Eleazar Rivera Salgado Versus Tri-Parish Roofing & Home Improvements ( 2020 )


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  • ELEAZAR RIVERA SALGADO                               NO. 19-CA-407
    VERSUS                                               FIFTH CIRCUIT
    TRI-PARISH ROOFING & HOME                            COURT OF APPEAL
    IMPROVEMENTS
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    ON APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION,
    DISTRICT 7
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    NO. 17-6294
    HONORABLE SHANNON BRUNO BISHOP, JUDGE PRESIDING
    May 27, 2020
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON
    JUDGE
    Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson,
    Robert A. Chaisson, and Hans J. Liljeberg
    AFFIRMED
    RAC
    MEJ
    HJL
    COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
    ELEAZAR RIVERA SALGADO
    J. Casey Cowley
    Pamela C. McLendon
    Ana Mafalda Morgado Rodrigues
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
    TRI-PARISH ROOFING & HOME IMPROVEMENTS
    Laurie W. Maschek
    CHAISSON, J.
    In this workers’ compensation case arising from a construction-site accident,
    employer Tri-Parish Roofing and Home Improvement, LLC (“Tri-Parish”), appeals
    a June 13, 2019 judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation rendered in
    favor of the claimant, Eleazar Rivera Salgado. For the following reasons, we
    affirm the judgment.
    FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On October 5, 2017, Mr. Salgado filed a disputed claim for compensation
    with the Office of Workers’ Compensation wherein he alleged that, on August 23,
    2017, while employed as a roofer for Tri-Parish, he fell while descending a ladder.
    Other workers on-site witnessed the accident. Mr. Salgado remained at an
    apartment near the construction site provided by Tri-Parish for three days, until
    August 26, 2017, when he was taken to University Medical Center where he was
    diagnosed with a distal tibial fracture of his left ankle and given a boot cast and
    crutches before being discharged. Tri-Parish did not provide any assistance or
    compensation at that time.
    In its answer to the disputed claim for compensation, Tri-Parish denied all of
    Mr. Salgado’s allegations, and in particular denied that Mr. Salgado was ever
    employed by Tri-Parish or that he was injured. Tri-Parish also claimed that it had
    no knowledge of Mr. Salgado’s claim and had no knowledge of Mr. Salgado’s
    identity before the disputed claim for compensation was filed.
    Following a March 18, 2019 trial on the merits, during which the court heard
    testimony from both Mr. Salgado and James Dinger, the owner of Tri-Parish, the
    court issued a judgment wherein it found: Mr. Salgado met his burden to show that
    he was an employee of Tri-Parish at the time of the work accident; Mr. Salgado did
    in fact sustain an on-the-job injury on August 23, 2017; Mr. Salgado sustained
    injuries related to his work accident; and, Mr. Salgado was unable to work as a
    19-CA-407                                  1
    result of injuries sustained in the work accident. In addition to ordering Tri-Parish
    to pay temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and medical bills and expenses,
    the judge also assessed penalties in the amount of $8,000 for Tri-Parish’s arbitrary
    and capricious conduct in its failure to pay benefits or medical expenses and failure
    to authorize medical care.
    On appeal, Tri-Parish raises the following assignments of error:
    1. The trial court erred when it determined that Tri-Parish was the
    direct employer of Mr. Salgado.
    2. The trial court erred when it ruled that Mr. Salgado sustained his
    burden of proof regarding employment status, disability, and
    entitlement to benefits.
    3. The trial court erred when it awarded unreasonable penalties and
    attorney’s fees.
    DISCUSSION
    We consider first Tri-Parish’s argument that the trial court erred when it
    determined the existence of an employment relationship between Mr. Salgado and
    Tri-Parish. The finding of such a relationship is a question of fact which is subject
    to the manifest error standard of review upon appeal. Villatoro v. Deep S. BH & R
    Enterprises, LLC, 16-307 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/7/16), 
    206 So.3d 428
    , 434, writ
    denied, 17-0036 (La. 2/10/17). However, Tri-Parish argues that the trial court’s
    factual determination was the result of legal error, and therefore this court should
    apply a de novo standard of review rather than the manifest error standard of
    review. See MacFarlane v. Schneider Nat. Bulk Carriers, Inc., 07-1386 (La. App.
