Peyton Pettit Greene Versus Landon Ronald Greene ( 2020 )

PEYTON PETTIT GREENE NO. 19-CA-528
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
LANDON RONALD GREENE COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 751-262, DIVISION "O"
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR, JUDGE PRESIDING
May 28, 2020
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and Stephen J. Windhorst
AFFIRMED.
SMC
JGG
SJW
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
PEYTON PETTIT GREENE
Phillip A. Wittmann
Brooke C. Tigchelaar
Bryant S. York
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
LANDON RONALD GREENE
Terri M. Miles
CHEHARDY, C.J.
On appeal, Peyton Pettit Greene challenges the trial court’s grant of Landon
Greene’s Motion to Modify Child Support and the award of child support to Mr.
Greene in the amount of $7,789.00 per month. For the following reasons, we find
that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in vacating the 2017 Consent
Judgment and awarding child support. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Factual and Procedural History
This is the second appeal in this litigious custody proceeding.1 Peyton and
Landon Greene were married on February 15, 1997. On July 6, 2015, Peyton
Greene (“Peyton”) filed a petition for divorce against Landon Greene (“Landon”).
On August 11, 2015, the parties entered into a Consent Judgment in which the
parties agreed to “joint shared” custody of their three minor children, with Peyton
serving as domiciliary parent with a “50/50 visitation schedule.” Further, Peyton
was ordered to pay “100% of the children’s private school tuition, registration,
books, and supply fees, other fees, day care expenses and extracurricular activity
costs for the minor children.” On September 15, 2016, the judgment of divorce
was granted.
On April 28, 2017, Peyton and Landon signed a subsequent Consent
Judgment, stating, inter alia:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
in lieu of Plaintiff, [Peyton], paying a monthly child support to
Defendant, [Landon], Plaintiff … shall pay one hundred (100%)
percent of the children’s private school tuition, registration, books,
supply fees, other fees, reasonable and customary extracurricular
activity expenses, reasonable and customary camp expenses, tutoring
1
For the first appeal in this matter, see Greene v. Greene, 19-37 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/19), 286 So.3d
1103. In that case, Peyton Greene appealed the trial court’s judgment dismissing her (1) expedited
motion for contempt against Landon and (2) request for an injunction against Landon for harassment
including “walking on the sidewalk to her house during custody exchanges; by filming the custody
exchanges; by ringing the doorbell to announce his presence at the door; by calling her names; by sending
inappropriate gifts; and by engaging in problematic behavior with Peyton’s current boyfriend during
custody exchanges.” This Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the merits, yet reversed with
respect to a non-party.
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expenses, as well as medical, dental, and vision insurance for the
children and medical, dental, vision and psychological expenses
which are not covered by insurance.
On October 16, 2018, Landon filed a rule to modify custody alleging that the
three minor children attend three different schools, which results in an exchange at
the parties’ homes every morning of the school week. Landon alleged that his new
work schedule required out-of-town travel and sought a “week on/week off”
schedule with the week beginning on Friday. Further, Landon contended that his
income had decreased from $70,000.00 per year to $5,000.00 per year since 2017,
which was a material change in circumstances, and, as such, he sought an award of
child support under La. R.S. 9:315 et seq.
On November 14, 2018, after meeting with the parties, the hearing officer
recommended that the parties implement the “week on/week off” schedule but,
finding that there was insufficient documentation to make an interim support
recommendation, deferred all child support matters until January 7, 2019.2 On
November 15, 2018, Landon filed an objection to the hearing officer’s
recommendations on the basis that the hearing officer should have made an interim
award of support. To his objection, Landon attached the hearing officer’s shared
obligation worksheet dated November 14, 2018, with calculations indicating that
Landon should be awarded “recommended child support … of $2,351.70.” Peyton
opposed Landon’s objection.
On November 19, 2018, the trial judge heard Landon’s objection, noting that
her intent in sending the parties to the hearing officer on November 14 was for the
hearing officer to set an interim child support award. That day, the trial judge
ordered an interim child support award of $2,351.00 per month payable to Landon,
2
Because of disagreement between the parties over the wording, the Consent Judgment implementing the
hearing officer’s recommendations from November 14, 2018 hearing was not approved for signing by the
Domestic Commissioner until December 22, 2018. Further, we note that counsel for Peyton did not sign
the copy in the appellate record.
