Jennifer Ravain, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Jason Ravain Versus Ochsner Medical Center Kenner, LLC, Jefferson Parish School Board, and East Jefferson High School ( 2023 )


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  • JENNIFER RAVAIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON                         NO. 23-C-425
    BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD, JASON
    RAVAIN                                                       FIFTH CIRCUIT
    VERSUS                                                       COURT OF APPEAL
    OCHSNER MEDICAL CENTER KENNER, LLC,                          STATE OF LOUISIANA
    JEFFERSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, AND
    EAST JEFFERSON HIGH SCHOOL
    September 28, 2023
    Linda Wiseman
    First Deputy Clerk
    IN RE OCHSNER MEDICAL CENTER KENNER, LLC
    APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
    PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE DANYELLE M.
    TAYLOR, DIVISION "O", NUMBER 822-804
    Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
    Robert A. Chaisson, and Scott U. Schlegel
    WRIT GRANTED
    In this writ application, defendant, Ochsner Medical Center Kenner, L.L.C.
    (“Ochsner”), seeks review of the trial court’s July 20, 2023 judgment, denying its
    dilatory exception of prematurity. For the following reasons, we grant the writ
    application, sustain the exception of prematurity, and dismiss plaintiff’s claims
    against Ochsner without prejudice.
    Facts and Procedural History
    On November 15, 2021, plaintiff, Jennifer Ravain, individually and on
    behalf of her minor child, Jason Ravain, filed this lawsuit against Ochsner, the
    Jefferson Parish School Board, and East Jefferson High School. In her petition,
    Ms. Ravain contends that on October 20, 2021, Jason was in his home room class
    23-C-425
    at East Jefferson High School when there was an announcement inviting students
    to go to the Ochsner mobile vaccine unit if they wanted to receive a COVID shot.
    Ms. Ravain asserts that Jason, who was 16 years old at the time, approached
    the Ochsner mobile unit and was met by two nurses who took his basic
    information, such as his name and date of birth, and then gave him a consent form
    and told him to sign it. According to Ms. Ravain, Jason believed he was just
    signing up for the shot, and he asked the nurses when he would be scheduled to
    receive it. When Jason was told he would receive the shot “right then and there,”
    he did not know what to do, and the shot was immediately administered.
    In her petition, Ms. Ravain contends that Ochsner committed the intentional
    tort of battery, because as a minor, Jason did not have the legal capacity to consent
    to the shot. She further asserts that there are inherent risks associated with COVID
    shots, but Ochsner still failed to obtain her consent, thereby causing both her and
    Jason to suffer extreme emotional distress. She also claims damages for loss of her
    parental right to direct the medical care of her minor child.
    On October 11, 2022, Ochsner filed a dilatory exception of prematurity,
    asserting that plaintiff’s claims are based on lack of informed consent and are
    therefore, subject to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“LMMA”). Ochsner
    contends that Ms. Ravain’s claims are premature, because they have not been
    presented to a medical review panel.1 On January 2, 2023, Ms. Ravain filed a
    memorandum in opposition to Ochsner’s exception of prematurity, arguing that the
    LMMA does not apply because Jason was not a “patient” and Ochsner committed
    an intentional tort, which is not included in the definition of “malpractice.”
    1
    La. R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part:
    All malpractice claims against health care providers covered by this Part,
    other than claims validly agreed for submission to a lawfully binding
    arbitration procedure, shall be reviewed by a medical review panel
    established as hereinafter provided for in this Section.
    2
    A hearing on the exception of prematurity was held on May 31, 2023, and
    the trial court took the matter under advisement. On July 20, 2023, the trial court
    rendered a judgment denying the exception and issued written reasons for
    judgment. In its reasons, the trial court found that Jason was not a “patient” under
    the LMMA, because he did not have parental consent to establish a patient-
    physician relationship. The court further found that Jason did not receive “medical
    care,” because he did not seek a diagnosis or information regarding a physical
    condition. Also, the court found that Jason did not receive “treatment,” because he
    was only seeking information and was not expecting to receive the COVID shot
    that day.
    Law and Discussion
    A dilatory exception of prematurity, as provided for in La. C.C.P. art.
