Zachary Marcade Versus New York Marine and General Insurance Company and Nola Motor Club, L.L.C. ( 2023 )

ZACHARY MARCADE NO. 23-CA-17
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
NEW YORK MARINE AND GENERAL COURT OF APPEAL
INSURANCE COMPANY AND
NOLA MOTOR CLUB, L.L.C. STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 807-130, DIVISION "J"
HONORABLE STEPHEN C. GREFER, JUDGE PRESIDING
October 04, 2023
MARC E. JOHNSON
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Marc E. Johnson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
REVERSED; REMANDED
MEJ
FHW
JJM
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
ZACHARY MARCADE
Charles M. Thomas
Leandro R. Area
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
NEW YORK MARINE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND NOLA
MOTOR CLUB, L.L.C.
Mark C. Dodart
Stuart G. Richeson
James H. Gilbert
Harrison M. Martin
JOHNSON, J.
Appellant, Zachary1 Marcade, seeks review of the 24th Judicial District
Court’s November 14, 2022 judgment granting the summary judgment filed by
Defendants/Appellees’, New York Marine and General Insurance Company and
NOLA Motor Club, L.L.C.’s (collectively referred to as “NOLA Motor Club”), .
Mr. Marcade sustained serious injuries to his left leg after a collision with a go-kart
operated by his son’s minor friend at NOLA Motor Club’s kart track in Jefferson
Parish. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment and
remand the matter.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Marcade and his wife celebrated the birthday of their 12 year old son,
along with two of their son’s minor friends, on August 9, 2019 at a party held at
the NOLA Motorsports Park, operated by NOLA Motor Club, in Avondale, LA.
The party of five participated in the first heat of a race without incident. During the
second heat of the race, Kart #4, driven by one of their minor son’s friends, who is
referred to in the case record as “ST”, spun out in front of Kart #14, the kart Mr.
Marcade was driving. Mr. Marcade’s kart collided into ST’s kart at full speed, and
Mr. Marcade was ejected from Kart #14 upon impact. According to a medical
report completed by the NOLA Motor Club personnel in response to the accident,
a medic placed Mr. Marcade’s deformed left leg in a splint and noted that there
were no other visible injuries. Thereafter, Mr. Marcade was released to the care of
West Jefferson EMS for further treatment.
Before the group began the karting activity, Mr. Marcade’s wife signed a
Parental Consent, Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk, and
Indemnity Agreement form, and their son signed a Minor’s Assumption of Risk
1
Here, we use the same spelling of Appellant’s first name as the case caption, although the record
suggests it should be spelled “Zacharie”.
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and Release and Waiver of Liabilty, before a witness who was an employee of the
track. The group also provided NOLA Motor Sports with forms that had been
signed by ST and his father the day before the party. On the parental consent form,
ST’s father acknowledged:
I know the nature of the EVENT(S) and the Minor’s experience
and capabilities, and believe the Minor to be qualified to participate in
the Event(s). I will inspect the premises, facilities, and equipment to
be used, or with which the Minor may come in contact. IF I OR THE
MINOR BELIEVE ANTYTHING IS UNSAFE, I WILL INSTRUCT
THE MINOR TO IMMEDIATELY LEAVE THE RESTRICTED
AREA AND REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN THE
EVENT(S).
Through signing the forms, the adults also acknowledged the inherent danger and
risk of harm karting poses, and NOLA Motorsports Park’s immunity from liability
pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2795.4.
On June 5, 2020, Mr. Marcade filed a Petition for Damages against NOLA
Motor Club. Mr. Marcade alleged that he “has suffered physical pain and suffering,
mental anguish, medical expenses, permanent disability, and disfigurement among
other damages” as a result of the accident that “was caused solely and proximately
by the negligence of NOLA Motor Club.” NOLA Motor Club filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on May 5, 2022. In its motion, Appellees alleged that karting
was a “motorized off-road vehicle activity” as contemplated by La. R.S. 9:2795.4,
claimed that they met all of the statute’s requirements, and asserted the immunity
provided by the statute. NOLA Motor Club further argued that Mr. Marcade could
not claim the exception to immunity provided by La. R.S. 9:2795.4(C)(2) because
the statute required activity sponsors to make “reasonable and prudent efforts to
determine the ability of the participant [claiming the exception] to engage safely”
in the activity, and not the other participants partaking in the activity. Mr. Marcade
timely filed an opposition, arguing that the collision was caused by a twelve-year-
old child and NOLA Motor Club violated its own safety policy in allowing a child
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under the age of fifteen to operate a SR kart unless the parent confirmed the minor
had prior karting experience; that NOLA Motor Club’s failure to make reasonable
and prudent efforts to determine the participant’s ability to kart safely and their
failure to make sure ST had prior karting experience “constituted willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of the participant” pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2795.4(C)(2) did
in fact apply in this case; NOLA Motor Club had to prove immunity; NOLA Motor
Club’s conduct triggered two of the exceptions to immunity under the statute; and
whether NOLA Motor Club confirmed that ST had prior karting experience was a
genuine issue of material fact in dispute. In the alternative, Mr. Marcade also
argued that La. R.S. 9:2795.4(C)(2) was unconstitutionally vague, and indefinite.
