In Re: Medical Review Panel for the Claim of Kayla Marles Neville ( 2020 )

IN RE: MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL FOR THE NO. 20-C-127
CLAIM OF KAYLA MARLES NEVILLE FIFTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
June 30, 2020
Susan Buchholz
First Deputy Clerk
IN RE FELIX H. SAVOIE, M.D.
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE ELLEN SHIRER
KOVACH, DIVISION "K", NUMBER 791-435
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Marc E. Johnson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT OVERRULING PEREMPTORY
EXCEPTION OF PRESCRIPTION REVERSED; PEREMPTORY
EXCEPTION OF PRESCRIPTION SUSTAINED; MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST DR. SAVOIE DISMISSED.
In this writ application, relator/defendant, Felix Savoie, M.D.,
seeks review of the trial court’s March 4, 2020 judgment overruling his
peremptory exception of prescription.1 After review, and finding the
district court erred in overruling Dr. Savoie’s exception, we grant the
writ, reverse the trial court’s judgment, sustain Dr. Savoie’s peremptory
exception of prescription, and dismiss plaintiff’s medical malpractice
claim against Dr. Savoie.
Factual Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff, Kayla Marles Neville, is a twenty-one-year-old woman
who injured her right arm on June 22, 2016, while in the course and
scope of her employment as an intern at Disney World in Orlando
Florida. Upon her return to New Orleans in late 2016, she began
treating with defendant, Dr. Savoie, and he eventually performed
surgery to repair the triceps tendons in her right arm on February 17,
2017. In the course of that surgery, Dr. Savoie inserted dissolvable
screws to hold the tendon in the correct position. Unfortunately, Ms.
1
This Court initially denied Dr. Savoie’s writ application because he failed to append certain documents to
his original writ filing in accordance with the Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal. Dr. Savoie then requested rehearing
asserting that difficulties with the COVID19 time extensions and subsequent shutdown of the 24 th Judicial District
Court made it impossible for him to append the required documents, and we agreed to rehear Dr. Savoie’s original
matter in the interest of justice. Dr. Savoie then timely filed a supplement to the original writ supplying the requisite
documents, which brings us to the merits.
20-C-127
Neville continued to experience pain and discomfort after the surgery,
and as such, sought a second opinion from Dr. Claude Williams in
July/August of 2017, some six months post-surgery.
On November 15th of 2017, Dr. Williams read an MRI that had
been performed on Ms. Neville’s arm, and discovered that one of the
screws that had been inserted at the time of the original surgery in
February of that year had not dissolved, and had, in fact, migrated into
the joint. Dr. Williams diagnosed this non-dissolved/migrated screw as
the cause of Ms. Neville’s continued pain, and informed her that she
should return to defendant Dr. Savoie for a surgical follow up. The next
day, November 16, 2017, Ms. Neville saw Dr. Savoie, allowed him to
review the MRI that had been ordered by Dr. Williams, and he
confirmed that the screw inserted during the surgery he performed, in
fact, had not dissolved and had migrated into the joint, which was likely
the source of her continued pain and prolonged recovery. He also
indicated at that appointment that Ms. Neville would have to undergo a
second operative procedure to remove the migrated screw. Ms. Neville
did not want Dr. Savoie to perform the follow-up surgery. She returned
to Dr. Williams on November 20, 2017, to schedule the second surgery,
which was performed by Dr. Williams on December 17, 2017.
According to Ms. Neville’s original medical review panel (“MRP”)
complaint, in July of 2018, she was told she would have a permanent
4% reduction in the use of her right arm. Ms. Neville initiated her
request for a MRP on December 12, 2018. In her complaint, Ms.
Neville alleges that while the malpractice occurred on February 17,
2017, she did not become aware of the alleged malpractice until
December 17, 2017, when the corrective surgery was performed.
