Fred Tuckerson Versus Amtrust Insurance Company and Avondale Container Yard, L.L.C. ( 2021 )

FRED TUCKERSON NO. 21-CA-203
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
AMTRUST INSURANCE COMPANY AND COURT OF APPEAL
AVONDALE CONTAINER YARD, L.L.C.
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 783-096, DIVISION "O"
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR, JUDGE PRESIDING
December 22, 2021
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
AFFIRMED
JJM
SMC
SJW
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
FRED TUCKERSON
John W. Redmann
Edward L. Moreno
Travis J. Causey, Jr.
Christian A. Galleguillos
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
AVONDALE CONTAINER YARD, L.L.C. AND ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
Mark E. Young
Meredith R. Durham
MOLAISON, J.
Appellant/Plaintiff Fred Tuckerson appeals the district court’s February 22,
2021 judgment, granting the motion for summary judgment of
Appellees/Defendants Avondale Container Yard, LLC, (“Avondale”) and
Associated Industries Insurance Company1, Inc., dismissing appellant’s premises
liability claims with prejudice. As we find that summary judgment was
appropriate, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant, a commercial truck driver, drove onto Avondale’s container yard
in Jefferson Parish to pick up a chassis and container on June 6, 2017. While
driving on the main road of the facility (Road 3) searching for a chassis, it began to
rain and appellant’s truck struck a hole between Avenues A and B. Appellant
testified in his deposition that he could not see the hole because it was
“camouflage[d]” by the rainwater. The yard has a dirt surface where there are
several intentionally-made “natural swirls” throughout which are meant to divert
water away from the roads and toward the ditches at the side of the facility. The
constant traffic of truck tires churns the ground of the gravel changing the size and
depth of the potholes (or “worn spots”) which are filled with a gravel mixture.
When it rains, water collects in the low spots. Appellant claims his wrist was
injured after being caught in the steering wheel and his truck’s air valve was
broken.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant filed a petition on April 4, 2018, seeking damages related to
personal injuries and property damage alleged to have been incurred due to a
pothole in the roadway of Avondale’s container. Defendants filed a motion for
1
Amtrust Insurance Company, an originally named defendant, was determined to be the incorrect insurer
for Avondale.
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summary judgment on October 9, 2020, claiming that appellant cannot show the
pothole was an unreasonably dangerous defect because it was open and obvious.
After a hearing on February 9, 2021, the district court rendered judgment in
favor of defendants.
DISCUSSION
Appellant alleges five assignments of error. Four of the assignments2 are
related to alleged errors in the trial court’s determination that summary judgment
was appropriate because defendants established they had not breached a duty to
protect against an unreasonably dangerous condition.3 As we review the granting
of summary judgment de novo, we do not rely on the trial court’s findings of facts
or interpretation of the law, but make our own determination under the same
criteria governing the district court’s consideration of the motion. Smith v. Our
Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93–2512 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 750. A motion
for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).
The moving party’s burden of proof on the motion, for issues which he will
not bear the burden of proof at trial, is satisfied by pointing out to the court that
there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the
2
As to the first assignment of error that the district court erred in holding that that the appellant failed to
put forth any evidence that defendant’s had knowledge of the pothole prior to the accident, we find the
trial court incorrectly ruled on the lack of notice on the part of defendants. This issue was not raised until
defendant’s December 3, 2020 reply brief, therefore the appellant would have been unable to produce any
evidence to refute this claim. As we find that summary judgment was appropriate because appellant was
unable to establish the existence of a genuine fact as to the element of the pothole creating an
unreasonably dangerous condition, the element of notice is immaterial.
3
The second assignment of error is that the district court erred in holding that appellant failed to produce
any evidence to establish a material factual dispute.
The third assignment of error is that the court erred in its application of the “open and obvious” doctrine.
The fourth assignment of error is that the court erred in its interpretation of Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot
Logging, Inc., 08-0528 (La. 12/2/08), 995 So.2d 1184.
The fifth assignment of error is that the court erred in holding that defendants had established they had not
breached the duty to protect appellant against an unreasonably dangerous condition.
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adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). Thereafter,
the nonmoving party must produce factual support sufficient to establish that it will
be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial; failure to do so shows that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. The party opposing summary
judgment cannot rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings, but must show that
he has evidence that could satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial; if he does not
produce such evidence, then there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
mover is entitled to summary judgment. Mbarika v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana
State Univ., 07–1136 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/6/08), 992 So.2d 551, 561, writ denied,
08–1490 (La. 10/3/08), 992 So.2d 1019.