The district court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on
October 25, 2022 and granted judgment in favor of NOLA Motor Club at the end
of the hearing. The court found: 1) that NOLA Motor Club met the threshold of
invoking the immunity statute’s protection; 2) the waiver executed by ST’s parent
would satisfy the statute’s requirements such that any exception under Subsection
B would not apply; 3) the father’s certification of ST’s ability to participate in the
activity was the “best discharge” of NOLA Motor Club’s obligation to ensure that
participants could safely engage in karting; 4) that, because ST’s father
acknowledged that he knew that the child was going karting, knew the nature of
karting, and determined that his child could safely participate, it was not NOLA
Motor Club’s responsibility to second guess the parent’s assessment, so (C)(2) did
not apply; 5) the disclosure and waiver executed by ST’s parent made resolution of
the statutory construction question regarding who was a participant under La. R.S.
9:2794.4(C)(2) unnecessary; and 6) verifying that the parent knew about the SR
kart safety policy was good practice, but not necessary to discharge any obligation
that could be found under Subsection (C)(4), again because the parent certified that
the child was capable of participating in the activity. The court also ruled that the
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constitutionality of the statute was not properly before the court because the
petition was not served upon the Attorney General.
This timely appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Appellant assigns the following as error:
(1) The district court committed reversible error in granting the
Motion for Summary Judgment because there was contradictory
evidence that established genuine issues of material fact listed as
such by NOLA Motor Club.
(2) The district court was not allowed to judge the facts or weigh the
evidence at the hearing of the Motion but did so when it
disregarded key testimony and inserted language into the parental
consent form.
(3) The district court similarly erred when it found that the parental
consent form outweighed the evidence of NOLA Motor Club’s
willful and wanton disregard for its safety policy.
Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment and appeal argue that two of the
exceptions to the immunity provided by La. R.S. 9:2795.4 are triggered by the
facts in this case. Plaintiff argues that NOLA Motor Club failed to make
reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant, ST, to
engage safely in the motorized off-road vehicle activity. Plaintiff also argues that
NOLA Motor Sports’ failure to follow its own policy of requiring drivers of the SR
karts to be at least fifteen years old or to have prior karting experience was an act
or omission that constituted willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the
participant Mr. Marcade, and that act or omission caused his injury. To support
that argument, Plaintiff highlighted the fact that ninety-six accidents at NOLA
Motor Club were caused by children between the ages of eight to fifteen in the five
years preceding the accident. Last, Mr. Marcade takes exception with Defendant’s
interpretation of “participant” under La. R.S. 9:2795.4 as anything other than a
“negligent kart operator” and contends that “[a]ny other reading of the law would
lead to an absurd consequence.”
23-CA-17 4
Defendants/Appellees argue that the district court correctly found that
NOLA Motor Club satisfied the requirements of La. R.S. 9:2795.4 (C)(2) to make
reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of ST to safely engage in
karting by obtaining a parental consent form from ST's father indicating that ST's
father was aware of the activities in which his son would be participating and that
he believed his son was qualified to participate.
Alternatively, even if NOLA Motor Club's reliance on the Parental Consent
Form signed by ST's father was not reasonable and prudent, Defendants argue that
La. R.S. 9:2795.4 does not require NOLA Motor Club, as a motorized off-road
vehicle activity sponsor, to make efforts to determine the ability of the other
participants, such as ST, to safely engage in the activity, but rather requires the
activity sponsor to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of
“the [injured] participant”, Mr. Marcade, to participate in the activity.
NOLA Motor Club also contends that the district court correctly found that
Plaintiff did not meet his burden to prove that an exception to immunity may
apply, considering the facts of the case, and did not create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether NOLA Motor Club “[c]ommitted an act or omission
that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and
that act or commission caused the injury.”
