State of Louisiana in the Interest of B. L. ( 2019 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST NO. 19-CA-115
OF B. F., B. F., B. F. C/W
19-C-144
C/W
FIFTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST
OF B. L. COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON PARISH JUVENILE COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2011-CC-119, DIVISION "B"
HONORABLE ANDREA PRICE JANZEN, JUDGE PRESIDING
August 09, 2019
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and Robert A. Chaisson
AFFIRMED; WRIT DENIED
JGG
FHW
RAC
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES
Elizabeth G. Lincoln
COUNSEL FOR PARENT/APPELLEE,
R. L., III, FATHER
Lisa P. Harell
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
R. L., JR. AND L. L., GRANDPARENTS
Kristine K. Sims
GRAVOIS, J.
In this child in need of care proceeding, appellants, L.L. and R.L., Jr.,1 the
paternal biological grandparents of the subject child, the infant B.F.,2 appeal the
judgment of the Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court at the placement hearing held on
November 27, 2018. In their limited intervention into this proceeding, appellants
sought custody of B.F. The placement hearing judgment under review maintained
custody of B.F. in her foster parents, subject to conditional visitation privileges in
favor of appellants. The judgment also resulted in a stay of appellants’
intervention as to all matters other than their visitation privileges.
After they filed their appeal, on February 5, 2019, appellants filed in the
Juvenile Court “expedited” motions to lift the stay of their intervention, for fixed
and unsupervised visitation, and for immediate implementation of a transition plan.
On February 20, 2019, the Juvenile Court judge granted a hearing on the issue of
visitation, but summarily denied appellants’ motions to lift the stay of their
intervention and for immediate implementation of a transition plan. In response,
on March 26, 2019, appellants filed a writ application with this Court, Docket No.
19-C-144, seeking supervisory review of the Juvenile Court judge’s denial of their
motions to lift the stay of their intervention and for immediate implementation of a
transition plan. Because of common parties and interrelated facts and issues, the
writ application has been consolidated with this appeal for decision.
For the following reasons, we affirm the November 27, 2018 judgment of
the Juvenile Court,3 and deny the writ application.
1
Pursuant to Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1 and 5-2, the initials of the parties are used herein
to protect and maintain the privacy of the minor child involved in this proceeding. See also L.R.F. v. A.A., 13-797
(La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/14), 133 So.3d 716, 717 n. 2.
2
The child at the center of this appeal is referred to in the record alternatively as “B.F.”, with F. being her
mother’s maiden name, and “B.L.”, with L. being her father’s last name. For simplicity, we shall refer herein to the
child as “B.F.” because the caption of the suit uses these initials. The other children listed in the caption of this
matter, B.F. and B.F., are older maternal half-brothers of B.F. who are not the subject of this appeal.
3
It is noted that R.L., III, appellants’ son, also filed a brief with this Court in support of appellants. R.L.,
III is not a party to his parents’ intervention and thus is not an appellant to the judgment on review herein.
Accordingly, we shall not consider the assignments of error contained in R.L., III’s brief.
19-CA-115 1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
B.F. (the subject child) was born drug exposed to R.F. on November 22,
2017, whereupon she was immediately taken into custody of the State through the
Department of Child and Family Services (“DCFS”) by instanter order. The State
thereafter immediately initiated this child in need of care proceeding. R.F. and
R.L., III, appellants’ son, were married in February of 2017 and were still married
at the time of B.F.’s birth, although they apparently have since divorced. The
record reflects that like R.F., R.L., III has a lengthy substance abuse history.4 The
couple lived at appellants’ home in a garage apartment at points prior to the birth
of B.F. and when B.F. was born, but after B.F.’s birth, R.F. returned for only a
short period of time and then appellants required her to leave their home due to
ongoing conflicts with her husband, R.L., III. R.F. moved elsewhere and the
couple separated. According to testimony in the record, appellants were
approached by DCFS soon after B.F. was born to see if they were interested in
custody of B.F., but they declined at that time, in part because R.L., III expressed
doubt, after B.F.’s birth, that she was his child, as well as for other reasons.5
Because no other relatives were either identified as suitable placements or
expressed interest in placement, B.F. was placed with foster parents on December
11, 2017, after she was discharged from the neonatal intensive care unit, where she
has since resided.6
4
Additionally, the record indicates that in 2008, R.L., III suffered a traumatic brain injury, which prevents
him from gainful employment and for which he receives disability benefits.
