Mrs. Baum stating that he had a prior lease agreement with her mother for a fixed
    monthly lease payment of $200.00, which Mrs. Baum accepted for approximately
    six years.    In February of 2011, the plaintiff received a certified letter from Mrs.
    Baum' s attorney advising him that the monthly lease amount would be increased to
    500. 00 effective April 1, 2011.       The letter further informed the plaintiff that if he
    chose not to continue leasing the property at the increased rental value, the letter
    would serve as notice of termination of the lease effective March 31, 2011.
    On March 30, 2011, in response to the letter sent by Mrs. Baum' s attorney,
    the plaintiff sent Mrs. Baum the fixed monthly lease payment amount of $200. 00,
    along with a copy of his letter sent to her in 2005. On April 12, 2011, Mrs. Baum' s
    attorney sent the plaintiff a certified letter stating that the plaintiffs $200. 00 check
    was being returned and advising him that the lease terminated on March 31, 2011.
    On April 29, 2011, Mrs. Baum' s attorney sent the plaintiff another letter that advised
    him again that the lease terminated on March 31, 2011 and that the plaintiff had until
    May 3, 2011 to vacate the property. The property was leased to a third party in July
    of 2011.
    In response to the plaintiff' s petition,        the defendants filed a peremptory
    exception raising the objections of prescription and no right of action.'                       The
    defendants argued that the action giving rise to the damages alleged by the plaintiff
    occurred more than ten year prior to the filing of the plaintiff s petition, therefore his
    claim   was   prescribed.     Specifically, the defendants argued that the prescriptive
    period for the plaintiff s breach of contract claim began on February 14, 2011, when
    the plaintiff received a certified letter from the defendants'                 attorney that the
    The defendants attached as exhibits several documents to their memorandum in support of the
    peremptory exception raising the objections of prescription and no right of action, which included:
    the February 11, 2011 certified letter to the plaintiff, the April 12, 2011 certified letter to the
    plaintiff, and the plaintiff s $ 200. 00 check dated March 30, 2011 that was returned to him.
    3
    defendants were terminating his lease effective March 31,               2011.   Therefore, the
    defendants argued that the plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and other causes
    of action filed on April 19, 2021 were prescribed. The defendants further argued
    that the plaintiff did not have a right of action to bring a petition for a declaratory
    judgment, partition, or revendicatory action because the plaintiff was a precarious
    possessor of the property, and he did not have a title or written document evidencing
    ownership rights in the property.
    The plaintiff opposed the defendants'             peremptory exception raising the
    objections of prescription and no right of action.'          The plaintiff argued that in order
    for the defendants to terminate the parties' lease agreement, it was necessary for the
    defendants to obtain the plaintiff' s consent or file suit against him under La. C. C. P.
    art. 4731 and prove that he violated the parties' lease agreement.                The plaintiff
    further argued that the defendants'          attorney sent him a letter on April 29, 2011,
    returning his monthly lease payment, as well as advising him that he would need to
    pay the new higher lease amount or that a formal eviction proceeding would be
    instituted if he did not vacate the property by May 3, 2011.          The plaintiff stated that
    following the May 3, 2011 deadline, he never received notice of a formal eviction
    proceeding from the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that sometime after May 3,
    2011,   the defendants entered the property and re- leased it to a third party.              The
    plaintiff argued that the April 29, 2011 letter from the defendants established that
    the defendants breach of contract could not have occurred prior to May 3, 2011.
    Therefore, the plaintiff argued that the defendants' peremptory exception raising the
    objection of prescription should be denied because he timely filed his petition for
    damages within the ten- year prescriptive period for a breach of contract claim.
    3 The plaintiff attached several exhibits to his opposition memorandum, including, but not limited
    to the plaintiffs May 31, 2005 and March 30, 2011 letters to Priscilla Baum, and the defendants'
    letters to the plaintiff dated April 12, 2011 and April 29, 2011.
