Christopher McWhorter v. Kassie Gill ( 2023 )


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  •                               STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    N0. 2023 CU 0089
    VU I
    CHRISTOPHER McWHORTER
    q4g'"'
    VERSUS
    KASSIE GILL
    NOV 2 7 2023
    Judgment Rendered:
    Appealed from the
    17th Judicial District Court
    Parish of Lafourche, State of Louisiana
    No. C- 145424
    The Honorable Kirk A. Vaughn, Judge Pro Tempore Presiding
    Timothy Thriffiley                          Attorney for Defendant/Appellant,
    Belle Chasse, Louisiana                     Kassie Gill
    Joan M. Malbrough                           Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee,
    Estelle E. Mahoney                          Christopher McWhorter
    Cheleste H. Gottschalk
    Houma, Louisiana
    BEFORE: GUIDRY, C. J., McCLENDON, CHUTZ,
    PENZATO, AND WOLFE, JJ.
    rep
    WOLFE, J.
    In this custody suit, the mother appeals a trial court judgment awarding the
    father shared custody of the minor child. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and
    remand for further proceedings.
    FACTS
    Christopher McWhorter and Kassie Gill are the unmarried parents of SJM,
    born January 14, 2022. On August 15, 2022, Mr. McWhorter filed the instant suit
    in Lafourche Parish to establish filiation, custody, and child support of the minor
    child.   In his petition, Mr. McWhorter alleged that he formally acknowledged the
    child and was listed as the father on the child' s birth certificate, and further that he
    had exercised visitation with the child since his relationship with Ms. Gill ended in
    March. Mr. McWhorter requested joint custody of the child or, alternatively, shared
    custody exercised on an alternating fourteen -day basis to accommodate his work
    schedule.    He asked that child support be set in accordance with Louisiana' s child
    support guidelines, with Ms. Gill ordered to pay her proportionate share of the
    child' s expenses, and that he be allowed to claim the tax dependency exemption for
    the child.
    A hearing on Mr. McWhorter' s petition was set for September 28, 2022. The
    hearing was first continued on motion of Ms. Gill, who represented that she lived in
    Plaquemines Parish and needed more time to prepare and retain counsel to represent
    her in Lafourche Parish.   She additionally claimed that she was obligated to work in
    Monroe, Louisiana, during the week of the scheduled hearing.         She indicated that
    she contacted "   the opposing party/counsel" but did not indicate whether there was
    any objection to the requested continuance. The trial court granted the motion, and
    the hearing was re -set for October 25, 2022.
    The October 25,    2022 hearing was then continued on motion of Mr.
    McWhorter, who represented that he would be out of state for work on the date of
    2
    the scheduled hearing.   He indicated that Ms. Gill had been contacted and had no
    objection to the continuance. The trial court granted the motion and the hearing was
    re -set for November 29, 2022.
    On the afternoon before the November 29, 2022 hearing, an attorney fax -filed
    a motion to enroll on behalf of Ms. Gill for the limited purpose of requesting a
    continuance and stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of a petition for
    protection from abuse that Ms. Gill        filed   in   Plaquemines   Parish.   In   the
    accompanying motion for continuance and stay, it was explained that a hearing on
    the petition for protection from abuse was scheduled for November 21, 2022, but
    continued to December 12, 2022, due to lack of service. Attached as an exhibit was
    a copy ofthe petition for protection from abuse filed by Ms. Gill, on behalf of herself
    and SJM, against Mr. McWhorter in Plaquemines Parish. Therein, Ms. Gill alleged
    abuse by Mr. McWhorter, including the failure to return the minor child at the agreed
    upon time and place, harassment, and threatening her and her unborn child with
    bodily harm. As supporting evidence, Ms. Gill appended a typewritten list of dates
    and alleged threats made by Mr. McWhorter.         In the petition, Ms. Gill requested
    issuance of a temporary restraining order and an award oftemporary custody of SJM;
    however, the attachment did not include any orders issued in connection with the
    petition.
    On November 29, 2022, Mr. McWhorter and his attorney appeared in court
    for the scheduled hearing.    Neither Ms. Gill nor the attorney who fax -filed the
    motions to enroll and for continuance were present. When the case was called, Mr.
    McWhorter' s attorney explained that the previous day she received a fax from an
    attorney seeking a continuance of the hearing. Mr. McWhorter' s attorney voiced
    her objection to the request, stating that the petition in this matter had been pending
    since August 15, that Mr. McWhorter had not been allowed any visitation with the
    child in the preceding month, and that she was ready to proceed.
