Elmore Tregre, II Versus Bis Services, LLC ( 2023 )

ELMORE TREGRE, II NO. 23-C-124
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
BIS SERVICES, LLC, ET AL. COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 796-885, DIVISION "D"
HONORABLE SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL, JUDGE PRESIDING
October 04, 2023
MARC E. JOHNSON
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, and Robert A. Chaisson
AFFIRMED
MEJ
FHW
RAC
DISSENTS WITH REASONS
SMC
DISSENTS FOR THE REASONS ASSIGNED BY CHEHARDY, C.J.
JGG
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
ELMORE W. TREGRE, II
David P. Salley
Stephen C. Resor
Michael W. Rutledge
James G. Albertine, III
Robert L. Keller, II
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR,
BIS SERVICES, LLC
Michael W. McMahon
Kirk N. Aurandt
Paul R. Trapani, III
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
PHYLWAY CONSTRUCTION, LLC
Alex P. Tilling
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
VIXEN, LLC
James A. Prather
Joshua Dierker
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
EAST JEFFERSON LEVEE DISTRICT AND SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA
FLOOD PROTECTION AUTHORITY -EAST
Mark E. Hanna
Trevor M. Cutaiar
John Zazulak
JOHNSON, J.
Relator, BIS Services, LLC (“BIS”), seeks supervisory review of the 24th
Judicial District Court’s December 27, 2022 judgment denying its motion for
summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2017 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded BIS a $4.5 million
Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System contract for work on the
levee adjacent to the All-Weather Access Road (AWAR) in Jefferson Parish along
the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain. The construction project involved relocating
existing concrete access ramps, installing turf reinforcement “armoring” systems
on the levee, replacing the turf grass, and installing an irrigation system, followed
by periodic watering and mowing.
The East Jefferson Levee District granted a right-of-way for the project.
Although the primary function of the AWAR is for levee maintenance, the District
specified that the AWAR is required to be open “at all times” for public
recreational use, and “pedestrians and cyclists shall have right of way.”
At approximately 5:00 p.m., during daylight hours, on July 25, 2018,
plaintiff, an avid cyclist, was riding his bicycle on the AWAR near the Ridgelake
ramp in Metairie. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was familiar with that
section of the AWAR; before his accident, he had ridden on the Ridgelake ramp
numerous times between January and July 2018. Plaintiff also stated that he had
substantial experience in riding his bike in windy and wet conditions. Plaintiff
testified that on the day of the accident, while at the top of the ramp, he saw the
water on the pavement, the silt fences, and the other implements of construction.
When plaintiff and two companions road their bikes down the Ridgelake ramp
headed west, with plaintiff in the lead, plaintiff’s bike tire hit a wet patch on the
23-C-124 1
ramp, causing his bike to slip and plaintiff to fall and suffer a broken femur, broken
humerus, and crushed humeral head.1 Initially, plaintiff testified that he saw no
mud on the road on the day of his accident. However, after looking at a picture of
the area that was taken a day after his accident, plaintiff stated he believed there
was also mud in the area where he slipped. He agreed, though, that he had no
independent recollection to suggest that the area was this way on the day of his
accident.
Tommy Ridgley, one of plaintiff’s cycling companions who followed
plaintiff down the ramp, testified in his deposition that the area was a little muddy
and that he saw a greenish substance. David Songy was the second companion who
followed Ridgley down the ramp. He described the wet area to be “more like
algae” that was “building up over time.” Mr. Songy also testified that another
accident occurred in the same spot within a week of plaintiff’s accident. Mr.
Ridgley testified that plaintiff was the “most experienced” cyclist among the three
of them, and that all three had ridden in this area, and up and down the Ridgelake
ramp, numerous times. When they reached the top of the approach ramp the
cyclists were in single-file order; they then slowed down to descend the other side
of the levee, because they could see that there were wet conditions, and because
more cyclists were coming their way from the opposite direction, which required a
sharp right turn to continue on the bike path while avoiding the oncoming bicycle
traffic. Mr. Ridgley saw plaintiff’s wheel “wobble” and stated that plaintiff “went
down quickly.” Mr. Ridgley testified that it “was always a little muddy” in the area
where plaintiff fell, and that he saw a greenish-colored algae substance there.
1
Plaintiff described the accident as follows: “as my front wheel slid ever so slightly through the
patch of wet pavement, when it hit the next piece of dry pavement, it actually gripped. It gripped
really well. Unfortunately, my back tire hit the same spot of pavement as the front that had
slipped, and I stayed in that wet [spot] and … my back wheel went out from under me. I’ll
describe it as a fishtail motion.”