In response to Ms. Neville’s request for a MRP, Dr. Savoie filed
an exception of prescription. According to Dr. Savoie, Ms. Neville
knew or should have known that she had a claim for alleged malpractice
against defendant no later than November 20, 2017, when her second
surgery was scheduled to remove the screw he implanted during the
first. Thus, Dr. Savoie averred that Ms. Neville’s request filed more
than one year later on December 12, 2018, was untimely, and the matter
was prescribed. Ms. Neville opposed the motion stating that because
she did not have “definitive knowledge” of her claim for malpractice
until December 17, 2017, when the undissolved screw was actually
removed from her right arm during the second surgery, her request for a
MRP was timely since it was filed within one year from that date.
Dr. Savoie’s exception came for hearing on February 7, 2020.
The district court denied the exception and issued a judgment to that
effect on March 4, 2020.2 This writ application followed.
Law and Analysis
Prescription on a claim of medical malpractice is governed by La.
R.S. 9:5628(A), which provides, in pertinent part, that a medical
2
The judgment rendered by the trial court on March 4, 2020 also dismissed the exception of prescription as
to co-defendant Omega Hospital, however they did not join with defendant Savoie in the filing of the original writ in
April.
2
malpractice claim must be brought “… within one year from the date of
the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of
discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, evens as to
claims filed within one year from the date of discovery, in all events
such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years
from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.” Under this
statute, prescription commences when a plaintiff obtains actual or
constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person that
he or she is the victim of a tort. Campo v. Correa, 01-2707 (La.
6/21/02), 828 So.2d 502, 510. A prescriptive period will begin to run
even if the injured party does not have actual knowledge of facts that
would entitle him to bring suit as long as there is constructive
knowledge of same. Id. Constructive knowledge is whatever notice is
enough to excite attention and put the injured party on guard and call for
inquiry. Id. at 510-00. Such notice is tantamount to knowledge or
notice of everything to which a reasonable inquiry may lead. Id. at 511.
Such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably put the alleged
victim on inquiry is sufficient to start the running of prescription. Id.Ordinarily, the party urging prescription bears the burden of proof
at the trial of the exception; however, if the petition is prescribed on its
face, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the action has not
prescribed. In re Medical Proceedings v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation,
17-488 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/18), 241 So.3d 1226, 1230, writ denied,
18-594 (La. 6/1/18), 244 So.3d 435. On the trial of a peremptory
exception pleaded at or prior to the trial of the case, “evidence may be
introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when
the ground thereof do not appear from the petition.” La. C.C.P. art. 931.
When evidence is introduced at a hearing on an exception of
prescription, the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the
manifest error standard. In re Medical Proceedings, 241 So.3d at 1230.
However, when the district court is not called upon to exercise its fact-
finding function and the matter involves the determination of purely
legal issues, reviewing courts apply a de novo standard of review. Kem
Search, Inc. v. Sheffield, 434 So.2d 1067 (La. 1983).
Here, a review of the specific allegations set forth in Ms.
Neville’s request for MRP show on its face that the request was timely
filed and was not prescribed. Specifically, Ms. Neville alleged that the
act of malpractice occurred on the date of the original surgery, February
17, 2017, but that she did not discover the alleged negligent act until
December 17, 2017, when the corrective surgery was performed to
remove the non-dissolved/migrated screw. Although Ms. Neville’s
request for MRP was filed more than one year from the date of the
alleged malpractice, her request for MRP made a prima facie showing
that it was filed “within one year from the date of [her] discovery” and
“within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission
or neglect.” La. R.S. 9:5628(A); Campo, 828 So.2d at 509.
Accordingly, since Ms. Neville’s request for MRP was not prescribed
on its face, Dr. Savoie bore the burden of proving that Ms. Neville’s
claim was prescribed.