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retroactive to the date of filing.3 On December 3, 2018, Peyton sought supervisory
review and a stay of the interim award with this Court; both were denied on
December 17, 2018.4
On January 7, 2019, the hearing officer held a conference and increased the
temporary support award to $2,370.00 per month. On May 2, 2019, the trial on
Landon’s rule to set child support and rule for contempt began; it continued on
May 21, May 23, June 12, and June 17, 2019. On July 24, 2019, the trial judge
granted Landon’s rule, awarding him $7,789.00 per month in child support,
retroactive to the date of demand, to be paid on the first day of every month, with
the first payment due on August 1, 2019.5 Peyton now appeals that award.
Assignments of error
In her brief, Peyton urges six assignments of error: first, the district Court
erred by awarding child support to a non-domiciliary parent; second, the district
Court erred by impermissibly nullifying the 2017 Consent Judgment, which was
binding and enforceable; third, the district Court erred by negating the movant’s
3
Again, because of contentions between the parties, the Interim Judgment included in the record is not
signed by counsel for Payton. Further, the trial judge signed the judgment on December 20, 2018.
4
Greene v. Greene, 18-695 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/17/18) (unpublished writ disposition).
5
Additionally, the July 24, 2019 Judgment also stated:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Ms. Greene shall
continue to pay 100% of the children’s private school tuition, registration, books, supply
fees, and other mandatory fees; reasonable and customary extracurricular activities;
reasonable and customary summer camp expenses; work-related childcare; tutoring
expenses; medical, dental, and vision insurance for the children, and medical, dental, vision
and psychological expenses which are not covered by insurance. In the event Mr. Greene
incurs any of the medical, dental, vision, or psychological expenses, he shall forward copies
of the bills for these uncovered expenses through “Our Family Wizard” and Ms. Greene
shall reimburse him within 20 days of receipt of the bills. Mr. Greene is allowed to
participate in the selection of a counselor as well as counseling with the children.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that any expenses for the
children to participate in the Krewe of Dorians Mardi Gras festivities shall be considered a
reasonable and customary extracurricular activity and paid 100% by Ms. Greene.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Mr. Greene’s Rule for
Contempt is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Ms. Greene reimburse
Mr. Greene the $900.00 he expended for LR’s participation in the Krewe of Dorians Mardi
Gras Ball.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Ms. Greene reimburse
Mr. Greene the $610.40 he expended for travel expenses transporting the girls to and from
summer camp.
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burden of proof; fourth, the district Court erred by not requiring a showing of a
substantial, continuing change in circumstances to justify a modification of child
support; fifth, the district Court erred by premising the modification of child
support entirely on a one-time extraordinary transaction; and, sixth, the district
Court erred by calculating child support not based on the children’s needs, but on
their father’s desired lifestyle.
Award to non-domiciliary parent
In her first assignment, Peyton argues that the trial court erred in awarding
child support in favor of Landon because he is the “non-domiciliary parent.” As
the trial judge pointed out in her well-written Reasons for Judgment,
Ms. Greene further argues that she cannot be compelled to pay
child support to Mr. Greene because she is the domiciliary parent
although the Greenes have equal, shared custody of their children.
First, Ms. Greene’s counsel cites cases which are not analogous, as
none concerned equal, shared custody, including the cited case that
was decided by this trial court. Secondly, Ms. Greene cites La. R.S.
9:315.8 to support her argument. However, paragraph E of that article
clarifies that the statute does not apply to “shared custody as defined
in La. R.S. 9:315.9.” Furthermore, paragraph (E)5 further
substantiates that “Worksheet A .... shall be used in accordance with
this subsection.” Thus on its face and plainly stated in the statute, La.
R.S. 9:315.8 is inapplicable to the Greene’s custodial arrangement.
This Court holds that La. R.S. 9:315.9, aptly titled “Effect of shared
custodial arrangement” is the applicable statute to the case at bar. This
statute makes no distinction between a domiciliary and non-
domiciliary parent for the purposes of determining support in a shared
custodial arrangement. Moreover, it requires the utilization of
Worksheet B, which also does not make the distinction as argued by
counsel for Ms. Greene. Thirdly, counsel for Ms. Greene argues that
paragraph (7) of La. R.S. 9:315.9[A], states that
(7) The parent owing the greater amount of child support
shall owe to the other parent the difference between the two
amounts as a child support obligation. The amount owed
shall not be higher than the amount which that parent would
have owed if he or she were a domiciliary parent.