5
Case officer Erin Luquette with DCFS testified at the permanency hearing on November 27, 2018 that
while B.F. was still in the neonatal intensive care unit, a worker with child protection investigations visited
appellants’ home (which was also where R.L., III resided at that time), and while there, asked about possible
placement of B.F. with appellants. She testified that only R.L., Jr. was at home at the time and that “[w]hen I
actually received the case as a foster care worker, it had been addressed with [appellants]. They said no, … .”
R.L., Jr. testified at the intervention hearing on August 7, 2018 that he declined placement at that time
because they weren’t sure about paternity, specifically stating that “we didn’t know if it [B.F.] was his [R.L., III’s]”
and because “after that we didn’t - - I didn’t want to have to deal with [R.F.]” They also felt that they wanted R.L.,
III “to do what he needed to do to get himself straight and the situation where he can take his baby - - get his baby.”
He further testified that “we’re getting kind of old to be taking care of, you know, an infant till its college years. We
kind of wanted to relax and enjoy ourselves. …”
6
Upon being placed in the custody of DCFS, B.F. and her parents began receiving services from the Tulane
Parent Education Program (“T-PEP”), who provides parent education services for DCFS.
19-CA-115 2
On February 6, 2018, at an answer hearing on the petition for the child in
need of care proceeding, R.F. and R.L., III both stipulated that B.F. was in need of
care without admitting the allegations of the petition. At an Adoption and Safe
Families Act (“ASFA”)7 dispositional hearing on March 13, 2018, R.F. and R.L.,
III were each given case plans with stated goals of reunification. The case plans
required, among other things, that R.F. and R.L., III each remain drug-free,
complete substance abuse treatment, and maintain clean and safe housing.
DNA test results filed into the Juvenile Court record on March 5, 2018
established that B.F. was indeed R.L., III’s biological daughter. These DNA test
results were delivered to R.L., III at appellants’ home, where he resided at the time,
shortly before this date, around February 26, 2018. Following confirmation of
paternity, appellants provided their son with some assistance in meeting his case
plan goals, including transporting R.L., III to supervised visitation with B.F. at the
DCFS office.
In late May of 2018, appellants told the DCFS caseworker that they were
interested in custody of B.F. On June 22, 2018, appellants filed in the Juvenile
Court proceeding a pleading entitled “Paternal Grandparents’ Motion to Intervene,
Motion for Immediate Family Placement, and Request for Notice of Proceedings
Pursuant to La. Ch.C. Art. 623A.” On June 25, 2018, the Juvenile Court judge
summarily denied appellants’ motions pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 697.8 Appellants
7
ASFA, 42 U.S.C. § 601, et seq., passed by Congress in 1997, requires states, as a condition to continued
receipt of certain federal funding, to enact parallel legislation. ASFA is intended to make four principal reforms: (1)
that the safety of children is paramount in custody decision making; (2) that foster care is temporary and that agency
and judicial decision making must be expedited in order to optimize the child’s needs for a stable and permanent
home; (3) that the state’s duty to make “reasonable efforts” to reunify a family is subordinate to legitimate concerns
about the child’s health and safety; and (4) that states will be held accountable for their efforts to reduce the number
of children who are stranded in the foster care system. State ex rel. SNW v. Mitchell, 01-2128 (La. 11/28/01), 800
So.2d 809, 815, quoting La. Ch.C. art. 601, Official Comment (b).
8
Article 697 of the Louisiana Children’s Code provides:
A. For good cause shown, the court or administrative review body may allow any interested person,
agency, or organization to intervene in the case review proceedings to facilitate the permanent
placement of the child and to insure that the best interests of the child are protected.
B. Upon motion of a party and for good cause shown, the court or administrative review body may limit
the nature and extent of intervener’s participation in the case review hearing.