    4 Cir. 4/30/08), 
    984 So.2d 185
    , 188.
    Tri-Parish argues that there was no employment relationship between Tri-
    Parish and Mr. Salgado, but rather that Mr. Salgado was an independent contractor
    under the four part test set forth in Alexander v. J. E. Hixson & Sons Funeral
    Home, 
    44 So.2d 487
    , 488 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950), which states that selection and
    engagement, payment of wages, power of dismissal, and power of control are
    19-CA-407                                 2
    evidentiary factors for a court to consider when determining the right to control in
    an employment relationship. Tri-Parish, however, fails to acknowledge La. R.S.
    23:1044, the provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act which creates a
    rebuttable presumption of employee status for any person rendering service for
    another in any trades, businesses or occupations covered by the Act. This statutory
    presumption is the sole statutory provision on the subject of what constitutes an
    employer-employee relationship. Hillman v. Comm-Care, Inc., 01-1140 (La.
    1/15/02), 
    805 So.2d 1157
    , 1161. An alleged employer can rebut this presumption
    by either (i) establishing that the services were not pursuant to any trade, business,
    or occupation, or (ii) establishing that the individual was performing services but
    doing so as an independent contractor. 
    Id.
     The factors articulated in the Alexander
    test are illustrative but not controlling, and the trial court must consider the totality
    of the circumstances in determining the nature of the employment relationship. 
    Id.
    The trial judge was correct in expressly relying on the presumption contained in
    La. R.S. 23:1044 and therefore her determination that there existed an employment
    relationship between Tri-Parish and Mr. Salgado must be examined under the
    manifest error standard of review.
    It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s
    findings of fact in the absence of manifest error, or unless it is clearly wrong, and
    where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and
    reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review. Glob. Constr.
    & Equip., L.L.C. v. Rathborne Properties, L.L.C., 18-169 (La. App. 5 Cir.
    5/29/19), 
    274 So.3d 837
    , (citing Rosell v. ESCO, 
    549 So.2d 840
    , 844 (La. 1989)).
    At trial, the trial judge considered the written affidavit of Mr. Salgado stating that
    he was employed by Tri-Parish on August 23, 2017, and was injured on the job
    that day, that he was given a Tri-Parish roofing shirt to wear while working, and
    19-CA-407                                   3
    that he was paid in cash by Tri-Parish. The judge also heard live testimony from
    Mr. Salgado and Mr. Dinger.
    Mr. Salgado testified that he was paid $100 a day in cash to work six days a
    week as a roofer on a construction site in Alexandria by Daniel Saguesteumi, who
    was handed the money by Mr. Dinger, the owner of Tri-Parish, and who was
    known on the construction site as “Steven.” A taxi was sent to bring Mr. Salgado
    and other workers from New Orleans to an apartment in Alexandria where they
    stayed a few weeks for the duration of the job. Mr. Dinger and Mr. Saguesteumi
    were present at the apartment when Mr. Salgado arrived. They gave Mr. Salgado
    and other workers t-shirts with the Tri-Parish logo to wear while working. Mr.
    Dinger drove Mr. Salgado and the other workers from the apartment to the jobsite
    in a company car marked with Tri-Parish on the side. Mr. Salgado saw Mr. Dinger
    bring materials to the jobsite; also, on the day of the accident, he bought everyone
    on the jobsite hamburgers. Mr. Salgado testified that he fell from a ladder on the
    jobsite and that Mr. Dinger was present at the jobsite when the accident occurred.
    Mr. Salgado requested to be taken to the hospital, but was told he had just a little
    injury and that he would be fine. Mr. Salgado waited in pain at the jobsite without
    medical care for hours while the other employees finished their job before being
    taken back to the apartment. He stayed in the apartment room, abandoned, for
    three days with no food or pain medication until his sister arranged a ride for him
    back to New Orleans on August 26th. He went straight to University Medical
    Center where he was x-rayed and shown images of two fractures in his left leg
    before placing the leg in a cast, which remained on for about five months. Mr.
    Salgado testified that he went to the doctor a few times in the next few months. He
    was referred to an orthopedic specialist, but never went to see the specialist
    because he did not have the money. He did not work the entire five months his leg
    was in a cast, and he testified to continuing pain following the removal of the cast.