23-C-124 2
The access-ramp area where the accident occurred was a known construction
zone, and orange cones, orange temporary fencing, and silt fencing were visible
adjacent to the accident site. Mr. Adrianne Diaz, the BIS Site Safety and Health
Officer, testified that at approximately 8:30 on the morning of the accident he
inspected the AWAR, including the Ridgelake ramp, and found no mud or debris
in the area. Diaz returned to the area around 4:45 p.m. and saw that the AWAR
was wet because of the ongoing turf grass irrigation, but he did not see any mud or
debris. He returned again after the accident.2 A photograph taken after the accident
2
Mr. Diaz explained that when he arrived at the scene immediately after the accident, he did not
see any mud:
Q: Okay. And when you were out at the site following Mr. Tregre’s accident, we
can see the pictures that have, you know, wet concrete or asphalt, whatever it is,
but did you see any actual mud flows, if you will, or mud –
A: No, sir.
Q: -- on the roadway?
A: No.
***
Q: In the area where Mr. Tregre fell and this water and alleged to be mud, prior to
his fall had you advised anyone to take any corrective action concerning that area
of the project at all?
A: No.
***
Q: So when you found debris out there, did you report that to Mark Silver?
A: Yes.
Q: In these QC notes?
A: Yes.
Q: If you found debris on the AWAR, after you report it to Mark, [ ] do you instruct
somebody to clean it up?
A: Yes. I would let Jay Manifold know this such and such area needs to be
addressed, you bring a sweeper or whatever to clean it up.
***
Q: Did you walk the project that morning?
A: Yes.
Q: And earlier you said you also walked the project at 4 o’clock; is that right?
A: Yes.
***
Q: After the accident, did you walk actually up the ramp or in the wet area?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you see any mud on your shoes?
A: No.
Q: Did you find the area slippery?
A: Slippery?
Q: With mud?
A: With mud, no.
Q: What do the orange cones tell you?
Mr. Rutledge: Object to form.
A: Indication of a work hazard, work zone.
Q: What about the orange fencing? What does that tell you?
A: It’s another sign indicating work zone, construction work.
23-C-124 3
shows several wet spots in the area of the ramp, orange cones, orange mesh
fencing, and a black silt fence.
Plaintiff filed suit against BIS asserting claims in general negligence under
La. Civ. Code arts. 2315 and 2316, and premises-liability claims under La. Civ.
Code arts. 2317 and 2317.1. In addition to the allegations that an unreasonably
dangerous condition on the AWAR caused his accident, plaintiff asserted that BIS
“failed to construct the Project in a reasonable and workmanlike manner,” thereby
creating the unreasonably hazardous condition; failed to inspect the area and/or
prevent or remove the condition; and “violated the Project Specifications by failing
to keep the All Weather Access Road free of mud, tracking, spillage and/or other
surface pollution from their equipment and operations.”3
BIS and its subcontractors filed motions for summary judgment seeking
dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against them.4 BIS argues that the wet pavement
presented a “clear and obvious” hazard that could not, as a matter of law, pose an
unreasonable risk of harm either in general negligence or under a theory of
premises liability. BIS further argued that no genuine issues of material fact exist.
In opposing BIS’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argued that BIS
failed to adhere to the contract specifications requiring BIS to keep the AWAR
“free of mud, tracking, spillage and/or other surface pollution…. Contractor shall
take whatever means required (i.e., street cleaners, manual labor, water trucks with
sprayers) as often as needed to maintain clean streets near the work site.”
According to plaintiff, BIS’s failure to keep the AWAR free of mud and surface
3
Plaintiff named the owners of the AWAR (the East Jefferson Levee District and the Southeast
Louisiana Flood Protection Authority East), and other subcontractors, including Phylway
Construction, LLC, and Vixen, LLC, as additional defendants.
4
The only motion for summary judgment before this Court is BIS’s motion. The trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the East Jefferson Levee District and the
Southeast Flood Protection Authority East, and those entities have been dismissed from the case.
23-C-124 4
pollution constituted a breach of the terms of the contract as well as a breach of its
duty to plaintiff to maintain the area free of hazardous and/or unreasonably
dangerous conditions.
The trial court denied BIS’s motion for summary judgment, finding that
genuine issues of material fact remain, including whether there was mud or a
greenish substance on the wet pavement that created an unreasonably dangerous
condition. BIS seeks supervisory review of that ruling. Initially finding potential
merit in BIS’s arguments, we granted the parties an opportunity to provide
additional briefing and to request oral argument, if desired, pursuant to La. C.C.P.
art. 966 H. After oral argument, the matter was assigned to a five-judge panel and
reargued, pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 8(B).
