State of Louisiana Versus Marvin S. Acevedo ( 2020 )


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  • STATE OF LOUISIANA                                  NO. 18-KA-683
    VERSUS                                              FIFTH CIRCUIT
    MARVIN S. ACEVEDO                                   COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    ON REMAND FROM THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
    AN APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
    NO. 17-3961, DIVISION "K"
    HONORABLE ELLEN SHIRER KOVACH, JUDGE PRESIDING
    June 30, 2020
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    JUDGE
    Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
    Jude G. Gravois, and Marc E. Johnson
    CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED
    JGG
    SMC
    MEJ
    COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
    Terry M. Boudreaux
    Thomas J. Butler
    Rachel L. Africk
    Jennifer C. Voss
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
    MARVIN S. ACEVEDO
    Cynthia K. Meyer
    GRAVOIS, J.
    ON REMAND FROM THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
    This case was remanded to this Court by the Louisiana Supreme Court for
    further proceedings. See State v. Acevedo, 19-824 (La. 6/3/20), --- So.3d ----, 
    2020 WL 3423975
     (Mem.) (per curiam). In its order of remand, the Supreme Court
    instructed this Court to conduct a new errors patent review in light of the United
    States Supreme Court’s ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ----, 
    140 S.Ct. 1390
    , --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2020), 
    2020 WL 1906545
     (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020).1
    Previously, this Court affirmed defendant’s conviction, by a non-unanimous 12-
    person jury, for possession of over 400 grams of cocaine in violation of La. R.S.
    40:967(F). See State v. Acevedo, 18-683 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/8/19), 
    273 So.3d 462
    .
    For the following reasons, after further proceedings in accordance with said order
    of remand, we find that defendant is entitled to a new trial, and accordingly, we
    vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence and remand the matter to the trial court
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    ANALYSIS
    As noted in this Court’s previous opinion, defendant was charged with
    possession of over 400 grams of cocaine in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(F), which
    provided that a conviction thereunder was punishable by imprisonment at hard
    labor for not less than fifteen years, nor more than thirty years, and payment of a
    fine of not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, nor more than six hundred
    thousand dollars.2 Since the punishment for this offense is necessarily confinement
    1
    The order of remand further instructed: “If the non-unanimous jury claim was not preserved for review in
    the trial court or was abandoned during any stage of the proceedings, the court of appeal should nonetheless consider
    the issue as part of its error patent review. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2).”
    2
    La. R.S. 40:967(F) was repealed in its entirety by Acts 2017, No. 281.
    18-KA-683                                                   1
    at hard labor, defendant had to be tried before a 12-person jury. See La. Const.
    Art. I, § 17; La. C.Cr.P. art. 782.3
    Non-unanimous jury verdicts were previously allowed under both La. Const.
    Art. I, § 17 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 782, and the circumstances of the instant case. In
    defendant’s appeal before this Court, he argued the unconstitutionality of La.
    C.Cr.P. art. 782(A).4 This Court found, at that time, no merit to that assignment of
    error, finding that:
    [T]he constitutionality of non-unanimous jury verdicts was
    upheld in both State v. Bertrand, 08-2215 and 08-2311 (La. 3/17/09),
    
    6 So.3d 738
    , and Apodaca v. Oregon, 
    406 U.S. 404
    , 
    92 S.Ct. 1628
    , 
    32 L.Ed.2d 184
     (1972). As an intermediate court, we are bound by that
    precedent.
    State v. Acevedo, 
    273 So.3d at 487
    .
    However, in Ramos, the United States Supreme Court found that the Sixth
    Amendment right to a jury trial—as incorporated against the States by the
    Fourteenth Amendment—requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a
    serious offense. The Court concluded:
    There can be no question either that the Sixth Amendment’s
    unanimity requirement applies to state and federal criminal trials
    equally. This Court has long explained that the Sixth Amendment
    right to a jury trial is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice”
    and incorporated against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.
    This Court has long explained, too, that incorporated provisions of the
    Bill of Rights bear the same content when asserted against States as
    they do when asserted against the federal government. So if the Sixth
    Amendment’s right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to
    support a conviction in federal court, it requires no less in state court.
    (Footnotes omitted.)
    Ramos, 
    supra,
     
