Renee Jackson & Antione Coleman Versus Liberty Personal Insurance Company ( 2020 )

RENEE JACKSON & ANTIONE COLEMAN NO. 20-CA-13
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
LIBERTY PERSONAL INSURANCE COURT OF APPEAL
COMPANY
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 772-251, DIVISION "P"
HONORABLE LEE V. FAULKNER, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING
April 28, 2020
PER CURIAM
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
FHW
SMC
JJM
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
RENEE JACKSON & ANTIONE COLEMAN
William R. Mustian, III
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
LIBERTY PERSONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
H. Minor Pipes, III
Stephen L. Miles
WICKER, J.
Plaintiffs, Renee Jackson and Antione Coleman, appeal from the trial court’s
ruling granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, Liberty Personal
Insurance Company, finding that the UM coverage under the Liberty Personal
Insurance Company Policy issued to Ms. Jackson is limited to economic-only
UMBI coverage based upon an enforceable UMBI coverage selection form. For
the following reasons, we remove this case from our May 2020 docket and remand
the case to the district court for preparation of a judgment properly invoking the
jurisdiction of this Court and, thereafter, for supplementation of the appellate
record with that judgment.
Plaintiffs filed suit against Liberty Personal Insurance Company, (hereinafter
“Liberty”), alleging personal injury and property damages as a result of an
automobile accident. In their petition, they allege that Ms. Jackson was driving her
2011 Dodge Charger, with Antione Coleman as a passenger, when they were
struck from behind by an unknown vehicle operated by an unknown driver. The
unknown driver then fled the scene of the accident. At the time of the accident,
Liberty was Ms. Jackson’ automobile insurance provider, and provided coverage
under the uninsured/underinsured bodily injury (UMBI) provision of the policy.
Liberty filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Ms. Jackson
had validly elected economic-only UMBI coverage, and that plaintiffs have been
fully compensated for their economic-only damages from the accident, therefore it
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs opposed the
motion, alleging that the election of economic-only UMBI was invalid under
Louisiana law.
After a hearing on Liberty’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court
rendered judgment as follows:
20-CA-13 1
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant, Liberty Personal
Insurance Company, and against Plaintiffs, Renee Jackson and Antoine
Coleman, be and is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
UM coverage under the Liberty Personal Insurance Company Policy is
limited to economic-only UMBI coverage based upon an enforceable UMBI
coverage selection form.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court.
Plaintiffs then filed a motion for appeal, which was granted. This appeal followed.
Initially we find that the judgment before us is not a final judgment
appealable judgment. We cannot determine the merits of an appeal unless our
jurisdiction is properly invoked by a final judgment. Tomlinson v. Landmark Am.
Ins. Co., 15-0276 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16), 192 So.3d 153, 156. For a judgment
to be a final judgment it must contain appropriate decretal language. For the
language to be considered decretal, it must name the party in favor of whom the
ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is
granted or denied. Simon v. Ferguson, 18-0826 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/28/19), 274
So.3d 10, 13-14; Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson Greatbatch, Techs., Inc.,
10-477 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10), 52 So.3d 909, 916. The specific relief granted
should be determinable from the judgment without reference to an extrinsic source
such as pleadings or reasons for judgment. Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. at. 916.
A summary judgment rendered “as to one or more but less than all of the claims,
demands, issues, or theories against a party . . . shall not constitute a final judgment
unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay.” La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B).
In their appellate brief, plaintiffs allege that the trial court erred in
dismissing their claim for future economic losses. In its appellee brief, Liberty
argues that the trial court did not err in dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims.
However, the language of the judgment before us determines only the scope of
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UMBI coverage under the automobile liability policy issued by Liberty. There is
no language in the judgment dismissing any party from the suit, and we cannot
consider extrinsic sources such as counsels’ requests or arguments in determining
whether a particular relief, such as dismissal of a claim or a party, has been
granted. In the judgment before us, the only relief granted is a finding that the
UMBI coverage extended only to economic losses. Cf. Gaten v. Tangipahoa Par.
Sch. Sys., 11-1133 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/23/12), 91 So. 3d 1073, 1074. Further, the
judgment was not designated as final for purposes of immediate appeal by the trial
court.
The judgment at issue is an interlocutory judgment, and there has been no
certification of the partial judgment as final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915.
Therefore, we remove the instant appeal from the docket and remand this matter to
the district court for formulation of an appealable judgment that reflects the judge’s
intentions either to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety or designate the
partial judgment as final after determining that there is no just reason for delay.
Upon the signing of a judgment by Monday, May 4, 2020, the Clerk of Court shall
supplement the appellate record with the judgment no later than the following
Monday, May 11, 2020. Thereafter, this Court will docket this case on the next
appropriate date available.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
20-CA-13 3
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
APRIL 28, 2020 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
20-CA-13
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HON. LEE V. FAULKNER, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
WILLIAM R. MUSTIAN, III (APPELLANT) STEPHEN L. MILES (APPELLEE) H. MINOR PIPES, III (APPELLEE)
MAILED
NO ATTORNEYS WERE MAILED