    19-CA-407                                 4
    He eventually worked again as a painter a few months after the removal of his cast,
    and he testified at the time of the trial that he was currently working in
    construction.
    Mr. Dinger testified that he recognized Mr. Salgado from one of his jobsites
    as an employee of Mr. Saguesteumi, who Mr. Dinger hired as a subcontractor for
    Tri-Parish. Mr. Dinger wrote checks to Mr. Saguesteumi. He did not sign a
    contract with Mr. Saguesteumi.1 Mr. Dinger was present at the jobsite and
    recognized Mr. Salgado as the man he saw on the ground on the day of the injury.
    Mr. Dinger required his subcontractors to wear company t-shirts while on the
    jobsite for advertisement and he did not allow anyone else to advertise on his
    jobsites. Mr. Dinger found out after the accident that he did not have workers’
    compensation insurance. He testified that he saw Mr. Saguesteumi speaking to an
    injured Mr. Salgado at the jobsite, but Mr. Salgado was not taken to the hospital
    and the workers finished out the rest of the day. Mr. Dinger testified that he set up
    the apartment for Mr. Saguesteumi. Mr. Dinger has not hired Mr. Saguesteumi
    since 2017 and does not have his phone number.
    Also entered into evidence were medical records from University Medical
    Center indicating that on August 26, 2017, Mr. Salgado was admitted for
    emergency care and, after x-rays, was diagnosed with a fractured tibia and placed
    in a cast. Medical records from another healthcare provider, LA Health Solutions,
    indicate that Mr. Salgado was again examined and found to have a tibial fracture,
    and the treating physician recommended that he do no work until cleared by an
    orthopedist. That physician wrote a referral for an orthopedic evaluation, but the
    evaluation required a $500 deposit for initial consultation and evaluation.
    1
    No documentary evidence of the relationship between Mr. Dinger and Mr. Saguesteumi was introduced
    at trial.
    19-CA-407                                        5
    We find that the evidence in the record supports the trial court’s factual
    finding that Mr. Salgado was employed by Tri-Parish, and that Tri-Parish failed to
    overcome the presumption of employment. Though Mr. Dinger claimed that Mr.
    Salgado was an employee of Mr. Saguesteumi, who was in turn a subcontractor for
    Tri-Parish, no documentary evidence of such a relationship was introduced, and the
    trial judge did not find Mr. Dinger’s testimony regarding the subcontractor
    relationship credible in light of the other evidence presented. This assignment of
    error is without merit.
    We turn next to Tri-Parish’s second assignment of error concerning whether
    Mr. Salgado met his burden of proof regarding his employment status, his
    disability, and his entitlement to benefits. In a workers’ compensation case, the
    employee bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an
    accident occurred, it occurred in the course and scope of his employment, the
    accident caused his injury, and the injury caused his disability. Miken Specialties
    v. Abarca, 16-231 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/7/16), 
    209 So.3d 268
    , 272. A worker’s
    testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge this burden of proof in situations
    where no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker’s
    version of the incident, and the worker’s testimony is corroborated by the
    circumstances following the alleged incident. Bruno v. Harbert Int’l Inc., 
    593 So.2d 357
    , 361 (La. 1992). Such corroboration may be provided by medical
    evidence. 
    Id.
     The trial court’s determinations as to whether the worker’s
    testimony is credible and whether the worker has discharged his or her burden of
    proof are factual determinations not to be disturbed on review unless clearly wrong
    or absent a showing of manifest error. 
    Id.
    Mr. Salgado testified that he was working for Tri-Parish on August 23, 2017,
    as a roofer at a construction site when he fell from a ladder and was injured. The
    medical records from University Medical Center indicate that Mr. Salgado told
    19-CA-407                                 6
    doctors there he injured his left ankle when he fell from a ladder. The medical
    records from LA Health Systems indicate that the treating physician there believed
    Mr. Salgado’s left ankle injury to be consistent with and caused by the reported fall
    from a ladder. Mr. Salgado testified that he was placed in a cast and unable to
    work for at least five months; the medical records state he was placed in a cast and
    was told by at least one physician not to work until cleared by an orthopedist. Mr.
