State of Louisiana Versus Abraham Aguilar ( 2023 )


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  • STATE OF LOUISIANA                                    NO. 23-KA-34
    VERSUS                                                FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ABRAHAM AGUILAR                                       COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
    NO. 20-5824, DIVISION "K"
    HONORABLE ELLEN SHIRER KOVACH, JUDGE PRESIDING
    November 15, 2023
    JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
    JUDGE
    Panel composed of Judges Robert A. Chaisson,
    John J. Molaison, Jr., and Scott U. Schlegel
    CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED
    JJM
    RAC
    SUS
    COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
    Thomas J. Butler
    Anne M. Wallis
    Christina Fisher
    Molly Love
    John Ransone IV
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
    ABRAHAM AGUILAR
    Lieu T. Vo Clark
    MOLAISON, J.
    In this criminal appeal, the defendant seeks review of his conviction for
    sexual battery of a victim under the age of 13. For the reasons that follow, the
    defendant’s sentence and conviction are affirmed.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The record in this matter indicates that on August 17, 2020, 11-year-old G.P.
    disclosed to her mother, M.P., that the defendant, Abraham Aguilar, her
    grandmother’s live-in boyfriend, had sexually abused G.P. on multiple occasions.
    G.P. disclosed to investigating officers that on August 14, 2020, the defendant
    walked up behind her while she was in the kitchen of their Jefferson Parish
    apartment, touched her breasts over her shirt and inserted his finger into her
    vagina. She described another incident in January of 2020, when the defendant had
    rubbed her breasts over her clothing while she was standing at the top of the
    apartment stairwell. G.P. said that he had grabbed her breasts and digitally
    penetrated her vagina on multiple occasions.1 In another incident that happened
    when G.P. was eight years old, the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to put his
    “private part” into G.P.’s vagina.
    Based on the information provided, the defendant was taken into custody by
    the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”) pursuant to an arrest warrant. It was
    discovered that the defendant also used an alias, Cristobal Santiago Aguilar
    Lucero.2 After being advised of, and waiving his rights, the defendant gave an
    interview with JPSO detectives. Initially, the defendant denied that any physical
    contact of that type took place between himself and G.P. But then he recounted one
    incident when G.P. was 11 years old. He stated that he went downstairs in the
    1
    The record shows that the majority of these incidents were alleged to have occurred in a New
    Orleans residence, and therefore were not charged in the instant bill of information.
    2
    The JPSO Crime Report, which was entered into evidence, indicates the defendant admitted to
    an arrest for burglary of an inhabited dwelling under this name.
    23-KA-34                                           1
    family’s apartment to go outside and smoke when he saw G.P. alone in the kitchen.
    He stated that he walked up behind her with the intention of “hugging her.” The
    defendant then claimed that when he did so, G.P. became “ticklish” and moved in
    such a manner that one of his hands touched her breasts. The defendant also stated
    that there was a “probability” that in the same incident that his hands went into
    G.P.’s pants and that he touched her vagina. The defendant was asked by
    detectives how many other similar incidents with G.P. occurred over the 12 years
    he lived with her family, which could have been deemed inappropriate, to which he
    replied “a couple” of times and several times.
    The defendant was charged in a bill of information filed on October 27,
    2020, by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office with one count of
    misdemeanor sexual battery of a known juvenile which took place between
    January 1, 2020, and August 18, 2020, in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1.1.3 After
    initially pleading not guilty, the defendant proceeded to a judge trial on June 15,
    2022, and he was found guilty as charged. On June 30, 2022, the defendant’s
    motion for a new trial was denied, and he was then sentenced to six months in
    parish prison with credit for time served to run concurrently with any other
    sentence he was serving. This timely appeal follows.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    The defendant’s sole assignment of error is that the evidence presented is
    insufficient to convict him under La. R.S. 14:43.1.1. Specifically, the defendant
    contends that the State failed to prove that he touched G.P.’s breasts or buttocks as
    an element of the offense.
    3
    The defendant was charged in a bill of information filed on October 27, 2020, by the Jefferson
    Parish District Attorney’s Office with one count of the sexual battery of a known juvenile that occurred
    between January 1, 2020, and August 18, 2020, in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1. After initially pleading
    not guilty, the defendant proceeded to a jury trial on June 15, 2022, and he was found guilty as charged in
    a unanimous verdict. His sentence and conviction were affirmed in companion case, 23-KA-33. The
    defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in that appeal.
    23-KA-34                                             2
    LAW AND ANALYSIS
    No motion for PVJA filed
    The question of sufficiency of evidence is properly raised in the trial court
    by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal (“PVJA”) under La. C.Cr.P. art.