Appellant asserts that Avondale was negligent in failing to warn of the
dangerous condition, failing to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, failing to maintain the premises or take precautions, failing to supervise
and train employees as to the care and maintenance of the property, creating a trap,
and failing to take reasonable precautions to avoid injuries to invitees and guests.
In Louisiana, the owner or custodian of immovable property has a duty to
keep his property in a reasonably safe condition. He must discover any
unreasonably dangerous condition on his premises and either correct the condition
or warn potential victims of its existence. Pryor v. Iberia Parish School Board,
10-1683, (La. 3/15/11), 60 So.3d 594, 596. The basis for such liability is
established in Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315, 2317, and 2317.1. La. C.C. art.
2317.1 provides that “[t]he owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage
occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he knew or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect which
caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care.” Granda v.
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State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 04–1722 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/10/06), 935 So.2d 703,
707–08, writ denied, 06–0589 (La. 5/5/06); 927 So.2d 326.
In order to recover, appellant must establish that (1) Avondale was the
owner or custodian of the road; (2) the road contained a defect, i.e., a condition that
created an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the unreasonably dangerous condition
caused his injuries; (4) Avondale had actual or constructive notice of the condition;
(5) his injuries could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care; and
(6) Avondale breached its duty of reasonable care. See Teel v. State, Dept. of
Transp. and Development, 96-0592 (La.10/15/96), 681 So.2d 340, 343.
The existence of a duty is decided as a matter of law by the court; the
absence of an unreasonably dangerous condition necessarily implies the absence of
a duty on the part of the defendant. Oster v. Dep't of Transp. and Dev., 582 So.2d
1285, 1288 (La. 1991). The unreasonable risk inquiry is treated as a mixed
question of law and fact. See, e.g., Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs.,
12-1238 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So. 3d 175, 183; Jeansonne v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co.,
08-568 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/13/09), 8 So.3d 613. Because premises liability cases
are naturally fact-intensive, whether a condition constitutes an unreasonably
dangerous condition is generally a question of fact for the jury; however, in some
circumstances, it is the court’s obligation to decide as a matter of law which risks
are unreasonable. See Allen v. Lockwood, 156 So.3d 650, 653 (La. 2015).4
The Louisiana Supreme Court devised a risk-utility balancing test involving
consideration of four pertinent factors: “(1) the utility of the complained-of
condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of the harm, including the obviousness
and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the
4
The Louisiana Supreme Court clarified that “[w]e note that our opinion in Broussard v. State ex rel.
Office of State Buildings, supra, should not be construed as precluding summary judgment when no legal
duty is owed because the condition encountered is obvious and apparent to all and not unreasonably
dangerous.” Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 14-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So. 3d 851, 859 [n. 3].
21-CA-203 4
nature of the plaintiff’s activities in terms of social utility or whether the activities
were dangerous by nature.” Bufkin v. Felipe's Louisiana, LLC, 171 So. 3d at 859
(citing Broussard, 113 So.3d at 184). When the burden of the precautionary
activity outweighs the probability and magnitude of the risk, the custodian owes no
duty to correct the alleged defect. Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging Inc., 995
So.2d 1184, 1186-87 (La. 2008).
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment asserts that appellant’s claim
fails as a matter of law because the alleged pothole did not present an unreasonably
dangerous condition as it was obvious and apparent, the focus of the second prong
of the risk-utility inquiry. Under Louisiana law, a defendant generally does not
have a duty to protect against an obvious and apparent hazard. Broussard, 113
So.3d at 184. For an alleged hazard to be obvious and apparent, the hazard should
be “open and obvious to everyone who may potentially encounter it.” Bufkin, 171
So. 3d at 856 (citing Broussard, 113 So.3d at 184). A landowner is not liable for an
injury caused by “a condition which should have been observed by the individual
in the exercise of reasonable care, or which was as obvious to a visitor as it was to
the landowner.” Dauzat, 995 So. 2d at 1186.
The trial court relied on the Dauzat case, in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court analyzed the reasonableness factors and found that an open and obvious
defect did not present an unreasonable risk of harm. 995 So.2d at 1187-88. In that
case, the plaintiff allegedly injured his back after the truck he was driving struck a
hole in an unpaved logging road. Id. at 1185.
