Nicole T. Jones, Cams Versus Liseli Oliva Chavez ( 2023 )

LISELI OLIVA NO. 22-CA-385 C/W
22-CA-386
VERSUS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
NICOLE TIARA JONES
COURT OF APPEAL
C/W
STATE OF LOUISIANA
NICOLE T. JONES, CAMS
VERSUS
LISELI OLIVA CHAVEZ
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 826-677 C/W 826-416, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG, JUDGE PRESIDING
March 29, 2023
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Marc E. Johnson, and Stephen J. Windhorst
AFFIRMED
SMC
MEJ
SJW
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
LISELI OLIVA
In Proper Person
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
NICOLE TIARA JONES, CAMS
In Proper Person
CHEHARDY, C.J.
Appellant, Nicole T. Jones Cams (“Jones”), challenges the trial court’s April
13, 2022 judgment, which issued a permanent order of protection from stalking
against her in favor of appellee, Liseli Oliva Chavez (“Oliva”), on grounds that (1)
the order of protection is vague and impinges upon her constitutional right to free
speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 7 of the Louisiana Constitution, and (2) Oliva failed to present evidence
sufficient to show that an order of protection against Jones was warranted. For the
reasons set forth more fully below, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court
or violation of Jones’ constitutional right to free speech, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 24, 2022, appellant, Jones, filed a petition for protection pursuant
to La. R.S. 46:2171, et seq., known as the “Protection from Stalking Act.,” against
appellee, Oliva, in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson,
Case No. 826-416, which was allotted to Judge June B. Darensburg, Division C.
One week later, on March 31, 2022, Oliva filed a similar petition for protection
from stalking against Jones on her own behalf, and on behalf of her minor child,
A.K., and Richard Kelly (“Kelly”), the father of the minor child and then boyfriend
of Oliva. On April 6, 2022, Case No. 826-677, Oliva’s petition for protection, was
transferred to Division C, and was consolidated with Case No. 826, 416, Jones’
petition for protection.
In her petition, Oliva alleged that on January 13, 2021, Jones visited Kelly’s
home and became irate when she realized that Oliva was living there, and from that
date forward, Jones began harassing, stalking and cyberstalking her. The petition
further alleged that Jones not only sent private messages to harass Oliva through
social media and left messages on her social media platforms, Jones also created
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fake profiles using false photographs and sent messages to her through the fake
accounts. Oliva’s petition alleged that Jones researched Oliva’s personal divorce
records and sent threatening letters to her home. Additionally, Oliva’s petition
alleged that Jones was posting on her own personal blog, public platforms, and
tiktok accounts, personal information concerning Oliva and Kelly’s private
relationship. Lastly, Oliva’s petition alleged that Jones stalked her at Planet
Fitness in Metairie, Louisiana, and at Target, also in Metairie, necessitating police
intervention.
On March 31, 2022, the trial court issued a Uniform Abuse Protection Order
– temporary restraining order, effective through April 13, 2022, prohibiting Jones
from abusing, harassing, assaulting, stalking, following, tracking, monitoring, or
threatening Oliva, her minor child, A.K, and Richard Kelly, in any manner. In
addition, the TRO ordered Jones not to contact Oliva, A.K., or Kelly, personally,
through a third party, or via public posting, by any means, including written,
telephone, or electronic (text, email, messaging, or social media) communication
without the express written permission of the court. Among other things, the TRO
also ordered Jones not to come within 100 yards of Oliva, A.K., or Kelly, or within
100 yards of their residence, apartment complex, or multiple family dwelling. The
TRO further ordered Jones not to contact any family members or acquaintances of
Oliva, A.K., or Kelly, and set an April 13, 2022 hearing date for Jones to show
cause why, among other things, she should not be ordered to “remove her blog and
social media which identifies [Oliva] and [Kelly].”1
1
On March 24, 2022, in response to the petition for protection against stalking filed by Jones
against Oliva, the trial court issued a similar Uniform Abuse Protection Order – Temporary Restraining
Order prohibiting Oliva from, among other things, stalking, harassing, or threatening Jones in any
manner, and that Oliva not come within 100 feet of Jones or her residence. The order also ordered Oliva
to stay away from Jones at the Planet Fitness located on Labarre Road in Metairie, Louisiana, and from
contacting any family members or acquaintances of Jones.
