Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors Through Louisiana State University v. Jasmine L. Lewis ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                                 STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2023 CA 0647
    LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS THROUGH
    LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
    VERSUS
    JASMINE L. LEWIS
    Judgment Rendered:       NOV 0 0 2023
    1
    On Appeal from the
    Nineteenth Judicial District Court
    In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
    State of Louisiana
    No. 719444, Section 21
    The Honorable Ronald R. Johnson, Judge Presiding
    Jeff Landry                                  Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Attorney General                             Louisiana State University Board of
    Amy D. Richard                               Supervisors Through Louisiana
    Olivia G. Boudreaux                          State University
    Kirsten E. Smith
    Assistant Attorneys General
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana
    Gregory Thomas Akers                         Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
    Joshua Paul Melder                           Jasmine L. Lewis
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana
    BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ.
    HOLDRIDGE, J.
    In this suit on an open account, the appellant, Louisiana State University
    Board of Supervisors through Louisiana State University ( LSU), appeals from a
    trial court judgment rendered in favor of the appellee, Jasmine L. Lewis, that
    sustained a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription and
    dismissed LSD' s claim with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and
    remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On May 26, 2022, LSU filed a suit on an open account against Jasmine L.
    Lewis, alleging that Ms. Lewis was indebted to LSU in the amount of $7, 662. 80,
    together with interest, late/ other charges,           collection    costs,   and   attorneys'   fees.
    According to the allegations in the petition, Ms. Lewis enrolled in classes at LSU
    in 2012 and 2013, wherein she incurred the debt. LSU attached to its petition Ms.
    Lewis' academic record for 2012 and 2013, which showed that the last payment
    made by Ms. Lewis to LSU was on May 25, 2018.                       LSU asserted that the debt
    incurred by Ms. Lewis was an educational obligation due to a public institution of
    higher education,      and was subject to a thirty-year liberative prescription period
    pursuant to La. R.S. 9: 5701( A).1
    In response to the suit on open account, Ms.                 Lewis filed a peremptory
    exception raising the objection of prescription and a motion for sanctions.                       Ms.
    Lewis argued that LSU erroneously claimed that the thirty-year prescriptive period
    under La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) applied to this case              because LSU did not attach any
    evidence either in authentic form or under private signature by the parties
    containing the terms of its open account agreement. Ms. Lewis further argued that
    1 Louisiana Revised Statutes La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) provides, in pertinent part, that " actions for
    debts including student loans ... to any ... educational institution in the state ... are prescribed by
    thirty years, provided the debt is evidenced in writing."
    2
    LSU was limited to the three- year prescriptive period set forth in La. C. C.                   art.
    3494, which made LSU' s action against Ms. Lewis prescribed.'                    Therefore, Ms.
    Lewis argued that the suit should be dismissed with prejudice.
    Ms. Lewis further argued that LSU' s arguments had no basis in law and
    therefore the trial court should sanction LSU for violating La. C.C. P. art. 863.
    Specifically, Ms. Lewis argued that LSU violated La. C. C.P. art. 863( B)( 2) 1 by
    deliberately bringing an action against [ Ms.] Lewis which it clearly knew had
    prescribed."       In support of her argument, Ms. Lewis cited Louisiana State
    University System Board of Supervisors Through Louisiana State University
    Veterinarian Teaching, Hospital v. Johnson, 2020- 272 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 417121), 
    318 So. 3d 292
    , 302, writ denied, 2021- 00618 ( La. 9127121), 
    324 So. 3d 98
    , wherein the
    Third Circuit upheld the trial court' s decision to impose sanctions on LSU for
    bringing a prescribed cause of action and falling to certify that its claim was
    warranted by existing law.            Therefore, Ms. Lewis argued that like the Johnson
    case, the facts of this case warranted sanctions on LSU for violating La. C.C.P. art.
    863( B)( 2).
    LSU opposed Ms. Lewis'              motion and peremptory exception raising the
    objection of prescription, arguing that its claim was not prescribed and that as the
    exceptor, the burden of proof was on Ms. Lewis to prove that her claim was not
    prescribed.     LSU argued that La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) was the prescriptive period that
    applied to this case because it was for an open account to an educational
    institution.     LSU further argued that La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) did not require an
    z Louisiana Civil Code article 3494 provides that an action on an open account is subject to a
    libcrative prescriptive period of three years.
    3 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 863( B)( 2) states that a signed pleading by an attorney
    certifies that "[ elach   claim, defense, or other legal assertion in the pleading is warranted by
    existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
    existing law,"
    3
    authentic act or an act under private signature, as the statute specifically stated that
    the debt is evidenced in writing."            LSU argued that the language of La. R.S.
    9: 5701( A) should be given its common meaning to require written evidence of the
    debt consistent with the definition provided by La. C.E. art. 1001( 1). 4 Therefore,
    LSU argued that it was not required to produce an open account agreement in the
    form of an authentic act or under private signature to receive the thirty-year
    prescriptive period as mandated by La. R.S. 9: 5701( A).
    On February 16, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Ms.                               Lewis'
    peremptory      exception     raising the     objection       of prescription      and   motion       for
    sanctions.     No evidence or testimony was offered at the hearing by either party. At
    the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.                      On
    March     7,   2023,   the   trial   court   signed     a judgment,         sustaining Ms.        Lewis'
    peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissing LSU' s
    claim against Ms. Lewis with prejudice.               The judgment further denied Ms. Lewis'
    motion for sanctions.'       LSU subsequently appealed the judgment.
    APPLICABLE LAW
    The objection of prescription is properly raised through a peremptory
    exception and must be specially pled. La. C. C. P. art. 927. Prescription statutes are
    strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the claim sought to be
    extinguished by it.      Seale &     Ross PLC v. Littleleaf Properties, LLC, 2021- 
    0083 La. App. 1
     Cir. 1014121), 
    2021 WL 4520217
    , at * 2 ( unpublished). Ordinarily, the
    party pleading the exception of prescription bears the burden of proving the claim
    Louisiana Code of Evidence article 1001( 1) states:
    Writings and      recordings. " Writings"      and "   recordings"   consist of letters,    words,
    numbers, sounds, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing,
    photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or
    other form of data compilation.
    5 We note that the motion for sanctions is not at issue in this appeal.
    4
    has prescribed. However, when the face of the petition reveals that the plaintiffs
    claim has prescribed, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show why the claim has
    not prescribed.   Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009- 2632, 2009- 2635 ( La. 716110),
    