In its risk-utility inquiry, the Dauzat court found the first reasonableness
factor of utility favored a finding of no duty, as the unpaved logging road provided
the only method for removing harvested timber from the defendant’s land. Id. at
1187. After considering the third factor, the court found the cost of preventing the
harm for unpaved and temporary logging roads would have been unreasonably
21-CA-203 5
expensive. Id. The court found that the fourth factor favored a finding of no duty,
as the job of logging is a dangerous one by nature, as drivers frequently encounter
poor road conditions. Id.The Dauzat court found that the dispute turned on the second factor, “the
substantial likelihood and magnitude of injury from the hole, with consideration to
whether the hole was apparent or obvious.” Id. In its analysis, the court
emphasized that the plaintiff was aware of the condition of the logging road,
having traveled over it several times on the day of the accident. Id. The court also
noted that five other truck drivers, who were working on the day of the incident,
never reported any problems with the road. Id. The court “conclud[ed] that the
presence of the hole in the logging road was an obvious danger which did not
create a significant likelihood of injury.” Id.In the present case, looking at the evidence presented, this Court can weigh
the risk and utility of the condition of Avondale’s yard in determining whether it
was an unreasonably dangerous condition by applying the law to the uncontested
facts. In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants attached the
deposition of Michael O’Brien, the corporate representative of Avondale; the
deposition of appellant; and the deposition of Brandi Hebert, Avondale’s terminal
manager and gate clerk.
In examining the first factor regarding the utility of the unpaved road, Mr.
O’Brien testified as to the road’s utility for trucks to pick up containers released
from a steamship line. It is not clear that, like in Dauzat, the unpaved road
provided the only method for removing containers from steamships, but it is the
only way to remove them from Avondale’s property. Appellant’s opposition to the
motion for summary judgment states that “the social utility of the Defendants’
services, although valuable, has been exaggerated.” Thus, it is uncontested that the
road is useful to the valuable services of defendants.
21-CA-203 6
As to the third factor, the cost of preventing the harm, maintaining a dirt and
gravel road to keep it free of potholes, would not be feasible. “[W]e do not live in
a perfect world. We cannot impose a duty on a landowner to have perfectly
flawless premises. . . Everyday life presents risks which must be encountered and
negotiated.” Williams v. Leonard Chabert Med. Ctr., 98-1029 (La. App. 1 Cir.
9/26/99), 744 So.2d 206, 211, writ denied, 00-11 (La. 2/18/00), 754 So.2d 974(emphasis in original). Keeping the surface free from defects is likely impossible,
given the number of heavy trucks traveling over the road each day, and is certainly
cost-prohibitive. Michael O’Brien testified that to pave the road with concrete
would cost $5 million. He also testified to the measures taken by employees and
money spent on equipment to maintain the condition of the roads. His employees
are “on an hourly, daily basis, we are maintaining these particular issues to the best
of our ability before they become some sort of problem” by packing dirt on top of
the potholes in the road created after trucks turn and the tires make a “worn spot”
in the natural dirt. Avondale hired Andrew Morrison, terminal assistant manager,
to ensure that the facility is in proper condition and ground appearance,
maintaining the road daily. O’Brien testified that “everybody” is keeping an eye
on the condition of the road, including the terminal manager, lift operators, and
customer truck drivers.
As to the fourth factor of the nature of appellant’s activities in terms of
social utility or whether the activities were dangerous by nature, appellant claims
that he was not engaged in any inherently dangerous activity, only “waiting to pick
up a chassis so that he may go fulfill his next delivery.” We note that appellant
testified that he is a trained driver, capable of driving large tractors/containers, with
experience on roads throughout the ports and plants of the New Orleans and Baton
21-CA-203 7
Rouge areas. According to Michael Beaumont, Avondale’s mechanic,5
“professional drivers” should be used to a variety of roads and take the conditions
into consideration.
Like the analysis in Dauzat, the dispute in this case revolves around the
second factor, namely, the substantial likelihood and magnitude of harm from the
hole, with consideration of whether the hole was apparent or obvious. 995 So.2d at
1187. Appellant testified that he did not see the hole before his truck hit it, but
noted that he could see other potholes that day that were filled up. However, it is
not the victim’s actual or ascertainable knowledge, but “the global knowledge of
everyone who encounters the defective thing or dangerous condition,” Broussard,
113 So.3d at 188. If the “risk of harm is obvious, universally known and easily
avoidable, the risk is not unreasonable.” Trice v. Isaac, 99-839 (La. App. 5 Cir.