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On April 13, 2022, Jones and Oliva appeared before the trial court, both in
proper person, for a contradictory hearing on the respective petitions for protection
from stalking filed by the parties. At the close of the hearing, the trial court
granted both parties’ respective petitions for protection and entered mutual
permanent orders of protection—one in favor of Jones against Oliva, and the other
in favor of Oliva and the minor child, A.K., against Jones—stating:
Both parties shall not reference the other party and/or
protected persons in their social media blogs and/or
webistes [sic]. All current references shall be removed
within 30 days of this judgment.
Prior to signing the respective orders, and having Jones and Oliva each
review and sign the orders, the trial court stated:
All right, Ladies, I’m going to review these very quickly;
and then I’m going to give these to you to take a look at
and to sign off on. … I’m going to give these to each of
you, Ladies, before I spend time signing anything; this
one on this side and this one to [Jones] in this side. …
If you’ll read through it, if there’s anything we may have
missed, anything we have incorrect, take a look at it.
And if you’re comfortable with it, there is a page
where you sign off. [Emphasis supplied.]
After she reviewed the proposed orders of protection, Jones stated:
Everything looks good. [Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, the trial court, Jones, and Oliva each signed the mutual
protective orders.
This appeal filed by Jones, in proper person, followed.2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to Jones, she was in a four-year relationship with Richard Kelly,
and he fraudulently led her to believe that their relationship was monogamous.
The relationship ended contentiously when Jones discovered that Kelly was
2
Oliva did not appeal the protective order granted in favor of Jones against her.
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simultaneously in an intimate relationship with Oliva, and was the father of Oliva’s
three-year-old child.3
Jones claims that, as a matter of self-help to cope and heal from Kelly’s
devastating betrayal and deception, and with the intention of helping other women
involved in similar situations, she created a public blog, entitled “Intuitively
Challenged.” Jones contends that the “purpose and substance” of the blog was to
share her experiences, not only regarding her involvement with Kelly, but also in
other relationships. She avers that the blog talks about what it feels like to endure
narcissistic abuse, how one can heal from it, and provides resources for people who
visit the blog who are looking for help. Jones contends that the blog is not a gossip
forum; it is a self-help blog that provides resources for people who may be
suicidal, and a blog where people can find refuge. Additionally, Jones believes the
blog’s growing success is due to a combination of the fact that she had a past toxic
relationship, which was the source of her problems, and that she publicly shares
her experiences with people who can relate.
Jones denies that her blog ever mentioned by name, or used any identifiers
of, either Kelly or Oliva. She contends that she was very careful not to use any
language that would allow a reader of the blog, who did not have personal
knowledge of Jones’ personal life, to know the subject of any of the situations
described in her blog. Further, Jones claims that she monitored any comments
made by others to make sure that no language used would identify the subject of
any of the situations she described or those described by others sharing their own
situations on her blog. While claiming that Oliva continuously stalked and
3
It appears from the record that Jones and Oliva, who, at the time, was married to Carlos Chavez,
were impregnated by Kelly around the same time. Kelly allegedly encouraged both women to end their
pregnancies; Jones did, but Oliva did not, resulting in the birth of a daughter while she was still married to
Chavez.
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harassed her,4 Jones denies that she ever stalked or cyberstalked Oliva or Kelly,
and contends that the incidents occurring at Planet Fitness and Target were
initiated by Oliva. Additionally, she contends that, on both occasions, the
Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office concluded that no crime had been committed by
Jones and, thus, no arrests or citations were issued.5
After reviewing the information contained in the records from both Jones’
petition for protection filed against Oliva, and in Oliva’s petition for protection
filed against Jones, as well as the parties’ presentations to the court at the
contradictory hearing, the trial court found that neither party “had clean hands,”
and that the issuance of mutual permanent protective orders was supported by the
record. Consequently, the trial court rendered judgment granting both Jones and
Oliva’s respective petitions for protection, and issued mutual permanent orders of
protection as discussed above.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
Jones raises two issues for this Court’s appellate review: (1) whether the trial
court abused its discretion in issuing a permanent order of protection in favor of
Oliva against Jones, when Oliva failed to present evidence to substantiate a claim
for stalking; and (2) whether the permanent order of protection impinges upon
Jones’ constitutional right of free speech protected by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 1, § 7 of the Louisiana Constitution.
