Valerie Cantrelle Versus Wallace Brady, Allied Building Products, and Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company ( 2023 )

VALERIE CANTRELLE NO. 22-CA-272
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
WALLACE BRADY, ALLIED BUILDING COURT OF APPEAL
PRODUCTS, AND TRAVELERS PROPERTY
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 802-422, DIVISION "F"
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ, JUDGE PRESIDING
February 27, 2023
ROBERT A. CHAISSON
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Robert A. Chaisson, and Hans J. Liljeberg
REVERSED AND REMANDED
RAC
FHW
HJL
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
VALERIE CANTRELLE
Nanak S. Rai
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
WALLACE BRADY, ALLIED BUILDING PRODUCTS, AND TRAVELERS
PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA
Lee M. Peacocke
Kelsey L. Haddow
CHAISSON, J.
In this personal injury case arising from an automobile accident, Valerie
Cantrelle appeals a March 30, 2022 judgment of the trial court that granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Ms. Cantrelle’s claims
with prejudice. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand this matter.
BACKGROUND
On December 17, 2019, Ms. Cantrelle filed suit against Wallace Brady, his
employer, Allied Building Products, and their insurance company, Travelers
Property Casualty Insurance Company (“Travelers”). In her petition for damages,
she alleges that on December 17, 2018, at approximately 2:00 p.m., she was
driving her 2015 Chevrolet Cruze in a westerly direction on Interstate 10 near the
Causeway Boulevard exit when suddenly and without warning her vehicle was
struck on the rear passenger side by a 2018 Freightliner 7400 18-wheeler driven by
Wallace Brady.
Mr. Brady and Travelers filed an answer to the petition denying all of the
allegations. While discovery in the case was still ongoing and before any trial date
had been set, Mr. Brady and Travelers filed a motion for summary judgment
wherein they argued that summary judgment should be granted in their favor
because Ms. Cantrelle has no “admissible” evidence to support her claims. In
support of their motion, they attached Ms. Cantrelle’s petition for damages, her
answers to interrogatories, and a selected excerpt of her deposition wherein she
stated that she did not see the vehicle hit her on the right passenger side before she
felt the impact and lost control of her vehicle.
Ms. Cantrelle filed an initial opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, but did not include any evidence with the memorandum accompanying
her opposition. In response to defendants’ reply to her opposition, Ms. Cantrelle
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subsequently filed, on March 29, 2022, the day before the hearing on the summary
judgment motion, an additional opposition that included her answers to
interrogatories, her complete deposition, and an affidavit from an eyewitness to the
accident.
At the March 30, 2022 hearing on the motion, the trial court declined to
consider the evidence attached to Ms. Cantrelle’s untimely filed second opposition
memorandum pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966. Following the hearing, the trial
court rendered a judgment in favor of Mr. Brady and Travelers that granted their
motion for summary judgment, dismissed Ms. Cantrelle’s claims against them with
prejudice, and certified the judgment as final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B).
On appeal, Ms. Cantrelle argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law
in failing to admit an affidavit from an eyewitness and in granting the motion for
summary judgment when issues of material fact exist, with or without an affidavit.
DISCUSSION
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo using the same criteria
that govern the trial court’s determination of whether summary judgment is
appropriate. In re Succession of O’Krepki, 16-50 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 193
So.3d 574, 577, writ denied, 16-1202 (La. 10/10/16), 207 So.3d 406. A motion for
summary judgment should be granted if, after an adequate opportunity for
discovery, the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is
no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). A material fact is one that potentially
insures or prevents recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the
outcome of the lawsuit. Mealey v. Lopez, 16-77 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 193
So.3d 539, 542.
Ms. Cantrelle argues that the trial court erred in declining to consider the
affidavit of the eyewitness to the accident attached to her second opposition to
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defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The deadlines for filing an opposition
to a motion for summary judgment and documents in support of the opposition are
mandated by La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2), which provides in pertinent part:
B. Unless extended by the court and agreed by all of the parties,
a motion for summary judgment shall be filed, opposed, or replied to
in accordance with the following provisions:
(2) Any opposition to the motion and all documents in support
of the opposition shall be filed and served in accordance with Article
1313 not less than fifteen days prior to the hearing on the motion.