    926(1), questions whether a cause of action has matured to the point where it is
    ripe for judicial determination. Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., L.L.C., 15-1754
    (La. 3/15/16), 
    187 So.3d 436
    , 438; Williamson v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of
    Jefferson, 04-0451 (La. 12/1/04), 
    888 So.2d 782
    , 785. Under the LMMA, a
    medical malpractice claim against a qualified health care provider is subject to
    dismissal on a timely exception of prematurity if such claim has not first been
    presented for review to a medical review panel. La. R.S. 40:1231.8; Dupuy, 
    187 So.3d at 438
    . An exception of prematurity neither challenges nor attempts to
    defeat any of the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action, but instead asserts that
    the plaintiff has failed to take some preliminary step necessary to make the
    controversy ripe for judicial involvement. 
    Id.
    Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s ruling on an
    exception of prematurity, because the issue of whether a claim sounds in medical
    malpractice involves a question of law. Perry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
    16-418 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/16), 
    209 So.3d 308
    , 311; Matherne v. Jefferson
    3
    Parish Hospital Dist. No. 1, 11-1147 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/8/12), 
    90 So.3d 534
    , 536,
    writ denied, 12-1545 (La. 10/12/12), 
    98 So.3d 873
    . The burden of proving
    prematurity is on the moving party, which in a medical malpractice case, must
    show that it is entitled to a medical review panel because the allegations fall within
    the scope of the LMMA. Kelleher v. University Medical Center Management
    Corp., 21-0011 (La. 10/10/21), 
    332 So.3d 654
    , 657; Perry, 
    209 So.3d at 311
    .
    In this writ application, Ochsner argues that the trial court erred by denying
    its exception of prematurity. It asserts that the LMMA applies in this case and that
    plaintiff’s claims must first be presented to a medical review panel. We agree.
    The LMMA and its limitations on tort liability for a qualified health care
    provider apply only to claims “arising from medical malpractice,” while all other
    tort liability on the part of the qualified health care provider is governed by general
    tort law. LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 07-0008, 07-0016 (La.
    9/5/07), 
    966 So.2d 519
    , 524; Coleman v. Deno, 01-1517 (La. 1/25/02), 
    813 So.2d 303
    , 315. La. R.S. 40:1231.1(A)(13) provides, in pertinent part:
    “Malpractice” means any unintentional tort or any
    breach of contract based on health care or
    professional services rendered, or which should have
    been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient,
    including failure to render services timely and the
    handling of a patient….
    The parties do not dispute that Ochsner is a qualified health care provider.
    Ms. Ravain contends, and the trial court found, that the LMMA does not apply in
    this matter because Jason was not a “patient” and did not receive “health care.”
    La. R.S. 40:1231.1(15) of the LMMA provides that a “patient” means “a
    natural person….who receives or should have received health care from a licensed
    health care provider, under contract, express or implied.” In the present case,
    Jason was a “patient” under the LMMA, because he is a natural person who
    4
    received health care from a licensed health care provider when he received the
    COVID shot.
    La. R.S. 40:1231.1(9) provides that “health care” is “any act or treatment
    performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any
    health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient’s medical
    care, treatment, or confinement….” Vaccinations have been considered as “health
    care” or “medical care” in the caselaw. See Hayes v. University Health Shreveport,
    L.L.C, 21-1601 (La. 1/7/22), 
    332 So.3d 1163
    ; Thompson v. Center for Pediatric
    and Adolescent Medicine, L.L.C., 17-1088 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/15/18), 
    244 So.3d 441
    , writ denied, 18-583 (La. 6/1/18), 
    243 So.3d 1062
    ; Boyd v. Louisiana Medical
    Mut. Ins. Co., 
    593 So.2d 427
     (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 
    594 So.2d 877
    (La. 1992). In her petition, Ms. Ravain also refers to the COVID shot as medical
    care.2 The act of administering the COVID vaccine3 was an act performed by a
    health care provider during Jason’s medical care or treatment, and thus, it is
    considered health care.