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria
that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is
appropriate. Caminita for & on Behalf of Caminita v. Roman Catholic Church of
Archdiocese of New Orleans, 20-54 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/8/20), 299 So.3d 1269,
1271, citing Stogner v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation, 18-96 (La. App. 5 Cir.
9/19/18), 254 So.3d 1254, 1257. Summary judgment shall be granted “if the
motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine
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issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Id.In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge's role is
not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of
the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of
triable fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party's
favor. Hines v. Garrett, 2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765.
A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery,
affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the
legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons
could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion,
there is no need for a trial on that issue and summary judgment is
appropriate. Id. at 765–66.
On motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof remains
with the movant. However, if the moving party will not bear the
burden of proof on the issue at trial and points out that there is an
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the
adverse party's claim, action, or defense, then the non-moving party
must produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be
able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the opponent
of the motion fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact
and summary judgment will be granted. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1);
see also Schultz v. Guoth, 2010-0343 (La. 1/19/11), 57 So.3d 1002,
1006.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in La. C.C.P. art. 967, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in La. C.C.P. art. 967, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
rendered against him. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B); see also Dejoie v.
Medley, 2008-2223 (La. 5/5/09), 9 So.3d 826, 832.
Whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in
light of the substantive law applicable to the case.
Larson v. XYZ Ins. Co., 16-0745 (La. 5/3/17), 226 So.3d 412, 417. The party
seeking immunity pursuant to statute, here NOLA Motor Club, also bears the
burden of proving that the statutory immunity in question applies to the particular
set of facts currently at issue. Tebault v. E. Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 18-539 (La. App.
5 Cir. 3/25/19), 2019 WL 1339471 at *2, writ denied, 19-641 (La. 6/17/19), 273
So.3d 1211. As a general rule, statutes granting immunities or advantages to a
special class in derogation of the general rights available to tort victims must be
23-CA-17 6
strictly construed against limiting the tort claimants’ rights against the wrongdoer.
Id.Recreational Use Statutes are in derogation of common or natural rights and,
therefore, are to be strictly interpreted, and must not be extended beyond their
obvious meaning. Richard v. Louisiana Newpack Shrimp Co., Inc., 11-309 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 12/28/11), 82 So.3d 541, 546. La. R.S. 9:2795.4, titled “Limitation of
liability; motorized off-road vehicle activities; definitions; exceptions; required
warning” provides, in pertinent part:
A. As used in this Section, the following terms shall have the
following meanings, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) “Engages in motorized off-road vehicle activity” means
rides or drives, or is a passenger upon a motorized off-road
vehicle, or is a person assisting a participant or management.
The term “engages in a motorized off-road vehicle activity”
does not include being a spectator at a motorized off-road
vehicle activity, except in cases where the spectator places
himself in an unauthorized area and in immediate proximity to
the motorized off-road vehicle activity.
(2) “Inherent risks of motorized off-road vehicle activities”
means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of
a motorized off-road vehicle activity, including but not limited
to:
[. . .]
(c) Collisions with other motorized off-road vehicles or
objects.
(d) The potential of a participant to act in a negligent
manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or
others, such as failing to maintain control over the
motorized off-road vehicle or not acting within his
ability.
[. . .]
(4) “Motorized off-road vehicle activity” includes any or all of
the following:
(a) A motorized off-road vehicle show, race, competition,
or performance that involves any or all motorized off-
road vehicles, including but not limited to any dirt track,
paved or unpaved race course, or jump.
[. . .]
(c) Driving, inspecting, or evaluating a motorized off-
road vehicle belonging to another, whether or not the
owner has received some monetary consideration or other
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thing of value for the use of the motorized off-road
vehicle at a motorized off-road vehicle facility.
[. . .]
(8) “Participant” means any person, whether amateur or
professional, who engages in a motorized off-road vehicle
activity, whether or not a fee is paid to participate in the
motorized off-road vehicle activity.
B. Except as provided in Subsection C of this Section, a motorized
off-road vehicle activity sponsor, a motorized off-road vehicle
professional, or any other person, which shall include individuals and
all forms of business entities, shall not be liable for an injury to or the
death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of a motorized
off- road vehicle activity and, except as provided in Subsection C of
this Section, no participant or participant's representative shall make
any claim against, maintain an action against, or recover from, a
motorized off-road vehicle activity sponsor, a motorized off-road
vehicle professional, or any other person for injury, loss, damage, or
death of the participant resulting from any of the inherent risks of
motorized off-road vehicle activities.