    140 S.Ct. at 1397
    .
    3
    Both La. Const. Art. I, § 17 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) currently provide, in pertinent part, that a case for
    an offense committed prior to January 1, 2019, in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor
    shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict, and that a case for an
    offense committed on or after January 1, 2019, in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor
    shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.
    4
    This Court’s previous opinion noted that the jury verdict was 11 to 1 in favor of conviction. See State v.
    Acevedo, 
    273 So.3d at 486
    .
    18-KA-683                                                   2
    For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, federal law defines petty offenses as
    offenses subject to imprisonment of six months or less, and serious offenses as
    offenses subject to imprisonment over six months. The Sixth Amendment’s right
    to a jury trial only attaches to serious offenses. See generally Lewis v. United
    States, 
    518 U.S. 322
    , 327-28, 
    116 S.Ct. 2163
    , 
    135 L.Ed.2d 590
     (1996); Hill v.
    Louisiana, 
    2013 WL 486691
     (E.D. La. 2013).
    Although we have conducted an errors patent review on remand as
    instructed, in his first appeal, as noted above, the unconstitutionality of La. C.Cr.P.
    art. 782 was previously raised by defendant as an assignment of error.5 Based on
    Ramos and the fact that the instant case is still on direct appeal,6 we find that since
    the verdict resulting from defendant’s jury trial was not unanimous for this
    “serious offense,” defendant is entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, in light of the
    United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos and the circumstances of this
    case, we vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence and remand the matter to the
    trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction and sentence are vacated
    and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
    VACATED; REMANDED
    5
    Likewise, in his appeal, defendant also raised as error sufficiency of the evidence to convict, which we
    previously rejected as having no merit. See State v. Acevedo, 
    273 So.3d at 476
    . Accordingly, another review of
    sufficiency of the evidence by this Court on remand is unnecessary.
    6
    See Schriro v. Summerlin, 
    542 U.S. 348
    , 351, 
    124 S.Ct. 2519
    , 2522, 
    159 L.Ed.2d 442
     (2004), observing
    that “[w]hen a decision of [the United States Supreme Court] results in a ‘new rule,’ that rule applies to all criminal
    cases still pending on direct review,” citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 
    479 U.S. 314
    , 328, 
    107 S.Ct. 708
    , 
    93 L.Ed.2d 649
    (1987) (“a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or
    federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a
    ‘clear break’ with the past.”).
    18-KA-683                                                  3
    SUSAN M. CHEHARDY                                                              CURTIS B. PURSELL
    CHIEF JUDGE                                                                    CLERK OF COURT
    MARY E. LEGNON
    FREDERICKA H. WICKER
    CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    MARC E. JOHNSON
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON                                                             SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
    STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
    FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
    HANS J. LILJEBERG
    JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.                       FIFTH CIRCUIT
    MELISSA C. LEDET
    JUDGES                              101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
    DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
    POST OFFICE BOX 489
    GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054                  (504) 376-1400
    (504) 376-1498 FAX
    www.fifthcircuit.org
    NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
    I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
    IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
    JUNE 30, 2020 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
    18-KA-683
    E-NOTIFIED
    24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
    HONORABLE ELLEN SHIRER KOVACH (DISTRICT JUDGE)
    TERRY M. BOUDREAUX (APPELLEE)        THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)        CYNTHIA K. MEYER (APPELLANT)
    MAILED
    HON. PAUL D. CONNICK, JR. (APPELLEE)
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY
    RACHEL L. AFRICK (APPELLEE)
    JENNIFER C. VOSS (APPELLEE)
    ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
    TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    200 DERBIGNY STREET
    GRETNA, LA 70053
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-KA-683

Judges: Ellen Shirer Kovach

Filed Date: 6/30/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/21/2024