As the Louisiana Supreme Court recently noted, this language mandates
compliance without regard to cause or prejudice. Auricchio v. Harriston, 20-1167
(La. 10/10/21), 332 So.3d 660, 663. Because Ms. Cantrelle filed her second
opposition one day before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, well
outside the deadline mandated in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2), we find no error in the
trial court’s decision to not consider the second opposition or any of the exhibits
attached thereto. This assignment of error is without merit.
Next, Ms. Cantrelle argues that the trial court erred in finding no genuine
issues of material fact, despite the allegations raised in her petition, her answers to
interrogatories, and her excerpted deposition testimony included by defendants in
their motion for summary judgment.
La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) provides:
The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover
will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the
court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden on the
motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the
court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential
to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the
adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Pursuant to this section, the mover on a motion for summary judgment has
the initial burden of pointing out the absence of factual support for one or more
22-CA-272 3
elements essential to the adverse party’s claim. The failure to file an opposition or
to file opposing affidavits or other evidence does not automatically entitle the
moving party to summary judgment. Auricchio v. Harriston, 332 So.3d at 664,
fn 2; Sharp v. Harrell, 99-737 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/12/00), 762 So.2d 1119, 1121,
writ denied, 00-2458 (La. 11/3/00), 773 So.2d 150. It is only after the moving
party has shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the burden shifts to the party opposing
the motion to come forward with specific facts establishing the existence of a
genuine issue for trial. Id. Factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence
must be construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment, and all doubt must be resolved in the opponent’s favor. Prince v.
Rouse’s Enterprises, L.L.C., 20-150 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/2/20), 305 So.3d 1078,
1081.
In the petition for damages attached by Mr. Brady and Travelers to their
motion for summary judgment, Ms. Cantrelle makes the claim that she was driving
along the highway when “suddenly, and without warning her vehicle was struck on
the passenger side rear, by a 2018 Freightliner 7400 18-wheeler, being driven by
Wallace Brady.” Included in their Statement of Uncontested Material Facts
attached to their motion for summary judgment, defendants state that “[p]laintiff
lost control of her vehicle after hearing a loud boom while passing ‘an 18 wheeler
truck, with a forklift attached to the back of the truck’” and “[p]laintiff did not see
the vehicle that allegedly struck her vehicle and caused her to lose control of her
vehicle.” Consequently, defendants argue in their memorandum in support of their
motion for summary judgment that “[p]laintiff has no admissible evidence to
support her contention that she lost control of her vehicle because of any actionable
conduct attributable to Wallace Brady.”
22-CA-272 4
While defendants’ recitation that Ms. Cantrelle reported that she lost control
of her vehicle after hearing a loud boom is accurate, we disagree with defendants’
characterization of Ms. Cantrelle’s deposition testimony regarding whether she
saw “the vehicle” that initially struck her vehicle and caused her to lose control.
Specifically, the excerpt of Ms. Cantrelle’s deposition referred to by defendants in
support of this uncontested fact is as follows:
Q. Jumping back to, again, right when the accident
happened - - okay - - and that first impact that you felt to the rear
passenger side, did you see the white car hit you?
A. No.
Q. Did you see anybody hit you?
A. No.
Q. You just felt an impact?
A. Correct.
Clearly, Ms. Cantrelle was being questioned as to whether she observed the
initial impact, not whether she had ever seen the vehicle that she maintains initially
struck her vehicle. On that point, Ms. Cantrelle has consistently maintained that it
was the eighteen wheeler driven by Mr. Brady that initially struck her vehicle
causing her to lose control. In her answers to interrogatories, attached by
defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment, Ms. Cantrelle states
that “the forklift attached to the eighteen wheeler struck the passenger side rear of
plaintiff’s vehicle.”
Although Ms. Cantrelle readily admitted that she did not see the moment of
impact when she maintains the eighteen wheeler initially struck her, she testified in
her deposition, the portions of which are included in the excerpts that defendants
attached to their motion for summary judgment, to circumstances surrounding the
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accident that lead her to believe that it was the eighteen wheeler that initially struck
her. Specifically, Ms. Cantrelle testified:
As I was driving, I noticed there was a large 18-wheeler on the right-
hand side of me on the interstate. Within minutes of being on the side
of him, I felt a large hit on the back passenger side of my car. Soon
after that hit or that force, I went straight onto this 18-wheeler, and I
lost control of my car.