C. Nothing in Subsection B of this Section shall prevent or limit the
liability of a motorized off-road vehicle activity sponsor, a motorized
off-road vehicle professional, or any other person if the motorized off-
road vehicle activity sponsor, motorized off-road vehicle professional,
or other person either:
[. . .]
(2) Failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine
the ability of the participant to engage safely in the motorized
off- road vehicle activity.
[. . .]
(4) Committed an act or omission that constitutes willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that act or
omission caused the injury.
[. . .]
In the past, we have endorsed the third circuit’s explanation of “willful” and
“wanton.”
The terms ‘willful’, ‘wanton’, and ‘reckless' have been applied
to that degree of fault which lies between intent to do wrong, and the
mere reasonable risk of harm involved in ordinary negligence. These
terms apply to conduct which is still merely negligent, rather than
actually intended to do harm, but which is so far from a proper state of
mind that it is treated in many respects as if harm was intended. The
usual meaning assigned to do [sic] the terms is that the actor has
intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in reckless
disregard of the risk known to him, or so obvious that he must be
taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly
probable that harm would follow. It usually is accompanied by a
conscious indifference to consequences, amounting almost to a
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willingness that harm should follow. See Prosser, Law of Torts,
Section 34, at pages 187-189 (od Ed.1964).
Adams v. Marathon Oil Co., 96-693 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/15/97), 688 So.2d 75 citing
Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., 316 So.2d 907, 916 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1975),
aff'd 328 So.2d 367 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S.Ct. 97, 50 L.Ed.2d
98 (1976). A plaintiff must prove the misconduct:
was committed with the state of mind that [defendant] knew the
public safety was at risk or should have known that it was highly
probable that harm to the public would follow as a consequence of its
derelictions. In other words plaintiff must show that [defendant's]
alleged acts and omissions of negligence were accompanied by a
conscious indifference to consequences amounting almost to a
willingness that harm to the public safety would follow.
Adams, supra, citing Griffin v. Tenneco Oil Company, 531 So.2d 498 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1988).
The limitation of liability of motorized off-road vehicle activities was
constructed from the limitation of liability of equine activity, which
was first enacted in 1999 under La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2795.1 (1999). The
current limitation of liability of equine activity is found under La.
Rev. Stat. § 9:2795.3. With almost identical language to limitation of
liability of equine activity, limitation of liability of motorized off-road
vehicle activities was first enacted in 2003 as La. Rev. Stat. §
9:2795.3 (2003), but moved to La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2795.4 in 2004. Due
to the similarity of the language, and because there seem to be no
reported state or federal cases applying La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2795.4, this
Court looks to the limitation of liability of equine activity as stated in
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2795.3 to interpret the terminology found in La.
Rev. Stat. § 9:2795.4.
Tillman v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co., 21-2331, 2022 WL 1403356, at *4
(E.D. La. May 4, 2022), n.3.
Upon review of the record, we find that there is a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether NOLA Motor Club’s failure to enforce their safety policy
regarding verification that prospective SR kart operators under the age of 15 have
had previous karting experience was an act or omission that constitutes wanton or
willful disregard for the safety of the participant, or whether NOLA Motor Club
made reasonable and prudent efforts to ensure that participants could safely engage
23-CA-17 9
in the sponsored activity. Looking to the equine activity statute as the court in
Tillman, supra did, there are at least two cases that suggest that the equine
activity’s sponsor’s alleged failure to mitigate a horse’s pattern of unsafe behavior
could potentially be found to be an act or omission that constitutes wanton or
willful disregard for the safety of the participant.
In Faul v. Trahan, 98-488 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/7/98), 718 So.2d 1081, 1089,
a farm employee sustained injuries when a horse “flipped” onto him as he began
exercising it. At trial, several witnesses testified and there were conflicts in the
evidence adduced at trial regarding whether the equine activity sponsors knew that
the horse was a “flipper” or “had dangerous tendencies.” Id. The Third Circuit
opined that, in order to prove the liability of the defendants under the Equine
Immunity Statute, the plaintiff had to show that they “acted with a reckless
disregard for the consequences of their actions in the face of a known or obvious
risk.” Id. at 1088-1089. Further, because the trial court’s findings in those regards
were factual in nature and would not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error,
the appellate court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that neither the horse’s
trainer nor owner “acted with a reckless disregard for the consequences of their
actions in the face of a known or obvious risk.” Id.