    45 So. 3d 991
    , 998.   When, as in this case, no evidence is introduced at the hearing
    to   support or controvert the   exception of prescription,    the exception must be
    decided upon facts alleged in the petition with all allegations accepted as true.
    Harris v. Breaud, 2017- 0421 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 27/ 18), 
    243 So. 3d 572
    , 578.    If no
    evidence is introduced to support or controvert the exception, the manifest error
    standard of review does not apply, and the appellate court' s role is to determine
    whether the trial court' s ruling was legally correct. Harris, 
    243 So. 3d at
    578- 579.
    DISCUSSION
    The parties disagree over the prescription statutes applicable to this case and
    how to interpret them.    LSU asserts that the thirty-year prescriptive period in La.
    R.S. 9: 5701 is the proper prescriptive period in this case rather than the three- year
    prescriptive period provided in La. C.C. art. 3494.       In cases involving statutory
    interpretation, the fundamental question is legislative intent and the ascertainment
    of the reason or reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the law.            Law
    Industries, LLC_v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 2018- 
    1756 La. App. 1
     Cir. 312120), 
    300 So. 3d 21
    , 27, writ denied, 2020- 00745 ( La. 10/ 6120),
    
    302 So. 3d 515
    .    The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and
    enforce the intent of the legislature. 
    Id.
    The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the
    statute itself. Dejoie v. Medley, 2008- 2223 ( La. 515109), 
    9 So. 3d 826
    , 829.    When
    a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
    consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may
    be made in search of the intent of the legislature.   La. C. C. art. 9; Conerly v. State,
    5
    97- 0871 ( La. 7/ 8/ 98), 
    714 So.2d 709
    , 710.             Therefore, in construing a statute, an
    appellate court is bound to consider all parts together, giving effect to all parts, if
    possible,
    not construing       as surplusage        any sentence,     clause,   or   word,     if a
    construction can be legitimately found which will give meaning to and preserve all
    words of the statute. Louisiana Gil &           Gas Assn Inc. v. Caldwell, 2015- 0889 ( La.
    1      Cir.     2118116),    
    2016 WL 687144
    ,             4(
    App.                                                                     at *          unpublished).
    Louisiana Civil Code article 3494 states, in pertinent part:
    The following actions are subject to a liberative prescription of three
    years:
    1) An action for the recovery of compensation for services rendered,
    including payment of salaries, wages, commissions, professional
    fees, fees and emoluments of public officials, freight, passage,
    money, lodging, and board;
    4) An action on an open account[.]
    In 2018, La. C. C. art. 3494 was amended when the legislature removed " tuition
    fees" from La. C. C. art. 3494( 1).         See 2018 La. Acts. No. 471, § 1 (        eff. Aug. 1,
    2018).
    Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 5701 states:
    A. Except as provided in Subsection B of this Section, actions for
    debts including student loans, stipends, or benefits due to any
    charitable or educational institution in the state or to any fund
    bequeathed for charitable or educational purposes, or educational
    obligations owed to the state or its agencies, other than obligations
    created under the Federal Family Education Loan Program, are
    prescribed by thirty years, provided            the debt is evidenced in
    writing.
    B. Actions for debts, due to public institutions of higher education in
    this   state,   other than   student loans,     stipends,    or benefits are
    prescribed by ten years, provided the debt is evidenced in writing.
    Pursuant to the general rules of statutory construction, where two or more
    statutes deal with the same subject matter, the statute more specifically directed to
    the matter at issue must prevail over a statute more general in character if they
    rel
    cannot be reconciled.    Pumphrey v. City of New Orleans, 2005- 0979 ( La. 414106),
    