4
In her petition for protection, Jones sought to prevent Oliva, personally or through third parties,
“from leaving derogatory, threatening, and defamatory comments on her blog.”
5
On March 23, 2022, both Jones and Oliva were apparently working out at Planet Fitness in the
same workout room. According to Oliva, initially Jones was simply standing and staring at her, and then
approached Oliva and asked a question. Oliva initiated a 9-1-1 service call alleging a disturbance at
Planet Fitness. When officers arrived, Oliva relayed that she had “previous problems inside the business
(Planet Fitness) with [Jones],” and claimed that Jones was stalking her. On April 8, 2022, Oliva
contacted the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Department alleging that Jones was stalking her at Target. Jones
denied the allegation and stated that they “just happened” to be at the same Target store at the same time.
22-CA-385 C/W 22-CA-386 5
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews orders of protection against abuse for an abuse of
discretion. Larremore v. Larremore, 52,879 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/25/19), 280 So.3d
1282, 1289. Much discretion is vested in the trial judge, particularly in evaluating
the weight of the evidence which is to be resolved primarily on the basis of the
credibility of the witnesses. Id. In matters of credibility, an appellate court must
give great deference to the findings of the trier-of-fact. Id. The trial court sitting
as the trier of fact is in the best position to evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses,
and its credibility determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest
error. Ruiz v. Ruiz, 05-175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/26/05), 910 So.2d 443, 445. When a
conflict in the testimony exists, reasonable evaluations of credibility and
reasonable inferences of fact made by the trial court are not to be disturbed upon
review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and
inferences are just as reasonable. Shaw v. Young, 15-974 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/17/16),
199 So.3d 1180, 1183. To reverse a fact-finder’s determination in an action
seeking a protection from abuse order, the appellate court must find from the
record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court
and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Lepine v. Lepine,
(La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/17), 223 So.3d 666. Whether to grant a protective order, and
the extent of protection, are within the discretion of the trial court, and an appellate
court will not ordinarily modify or reverse a trial court in such matters absent an
abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Palowsky v. Campbell, 21-279 (La. App. 5
Cir. 8/26/21), 327 So.3d 589, 595, writ denied, 21-1428 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So.3d
74.
22-CA-385 C/W 22-CA-386 6
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, Jones argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting
Oliva’s petition for protection because Oliva failed to present any evidence at the
hearing to support a claim for stalking or cyberstalking by Jones, and, accordingly,
the protective order should be quashed. We disagree.
Oliva petitioned the trial court for an order of protection from stalking
pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2171, et seq., known as the “Protection from Stalking Act.”
Under this Act, “stalking” means any act that would constitute the crime of
stalking under La. R.S. 14:40.2 or cyberstalking under La. R.S. 14:40.3. See La.
R.S. 46:2172; Head v. Robichaux, 18-366 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/2/18), 265 So.3d
813, 816. A victim of stalking by a perpetrator who is a stranger to or
acquaintance of the victim shall be eligible to receive all services, benefits, and
other forms of assistance provided by Chapter 28 of Title 46, which is the
“Protection from Family Violence Act” and includes specific statutes on
“Domestic Abuse Assistance,” provided the services, benefits, and other forms of
assistance are applicable based on the status of the relationship between the victim
and the perpetrator. See La. R.S. 46:2173.6
Under the “Domestic Abuse Assistance” law, La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq., to
obtain a protective order, the petitioner must prove his or her allegations of
domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. La. R.S. 46:2135(B). Proof is
sufficient to constitute a preponderance of the evidence when the entirety of the
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, shows that the fact sought to be proved is
6
Louisiana courts have recognized that stalking (La. R.S. 14:40.2) and cyberstalking (La. 14:40.3)
fall under the category of nonphysical offenses against the person included in the definition of physical
abuse. S.M. v. T.M., 19-369 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/26/19), 289 So.3d 141, 147.
22-CA-385 C/W 22-CA-386 7
more probable than not. Hanks v. Entergy Corp., 06-477 (La. 12/18/06), 944
So.2d 564, 578.
The crime of stalking is “the intentional and repeated following or harassing
of another that would cause a reasonable person to feel alarmed or to suffer
distress.” La. R.S. 14.40.2(A). The term “harassing” is defined as “the repeated
pattern of verbal communications or nonverbal behavior without invitation which
includes but is not limited to making telephone calls, transmitting electronic mail,
sending messages via a third party, or sending letters or pictures.” La. R.S.