LAW AND DISCUSSION
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.
C.C.P. art. 966 A(3). The burden of proof rests with the mover. La. C.C.P. art. 966
D(1). Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the
issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s
burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim, action, or defense. Id. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual
support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or
that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also Robinson
v. Otis Condominium Assoc., Inc., 20-359 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/3/21), 315 So.3d 356,
360-61, writ denied, 21-0343 (La. 4/27/21), 314 So.3d 837.
23-C-124 5
We review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Bourgeois
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15-451 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/15), 182 So.3d 1177, 1181.
Under this standard, we use the same criteria as the trial court in determining if
summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is a genuine issue as to material
fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Richthofen v.
Medina, 14-294 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/14), 164 So.3d 231, 234, writ denied, 14-
2514 (La. 3/13/15), 161 So.3d 639.
Plaintiff asserts claims against BIS under La. Civ. Code arts. 2315, 2316,
2317, and 2317.1. La. Civ. Code art. 2315(A) states: “Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”
La. Civ. Code art. 2316 states: “Every person is responsible for the damage he
occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want
of skill.” La. Civ. Code art. 2317 states: “We are responsible, not only for the
damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by … the things
which we have in our custody.” La. Civ. Code art. 2317.1, which governs
negligence claims against a property owner or custodian, provides, in pertinent
part:
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for
damage occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon
a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect which
caused the damage, that the damage could have been
prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he
failed to exercise such reasonable care.
“Whether a claim arises in negligence under La. Civ. Code art. 2315 or in premises
liability under La. Civ. Code art. 2317.1, the traditional duty/risk analysis is the
same.” Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 22-0849 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 467, 473.
In Farrell, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling
denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a premises liability suit
23-C-124 6
that was filed after the plaintiff slipped and fell while trying to traverse a large
puddle of water at the edge of a gas station parking lot. In that case, the Supreme
Court cleared up the admitted confusion in the jurisprudence surrounding the
application of the duty/risk analysis when assessing an allegedly unreasonably
dangerous condition in general negligence or premises liability claims.
The Farrell Court first reaffirmed the well-settled rule that under the
duty/risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove five separate elements: (1) the defendant
had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) the
defendant’s conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach
element); (3) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff’s injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant’s substandard
conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (the scope of duty element);
and (5) proof of actual damages (the damages element). Id. at 473 (citing Malta v.
Herbert S. Hiller Corp., 21-209 (La. 10/10/21), 333 So.3d 384, 395). See also
Boykin v. La. Transit Co., Inc., 96-1932 (La. 3/4/98), 707 So.2d 1225, 1230. If the
plaintiff fails to prove any one element by a preponderance of the evidence, the
defendant is not liable. Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-952 (La. 11/30/94), 646
So.2d 318, 326.
The Farrell Court then explained that Louisiana’s jurists have exhibited a
tendency to conflate the duty and the breach elements when evaluating an
allegedly unreasonably dangerous condition. The duty element, which is a question
of law, examines whether there is any legal support for Plaintiff’s claim that
defendant owed him a duty. Here, La. Civ. Code arts. 2315, 2316, 2317, and
2317.1 require the custodian of immovable property to discover any unreasonably
dangerous condition on his premises and either correct the condition or warn
potential victims of its existence. Farrell, 359 So.3d at 473-74. Like the defendant
in Farrell, BIS owed such a duty to plaintiff here.
23-C-124 7
Whether there is a breach of that duty is a mixed question of fact and law,
which we assess through application of the risk/utility balancing test by evaluating:
(1) the utility of the complained-of condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of
harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of
preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff’s activities in terms of
social utility or whether the activities were dangerous by nature. Id. (citing Bufkin
v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 14-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So.3d 851, 856).
Summary judgment, based on the absence of liability, may be
granted upon a finding that reasonable minds could only agree that the
condition was not unreasonably dangerous; therefore, the defendant
did not breach the duty owed. In such instance, the plaintiff would be
unable to prove the breach element at trial.
Farrell, 359 So.3d at 478. In this case, whether or not summary judgment is
appropriate turns on the second prong of the risk/utility balancing test which
addresses the likelihood and magnitude of the harm, including whether a condition
is open and obvious. See id.
The ruling in Farrell does provide that a slippery substance contained within
the water may fall short of creating an unreasonably dangerous condition. Id. at
479. However, noting the distinguishing facts in this case, after performing a risk-
utility analysis, we find that reasonable minds could differ in their assessments of
the likelihood and magnitude of the harm posed by the condition at the base of the
ramp.