    Dinger appears to have chiefly contested only Mr. Salgado’s status as an
    employee, while his own testimony seems to corroborate Mr. Salgado’s story of
    being injured on the jobsite, including the testimony by Mr. Dinger that he
    recognized Mr. Salgado from the jobsite and was aware of an accident on-site that
    day. We find no manifest error in the trial court’s factual findings in this regard.
    This assignment of error is without merit.
    In its final assignment of error, Tri-Parish raises as error the trial court’s
    award of penalties and attorney’s fees. Awards of penalties and attorney’s fees in
    workers’ compensation cases are essentially penal in nature, being imposed to
    discourage indifference and undesirable conduct by employers and insurers.
    Stretzinger v. Claims Mgmt., Inc., 19-168 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/19), 
    285 So.3d 591
    , 599 (citing Williams v. Rush Masonry, Inc., 98-2271 (La. 6/29/99), 
    737 So.2d 41
    , 46). The workers’ compensation judge has great discretion in the award of
    penalties and attorney’s fees and such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal
    unless clearly wrong. Villatoro, 
    206 So.3d at 437
    . La. R.S. 23:1201 imposes a
    twofold continuing obligation on the employer: (1) to pay all compensation and
    medical benefits due, and (2) to pay for compensation and medical benefits within
    the time limit specified. Stretzinger, 285 So.3d at 600. An employer may make
    multiple errors in this regard and be subject to two or more claims under La. R.S.
    23:1201(F). Id. In those instances where a claim is not reasonably controverted or
    if nonpayment results from conditions under the control of the employer, allowing
    19-CA-407                                  7
    for multiple penalties addresses the recalcitrant employer and encourages
    employers and their workers’ compensation insurers to honor their continuing
    obligation to the injured worker. Id. In order to reasonably controvert a claim, the
    employer must have some valid reason or evidence upon which to base the denial
    of benefits. Tri-Parish does not dispute that it has not paid any of Mr. Salgado’s
    medical bills, has not authorized any medical care, and has not investigated the
    claim. If the trial court credited Mr. Salgado’s testimony that he asked to be taken
    to the hospital upon being injured, only to be refused and left in pain for days while
    workers were instructed to continue working at the jobsite, this is certainly the kind
    of indifference and undesirable conduct by an employer that penalties are meant to
    discourage. Additionally, in his initial response to the claim for compensation, Mr.
    Dinger claimed to have no knowledge of Mr. Salgado or the accident, an assertion
    that was directly contradicted by his own testimony on the stand in favor of a more
    nuanced argument concerning employment status. The trial court found that Tri-
    Parish provided no valid reason for the denial of benefits and acted arbitrarily and
    capriciously in the denial of Mr. Salgado’s claim. We find no error in this ruling,
    and affirm that portion of the judgment.
    Finally, Tri-Parish argues for the first time in this appeal that the trial court’s
    judgment is indeterminate in that it specifies that Tri-Parish shall pay Mr. Salgado
    TTD benefits from the date of the accident through such time as he was released
    from an orthopedist or when he returned to work voluntarily. Mr. Salgado testified
    that he voluntarily returned to work a few months after the removal of his cast and
    that, as of the date of the trial in March 2019, he had returned to work in
    construction. We find no merit to Tri-Parish’s assertion that the trial court’s
    judgment is indeterminate.
    19-CA-407                                  8
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to Tri-Parish’s assignments of
    error and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court in Mr. Salgado’s favor.
    All costs of this appeal are assessed to Tri-Parish.
    AFFIRMED
    19-CA-407                                  9
    SUSAN M. CHEHARDY                                                              CURTIS B. PURSELL
    CHIEF JUDGE                                                                    CLERK OF COURT
    MARY E. LEGNON
    FREDERICKA H. WICKER
    CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    MARC E. JOHNSON
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON                                                             SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
    STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
    FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
    HANS J. LILJEBERG
    JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.                          FIFTH CIRCUIT
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    19-CA-407
    E-NOTIFIED
    OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 7 (CLERK)
    HON. SHANNON BRUNO BISHOP (DISTRICT JUDGE)
    ANA MAFALDA MORGADO RODRIGUES
    (APPELLEE)
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Document Info

Docket Number: 19-CA-407

Judges: Shannon Bruno Bishop

Filed Date: 5/27/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/21/2024