14:40.2(C)(1). A “pattern of conduct” means “a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, evidencing an intent to inflict a continuity of emotional
distress upon the person.” La. R.S. 14:40.2(C)(2).
Another “offense against the person” found in the Louisiana Criminal Code
is the crime of cyberstalking, set forth in La. R.S. 14:40.3, states, in pertinent part:
(B) Cyber stalking is action of any person to accomplish
any of the following: …
***
(2) Electronically mail or electronically communicate to
another repeatedly, whether or not conversation ensues,
for the purpose of threatening, terrifying or harassing any
person.
La. R.S. 14:40.3.
The cyberstalking statute defines “electronic communication” as “any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature, transmitted in whole or in part by wire, radio, computer, electromagnetic,
photoelectric, or photo-optical system.” La. R.S. 14:40.3(A)(1). The statute also
defines “electronic mail” as the “transmission of information or communication by
use of the internet, a computer, a facsimile machine, a pager, a cellular telephone, a
video recorder, or other electronic means sent to a person identified by a unique
address or address number and received by that person.” La. R.S. 14:40.3(A)(2).
22-CA-385 C/W 22-CA-386 8
At the contradictory hearing, Oliva stated that Jones’ harassment has
occurred for over a year and that Jones “will not leave [her] alone.” She averred
that she had more than 60 pages of communications, including emails and direct
contacts through her Facebook page, from Jones and Jones’ family members to
Oliva. Oliva contends that on Jones’ public blog, which was created after Jones’
separation from Kelly, Jones talks about Oliva and lets “everyone know all of [her]
information.” According to Oliva, while Jones does not refer to Oliva specifically
by name in the blog, when writing about her experiences regarding her former
relationship with Kelly, Jones refers to Oliva as the “new supply.” Additionally,
Oliva stated that Jones contacted her ex-husband, researched her marital records
and the history of her Planet Fitness gym membership, visited her 10-year-old
daughter’s social media page, and had her daughters contact Oliva directly. Oliva
further stated that, because of all of the distress created by Jones’ continued
harassment, Oliva has experienced two miscarriages since January 2021, when this
debacle began.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court made the following factual
findings:
I don’t think any party has a clean hand in any of this. I
can understand some things that have occurred, that
could make a person very angry. But when one of you
enter [sic] a place, a proper thing to do is leave. ...
***
Both of you posted something to inflame the situation,
and it needs to stop; so everybody will remove any public
media posts that’s out there. Any blogs that refers to the
other person, I order it removed.
***
Because I’ve said, I don’t think any party has clean hands
in this; that both parties have done some things that have
inflamed the other person. And it’s better to have mutual
stay away orders, protective orders against both of you
and move on, Ladies. Move on with your life.
***
And when I say do not refer to the other person in blogs,
on websites, I mean I’m not just talking about stating
their names. I mean even in an indirect way. Like this
22-CA-385 C/W 22-CA-386 9
lady did - - and we know what you’re talking about. No.
That is a violation of the protective order; so don’t think
you can get around it by stating something other than the
person’s name or someone else stating something other
than the person’s name.
***
… As far as Richard, [he is] fair game. And when I say
game, he’s not a part of this protective order is what I
mean by that.
***
I’m going through the record, reading some things; and
so that’s why I say neither one of you had clean hands in
this; so coming to pretend that, or even if you’re
responding to someone, you respond responsibly. You
don’t respond in a way that drags you into the same
category as them.
Upon review, based on the totality of the record, we find no abuse of the trial
court’s discretion in finding that Jones’ alleged communications through social
media and otherwise constitute a “repeated pattern of verbal communications or
nonverbal behavior without invitation” that would cause a reasonable person to
suffer emotional distress under the circumstances. As with the stalking statute, the
harassing e-mails and text messages to Oliva from Jones would constitute
cyberstalking. For these reasons, we find no merit to this assignment of error, and
affirm the trial court’s judgment granting a permanent protective order against
Jones and in favor of Oliva.
The Order of Protection does not violate Jones’ First Amendment rights to
free speech.
In this assignment of error, Jones focuses solely on the following language
set forth in the mutual protective orders:
Both parties shall not reference the other party and/or
protected persons in their social media blogs and/or
webistes [sic]. All current references shall be removed
within 30 days of this judgment.