    821. State v. Bazley, 09-358 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 
    60 So.3d 7
    , 18, writ denied,
    11-282 (La. 6/17/11), 
    63 So.3d 1039
    . Here, the record does not indicate that the
    defendant filed such a motion. This Court has previously held, however, that the
    failure to file a PVJA does not preclude appellate review of the sufficiency of the
    evidence. State v. Thomas, 08-813 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/28/09), 
    13 So.3d 603
    , 606,
    writ denied, 09-1294 (La. 4/5/10), 
    31 So.3d 361
     (citing State v. Washington, 
    421 So.2d 887
    , 889 (La. 1982)). Accordingly, we will consider the merits of the
    defendant’s assignment of error.
    Standard of review
    The constitutional standard for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, upon
    viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
    of fact could find that the State proved all of the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
     (1979); State v. Chinchilla, 20-60 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/20), 
    307 So.3d 1189
    , 1195, writ denied, 21-274 (La. 4/27/21), 
    314 So.3d 838
    , cert. denied,
    ––– U.S. ––––, 
    142 S.Ct. 296
    , 
    211 L.Ed.2d 138
     (2021). This directive that the
    evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution requires the
    reviewing court to defer to the actual trier of fact's rational credibility calls,
    evidence weighing, and inference drawing. State v. Clifton, 17-538 (La. App. 5 Cir.
    5/23/18), 
    248 So.3d 691
    , 702.
    This deference to the fact-finder does not permit a reviewing court to decide
    whether it believes a witness or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of
    the evidence. State v. Hayman, 20-323 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/28/21), 
    347 So.3d 1030
    ,
    23-KA-34                                     3
    1040. Further, a reviewing court errs by substituting its appreciation of the
    evidence and the credibility of witnesses for that of the fact-finder and overturning
    a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and
    rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Lane, 20-181 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/21), 
    310 So.3d 794
    , 804. As a result, under the Jackson standard, a review of the record for
    sufficiency of the evidence does not require the reviewing court to determine
    whether the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but
    whether, upon review of the whole record, any rational trier of fact would have
    found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ordonez, 16-619 (La. App. 5 Cir.
    3/15/17), 
    215 So.3d 473
    , 477.
    The elements of La. R.S. 14:43.1.1
    La. R.S. 14:43.1.1 states, in relevant part:
    A. Misdemeanor sexual battery is the intentional
    touching of the breasts or buttocks of the victim by the offender
    using any instrumentality or any part of the body of the
    offender, directly or through clothing, or the intentional
    touching of the breasts or buttocks of the offender by the victim
    using any instrumentality or any part of the body of the victim,
    directly or through clothing, when the offender acts without the
    consent of the victim.
    Thus, similar to its felony counterpart of La. R.S. 14:43.1, to support a conviction
    under La. R.S. 14:43.1.1, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
    that a defendant touched specific parts of the victim’s body without her consent.
    The defendant’s argument is based upon his definition of the term “breast”
    as used in the statute. The defendant asserts in his brief:
    At trial, G.P. testified that Mr. Aguilar had placed his hands under her
    shirt and touched her chest. Her testimony was brief concerning this
    allegation. G.P. never specified exactly where on her chest Mr.
    Aguilar touched. Considering that the breasts are just a portion of a
    female's chest and G.P. failed to specifically allege that Mr. Aguilar
    touched her breasts, the state has failed to prove that Mr. Aguilar is
    guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of misdemeanor sexual battery.
    23-KA-34                                   4
    [Record citations omitted.] Notably, the defendant cites no jurisprudence to
    support his narrow interpretation of the term “chest.”
    The evidence presented at trial
    “In cases involving sexual offenses, the testimony of the victim alone may
    be sufficient to establish the elements of the offense, even where the State does not
    introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the
    offense.” State v. Barbain, 15-0404 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/4/15), 
    179 So.3d 770
    , 778.
    We first take note of reported cases in which a female victim of sexual abuse
    described a defendant as touching her “chest,” and that description was deemed
    sufficient from an evidentiary standpoint. In State v. Cavazos, 11-0733 (La. App. 4
    Cir. 5/16/12), 
    94 So.3d 870
    , 879, writ denied, 12-1372 (La. 10/26/12), 
    99 So.3d 645
    , and writ denied sub nom. State ex rel. Cavazos v. State, 12-1438 (La.
    10/26/12), 
    99 So.3d 645
    , the victim testified that the defendant, “would go into her
    room and touch her chest.” In State v. E.J.M., III, 12-774 (La. App. 5 Cir.
    5/23/13), 
    119 So. 3d 648
    , 661, the victim testified that when she was nine years
    old, the defendant took off her clothes and began touching her chest and private
    area. In State v. Guidry, 95-254 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95), 
    664 So.2d 698
    , 700, the
    Third Circuit upheld a defendant’s conviction for sexual battery based on “the
    victim's unequivocal testimony about defendant's touching her chest and vagina.”