    3
    The trial court acknowledged receiving " a phone call from the attorney who
    didn' t even bother to come today —claiming that she wanted a continuance and that
    the lady, her client, was pregnant and was having some sort of transfusion or
    something [ like] that." The trial court explained that the attorney was instructed to
    contact Mr. McWhorter' s attorney. Recognizing that Mr. McWhorter' s attorney
    obviously did not agree to a continuance, the trial court stated it was ready to
    proceed.     The trial court observed, " they had to know these things were going on
    without contacting anyone until [the] last minute," which the trial court characterized
    as "   inappropriate."
    Mr. McWhorter then testified on his own behalf. He explained that he worked
    as an offshore tugboat captain and arranged his schedule to have custody of the child
    on an alternating fourteen -day schedule. According to Mr. McWhorter, he and Ms.
    Gill had shared custody of the child according to that schedule until Ms. Gill made
    unfounded allegations against him and filed for a protective order, after which he
    had not been allowed to see the child. Mr. McWhorter noted that Ms. Gill alleged
    instances of abuse during months he had custody of the child, but did not seek a
    protective order until November. Mr. McWhorter testified that he was the child' s
    primary caregiver, explaining that when Ms. Gill traveled to Monroe to work as a
    nurse practitioner, she left the child with him or babysitters, some of whom were as
    young as sixteen years old.     Mr. McWhorter confirmed that Ms. Gill was again
    pregnant and that he might be the unborn child' s father.
    During his testimony, Mr. McWhorter acknowledged that an order was issued
    in relation to the petition for protection from abuse that Ms. Gill filed in Plaquemines
    Parish. However, Mr. McWhorter affirmed that the Plaquemines Parish court was
    aware of the custody proceeding, as evidenced by the order stating that it would be
    superseded by any order rendered by a court in Lafourche Parish with jurisdiction
    over custody of the child.
    4
    At the conclusion of Mr. McWhorter' s testimony, the trial court stated it had
    a lot of questions, a lot of concerns" that it did not expect to have answered that
    day, noting "[ i] t would' ve been nice to have both parties here."         In response to
    questioning by the trial court, Mr. McWhorter indicated that DNA testing proved he
    was SJM' s father and if he was proven to be the unborn baby' s father, he was willing
    to raise it too.   Mr. McWhorter denied any substance abuse problems and, when the
    trial court asked if he had "[ a] ny type of criminal record," he answered "[ n] ot really."
    After a colloquy with Mr. McWhorter about how custody of the child could be
    transferred between the parents without Mr. McWhorter being arrested for violating
    the protective order issued in Plaquemines Parish, the trial court granted Mr.
    McWhorter' s request for shared custody. The trial court explained that it based its
    ruling on Mr. McWhorter having cared for the child " so much in the past" and the
    fact that it saw no prohibitions to a shared custody arrangement, noting that shared
    custody is presumed to be in the best interest of the child unless a party can overcome
    that presumption.     The trial court cautioned Mr. McWhorter to " be careful," telling
    him, " you' re the one that' s important in this process, not me." After Mr. McWhorter
    thanked the trial court for its ruling and advice, the trial court further explained that
    it knew how it would rule before questioning Mr. McWhorter, but wanted to make
    sure it " heard the right answers."   When Mr. McWhorter described bonding with the
    father of two of Ms. Gill' s other children, having earlier described the custody
    dispute between Ms. Gill and the children' s father, the trial court commented that
    shared abuse sometimes creates close friendships."            At the conclusion of the
    hearing, the trial court thanked Mr. McWhorter for " stepping up and caring for [his]
    daughter," noting that there were too many absentee fathers.
    In conformity with its oral ruling, the trial court signed a judgment on
    December 1, 2022, that awarded Ms. Gill and Mr. McWhorter shared custody of
    SJM on an alternating fourteen -day schedule.           The judgment decreed that the
    5
    custody schedule would begin immediately, with Mr. McWhorter having custody of
    the child until December 8, 2022, when his work schedule changed, and Ms. Gill
    having the child December 8,       2022, through December 22,        2022, then    Mr.
    McWhorter having custody December 22, 2022, through January 5, 2023, and
    custody thereafter alternating every fourteen days.       The judgment specifically
    provided that it superseded the Plaquemines Parish protective order.
    The day after the judgment was signed, the same attorney who filed the prior
    motion to enroll on behalf of Ms. Gill filed a second motion to enroll as counsel for
    Ms. Gill for the limited purpose of filing an accompanying motion to continue and
    stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the Petition for Protection pending in
    Plaquemines Parish. The trial court denied the motions as moot.