In Farrell, supra, the majority found that the likelihood and magnitude of
harm was “minimal” after considering the location, size, and condition of the pool
of water, and the fact that it was “apparent to all who may encounter it.” 359 So.3d
at 478-79. The injured plaintiff in Farrell was walking her dog near a large pool of
water at the edge of a gas station parking lot -- an area into which the proprietor
had a reasonable expectation that customers would not venture.
23-C-124 8
To contrast, in the instant case, the condition was located on the AWAR
ramp, plaintiff presented evidence that the AWAR’s secondary use was for the
recreation of pedestrians and cyclists, and the contractors working on the project
had a contractual obligation “to take whatever means required [. . .] as often as
needed to maintain clean [AWAR] near the work site”. The record contains
conflicting evidence regarding the existence of mud and/or a greenish algae-like
substance within the wet area where plaintiff’s accident occurred.5 The parties also
dispute whether the intervals at which the ramp was cleaned were adequate. On
summary judgment, we have no authority to weigh the evidence or to make
credibility determinations. See, e.g., Boros v. Lobell, 15-55 (La. App. 5 Cir.
9/23/15), 176 So.3d 689, 693.
Further, although the part of the ramp where plaintiff’s accident occurred
was clearly marked as a construction area, it is not certain that any reasonable
AWAR user would sufficiently be put on notice of the danger posed by the
slippery road conditions. There was no posted speed limit, and the ramp remained
accessible to invited recreational pedestrians and cyclists whose very presence and
safety had been contractually provided for.
For a hazard to be considered open and obvious, it must be one that is
open and obvious to all who may encounter it. The open and obvious
concept asks whether the complained of condition would be apparent
to any reasonable person who might encounter it. If so, that
reasonable person would avoid it, and the factor will weigh in favor of
finding the condition not unreasonably dangerous.
Farrell, 359 So.3d at 478. The Farrell court noted that the particular plaintiff’s
“knowledge and appreciation of the allegedly hazardous condition is not
determinative” for purposes of summary judgment proceedings, though it may be
considered in assessing fault. Id. The plaintiff in this case happens to be a very
5
Plaintiff’s cycling companions testified to seeing a greenish algae substance or muddy
conditions. However, the BIS employee who, on the day of the accident, inspected the site both
in the morning and at approximately 4:45 p.m., found no mud or debris in the area.
23-C-124 9
experienced cyclist, and an architect with knowledge of the dangers worksites,
such as the levee project, pose. However, we cannot find that any reasonable
cyclist’s analysis of the likelihood and magnitude of the harm presented by the
conditions at the end of the AWAR ramp that day would necessarily result in a
decision to dismount and avoid the conditions at the ramp on the day of the
accident. Therefore, we find that the possible outcomes of the risk/utility balancing
test at this point in the litigation do not preclude a finding that the condition
plaintiff encountered was unreasonably hazardous and that Relator breached a duty
to plaintiff.
DECREE
Considering the foregoing, the district court’s December 27, 2022 judgment
denying BIS’s motion for summary judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
23-C-124 10
ELMORE TREGRE, II NO. 23-C-124
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
BIS SERVICES, LLC, ET AL. COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
CHEHARDY, C.J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
I respectfully dissent. In my view, after conducting the risk/utility balancing
test outlined in Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 22-0849 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d
467, 473, the wet conditions on the AWAR ramp were open and obvious and
easily observed by all who looked, and BIS could not be found to have breached
the duty of care it owed to plaintiff. Accordingly, I would grant BIS’s writ
application, grant its motion for summary judgment, and dismiss plaintiff’s claims
against BIS.
Under the first prong of the risk/utility balancing test—evaluating the utility
of the complained-of condition—the very purpose of the ongoing construction
project on the AWAR was to enhance hurricane and storm protection through
reinforcement of the levees by, among other things, replacing the turf grass,
installing an irrigation system, and engaging in periodic watering of the area. This
purpose could not be achieved without water in the area. “If [the alleged defect]
was meant to be there, it often will have social utility, and in the balancing test,
weigh against a finding that the premises was unsafe.” Farrell, 359 So.3d at 474.
Unlike the large puddle of water at issue in Farrell for which there was no
discernable utility, there was significant utility in the wet conditions at the site of
this ongoing levee construction project.