19-CA-115 3
sought this Court’s supervisory review of that ruling. On July 25, 2018, upon
review of the writ application, this Court found that the Juvenile Court judge erred
in summarily denying appellants’ motion to intervene without conducting a full
hearing to consider the best interest of the child as per La. Ch.C. art. 697.9 Upon
remand and a hearing on August 7, 2018, the Juvenile Court judge granted
appellants a limited intervention. The minute entry reflecting this ruling indicates
that the Juvenile Court judge maintained custody of B.F. with DCFS and
placement with the foster parents, ordered increased visitation between B.F. and
appellants, and ordered that DCFS set up an assessment at Tulane Parent Education
Program (“T-PEP”) for appellants to address their parenting abilities and to
determine what if any attachment B.F. had with appellants, and if T-PEP deemed
appellants an appropriate placement, then T-PEP and DCFS were ordered to
develop a transition plan for B.F.
Following the grant of the limited intervention, appellants participated in at
least seven supervised visits with B.F. at the DCFS office, which were observed by
DCFS and T-PEP clinicians. R.L., III also attended several of these supervised
visits, as well as B.F.’s foster mother at the specific request of T-PEP and the
DCFS caseworker. Sometimes R.F. attended the visitations, as well as her
grandmother and R.F.’s two older children who are placed with different families.
R.L., III’s elder daughter, a half-sister of B.F., attended at least two of the
supervised visits.10
A scheduled ASFA review hearing was held on September 11, 2018
regarding all of R.F.’s children. Therein, the Juvenile Court judge noted that
DCFS was untimely in providing the required progress reports from T-PEP to all
9
State of Louisiana in the Interest of B.L., 18-389 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/25/18), 2018 WL 3581517.
10
The record indicates that A.L., R.L., III’s daughter (an older half-sister of B.F.) lives with appellants
approximately 80 percent of the time, though such custody is shared by agreement with A.L.’s mother, the other
custodian, and is not the result of a DCFS proceeding.
19-CA-115 4
of the parties. As to B.F. only, the hearing was continued until October 16, 2018.
The Juvenile Court judge admonished DCFS to provide all parties with pertinent
updated reports from T-PEP ten days in advance of the October hearing. The
judge also clarified that appellants’ intervention was limited, that they were only
entitled to information as it related to appellants and their relationship with B.F,
and that any information in reports regarding the mother, the foster parents, and the
mother’s other children was to be redacted from the reports, based upon privacy
rights, and not shared.11
The parties to this appeal appeared for an ASFA review hearing and a
permanency hearing on October 16, 2018. Also set for hearing that day were two
rules filed by appellants: a motion/rule to show cause to hire an independent
expert, and a rule to show cause against DCFS for contempt. The Juvenile Court
judge granted appellants’ motion to hire independent expert Amy Dickson, Ph.D.,
whom, she ruled, would be allowed to review the tape-recorded visitations between
appellants and B.F. and would also be allowed to observe future visitations.
Appellants were also given access to redacted reports concerning appellants and
B.F. from T-PEP through DCFS, and also the home development report of their
own home.
The rule for contempt concerned appellants’ allegation that instead of the
increased visitation with B.F. that the court had previously ordered, they in fact
had reduced visitation. After hearing testimony from Ms. Gabrielle Jackson, the
DCFS caseworker, that the visitation had increased since appellants had filed their
rule for contempt, and argument from the parties, the court declined to hold DCFS
in contempt, but asked T-PEP to consider if B.F. could handle increased visitation
11
The record suggests that only R.L., III waived his privacy rights in order to share his reports with
appellants (his parents).
19-CA-115 5
without undue stress.12 The permanency hearing was continued until November
27, 2018. The parties were advised that this would be a “firm” date.
An ASFA review hearing and the ASFA permanency hearing were held on
November 27, 2018. On November 21, 2018, the Wednesday prior to the
November 27, 2018 hearing, appellants fax-filed a motion to continue the hearing,
alleging that Mr. Jesse George, the child’s appointed attorney, was not qualified as
per the pertinent Supreme Court Rule to represent B.F. The judge noted that the
Juvenile Court did not accept fax filings and would not hear the motion to continue
on the morning of the hearing.