    Ms. Gill then filed a motion for new trial, in which she stated that when she
    requested a continuance and stay of these proceedings, she believed Mr. McWhorter
    was offshore and unable to move forward with the hearing.         She stated that she
    understood that the motion for continuance and stay filed by the attorney on her
    behalf were not considered due to untimely payment of filing fees.           Ms. Gill
    represented that she was 34 weeks pregnant with Mr. McWhorter' s child and, on the
    date of the custody hearing, received a blood transfusion and was put on bed rest,
    which rendered it "medically impossible" for her to appear at the hearing and put on
    evidence.   She further asserted that the trial court' s judgment awarding shared
    custody was contrary to the law and evidence, alleging instances of abuse by Mr.
    McWhorter that formed the basis of the protective order she obtained in Plaquemines
    Parish. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, noting that "[ t] he Judge
    in Plaquemines provided for the contingency of a custody ruling in Lafourche Parish
    regarding custody. Mover chose not to appear herein despite a continuance not being
    granted."
    Ms. Gill now appeals the trial court' s December 1,         2022 custody judgment
    and the denial of her motion for new trial.
    DISCUSSION
    Ms. Gill contends that the trial court should have granted her a continuance of
    the custody hearing as it had information that she was unable to attend because she
    was undergoing a medical procedure related to                 her pregnancy.      Ms.   Gill
    acknowledges that the information regarding her medical condition was not set forth
    in the motion for continuance and stay of the proceedings, but contends that the trial
    court was aware of it, as evidenced by the trial court' s comments regarding the phone
    call it received from the attorney who prepared the motion.              Additionally, she
    attached evidence of such to her motion for new trial, which she contends should
    have been granted on that basis and because she had evidence of domestic abuse by
    Mr. McWhorter.
    The trial court may grant a continuance on peremptory or discretionary
    grounds.       La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1601 and 1602.       There are only two peremptory
    grounds: (     1)    the party seeking the continuance, despite due diligence, has been
    unable to obtain material evidence; or ( 2) a material witness is absent without the
    contrivance of the party applying for the continuance.          La. Code Civ. P. art. 1602.
    Absent peremptory grounds, a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the
    trial court.        Matter of Succession of Patin, 2021- 1461 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 1114122),
    
    355 So. 3d 45
    , 48, writ denied, 2023- 00011 ( La. 3128123), 
    358 So. 3d 513
    . La. Code
    Civ. P. art. 1601 provides for a continuance " if there is good ground therefor." The
    trial court must consider the particular facts of a case when deciding whether to grant
    or deny a continuance. The trial court should consider the diligence and good faith
    of the party seeking the continuance and other reasonable grounds. The trial court
    may also weigh the condition of the court docket, fairness to the parties and other
    litigants before the court, and the need for orderly and prompt administration of
    7
    justice.      The trial court has great discretion in granting or denying a continuance
    under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1601, and its ruling should not be disturbed on appeal in
    the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Matter of Succession of Patin, 355 So. 3d
    A new trial shall be granted upon contradictory motion of any party when the
    judgment appears clearly contrary to the law and the evidence, or when the party has
    discovered new evidence that she could not have obtained before or during trial. See
    La. Code Civ. P. art. 1972.      Additionally, a new trial may be granted in any case if
    there are good grounds therefor. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1973. A new trial should
    be ordered when the trial court,        exercising its discretion, is convinced by its
    examination of the facts that the judgment would result in a miscarriage of justice.
    The denial of a motion for new trial, whether on peremptory or discretionary
    grounds, should not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of the trial court' s
    discretion.     Moore v. Prater, 2021- 1430 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 613122), 
    342 So. 3d 994
    ,
    1. 002- 03.
    We recognize that a trial court has wide discretion in the control of its docket.
    Rover Group, Inc. v. Clark, 2021- 1365 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 8/ 22), 
    341 So. 3d 842
    ,
    846, writ denied, 2022- 00766 ( La. 9/ 20/ 22),       
    346 So. 3d 287
    .     However, the
    paramount consideration in all child custody disputes is the best interest of the child.
    See La. Civ. Code art. 131; Evans v. Lungrin, 97- 0541 ( La. 216198), 
    708 So. 2d 731
    ,
    740. The trial court sits as a sort of fiduciary on behalf of the child and must actively
    pursue that course of conduct that will be of the greatest benefit to the child. Turner
    v. Turner, 
    455 So.2d 1374
    , 1379 ( La. 1984).         Every child custody case must be
    viewed in light of its own particular set of facts and circumstances. Underwood v.