And when questioned as to the exact place on the right passenger side of her
vehicle the initial point of impact occurred, Ms. Cantrelle testified “near the back
tire.” Thus, it is from the circumstances regarding the relative locations of Ms.
Cantrelle’s vehicle and the eighteen wheeler at the moment of impact, together
with the place on her vehicle where the initial impact occurred, from which Ms.
Cantrelle concludes that it was the eighteen wheeler, or some part thereof, that
made the initial impact with her vehicle, causing her to lose control.
In addition to this circumstantial evidence, in both her answers to
interrogatories and in her deposition testimony, Ms. Cantrelle identified “Jeff
Brown” as an eyewitness to this accident and stated that he gave a statement to
State Farm Insurance Company.1 Having determined that the trial court was
correct not to consider the late-filed affidavit of Mr. Brown, we likewise are unable
to consider the substance of Mr. Brown’s statement in his affidavit. However, we
note that the last question in the portion of Ms. Cantrelle’s deposition that
defendants chose to attach to their motion for summary judgment was “[w]hat did
Jeff tell you about the accident? Like, when you talked to him, what did he say?”
For the same reason that we are unable to consider the late-filed affidavit of
Mr. Brown, we are also unable to consider the late-filed deposition in its entirety of
Ms. Cantrelle, which presumably contains her response to the question of what Mr.
1
Because the testimony of an eyewitness is generally admissible, we surmise that defendants’ statement
in their memorandum that “[p]laintiff has no admissible evidence to support her contention that she lost
control of her vehicle because of any actionable conduct attributable to Wallace Brady,” (emphasis
added) was anticipatory that Ms. Cantrelle would be unable to produce competent summary judgment
evidence in the form of an affidavit from Mr. Brown in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment.
22-CA-272 6
Brown told her about the accident. However, from the facts that Ms. Cantrelle has
maintained and testified to that Mr. Brady caused this accident, that she offered
Mr. Brown as an eyewitness in support of her position, and that defendants chose
not to include Ms. Cantrelle’s sworn response to the question of what Mr. Brown
told her about the accident, we infer that, at a minimum, Ms. Cantrelle’s
interpretation of Mr. Brown’s observations are not favorable to defendants.
Circumstantial evidence may be used to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Tomlinson v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 15-276 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16),
192 So.3d 153, 159 (citing Wood v. Becnel, 02-1730 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/26/03), 840
So2d 1225, 1227 (citing Lyons v. Airdyne Lafayette, Inc., 563 So.2d 260 (La.
1990)). Furthermore, factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must
be construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, and
all doubt must be resolved in the opponent’s favor. Prince v. Rouse’s Enterprises,
L.L.C., supra. Because a reasonable trier-of-fact could conclude from this
evidence that Mr. Brady’s eighteen wheeler made initial contact with Ms.
Cantrelle’s vehicle, we find that this evidence alone, although circumstantial, is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to who was at fault in
causing this accident.
As stated previously, the initial burden on a motion for summary judgment
lies with the mover to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one
or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. La.
C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). Upon our de novo review of the evidence submitted by
defendants as part of their motion for summary judgment, we find that defendants
failed to meet their initial burden of pointing out an absence of factual support for
Ms. Cantrelle’s claims. The evidence submitted by defendants in their motion for
summary judgment reveal that there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Mr. Brady was at fault in causing this accident. Accordingly, the burden
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of proof never shifted to Ms. Cantrelle to provide evidence to defeat the motion for
summary judgment.
DECREE
We conclude that genuine issues of material fact remain and defendants are
not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law at this time. We therefore
reverse the March 30, 2022 judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
22-CA-272 8
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
FEBRUARY 27, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
22-CA-272
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ (DISTRICT JUDGE)
NANAK S. RAI (APPELLANT) LEE M. PEACOCKE (APPELLEE)
MAILED
KELSEY L. HADDOW (APPELLEE)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
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