    4
    The plaintiff further argued that the defendants' peremptory exception raising
    the objection of no right of action should be denied because it was a partial exception
    of no right of action.       The plaintiff stated that his petition argued the following
    claims: ( 1)   breach of contract; ( 2) declaratory judgment; ( 3) revendicatory action;
    and (   4) partition of property.       However, the defendants' peremptory exception
    raising the objection no right of action only addressed the plaintiffs declaratory
    judgment and revendicatory action claims.
    The defendants filed a reply memorandum addressing the plaintiff' s claims
    made in his opposition memorandum. The defendants argued that the prescriptive
    period for the plaintiff' s breach of contract claim began on February 14, 2011, the
    day that he received notice that his lease was terminating. The defendants further
    argued that it was irrelevant that the defendants gave the plaintiff until May 3, 2011
    to remove his personal belongings from the property. The defendants argued that if
    the trial court sustained their peremptory exception raising the objection of
    prescription as to the breach of contract claim, this would dismiss all of the plaintiffs
    claims, leaving him with no right of action as a matter of law.
    On June 21, 2022, the trial court held a hearing' on the defendants' exceptions.
    According to the minute entry for the June 21, 2022 hearing, evidence was
    introduced at the hearing on the defendants' peremptory exception raising the
    objections of no right of action and prescription.             The evidence included: ( 1) the
    February 11, 2011 letter from Mrs. Baum' s attorney to the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff s
    May 31, 2005 letter and check to Mrs. Baum; ( 3) the plaintiffs March 30, 2011 letter
    and checks to Mrs. Baum; and ( 4) the April 29, 2011 and April 12, 2011 letters from
    4 We note that the transcript of the hearing is not in the record before us. It is not clear whether a
    transcript of the hearing exists.
    5
    Mrs. Baum' s attorney to the plaintiff and the plaintiff' s returned check.' ( See exhibit
    A, P- 11 P- 2, P- 3)
    After hearing arguments from the parties, the trial court sustained the
    defendants' exceptions and dismissed the plaintiff' s claims with prejudice. The trial
    court signed a judgment on July 7, 2022. Subsequently, the plaintiff appealed the
    trial court judgment.
    APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
    Objection of Prescription
    The objection of prescription may be raised by a peremptory exception.             La.
    C. C. P. art. 927( A)( 1).    Ordinarily, a party urging an exception of prescription bears
    the burden of proving that the prescriptive period has elapsed.             However, if the
    petition shows that it is prescribed on its face, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff
    to prove that the prescriptive period has not elapsed. See Templet v. State through
    Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2019- 0037 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11115119),
    
    290 So. 3d 187
    , 191.         A de novo standard of review applies. Wells Fargo Financial
    Louisiana, Inc. v. Galloway, 2017- 0413 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 11115117), 
    231 So. 3d 793
    ,
    After reviewing the plaintiff s petition, the facts alleged by the plaintiff show
    that he filed a petition for declaratory judgment, for damages for breach of contract
    and unjust enrichment, for revendicatory action, for an accounting and disgorgement
    of sums received, and for partition. Of these causes of action, breach of contract has
    a prescriptive period of ten years.       See La. C. C. art. 3499 ( A personal action, such
    as a claim for a breach of contract, is a personal action subject to a liberative
    prescription      of ten years);    Division of Administration, Office of Community
    We note that although the minute entry from the June 21, 2022 hearing does not indicate what
    specific evidence was introduced, the exhibits contain a date stamp of "June 21, 2022" from the
    Clerk of Court.
    6
    Development -      DisasterT Recovery Unit v. Stewart, 2022- 0574 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
    12/ 15122), 
    357 So. 3d 407
    , 410 n.2.