3
To carry that burden, Dr. Savoie introduced into evidence at the
trial of the exception, plaintiff’s medical records. A review of these
records reveals the following operative dates, which are critical to a
determination of whether or not Dr. Savoie carried his burden of
proving that Ms. Neville’s malpractice claim is prescribed:
February 17, 2017: date of original surgery
July/August 2017: earliest date of second opinion by Dr. Williams
November 15, 2017: date of reading of MRI by Dr. Williams
November 16, 2017: confirmation of MRI results by defendant, Dr.
Savoie
November 20, 2017: return to Dr. Williams to schedule follow-up
surgery
December 17, 2017: follow-up surgery to remove migrated screw by
Dr. Williams
December 12, 2018: request initiated by Ms. Neville for MRP filed
The law in Louisiana is clear that a plaintiff has one year from the
date of the original act, or one year from the time that the plaintiff
should have reasonably been on notice that a problem had occurred that
might implicate malpractice, to file a claim. As set forth above, Ms.
Neville sought a second opinion as early as July of 2017, and by
November 20, 2017, had scheduled a second surgery with a different
doctor, with full knowledge of the alleged failure of the first.
Specifically, Dr. Williams diagnosed the alleged malpractice as the
cause of Ms. Neville’s pain on November 15, 2017, when he reviewed
the MRI and saw that the screw implanted by Dr. Savoie during the first
surgery had not dissolved, but had migrated into the joint. On
November 16, 2017, Dr. Savoie acknowledged to Ms. Neville that the
first surgery failed.
We find that based on the evidence presented by Dr. Savoie, he
successfully carried his burden of proving that Ms. Neville had, at the
very least, constructive knowledge of the alleged malpractice as early as
November 16, 2017, when Dr. Savoie confirmed Dr. Williams’
diagnosis and concurred with his recommendation for corrective
surgery. We are not persuaded that Ms. Neville’s knowledge required
that she actually undergo the second surgery in order that she “know”
that the first surgery was a suspected failure. To the contrary, as of
November 16, 2017, we find that Ms. Neville had knowledge or
information sufficient “to excite attention and put [her] on guard and
call for inquiry. … Such information or knowledge as ought to
reasonably put [her] on inquiry is sufficient to start running of
prescription.” See Campo, 828 So.2d at 510-511. Accordingly, Ms.
Neville had one year from November 16, 2017, to file her request for a
MRP. Ms. Neville did not file her request until December 12, 2018. As
such, we find that Dr. Savoie met his burden of proving Ms. Neville’s
request was untimely filed. The trial judge erred in ruling otherwise.
“When the overruling of the exception is arguably incorrect,
when a reversal will terminate the litigation, and when there is no
dispute of fact to be resolved, judicial efficiency and fundamental
fairness to the litigants dictates that the merits of the application for
4
supervisory writs should be decided in an attempt to avoid the waste of
time and expense of a possibly useless future trial on the merits.”
Herlitz Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hotel Inv’rs of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d
878, 878 (La. 1981); Bank v. New York Mellon v. Oldemeyer, 19-348
(La. App. 3 Cir. 10/9/19), 282 So.3d 1098, 1108; Jones v. State, 04-717
(La. App. 4 Cir. 9/29/04), 891 So.2d 698, 703, writ denied, 04-2706
(La. 1/7/05), 891 So.2d 681. See also, In re Medical Review Panel
Proceedings of Jonathan Junior, 19-134 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/1/19), ---
So.3d ---, 2019 WL 1941260; Johnson v. Foremost Insurance
Company, 18-406 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/15/18), --- So.3d ---, 2018 WL
3910685. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we grant Dr. Savoie’s
writ application, reverse the district court’s judgment overruling his
peremptory exception of prescription, sustain Dr. Savoie’s peremptory
exception of prescription, and dismiss Ms. Neville’s medical
malpractice claim against Dr. Savoie.
Gretna, Louisiana, this 30th day of June, 2020.
SMC
MEJ
JJM
5
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 06/30/2020 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
20-C-127
E-NOTIFIED
Michael G. Bagneris (Respondent) Michael F. Nolan (Relator)
Don S. McKinney (Respondent)
MAILED