    925 So. 2d 1202
    , 1210.     Pursuant to the rules of statutory interpretation, La. R.S.
    9: 5701( A) applies to this case because it is the more specific statute rather than the
    general statute, La. C. C. art. 3494.         See Burge v. State, 2010- 2229 ( La. 2111111),
    
    54 So. 3d 1110
    , 1113 ( per curiam).
    In this case, Ms. Lewis, as the exceptor, has the initial burden of proving that
    her claim has not prescribed on the face of the petition.            Since no evidence was
    introduced to support or controvert Ms. Lewis' peremptory exception raising the
    objection of prescription, the exception must be decided upon facts alleged in the
    petition with all allegations accepted as true, and this court must determine if the
    trial court was legally correct in applying La. C. C. art. 3494 rather than La. R.S.
    9: 5701( A) to the facts of this case.
    In its petition, LSU asserts that Ms. Lewis has a debt for an educational
    obligation due to an educational institution in the state of Louisiana. The petition
    further provides that this debt was incurred in 2012 and 201.3, and LSU filed its
    petition on an open account in 2022.              LSU attached to its petition an itemized
    invoice and affidavit showing that Ms. Lewis was indebted to LSU in the amount
    of $7, 662. 50.   Accepting these allegations as true, LSU asserts that its petition is
    not prescribed on its face, as the facts show that LSU filed its petition within the
    thirty-year prescriptive period as mandated by La. R.S. 9: 5701( A).
    Although Ms. Lewis agrees that La. R. S. 9: 5701( A) is the more specific
    statute providing a prescriptive period for educational institutions, she argues that
    the statute has a writing requirement that requires the obligation to be either an
    authentic act or an act under private signature.          Specifically, Ms. Lewis argues that
    evidenced        in    writing"         as      stated     in    La.     R.S.    9: 5701( A)
    demonstrates the legislature' s intent that educational obligations to be in authentic
    7
    act or act under private signature for the [ thirty-year] prescriptive period to apply."
    In support of her argument, Ms. Lewis relies on the Johnson case, wherein the
    Third Circuit held that:
    Louisiana law does not require an open account to be in written form.
    However, La. R.S. 9: 5701 expressly states the debt must be evidenced
    in writing. Thus, for purposes of applying the longer prescriptive
    period, written form is required by law to prove the obligation, and the
    writing must take the form of either an authentic act or act under
    private signature.   Johnson, 318 So. 3d at 299.
    After reviewing the record, we find that the Johnson case is inconsistent with
    Louisiana jurisprudence that does not require an open account to be in written
    form.   We agree with the statutory interpretation by Judge Fitzgerald in his dissent
    in Johnson that:
    An open account is not a particular type of contract that is required by
    law to be in writing. ... The statutory language in question—
    provided the debt is evidenced in writing"— requires written proof of
    the debt; the debt is the balance on the open account. The documents
    attached to LSU' s petition constitute written proof of that debt....   But
    the interpretation given [ in Johnson], requiring the open account itself
    to be in written form ...   renders the prescriptive statute meaningless
    for future actions on open accounts.        Johnson, 318 So. 3d at 305
    Fitzgerald, J., dissenting in part).
    We find that the debt due on the open account is the remaining balance owed
    by Ms. Lewis in the sum of $7, 662. 80.         LSU evidenced the debt due with the
    itemized invoice showing the billing statement for Ms. Lewis and the affidavit it
    attached to its petition verifying the debt owed by Ms. Lewis in accordance with
    La. R.S. 9: 5701( A). Louisiana courts have held that in a suit on open account, it is
    of crucial importance that an itemized statement of the account, showing all the
    debits and all the credits which produce the balance due, be produced. Capital One
    Bank (USA)_NA_v. Young, 2015- 70 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 9/ 23/ 15), 
    176 So. 3d 695
    , 697.
    Only in this way is the sum due on account mathematically documented. 
    Id.
     Thus,
    we find that the evidence submitted by LSU satisfies the writing requirement of
    La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) and establishes a prima facie showing that LSU is entitled to
    the amount sought.
    Accordingly, we find that the trial court' s ruling was not legally correct in
    finding that LSU' s claim was prescribed and dismissing its claim with prejudice.
    We find that on the face of LSU' s petition, it alleged sufficient facts and dates
    showing that its claim fell within the thirty-year prescriptive period provided in La.
    R.S. 9: 5701( A). Ms. Lewis offered no evidence, testimony, or documents to prove
    that the thirty-year prescriptive period under La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) did not apply to
    this case.   Therefore, we find that the trial court incorrectly found that LSU did not
    satisfy the writing requirement of La. R.S. 9: 5701( A), as the record clearly shows
    that LSU provided the proper documentary evidence showing the debt incurred by
    Ms. Lewis.      Therefore, we reverse the trial court' s judgment and remand for
    further proceedings.
    CONCLUSION
    The March 7, 2023 judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter is
    remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.        All costs of this
    appeal are assessed to the appellee, Jasmine L. Lewis.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    0
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2023CA0647

Filed Date: 11/9/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/9/2023