    Based on the record before us, we are unable to determine whether this case
    is prescribed on the face of the plaintiffs petition. Therefore, the defendants have
    the burden of proving that the plaintiff' s claim was prescribed. See Cook v. Rigby,
    2019- 1475 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11125120), 
    316 So. 3d 482
    , 485, writ denied, 2020- 
    01493 La. 319121
    ) 
    312 So. 3d 588
    .        From the pleadings, we are unable to determine if the
    lease agreement and the plaintiff' s right of occupancy ended on March 31, 2011,
    April 12, 2011, April 29, 2011, or May 3, 2011. An issue remains as to whether the
    defendants had the ability to increase the monthly rental rate.                 Furthermore, the
    termination date of the lease agreement is uncertain due to the fact that a formal
    eviction proceeding was not filed by the defendants. A formal eviction hearing was
    not conducted in accordance with La. C. C. P. arts. 4731 and 4732.
    Even taking into consideration all of the evidence submitted at the June 21,
    2022 hearing, the defendants still did not carry their burden of proving that the
    plaintiffs   claim   was   prescribed.     The pleadings and documents submitted into
    evidence show that there was a lease agreement between the plaintiff and Mrs.
    Jarreau.     No evidence was introduced as to the plaintiffs right of occupancy.
    Furthermore, the plaintiff was not formally evicted.'
    G Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4731( A) provides:
    If the lessee or occupant fails to comply with the notice to vacate required under
    this Title, or if the lessee has waived his right to notice to vacate by written waiver
    contained in the lease, and has lost his right of occupancy for any reason, the lessor
    or owner, or agent thereof, may cause the lessee or occupant to be cited summarily
    by a court of competent jurisdiction to show cause why he should not be ordered to
    deliver possession of the premises to the lessor or owner. The rule to show cause
    shall state the grounds upon which eviction is sought.
    Louisiana. Code of Civil Procedure article 4732( B) provides:
    7
    Accordingly, we reverse the trial court' s July 7, 2022 judgment sustaining the
    defendants' peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription because the
    record does not contain sufficient evidence submitted by the defendants to carry their
    burden of proving that the plaintiff's claim was prescribed.
    Obiection of No Right of Action
    The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting the defendants'
    peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action. The function of an
    objection of no right of action is to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to the
    class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted. Eagle_Pipe and
    Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation, 2010- 2267, 2010- 2272, 2010- 2275,
    2010- 2279, 2010- 2289 ( La. 10125/ 11), 
    79 So. 3d 246
    , 255. The objection assumes
    that the cause of action asserted is valid and tests whether the plaintiff has an interest
    in judicially enforcing it. The question is simply whether the plaintiff has a right to
    sue the defendant to enforce the claim.           St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 2016- 0896 ( La. App. 1
    Cir. 2121117), 
    215 So. 3d 283
    , 285, writ denied, 2017- 0511 ( La. 3131117), 
    217 So. 3d 357
    .
    The party raising the objection of no right of action bears the burden of proof.
    St. Cyr, 215 So. 3d at 285.     At the hearing, the objection of no right of action may be
    submitted on the pleadings, or evidence may be introduced either in support of or to
    controvert the objection raised when the grounds thereof do not appear from the
    petition.   See La. C. C. P. art. 931; Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc., 79 So. 3d at 255. The
    standard of appellate review for the peremptory exception raising the objection of
    If the court finds the lessor or owner entitled to the relief sought, or if the lessee or
    occupant fails to answer or to appear at the trial, the court shall render immediately
    a judgment of eviction ordering the lessee or occupant to deliver possession of the
    premises to the lessor or owner. The judgment of eviction shall be effective for not
    less than ninety days.
    8
    no right of action is de novo.             St. Cyr, 215 So. 3d at 285. "      An appellate court
    considering an exception of no right of action should focus on whether the particular
    plaintiff has a right to bring the suit and is a member of the class of persons that has
    a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation, assuming the petition states a
    valid cause of action for some person."             Rebel Distributors Corp., Inc._v. LUBA
    Workers' Comp., 2013- 0749 ( La. 10115113), 
    144 So. 3d 825
    , 833.
    We must determine whether the plaintiff is a proper party plaintiff in this case.