As per their limited intervention, appellants did not participate in the
permanency hearing, as that hearing concerned only whether B.F.’s parents, R.F.
and R.L., III, had met their case plan goals. At the permanency hearing, it was
determined that because the parents had not made meaningful progress in their
case plans, the case plan goals were changed to adoption instead of reunification.13
Appellants returned to the courtroom to participate in the placement hearing that
followed the permanency hearing. After hearing testimony from the DCFS’s
expert, Devi Miron Murphy, Ph.D., who is affiliated with T-PEP, and DCFS
personnel, as well as appellants’ expert Dr. Dickson, and hearing closing
arguments, the Juvenile Court judge found that it was in B.F.’s best interest to
maintain her current placement with her foster parents. In so finding, the judge
noted that she was well aware that relative placement was statutorily preferred over
foster care. The judge stated that she gave little weight or credibility to Dr.
Dickson’s testimony because her involvement in the case was too limited for her to
express an opinion as to what was in B.F.’s best interest. The judge noted that no
12
The observing clinicians, as well as some of the parties, reported that the great number of people in the
small visitation room was stressful to B.F.
13
The parties allege in brief that since the November 27, 2018 rulings, termination of parental rights
proceedings have been initiated.
19-CA-115 6
witness, expert or lay, testified that it was in B.F.’s best interest for her to be
removed from her current placement with the foster parents and placed with
appellants. She did find, however, that it would not be harmful for B.F. to
maintain a relationship with appellants (her paternal grandparents), provided they
could respect B.F.’s placement with the foster parents. The judge ordered that T-
PEP look into continued visitation between the parties. Finally, the judge stayed
appellants’ intervention except as it pertained to continued visitation.
Appellants timely filed an appeal of the placement ruling, raising five
assignments of error, to-wit:
(1) The Juvenile Court committed legal error by failing to comply with state
and federal law in favor of preservation of families and relative
placement.
(2) The Juvenile Court committed legal error on June 5, 2018 and November
27, 2018 when it was ordered that placement of the child could not be
changed “under any circumstances” without court approval.
(3) The Juvenile Court erred by misapplying time limitations.
(4) The Juvenile Court erred by failing to hear appellants’ motion and
incorporated memorandum to continue the permanency hearing and for
failing to grant a continuance when DCFS again failed to timely
disseminate reports and proceeding with a permanency hearing while
excluding appellants.
(5) The Juvenile Court erred in proceeding on November 27, 2018 with both
the permanency and placement hearings without conducting a hearing on
appellants’ motion for expedited hearing to vacate order of continued
custody of B.F. and declare such judgments an absolute nullity and by
afterwards denying the motion as moot.
Prior to the lodging of the appeal in this Court, on February 5, 2019
appellants filed in the Juvenile Court the aforementioned “expedited” motions to
lift the stay of their intervention, for fixed and unsupervised visitation, and for
immediate implementation of a transition plan. The Juvenile Court judge
summarily denied the motions relative to the intervention and transition plan on
February 20, 2019, but set the motion for visitation for a hearing.
Appellants/relators timely filed a writ application with this Court, seeking review
19-CA-115 7
of the February 20, 2019 judgment. Regarding the writ application,
appellants/relators argue that the Juvenile Court judge erred in denying their
motions to lift the stay on their intervention and for immediate implementation of a
transition plan without first affording them a hearing. They also argue that the
Juvenile Court judge erred in denying their motions.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Louisiana Children’s Code was written with the intent that courts should
resolve parental status and permanency of children issues in an expeditious
manner. Specifically, La. Ch.C. art. 601 provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he
proceedings shall be conducted expeditiously to avoid delays in achieving
permanency for children. This Title is intended to provide the greatest possible
protection as promptly as possible for such children. The health, safety, and best
interest of the child shall be the paramount concern in all proceedings under this
Title. … This Title shall be administered and interpreted to avoid unnecessary
interference with family privacy and trauma to the child, and yet, at the same time,
authorize the protective and preventive intervention needed for the health, safety,
and well-being of children.” (Emphasis added.) See also State in Interest of C.C.,
18-440 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/12/18), 256 So.3d 565, 572, n.13, writ denied, 18-1766
(La. 12/3/18), 257 So.3d 192. Consistent with this statutory scheme of expediency,
in State ex rel. C.P., 00-2703 (La. 1/17/01), 777 So.2d 470, 471, the Supreme
Court stated that “[c]ourts shall avoid delays in resolving the status of the parent
and in achieving permanency for the child,” citing La. Ch.C. art. 1032,14 and that
“[a]ll phases of termination of parental rights proceedings are thus to be given
priority,” citing State in the Interest of S.M., 98-0922 (La. 10/20/98), 719 So.2d
445 (La. 1998).