23-C-124 1
The second prong of the risk/utility balancing test assesses the likelihood
and magnitude of the harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the
condition. The Supreme Court explains:
The likelihood of the harm factor asks the degree to which
the condition will likely cause harm. If it is likely to cause
harm, that weighs in favor of finding it unreasonably
dangerous. If it is unlikely to cause harm, that weighs in
favor of it not being unreasonably dangerous. The
magnitude of the harm factor asks whether the condition
presents a risk of great or small injury and the likelihood
of each. The likelihood and magnitude of the harm
includes a consideration of the open[ness] and
obviousness of the condition.
Id.
All of the testimony in the record before us suggests that the wet area was
very apparent to anyone who was near. Plaintiff himself testified that he saw the
wet pavement from the top of the ramp, and as he descended from the ramp, he
slowed down because continuing on the bike path required a right turn. He saw that
other cyclists were coming from the opposite direction, and he wanted to remain in
his lane as much as possible rather than veering left before making the necessary
right turn. Plaintiff stated that he used both of his hand brakes when he was riding
down the ramp, but he stopped braking once he hit the wet areas, because “you
don’t want to be braking when you’re crossing wet pavement.”
Anyone who encountered the area would not look at the Ridgelake ramp and
conclude that it presents a likelihood of great harm, as record testimony established
that cyclists passed through that area often. Considering that the wet conditions
were open and obvious and that the risk of harm was not great, I find that the
second prong of the risk/utility balancing test weighs against the alleged defect
being found unreasonably dangerous.
As to the cost of preventing the harm under the third prong of the risk/utility
balancing test, there is not sufficient evidence of these costs in the record, but I
23-C-124 2
find this prong less relevant than the other factors, given that the area already
contained orange cones and temporary fencing, delineating a construction area.
Regarding the fourth prong—the nature of the plaintiff’s activities in terms
of social utility, or whether the activities were dangerous by nature—bicycle riding
is not dangerous per se but can become dangerous if a rider lacks sufficient skill or
fails to heed observable dangers; if the bicycle lacks stability; or any number of
other factors. In my view, this prong weighs neither for nor against a finding that
the conditions were unreasonably dangerous.
Moreover, although the record contains conflicting evidence regarding the
existence of mud and/or a greenish algae-like substance within the wet area where
plaintiff’s accident occurred, and while I agree with the majority that, on summary
judgment, we have no authority to weigh the evidence or to make credibility
determinations, this issue fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact and thus
does not preclude granting summary judgment in this case. In Farrell, the Supreme
Court explained that “the allegedly hazardous condition, be it the pool of water at
the edge of the parking lot or the slippery substance contained within the water,
was not an unreasonably dangerous condition.” 359 So.3d at 479 (emphasis
added). Under the present facts, even assuming that mud or an algae-like substance
was present at the time and exact place of plaintiff’s accident, Farrell suggests that
these conditions in and of themselves fall short of creating an “unreasonably
dangerous” condition.
Considering the risk/utility balancing test as a whole, including the
substantial utility of the construction project, the openness and obviousness of the
wet conditions, and the generally low likelihood of great harm, I find that the wet
conditions at the Ridgelake ramp did not present an unreasonable risk of harm.
Where, as here, the complained of condition is open and obvious and fails to
present an unreasonable risk of harm, Farrell dictates that the custodian cannot be
23-C-124 3
found to have breached the duty of care it may owe the plaintiff. Accordingly, I
find BIS is entitled to summary judgment.
23-C-124 4
ELMORE TREGRE, II NO. 23-C-124
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
BIS SERVICES, LLC, ET AL. COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
GRAVOIS, J., DISSENTS FOR THE REASONS ASSIGNED BY
CHEHARDY, C.J.
23-C-124 1
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
OCTOBER 4, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
23-C-124
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HON. SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL (DISTRICT JUDGE)
HON. JOSEPH A. MARINO, III (DISTRICT JUDGE)
DAVID P. SALLEY (RESPONDENT) MICHAEL W. RUTLEDGE (RESPONDENT) STEPHEN C. RESOR (RESPONDENT)
KIRK N. AURANDT (RELATOR) MICHAEL W. MCMAHON (RELATOR) PAUL R. TRAPANI, III (RELATOR)
ALEX P. TILLING (RESPONDENT) JAMES A. PRATHER (RESPONDENT) MARK E. HANNA (RESPONDENT)
TREVOR M. CUTAIAR (RESPONDENT)
MAILED
JAMES G. ALBERTINE, III (RESPONDENT) JOHN ZAZULAK (RESPONDENT) JOSHUA DIERKER (RESPONDENT)
ROBERT L. KELLER, II (RESPONDENT) ATTORNEY AT LAW ATTORNEY AT LAW
ATTORNEY AT LAW 701 POYDRAS STREET THREE SANCTUARY BOULEVARD
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