    In reviewing the plaintiffs petition for damages, one of his claims is that he
    sustained damages from the defendants' " bad faith willful and deliberate breach of
    the bilateral contract between the parties by entering upon the subject property extra-
    judicially without instituting [a] `` formal eviction' proceeding[.]"           The pleadings and
    documents introduced into evidence show that the parties had a lease agreement'
    and that the defendants attempted to terminate the plaintiff' s possession of the leased
    premises without obtaining a judgment of eviction. Louisiana jurisprudence holds
    that when a lessor takes the law in his hands by unlawfully dispossessing a tenant,
    he commits a trespass and is liable for general damages. Duhon v. Briley, 2012-
    1137, 2012- 1138 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 5123113), 
    117 So. 3d 253
    , 260 quoting Fo- Coin v.
    D   r ,    
    349 So. 2d 382
    , 384 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 1977).         Therefore, the plaintiff, as the
    dispossessed tenant, is the only party that has the right to bring a claim for damages
    against the defendants for breach of contract. Although the plaintiff asserts multiple
    claims in his petition for damages against the defendants, we note that he may only
    have a viable claim for breach of contract against the defendants.8
    7 The law provides that the form of a lease may be oral or written. La. C. C. art. 2681.
    8 It appears that the plaintiff' s remaining claims against the defendants may be moot or prescribed,
    as he is no longer in possession of the property at issue and does not have title to the property. See
    La. C. C. art. 526; La. C. C. P. art. 3653- 54.
    9
    Accordingly, after a de novo review, we find that the defendants failed to meet
    their burden of proof in this matter, as it appears that the plaintiff is a proper party
    plaintiff to bring a claim for breach of contract. See Poule_D' Eau Properties, L.L.C.
    v. TLC Property Inc., 2018- 1400 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 16/ 20), 
    2020 WL 3249294
    , at
    4 ( unpublished).       Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in sustaining the
    defendants' peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action.'
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons assigned, we reverse the July 7, 2022 judgment and remand
    this case to the trial court.    Costs are assessed to the defendants, Byron Baum and
    Priscilla J. Baum.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    4 We note that our decision does not preclude the defendants from refiling the peremptory
    exception raising the objections of no right of action and prescription.
    Having found this appeal to have merit, we need not address appellees' request for sanctions for
    the filing of a frivolous appeal. Further, we note that appellees did not file an answer seeking any
    relief with the court.
    10
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2022 CA 1329
    ROBERT TALLEY
    VERSUS
    BYRON BAUM AND PRISCILLA ]. BAUM
    McClendon, J., concurs.
    If a plaintiff has a right of action as to any one of the theories or demands for
    relief set out in his petition, the objection of no right of action should be overruled. State,
    by & through Caldwell v. Astra Zeneca AB, 2016- 1073 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 11/ 18),
    
    249 So. 3d 38
    , 43, writ denied, 2018- 00766 ( La. 9/ 21/ 18), 
    252 So. 3d 899
    , and writ denied
    sub nom. State by & through Caldwell v. AstraZeneca AB, 2018- 0758 ( La. 9/ 21/ 18),
    
    252 So. 3d 904
    ; St. George Pro. Firefighters Association Local 4524 v. St. George
    Fire Protection District No. 2, 2022- 0515 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 4/ 22), 
    355 So. 3d 40
    ,
    45.   Where the plaintiff pleads multiple theories of recovery based on a single occurrence
    or set of operative facts, the partial grant of an exception of no right of action, which
    attacks only one theory of recovery and which does not dismiss a party, would be invalid
    as an impermissible partial Judgment. Astra Zeneca AS, 249 So.3d at 43.
    As the majority correctly concludes, plaintiff is a proper party to bring a claim for
    breach of contract.    Therefore, regardless of whether plaintiff has a right of action to
    bring any of his remaining claims, the trial court erred in sustaining defendants`` exception
    raising the objection of no right of action.     See Astra Zeneca AB, 249 So. 3d at 46.
    Accordingly, I agree with the result reached by the majority.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022CA1329

Filed Date: 9/7/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2023