14
La. Ch.C. art. 1032 provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he court shall avoid delays in resolving the status
of the parent and in achieving permanency for the child.”
19-CA-115 8
An appellate court’s review of a juvenile court’s determination of a
permanent plan is governed by the manifest error standard. State In Interest of
T.B., 16-215 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/22/16), 202 So.3d 555, 560-61, citing State v. N.C.,
50,446 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 184 So.3d 760, 770. Under this standard, the
appellate court must not substitute its own opinion when it is the juvenile court that
is in the unique position to see and hear the witnesses as they testify. Where there
is conflicting testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable
inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even when the appellate
court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable as those of
the juvenile court. If the juvenile court’s findings are reasonable in light of the
record reviewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse, even though
convinced that, had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the
evidence differently. Id.FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Juvenile Court committed legal error by failing to comply with state and
federal law in favor of preservation of families and relative placement.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Juvenile Court erred by misapplying time limitations.
These assignments of error are interrelated and are therefore addressed
together.
In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that Louisiana law (in
particular the Children’s Code) and federal law (ASFA, 42 U.S.C. § 601, et seq.)
place a priority on preserving families and favor that children be placed with
relatives rather than in foster care. Appellants also argue extensively, within this
section of their brief (rather than under the heading of their third assignment of
error) that appellants were denied custody of B.F. because they were held to certain
“time limits” in which to express their desire for custody of B.F. that do not exist
within the statutory framework of the Children’s Code.
19-CA-115 9
First, appellants argue that the trial court ignored and/or misapplied various
provisions of the law to that effect, including La. Ch.C. art. 622, which specifically
favors relative placement of children who have been found in need of care, to-wit:
A. Prior to the continued custody hearing required in Article 624, a suitable
relative or other suitable individual may seek and obtain an ex parte court
order to take provisional custody of the child pending the continued
custody hearing. The provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Article 3945
are inapplicable to an ex parte order rendered pursuant to this Paragraph.
B. Unless the best interest of the child requires a different placement, a child
who appears to be a child in need of care and whose immediate removal
is necessary for his protection from further abuse or neglect shall be
placed, pending a continued custody hearing, in accordance with this
priority:
(1) In the home of a suitable relative who is of the age of majority and
with whom the child has been living in a wholesome and stable
environment if the relative is willing and able to continue to offer
such environment for the child pending an adjudication hearing and if
he agrees to the safety plan.
(2) In the home of a suitable relative who is of the age of majority if the
relative is willing and able to offer a wholesome and stable
environment for the child pending an adjudication hearing and if he
agrees to the safety plan.
(3) In the home of a suitable individual who is of the age of majority if he
is willing and able to offer a wholesome and stable environment for
the child pending an adjudication hearing and if he agrees to the
safety plan.
(4) In foster care under the supervision of the department until further
orders of the court.
(5) In a shelter care facility if the child, who is not in the custody of the
department, has been the victim of human trafficking as provided for
in R.S. 14:46.2 or trafficking of children for sexual purposes as
provided for in R.S. 14:46.3.
This Article pertains to initial custody following the removal of the child
from the situation of neglect, “pending a continued custody hearing.” The record
is clear that at the time B.F. was removed from her mother’s custody at birth by
instanter order, no suitable relative had been identified that was either available or
willing to take custody of B.F. Both appellants (L.L. and R.L., Jr.) testified at the
hearing on their motion for intervention on August 7, 2018 that shortly after B.F.
was born, DCFS asked R.L., Jr. whether they (the grandparents) would consider
19-CA-115 10
custody of B.F., and that he declined, citing uncertainty about B.F.’s paternity and
a desire not to have to interact with R.F., among other reasons, as noted earlier.
See footnote 5, supra.
Appellants note that at the continued custody hearing on December 14,
2017, which occurred pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 624(A),15 DCFS was ordered to
explore all relatives for placement. They argue that this created an “ongoing
obligation” as long as B.F. remains in state custody, which DCFS failed to
perform. DCFS argues, however, that once appellants had (admittedly) declined
placement of B.F., DCFS had no continuing duty to ask appellants to reconsider.
DCFS further argues that ASFA concerns funding requirements for states and does
not create a private right of action.