Ms. Greene argues that the second sentence precludes an award of
child support to a non-domiciliary parent. However, a plain reading of
… that sentence demonstrates that the “parent owing the greater
amount” owes the difference to the other parent without any
distinction between domiciliary and non-domiciliary parents. As
such, this Court finds this argument contrary to plainly stated law, and
without merit.
19-CA-528 4
We agree with the trial judge that La. R.S. 9:315.9(A)(7) does not preclude
payment of child support to a non-domiciliary parent in a “shared custody”
situation – the obligation is based solely on a proportion of income and time.
This assignment has no merit. See La. R.S. 9:315.9; Broussard v. Rogers,
10-593 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 54 So.3d 826, 829.
Consent Judgment
In her second assignment of error, Peyton argues that the district court erred
by nullifying the binding and enforceable 2017 Consent Judgment agreement
between the parties, which was reversible error. Peyton contends, as she did in the
district court, that Landon waived his right to child support in exchange for Peyton
paying 100% of the children’s tuition, expenses, and fees that are enumerated in
the Consent Judgment, citing Robertson v. Robertson, 45, 289 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/26/10), 37 So.3d 597.
Again, we look to the trial judge’s well-written Reasons for Judgment, in
which she clarifies that Robertson is inapplicable to Landon’s situation:
Ms. Greene cites the Second Circuit case of Robertson v.
Robertson, … for the proposition that Mr. Greene must be bound by
the prior consent agreement which deviated from the guidelines. This
Court finds that the Second Circuit [case]’s facts … were
diametrically opposite to the facts of this case. In Robertson, the court
stated:
As recognized by both parties, there is a huge disparity in
income and resources available to the two parties. Mr. Robertson
is wealthy. Mrs. Robertson is not. As recognized in the
judgment, this disparity in income was one of the factors used to
deviate from the ordinary statutory scheme. There in nothing
legally infirm with Mr. Robertson's agreement to pay child
support so Mrs. Robertson can have the resources to provide and
maintain a comfortable and safe living environment for the
children when they are with her. This fosters the support and
upbringing of these children. [Robertson at 601].
Thus, Robertson advocates for a deviation in favor of payment to
the un-wealthy spouse because it was in the best interest of the
children. The Consent Judgment in this case does the opposite. In this
case, the Greenes deviated in a manner that … provided no support
for the children when they are with the un-wealthy spouse; the
19-CA-528 5
Consent Judgment at issue specifically does not provide the minimum
support Mr. Greene would be statutorily entitled to receive. For these
reasons, the Court finds that argument without merit.
As noted by the trial judge, in Robertson, the wealthy spouse willingly paid child
support to the un-wealthy spouse to “maintain a comfortable and safe living
environment for the children … to foster the support and upbringing of these
children.” Robertson, 37 So.3d at 601. Thus, we find Robertson, supra,inapplicable to this instant proceeding also.
We turn, now, to the 2017 Consent Judgment. La. C.C. art. 227 provides
that parents, by the very act of marrying, contract together the obligation of
supporting, maintaining, and educating their children. The obligation to support
their children is conjoint upon the parents and each must contribute in proportion
to his or her resources. Hogan v. Hogan, 549 So.2d 267 (La. 1989). As a
complement to that obligation, La. R.S. 9:315 - 315.15 provides a detailed set of
guidelines that the courts are mandated to follow in setting the amount of child
support in “any proceeding to establish or modify child support filed on or after
October 1, 1989.” La. R.S. 9:315.1(A); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 626 So.2d 578(La. App. 3 Cir. 1993). As stated in La. R.S. 9:315.1(A), the amount determined
by the guideline formula is presumed to be in the child’s best interest. Percle v.
Noll, 93-1272 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/11/94), 634 So.2d 498.