2/16/00), 759 So. 2d 843, 847, writ denied, 00-1113 (La. 6/2/00), 763 So. 2d
600. Id. at 877.
The low likelihood of harm and whether the risk was obvious, universally
known, and avoidable is supported by defendants’ evidence that 128 truck drivers
safely navigated the road on June 6, 2017, including three other drivers from
appellant’s company. The gate clerk, Brandi Hebert received no other complaints
before the incident. See Dauzat, 995 So. 2d at 1187 (noting that none of the truck
drivers who were working on the day of the accident reported any problems with
the road).
As not every imperfection or irregularity creates an unreasonable risk of
injury, the vice or defect must be of such a nature as to constitute a dangerous
condition that would be reasonably expected to cause injury to a prudent person
using ordinary care under the circumstances. Dupree v. City of New Orleans, 99-
5
Excerpts of Mr. Beaumont’s deposition were attached to appellant’s opposition to the motion for
summary judgment.
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3651 (La. 8/31/00), 765 So.2d 1002, 1012–13. A reasonably prudent driver need
not be warned of conditions that are patent and obvious. Jenkins v. State ex rel.
Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 06-1804 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/19/08), 993 So.2d 749,
764, writ denied, 08-2471 (La. 12/19/08), 996 So.2d 1133. Appellant was an
experienced truck driver, had traveled on the road on a few different occasions
before the incident, and had driven over potholes in the yard before.
Appellant offered evidence that the pothole was not obvious because it was
covered by rain. However, the rain at the time of the incident is an adverse driving
condition which calls for unusual caution on the part of motorists. King v.
King, 253 La. 270, 280, 217 So.2d 395, 398 (1968); Hebert v. Lafayette Consol.
Gov't, 05-1452 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 5/3/06), 930 So.2d 281, 285. A driver does not
have the right to assume the course of travel is free from danger if he cannot see
clearly ahead. Kimble v. East Baton Rouge Parish, 95–1973 (La. App. 1 Cir.
5/10/96), 673 So.2d 682, 686. A motorist is held to a higher degree of care in
adverse conditions, and his duty to keep his vehicle under control increases in
periods of low visibility. Id. at 686–87; Crockett v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company, 229 So.2d 169, 173 (La. App. 1 Cir.1969), writ refused, 255
La. 286, 230 So.2d 589 (1970); O'Rourke v. McConaughey, 157 So. 598 (La. App.
Orleans Cir. 1934).
While puddles may obscure the depth of a pothole, a driver of a motor
vehicle has a duty not to drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent
under the weather conditions and potential hazards existing at the time. See
Hebert, 930 So.2d at 285. Other courts have found that puddling would be
impossible to prevent, and for the most part these puddles pose no unreasonable
danger to the traveling public. See Lazarus v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co., 535 So.2d 923 (La. App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1201 (La. 1988);
Shephard on Behalf of Shepard v. Scheeler, 96-1690 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So.2d
21-CA-203 9
1308, 1317. Due to appellant’s experience in driving on South Louisiana roads
and its weather, the risk of puddles should have been apparent.
Because of the obvious nature of the changing condition of a dirt and gravel
road under the wheels of trucks, and the presence of several potholes on the
property, with the additional precautions that a reasonable, much less professional,
driver would take during rain, we find under these circumstances, the presence of a
pothole in the road was an obvious danger and did not present a significant
likelihood of injury. Even if appellant can establish the other elements of his case,
he cannot overcome summary judgment because he has failed to generate factual
issues that the pothole created an unreasonable risk of harm.
CONCLUSION
Appellant failed to present evidence that the alleged defect on Avondale’s
property created an unreasonably dangerous condition under the risk-utility test.
After defendants pointed to an absence of factual support for the essential element
of the defect not being unreasonably dangerous due to its open and obvious nature,
appellant was required to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will
be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. After de novo review of
the record, we find appellant failed to show that there is a genuine issue of material
fact relating to the likelihood of harm from the defect to a reasonably prudent
person using ordinary care under the circumstances.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing
appellant’s case.
AFFIRMED
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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
NANCY F. VEGA
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 22, 2021 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
21-CA-203
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR (DISTRICT JUDGE)
EDWARD L. MORENO (APPELLANT) KELLY S. RIZZO (APPELLANT) MARK E. YOUNG (APPELLEE)
MEREDITH R. DURHAM (APPELLEE)
MAILED
CHRISTIAN A. GALLEGUILLOS
(APPELLANT)
JOHN W. REDMANN (APPELLANT)
TRAVIS J. CAUSEY, JR. (APPELLANT)
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