In Larson, 226 So.3d at 418, the plaintiff, Danielle Larson, filed suit after
her thumb was bitten off by a pony she was feeding at a horse farm. Larson
testified in her deposition that she asked for permission to visit with the horses at
the farm office. The office employee told her she could return with certain treats,
and feed and visit with the school horses. Id. at 414. On her way to feed the horses,
two riders advised her to be careful because they heard one of the school ponies
had bitten a child. Id. Afterwards, when she went to feed one of the ponies a carrot,
the pony knocked the carrot from her hand onto the floor and bit her thumb when
they both attempted to retrieve the carrot from the floor. Id. The farm moved for
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summary judgment and argued that Larson’s suit should be dismissed because of
the applicability of the Equine Immunity Statute. Id. at 415. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court of appeal reversed
summary judgment, finding that “Larson was not a participant engaged in equine
activity, and thus [the farm] was not afforded immunity under the statute.” Id. The
court of appeal’s majority opinion also opined that even if Larson was a spectator
as defined by the statute, the statute may still “provide immunity for the farm if
Larson placed herself in an unauthorized area,” but found that there were genuine
issues of material fact on that issue that barred summary judgment. Id. The
Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal regarding the “contested issues of
material fact that make summary judgment inappropriate.” Id. at 417. In his
concurrence, Justice Weimer noted:
La. R.S. 9:2795.3(C)(2) provides an exemption from statutory
immunity for the failure of an equine activity sponsor, equine
professional, or any other person to “make reasonable and prudent
efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in
the equine activity and to safely manage the particular equine based
on the participant's representations of his ability.” La. R.S.
9:2795.3(C)(2) (emphasis added).
Id.
By analogy, to determine whether NOLA Motor Club’s conduct may have
triggered exceptions to the immunity provided by La. R.S. 9:2795.4, we must
perform the same analysis that the Faul and Larson courts undertook with regards
to the Equine Immunity Statute. This Court must consider NOLA Motor Club’s
knowledge of the particular risk(s) faced by the plaintiff, and whether, in response
to those risk(s), the precautions it took were reasonable and prudent, and/or its acts
or omissions constituted wanton and willful disregard for the participant’s safety.
In the case sub judice, despite several accidents being caused by minors under the
age of fifteen operating karts, there is evidence that NOLA Motor Sports did not
advise participants or their parents of the dangers of minors under the age of fifteen
23-CA-17 11
operating the SR karts in particular, or enforce its safety policy and verify that kart
operators under the age of fifteen had previous karting experience. NOLA Motor
Club admitted that neither the consent forms nor their employees verify that
minors under the age of fifteen have previous karting experience before allowing
them to operate the faster SR karts.
Factual findings are required to determine whether the general disclosure
(given by the parental consent forms) of the inherent danger and risk karting posed
was adequate; whether NOLA Motor Club “acted with a reckless disregard for the
consequences of their actions in the face of a known or obvious risk” by failing to
verify the SR kart operators under the age of 15 had prior karting experience (or to,
at least, notify participants’ parents of that particular risk); and whether NOLA’s
acts or omissions constituted “willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the
participant.”. See Faul, supra. Subjective facts call for credibility evaluations and
the weighing of testimony and summary judgment is inappropriate for such
determinations. Read v. Willwoods Cmty., 11-222 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/14/12), 88
So.3d 534, 538, writ denied, 12-616 (La. 4/27/12), 86 So.3d 629. In determining
whether an issue is genuine for purposes of a summary judgment, courts cannot
consider the merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony or weigh
evidence. Id.Last, we find that that the use of “participant” in La. R.S. 9:2795.4(C)(2)
applies to both Mr. Marcade and ST. “Participant” is defined by the statute as “any
person, whether amateur or professional, who engages in a motorized off-road
vehicle activity, whether or not a fee is paid to participate in the motorized off-road
vehicle activity.” (Emphasis added). Further, the activity sponsor’s duty to “make
reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage
safely in the motorized off-road vehicle activity” must necessarily encompass
23-CA-17 12
making reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the other
participants to safely engage in the motorized off-road vehicle activity also.
DECREE
Based on the foregoing, the district court ruling granting summary judgment
to NOLA Motor Club and New York Marine and General Insurance Company is
reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED; REMANDED
23-CA-17 13
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
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GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
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OCTOBER 4, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
23-CA-17
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HONORABLE STEPHEN C. GREFER (DISTRICT JUDGE)
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