Under La. R.S. 9:315.1(B), the parties may deviate from the guidelines if the
application of the guidelines would not be in the best interest of the child or would
be inequitable to the parties. In this instance, it is incumbent upon the trial court to
“give specific oral or written reasons for the deviation, including a finding as to the
amount of support that would have been required under a mechanical application
of the guidelines and the particular facts and circumstances that warranted a
deviation from the guidelines.” Id. Moreover, there will be instances where the
parents will stipulate (consent) to an amount of child support. La. R.S. 9:315.1(D)
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provides:
The court may review and approve a stipulation between the parties
entered into after the effective date of this Part as to the amount of
child support to be paid. If the court does review the stipulation, the
court shall consider the guidelines set forth in this Part to review the
adequacy of the stipulated amount, and may require the parties to
provide the court with the income statements and documentation
required by R.S. 9:315.2.
“(W)hen the trial court reviews the agreement proposed by the parents, it ‘shall
consider the guidelines ... to review the adequacy of the stipulated amount.’ ”
Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044 (La. 7/7/99), 739 So.2d 762, 766.
“Such an approach underscores the integral role of the trial court as
gatekeeper in this area of paramount importance. If properly performed in
accordance with the guidelines, this judicial review will further assure the
adequacy and consistency of child support awards, foster evenhanded
settlements, and preserve a record for the evaluation of later proceedings to modify
initially stipulated child support awards.” Stogner, supra.
As noted by the trial judge, according to all testimony, the hearing officer
accepted the Consent Judgment in 2017 without proof of income from any parties
because Peyton refused to divulge her income information to Landon or the court.
In Stogner, the Louisiana Supreme Court challenged the lower courts to function as
“gatekeeper in this area of paramount importance … [to] further assure the
adequacy and consistency of child support awards, foster evenhanded settlements,
and preserve a record for the evaluation of later proceedings to modify initially
stipulated child support awards.” Stogner, supra at 768. The trial judge found that
neither the hearing officer nor the original trial judge functioned as the gatekeeper
envisioned by the Stogner court. We find no error in that ruling.
Change in circumstances
Moving to her third and fourth assignment of error, Peyton argues that the
district court erred by not requiring Landon to bear a burden of proof to show a
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continuing change in circumstances to justify a modification of child support.
Here, the trial judge found that the 2017 Consent Judgment did not rely upon the
guidelines as the agreement failed to fix a support obligation between the parties,
which amounted to de facto waiver of support by Landon that is void and against
public policy. See Sharp v. Moore, 47,888 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/13), 110 So.3d
1232, 1236. Because the 2017 Consent Judgment is void as a matter of public
policy and also failed to comply with the guidelines, there was no necessity for
Landon to show a change in circumstances according to La. C.C. art. 142; La. R.S.
9:311, Stogner, supra. For these reasons, the trial court was not in error for
“nullifying the 2017 Consent Judgment.”
Child support award
In her remaining assignments of error, Peyton challenges the child support
award to Landon. In a shared custody situation, such as this, the determination of
an award of child support is made pursuant to La. R.S. 9:315.2, which states:
A. Each party shall provide to the court a verified income statement
showing gross income and adjusted gross income, together with
documentation of current and past earnings. Spouses of the parties
shall also provide any relevant information with regard to the
source of payments of household expenses upon request of the
court or the opposing party, provided such request is filed in a
reasonable time prior to the hearing. Failure to timely file the
request shall not be grounds for a continuance. Suitable
documentation of current earnings shall include but not be limited
to pay stubs, employer statements, or receipts and expenses if self-
employed. The documentation shall include a copy of the party’s
most recent federal tax return. A copy of the statement and
documentation shall be provided to the other party.
B. If a party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, his or her
gross income shall be determined as set forth in R.S. 9:315.11.
C. The parties shall combine the amounts of their adjusted gross
incomes. Each party shall then determine by percentage his or her
proportionate share of the combined amount. The amount obtained
for each party is his or her percentage share of the combined
adjusted gross income.
D. The court shall determine the basic child support obligation
amount from the schedule in R.S. 9:315.19 by using the combined
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adjusted gross income of the parties and the number of children
involved in the proceeding, but in no event shall the amount of
child support be less than the amount provided in R.S. 9:315.14.
E. After the basic child support obligation has been established, the
total child support obligation shall be determined as hereinafter
provided in this Part.
In a shared custody arrangement, La. R.S. 9:315.9(B) provides that
“Worksheet B reproduced in R.S. 9:315.20, or a substantially similar form
adopted by local court rule, shall be used to determine child support in
accordance with this section.”