La. Ch.C. art. 627 pertains to further proceedings in a child in need of care
case following a hearing. The record reflects that an ASFA dispositional hearing
was in fact held on March 13, 2018, where both parents, R.F. and R.L., III, were
given case plans with the goal of reunification with B.F. At the June 5, 2018
ASFA hearing, the court changed the case plan to include adoption, based on the
status report and testimony taken at the hearing which indicated that neither parent
was making meaningful progress or in compliance with their case plans.
Upon review, we find that the record shows that DCFS complied with its
statutory duty to seek and consider relative placements, and that neither the statutes
cited by appellants (La. Ch.C. arts. 622, 627, and 683, among others) nor case law
requires the type of continuing duty argued by appellants to repeatedly approach
relatives, such as appellants, who have previously declined placement. Nor do
15
La. Ch.C. art. 624(A) provides:
If a child is not released to the care of his parents, a hearing shall be held by the court within three days
after the child's removal or entry into custody. An order setting the hearing shall provide for appointment of counsel
for the child and notice to the program approved to represent children. If a safety plan has been ordered, a hearing
shall be held by the court within three days from the issuance of the safety plan order, unless the parents are in
agreement with the safety plan. The parents' signature on the safety plan shall constitute evidence of their
agreement with the plan.
19-CA-115 11
these articles contain a requirement that relatives be notified in writing. The record
shows that appellants had multiple contacts with DCFS prior to the filing of their
motion for intervention, such as when R.L., III’s DCFS caseworker visited their
home,16 and when they brought R.L., III to his visitations with B.F., when they
could have expressed to DCFS an interest in placement of B.F., despite their
contention that they were unaware of their rights. The record also shows that
appellants changed their minds about seeking placement of B.F. only after they
were informed by their son’s attorney, around the end of May 2018, that the foster
care placement could be permanent because R.L., III was not in compliance with
his case plan, nor exhibiting the likelihood of success, as the status report of May
23, 2018 makes clear.17
Appellants thoroughly argue the point that the applicable code articles
contain no express time limitations in which relatives such as themselves must
seek placement. While this is accurate, as noted above, the Louisiana Children’s
Code was written with the intent that courts should resolve parental status and
permanency of children issues in an expeditious manner. Further, the entire
statutory scheme for child in need of care proceedings in the Children’s Code
clearly contemplates a steady time schedule under which the juvenile courts must
proceed in order to achieve permanency in a child in need of care’s placement.18
The record is clear in this proceeding that appellants declined to be considered for
placement when they were first contacted by DCFS shortly after B.F.’s birth, and
16
The record shows that R.L., III resided with his parents until they intervened, at which time he was
required to live elsewhere in order for appellants to be considered for placement.
17
Importantly, appellants testified at the May 23, 2018 hearing that they were satisfied with B.F.’s foster
parents and placement and were not interested in seeking custody of B.F. until late May or early June of 2018. They
explained at the intervention hearing that until this point, they believed that B.F.’s placement in foster care would be
temporary. They believed that their son would be given custody of B.F. once he “did what he needed to do”
regarding his case plan.
18
See, for example, the time frame set forth in La. Ch.C. arts. 624, 659, 673, and 678, which set forth
particular time frames within which hearings must be held and a case plan made, as well as the timeline described in
State ex rel. M.V., 96-324 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/13/99), 741 So.2d 48. Though particular statutes may have been
amended since then, the timeline and timeframes described therein remain largely intact.
19-CA-115 12
did not later seek placement until shortly before they filed their motion for
intervention on June 22, 2018, because until shortly before that point, they
apparently believed that their son would gain custody of B.F.