    With the holdings of these cases in mind, we next turn to the evidence of the
    victim’s account of sexual battery by the defendant presented at trial. State’s
    Exhibit 13 consisted of a video of a forensic interview conducted with G.P. by
    Julia Fisher at the New Orleans Children's Advocacy Center. In her interview,
    which was played for the judge and jury, G.P. states that the defendant touched her
    in places “where I shouldn’t be touched.” Beginning approximately 21 minutes
    into the interview, G.P. is asked to recount a time she remembers most about the
    defendant’s sexual abuse of her. She describes an incident that occurred in the
    23-KA-34                                  5
    kitchen of the family’s apartment, when the defendant touched her. When asked to
    clarify, G.P. gestures in the video toward her left breast. When asked to provide the
    name of that body part, she indicates that she does not have or know a name. The
    defendant touched G.P. both over and under her clothes. When asked about being
    touched over her clothes, G.P. again gestured toward her breast. When asked about
    defendant touching her under her clothes, she likewise moved her hand toward her
    breast.
    At trial, G.P. did not specifically use the word “breast” when describing how
    the defendant sexually abused her. Her testimony was as follows:
    THE STATE:
    And what part of your body did he touch?
    G.P.:
    My chest.
    THE STATE:
    Okay. And what part of your body was he using to touch
    your chest?
    G.P.:
    His hands.
    . . .
    THE STATE:
    And when he touched you with his hands on your chest,
    was it over your shirt, or under your shirt?
    G.P.:
    Under.
    . . .
    THE STATE:
    And did that happen once, or more than once, when he
    touched you under your shirt, on your chest?
    23-KA-34                                  6
    G.P.:
    More.
    Other evidence presented at trial included State’s Exhibit 8, which is an
    affidavit for the defendant’s arrest warrant. The warrant demonstrates that in her
    initial interview with police on August 18, 2020, G.P. indicated that during an
    incident two weeks prior, the defendant had walked up behind her while she was in
    the kitchen and touched her breasts inside and outside of her clothing before he
    inserted a finger into her vagina. The court was also aware of State’s Exhibit 1, a
    JPSO Crime Report, having previously ruled on its admissibility at trial and in
    relation to the defendant’s motion to quash.
    Accordingly, we conclude that G.P.’s testimony that defendant touched her
    chest was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt
    that defendant was guilty of sexual battery. See, State v. Perkins, 11-162 (La. App.
    5 Cir. 12/28/11), 
    83 So.3d 250
    , 257. In the absence of internal contradiction or
    irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence, the testimony of one witness, if
    believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Dixon,
    07-915 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08), 
    982 So.2d 146
    , 153, writ denied, 08-0987 (La.
    1/30/09), 
    999 So.2d 745
    . Moreover, the testimony of the victim alone can be
    sufficient to establish the elements of a sexual offense, even where the State does
    not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of
    the offense. State v. Bruce, 14-877 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15), 
    169 So.3d 671
    , 675,
    writ denied, 15-833 (La. 3/4/16), 
    187 So.3d 1007
    . This assignment of error is
    without merit.
    ERROR PATENT REVIEW
    Generally, an errors patent review is not conducted on misdemeanor
    convictions. State v. Clark, 19-522 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/24/20), 
    299 So.3d 1228
    ,
    1235, writ denied, 21-00062 (La. 3/9/21), 
    312 So.3d 585
    . Nevertheless, this Court
    23-KA-34                                    7
    in similarly situated matters has conducted an error patent review. See, State v.
    Jones, 12-640 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/13), 
    128 So.3d 436
    . Accordingly, this Court
    conducted an error patent review of all of the convictions before us and found no
    errors that require correction.
    DECREE
    Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction and
    sentence are affirmed.
    CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED
    23-KA-34                                  8
    SUSAN M. CHEHARDY                                                              CURTIS B. PURSELL
    CHIEF JUDGE                                                                    CLERK OF COURT
    SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
    FREDERICKA H. WICKER
    CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    MARC E. JOHNSON
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON                                                             LINDA M. WISEMAN
    STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
    FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
    JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
    SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL                            FIFTH CIRCUIT
    MELISSA C. LEDET
    JUDGES                               101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
    DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
    POST OFFICE BOX 489
    GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054                 (504) 376-1400
    (504) 376-1498 FAX
    www.fifthcircuit.org
    NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
    I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
    IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
    NOVEMBER 15, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL
    PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
    23-KA-34
    E-NOTIFIED
    24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
    HONORABLE ELLEN SHIRER KOVACH (DISTRICT JUDGE)
    ANNE M. WALLIS (APPELLEE)            THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)       LIEU T. VO CLARK (APPELLANT)
    MAILED
    CHRISTINA FISHER (APPELLEE)
    HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
    (APPELLEE)
    JOHN RANSONE IV (APPELLEE)
    MOLLY LOVE (APPELLEE)
    ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
    TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    200 DERBIGNY STREET
    GRETNA, LA 70053
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-KA-34

Judges: Ellen Shirer Kovach

Filed Date: 11/15/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/21/2024