In the present case, during the 5-day trial, the parties introduced more than
1500 pages of exhibits regarding child support. Three days before trial
commenced on May 2, 2019, Peyton, under threat of contempt, reluctantly
“supplemented” her previous Family Law Affidavit with documentation of her
2018 revenue. Peyton averred that she is a shareholder in four entities that
distributed $2,141,903.00 to her in 2018, which was unusually high due to a one-
time distribution on a five-year lease. Peyton also admitted that she received
royalty payments totaling $16,204.60. Finally, she also stated that, as the
beneficiary of a trust, she received income totaling $165,000.00. For 2018, Peyton
received revenue totaling at least $2,323,107.60.
Based on documentation that Peyton introduced, the trial court recognized
that the most significant distribution to Peyton is attributable to a five-year lease,
so the trial court divided the total lease payment that Peyton received and prorated
it prospectively over the next five years, i.e., $1,973,747.80 ÷ 5 = $394,749.56 per
year. To calculate Peyton’s monthly income, the trial court took Peyton’s total
revenue minus the entire one-time lease payment, to find her remaining income,
which is $349,359.80. To get Peyton’s adjusted 2018 income, the trial court added
the revenue to the prorated lease payment for a total of $774,109.36.
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2018 Total Revenue $2,323,107.60
-2018 Total Lease Payment $1,973,747.80
2018 Revenue without Lease $349,359.80
+ Prorated payment for 2018 $394,749.56
2018 Adjusted Income $744,109.36
The trial court found that, with an adjusted income of $744,109.36, Peyton’s
income per month in 2018 was $62,009.11.
Under direct examination, Landon testified that his adjusted gross income
for 2018 was $37,291.00, which is $3,107.58 per month. He testified that he was a
health insurance sales representative, which he had been since 2013. A Family
Law affidavit, numerous bank account ledgers, and Landon’s 2015 through 2018
federal income tax returns were introduced at trial.
The trial court found that the evidence established that the monthly income
of the parties for 2018 was $65,116.69, with Peyton’s percentage of the monthly
income being 95.23% and Landon’s being 4.77%.
La. R.S. 9:315.13(B) provides, in pertinent part:
If the combined adjusted gross income of the parties exceeds the
highest level specified in the schedule contained in R.S. 9:315.19, the
court:
(1) Shall use its discretion in setting the amount of the basic child
support obligation in accordance with the best interest of the child
and the circumstances of each parent as provided in Civil Code
Article 141, but in no event shall it be less than the highest amount
set forth in the schedule; and
Further, La. R.S. 9:315.13, Comments, 2001, reads that child support is to be
“measured by the standard of living enjoyed by the child while living with his
intact family and upon the ability to pay of each of the parents.”
In this case, as noted by the trial judge, $65,116.69 is well above the highest
amount set forth in the child support schedules found in La R.S. 9:315.19. The
highest combined gross income on the current schedule is $40,000.00, and the
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highest child support award for three children would be $5,640.00.
Here, the trial court awarded Landon $7,789.00 per month in child support,
and ordered Peyton to pay the children’s tuition, insurance, and other necessary
and extraordinary expenses. As the amount of child support is tied to the obligor
parent’s ability to pay, coupled with the lifestyle the children enjoyed during the
marriage, the evidence fully supports this amount. Testimony reflects that, during
the marriage, Peyton, Landon, and, more importantly, their children, enjoyed a
luxurious lifestyle of privilege, including private schools, international travel,
luxurious homes, and luxury vacations.
It is well settled that the district court’s conclusions of fact regarding
financial matters underlying an award of child support will not be disturbed in the
absence of manifest error. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 14-670 (La. App. 5 Cir.
3/25/15), 169 So.3d 587, 593-95; Hall v. Hall, 08-706 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/10/09), 4
So.3d 254, 259, writ denied, 09-812 (La. 5/29/09), 9 So.3d 166. Having reviewed
all of the evidence and testimony, and considering the applicable law, we find no
manifest error, or abuse of the trial court’s discretion, in its setting of the amount of
the child support award and, thus, affirm the award.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s award of child support is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
MAY 28, 2020 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
19-CA-528
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR (DISTRICT JUDGE)
BRYANT S. YORK (APPELLANT) JENNIFER C. CARTER (APPELLEE)
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TERRI M. MILES (ATTORNEY) BROOKE C. TIGCHELAAR (ATTORNEY)
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