Appellants cite several cases which, they argue, support their position that
DCFS violated state and federal law regarding the preference for relative
placement by holding appellants to arbitrary time limits. We find, however, that
the cited cases do not support appellants’ positions. In State in Interest of C.C.,
supra, 256 So.3d at 571, appellants note that an out-of-state paternal aunt, who was
first identified as a relative more than one year after the child entered state custody,
was granted custody after the child was with his foster family for 17½ months,
with no discussion of the late time frame in which she entered the case. This case,
appellants argue, shows that relative placement is favored over foster care despite
the length of time the child is in foster care. However, this case has no
authoritative value for that position, because on appeal this Court vacated the
judgment and returned custody to the foster parents, finding legal error that
prejudiced the material outcome of the case and deprived the parties of substantial
rights. Id. at 572. This Court found that the record failed to establish the child’s
filiation to the putative father. Id. Also, the custody judgment occurred without a
determination that such placement was in the child’s best interests, because the
trial court felt it did not have jurisdiction over the putative father because no
petition had been filed against him. No discussion was made regarding the time
frames in which relatives should apply for placement. Because this Court vacated
the judgment of placement on the basis of lack of evidence of filiation, the merits
of the judgment on appeal were not reviewed. Id.19
19
This Court stated in dicta, however, that though it was pretermitting discussion of the assignments of
error, it would find, among other issues, that the trial court committed legal error in concluding that it did not have
jurisdiction over the father of a child who had been found in need of care.
19-CA-115 13
Appellants also cite State in Interest of G.H., 18-465 (La. App. 5 Cir.
1/30/19), 265 So.3d 960, a case in which appellants’ counsel represented the
paternal grandparents who did receive placement of a 22-month-old grandchild
who had been in foster care for 21 months, despite having first come forward when
the child was 15 months old. Appellants claim that similarly to this case, DCFS
challenged placement with the grandparents on the basis that they were “too late.”
They also claim that, as in this case, the grandmother faced “aggressive
challenges” by T-PEP and the child’s CASA20 representative, and DCFS allegedly
failed to contact the grandmother regarding placement, in violation of state and
federal law. Appellants argue in brief that the G.H. case shows DCFS “has a
pattern of inconsistently applying the law and following its own policies and
procedures regarding relative placement,” which is “particularly egregious under
the facts and circumstances of this case,” and that tax dollars are “being wasted on
a child who doesn’t belong in foster care” and are “being frivolously spent by
DCFS to assist the foster parents in attaining a free adoption … .” They argue that
their expert, Dr. Dickson, opined at the permanency hearing on November 27,
2018 that B.F. can be safely transitioned to appellants.
State in Interest of G.H. is distinguishable both procedurally and factually
from the instant case. The only issue on appeal in that case was whether the
Juvenile Court judge erred in denying the former foster parents’ third motion for
intervention in the child in need of care proceedings, which motion was filed after
custody had been changed to the grandparents upon DCFS’s recommendation and
subsequent approval of the Juvenile Court judge. This Court found that the foster
parents lacked standing as foster parents when they filed their third motion to
intervene, because they were no longer foster parents. Id. at 965. This Court
20
“CASA” stands for Court Appointed Special Advocate.
19-CA-115 14
further found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of their third motion
to intervene as “interested persons” under La. Ch.C. art. 697, and thus pretermitted
assignments of error pertaining to the merits of the case. Id. at 965-66. This case
does not support appellants’ accusations against DCFS in the current case. And, as
each judgment in a child in need of care proceeding turns on its own particular
facts and circumstances, it is of no weight to this Court that in G.H., DCFS
recommended custody be awarded to the grandparents but did not so recommend
in this case.
This Court has thoroughly reviewed the entire record. Our review, paying
close attention to all of the proceedings and hearings, and the testimony and
evidence introduced at those hearings, does not support appellants’ counsel’s
accusations against DCFS. Further, as hereinafter set forth, the record reflects that
the “time limitations” were but one of the factors the Juvenile Court judge
considered when denying appellants’ limited intervention and placement of B.F.
based upon her determination of the best interest of B.F.
At the hearing on November 27, 2018, the Juvenile Court judge conducted
an ASFA review and permanency hearing first, at which appellants were not
allowed to participate, as the permanency review concerned only the parents’
compliance with their case plans.21 After ruling that the case plan goal was
changed from reunification to adoption, at the placement portion of the hearing,
where appellants were present, as previously noted, the trial court heard testimony
from DCFS supervisor Erin Luquette, and from Dr. Murphy, affiliated with T-PEP,
and the expert witness on behalf of DCFS, as well as Dr. Dickson, appellants’
expert witness.
21
As a matter of law, the limited intervention did not give appellants the legal right to participate in the
permanency hearing, nor did R.F. waive her privacy rights so as to permit appellants to be in the courtroom during
the hearing.