Despite having reviewed the specific language and having represented to the
trial court that “[e]verything looks good” prior to signing the order, Jones argues
that this language places an impermissible restriction on her First Amendment right
22-CA-385 C/W 22-CA-386 10
to free speech under both the United States Constitution and the Louisiana State
Constitution. Specifically, Jones asserts that, insofar as the order of protection
establishes that she must limit what she says in her public blog, this is a clear
violation of her right to freedom of speech protected by La. Const. art. I, § 7, and
that, if she wanted to, Jones could use Oliva’s actual name or any identifiers.
According to Jones, as long as she is not advocating violence or lawlessness
against Oliva, the trial court “cannot, in any way, limit her freedom of speech.”
Jones further argues that the order is unconstitutionally vague as it does not define
what is meant by “reference.” We disagree.
The right to free speech is guaranteed in the constitutions of both the United
States and Louisiana. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part:
Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press[.]
The Louisiana Constitution Art. 1, § 7, states:
No law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or
of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on any subject, but is responsible for
abuse of that freedom.
Louisiana’s interest in protecting the reputations of private individuals is
clearly expressed and preserved in our constitution, which has expressly balanced
the right of free speech with the responsibility for abuse of that right. See Kennedy
v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 05-1418 (La. 7/10/06), 935 So.2d 669.
The First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s
views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired. Godwin v. East
Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 408 So.2d 1214, 1217 (La. 1981). Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court has held that not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance. It is speech on matters of public concern that is at the
heart of the First Amendment’s protection. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
22-CA-385 C/W 22-CA-386 11
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2944-45, 86 L.Ed.2d 593,
(1985); Wainwright v. Tyler, 52,083 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18), 253 So.3d 203, 214.
Matters of public concern relate to any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1689, 75
L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Whether speech addresses matters of public concern must be
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by
the entire record. See Yount v. Handshoe, 14-919 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/15), 171
So.3d 381, 385. Abuses of the right to free speech are actionable under Louisiana
law, particularly when the speech tends to harm the reputation of another so as to
lower the person in the estimation of the community or to deter others from
associating or dealing with the person or otherwise exposes the person to contempt
or ridicule. Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129, 139-40; see
also Trentecosta v. Beck, 96-2388 (La. 1-/21/97), 703 So.2d 552, 559.
Here, it appears that the references to Oliva on Jones’ public blog, albeit
indirect, have nothing to do with any discussions involving matters of “public
concern.” In fact, Jones expressly stated that her blog was initiated as a matter of
“self-help” to personally cope and heal from Kelly’s devastating betrayal and
deception in their private relationship, and that the “purpose and substance” of the
blog was to share her experiences involving her own personal relationships.
Instead, taken in their proper context, the indirect references to Oliva on Jones’
blog appear to be nothing more than personal attacks on Oliva’s character and a
smear campaign to impugn Oliva’s reputation—speech which is not protected by
the First Amendment. While we commend Jones for her efforts to assist other
persons that are struggling in and/or attempting to heal from toxic relationships, we
can conceive of no reason, other than to harass, harm Oliva’s reputation, or expose
her to contempt or ridicule, for Jones, either individually or through a third party,
to mention or make reference to Oliva, directly or indirectly, in her public blog.
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We find that Jones has failed to show that the order of protection in this case
violates her constitutional right to free speech or that the order of protection is
vague or unduly restrictive. The trial judge made it very clear to the parties what
she meant by “referencing” the other in their respective blogs. The order does not
prohibit Jones from sharing on her blog about her unfortunate experiences with
Kelly, and the hard lessons she has learned from that relationship and/or other
relationships. The order, however, does prohibit Jones, in discussing her
misfortune with Kelly, from mentioning anything that references Oliva in any way.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
22-CA-385 C/W 22-CA-386 13
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
CORNELIUS E. REGAN, PRO TEM FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
MARCH 29, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
22-CA-385
C/W 22-CA-386
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG (DISTRICT JUDGE)
NO ATTORNEY(S) WERE ENOTIFIED
MAILED
LISELI OLIVA (APPELLEE) NICOLE T. JONES (APPELLANT)
137 12TH STREET 2656 PRESSBURG STREET
BRIDGE CITY, LA 70094 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70122