    Ms. Ravain asserts that Ochsner’s action of administering the COVID
    vaccine to her son was not included under the definition of “malpractice” because
    it was an intentional tort. She claims Ochsner committed the intentional tort of
    battery, because Jason did not have the legal capacity to consent to receiving the
    COVID shot. However, in Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 96-1575 (La. 10/10/97), 
    701 So.2d 447
    , the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected battery-based liability in lack of
    informed consent and no consent cases, and found that such cases sound in medical
    malpractice and must be submitted to a medical review panel. See also
    Thibodeaux v. Jurgelsky, 04-2004 (La. 3/11/05), 
    898 So.2d 299
    ; In re Medical
    2
    In her petition, Ms. Ravain refers to “medical treatment” and “informed consent to medical treatment.” She also
    seeks damages for “Loss of Parental Right to Direct the medical care of her minor child.”
    3
    Plaintiff argues that there is no such thing as a COVID “vaccine,” because the shots did not prevent contraction or
    transmission of the disease. However, the effectiveness of the vaccine is not at issue in this writ application.
    5
    Review Panel for Claim of Larche, 97-2397 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/98), 
    714 So.2d 56
    ; and Maybrier v. Louisiana Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 08-1508 (La. App. 3 Cir.
    6/10/09), 
    12 So.3d 1115
    , n. 1, writ denied, 09-1558 (La. 10/9/09), 
    18 So.3d 1287
    .
    Ms. Ravain also asserts that Ochsner failed to obtain parental consent prior
    to administering the vaccine and that the consent form signed by Jason was invalid
    due to his lack of capacity as a minor. These claims pertaining to lack of consent
    fall under the LMMA. In Lugenbuhl, 701 So.2d at 452-453, the Louisiana
    Supreme Court found that cases arising from lack of informed consent or no
    consent to medical treatment are subject to the provisions of the LMMA. See also
    Barnes v. Harandi, 98-0781 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/9/98), 
    727 So.2d 530
    , 533.
    In Filogene v. Brown, 03-1451 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/04), 
    871 So.2d 1206
    ,
    writ denied, 04-1050 (La. 6/25/04), 
    876 So.2d 836
    , the plaintiff, individually and
    on behalf of her minor child, filed suit against a doctor, alleging that the doctor
    performed an abortion on her thirteen-year-old daughter without verifying her age
    or obtaining valid parental consent. The doctor filed an exception of prematurity,
    arguing that the plaintiff was required to submit her claims to a medical review
    panel prior to commencing a civil action. After a hearing, the trial court
    maintained the exception of prematurity. Id. at 1207. On appeal, the plaintiff
    argued that her claims against the doctor were excluded from the LMMA because
    the procedure to terminate her daughter’s pregnancy was an intentional tort. The
    Fourth Circuit noted that in Lugenbuhl, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected
    battery-based liability in lack of informed consent and no consent cases, and found
    that these claims must be submitted to a medical review panel. Filogene, 871
    So.2d at 1208. The Filogene court affirmed the trial court’s judgment maintaining
    defendant’s exception of prematurity, and stated that “any allegations that
    Defendant failed to obtain proper consent prior to performing the procedure are
    6
    medical malpractice allegations and require submission to a medical review panel
    prior to commencement of an action.” Id.
    Similarly, in the present case, Jason was a minor when he received the
    COVID shot without parental consent. Thus, Ms. Ravain’s claims arise from lack
    of informed consent, or no consent, and are considered medical malpractice
    allegations that must first be presented to a medical review panel.
    Based on our de novo review and considering the applicable law, we find
    that plaintiff’s claims in this lawsuit are subject to the provisions of the LMMA
    and must first be submitted to a medical review panel. Accordingly, we grant
    Ochsner’s writ application, sustain its exception of prematurity, and dismiss Ms.
    Ravain’s claims without prejudice.
    Gretna, Louisiana, this 28th day of September, 2023.
    FHW
    RAC
    SUS
    7
    SUSAN M. CHEHARDY                                                               CURTIS B. PURSELL
    CHIEF JUDGE                                                                     CLERK OF COURT
    SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
    FREDERICKA H. WICKER
    CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    MARC E. JOHNSON
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON                                                              LINDA M. WISEMAN
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    FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
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    SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL                                       FIFTH CIRCUIT
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Document Info

Docket Number: 23-C-425

Judges: Danyelle M. Taylor

Filed Date: 9/28/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/21/2024