    Underwood, 2021- 0277 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 21/ 21), 
    332 So. 3d 128
    , 139.
    The record in this case establishes that Ms. Gill has made allegations of abuse
    against Mr. McWhorter in another court, which raise questions as to whether an
    N.
    award of shared custody is in SJM' s best interest.' By proceeding with the custody
    hearing in Ms. Gill' s absence, the trial court was denied the opportunity to
    adequately consider the truth of those allegations and assess the best interest of the
    child.   In fact, the trial court alluded to this when, after hearing Mr. McWhorter' s
    testimony, it stated it would have been nice to have both parties present as it had
    many unanswered questions.
    Ms. Gill has explained that her absence from the custody hearing was due to
    complications with her advanced pregnancy.                 Although the motion to continue
    presented to the trial court was not based on the pregnancy or the related
    complications, the trial court acknowledged that it had been informed that Ms. Gill
    was receiving a transfusion. Further, Mr. McWhorter testified that he was likely the
    unborn child' s father and expressed his concern over Ms. Gill obtaining proper
    medical care during the pregnancy.
    Considering the unique circumstances presented in this matter, we find that
    the trial court abused its discretion in proceeding with the custody hearing in Ms.
    Gill' s absence and rendering a judgment awarding shared custody of the child.               At
    the very least, a new trial is warranted so that all relevant evidence can be presented
    and the trial court can make an informed decision regarding SJM' s best interest.
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court' s judgment denying Kassie Gill' s motion for new trial is
    reversed and this matter is remanded for a new trial. Costs of this appeal are assessed
    to Christopher McWhorter.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    I
    These allegations appear in the petition for protection from abuse that was filed with her
    motion to continue. As Mr. McWhorter points out on appeal, Ms, Gill did not answer his petition
    or file any substantive pleadings in this matter that directly allege abuse.
    E
    CHRISTOPHER McWHORTER                                  FIRST CIRCUIT
    COURT OF APPEAL
    VERSUS
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    CASSIE GILL                                            NO. 2023 CU 0089
    1161   CHUTZ, J., dissenting.
    r
    I disagree with the majority' s conclusion that the trial court abused its
    discretion either in denying Ms. Gill' s motion for continuance or her motion for new
    trial.   Ms. Gill alleges it was " medically impossible" for her to appear at the custody
    hearing because she was scheduled to undergo a transfusion related to her pregnancy
    on the date of the hearing.     In her motion to continue, however, Ms. Gill made no
    mention of a scheduled medical procedure.         Instead, she requested a continuance
    solely on the basis that no ruling had been made in her pending action for a
    protective order against Mr. McWhorter in Plaquemines Parish.          As the trial court
    observed, it was not until the " last minute"    that Ms. Gill' s attorney contacted the
    trial court by phone and advised that Ms. Gill wanted a continuance because she was
    undergoing a medical procedure on the date of the custody hearing.
    Even if the medical necessity of the procedure is conceded, the record is
    devoid of any evidence showing the procedure was necessitated by a medical
    emergency that prevented Ms. Gill from timely requesting a continuance on medical
    grounds.     Although it is clear the procedure was scheduled in advance, the record
    does not establish whether the procedure was scheduled before or after the date of
    the custody hearing was set. Ms. Gill also failed to present any evidence that she
    lacked control over the scheduling of the procedure or that she could not have
    undergone the procedure on a different day without risk to her health or the health of
    the baby.
    Absent peremptory causes, which have not been established in this case, a
    continuance rests within the trial court' s sound discretion.   The trial court' s ruling
    on whether or not to grant a continuance should not be disturbed in the absence of a
    clear abuse of discretion.    Appellate courts interfere in such matters only with
    reluctance and in extreme cases.       Booth v. Amberg, 07- 2560 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
    9119108), 
    2008 WL 4287562
    , * 4 ( unpublished).
    In this case, Ms. Gill presented absolutely no evidence showing her failure to
    appear was due to circumstances beyond her control or contrivance. Thus, I do not
    believe the trial court abused its discretion in proceeding with the custody hearing in
    Ms. Gill' s absence.   In her motion for new trial, Ms. Gill argued a continuance
    should have been granted in view of her medical condition, which would have
    allowed her an opportunity to present evidence supporting her allegations of abuse
    by Mr. McWhorter.       However,   having concluded the trial court did not err in
    refusing to continue the custody hearing, I likewise do not believe the trial court
    erred in denying Ms. Gill' s motion for new trial, which was based largely on the
    denial of the requested continuance.    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2023CU0089

Filed Date: 11/27/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/27/2023