19-CA-115 15
The Juvenile Court judge specifically found that it was not in B.F.’s best
interest to be placed for custody with appellants. First, the Juvenile Court judge
did consider that appellants first declined custody and then did not come forward
until three months after their son’s paternity of B.F. was confirmed. The judge
next considered testimony from the experts, Dr. Murphy and Dr. Dickson, and
from Ms. Luquette with DCFS.
Dr. Murphy, the clinician with T-PEP, had previously testified at the
permanency hearing. She stated that she had two interviews with appellants of
approximately one hour each. She had also supervised at least seven visits with
B.F. and appellants at T-PEP every other week starting in August of 2018. She
stated that appellants were always prepared for the visits, bringing food and
supplies and toys. They were very loving and clearly wanted a relationship with
B.F., and in fact had established a grandparent relationship with her, in Dr.
Murphy’s opinion.
But Dr. Murphy voiced several concerns. Initially at these visits, B.F. cried
and exhibited a lot of distress, so DCFS asked the foster mother to stay in the room
to help soothe her. This strategy worked and B.F. was able to interact more
comfortably with her grandparents. At the scheduled visitations that occurred
following the intervention, the clinicians observed L.L. to be the primary active
caregiver. This raised concerns because, due to L.L.’s work schedule and R.L.,
Jr.’s retired status, R.L., Jr. would sometimes be the primary caregiver should B.F.
be placed in their home.22 Clinicians observed that R.L., Jr. was reluctant or
unwilling to change diapers, feed the child, calm her when she was distressed, and
otherwise attend to her needs. Also, R.L., Jr. demonstrated difficulty during
individual parenting sessions (“Circle of Security”) with T-PEP with the concepts
22
L.L. is a Jefferson Parish owner-operator of a school bus for special needs children in wheelchairs. Her
schedule required her to drive a shift early in the morning and another shift again during the afternoon.
19-CA-115 16
that T-PEP clinicians were attempting to teach him, despite the fact that he would
be B.F.’s primary caregiver while L.L. was at work. The clinicians also observed
both L.L.’s and R.L., Jr.’s frequent failures to recognize B.F.’s cues and to respond
appropriately to B.F.’s needs during visits without prompts by the parent educator,
as well as other interactions that Dr. Murphy deemed were “intrusive” to B.F. Dr.
Murphy opined that at this time, R.L., Jr. had not made meaningful progress in his
ability to understand the child’s needs, and thus he would not be an appropriate
independent caregiver for B.F.
The testimony also related an incident from one of the supervised visits
where appellants’ formula was expired but appellants declined to accept a bottle
from the foster mother (in brief, appellants explained that this occurred at the end
of a visit, so there wasn’t time to give her the bottle anyway), and another visit
where appellants refused assistance from the foster mother to console B.F., who
was upset. Clinicians further observed appellants discouraging B.F. from crawling
toward the foster mother when she was present in the room at a supervised visit.
Dr. Murphy was also concerned that appellants seemed to be putting the
needs of their son, R.L., III, who was disabled following a traumatic brain injury in
2008 and who was dealing with a decade-long opiate addiction, over the needs of
B.F. This concern was based on observations made at the supervised visits. At
several visits, when B.F. cried, L.L. picked her up and brought her to R.L., III to
soothe, instead of soothing B.F. herself, which led her to conclude that appellants
were focusing on fostering their son’s relationship with his daughter rather than
theirs with her. At another visit, R.L., Jr. left the visit early to transport R.L., III to
a counseling appointment rather than stay to visit with B.F. DCFS was also
concerned that appellants minimized their son’s long-standing addiction problems,
both in the amount of time he had problems, to contending that it was merely
because he had hung around with the “wrong people.” The clinicians also noted
19-CA-115 17
that appellants had allowed R.L., III and R.F. to have unrestricted access to R.L.,
III’s other minor daughter A.L., which at least once resulted in A.L.’s phone call to
appellants to come get her because their behavior was making her afraid.23 Dr.
Murphy felt that appellants would benefit from substance abuse-informed family
therapy and had recommended such.
Dr. Murphy concluded by recommending that B.F. stay in her current
placement because she felt it was in B.F.’s best interest. She noted that B.F. was
securely attached to her foster mother, and that her foster family was meeting all of
her physical, developmental, emotional, and psychological needs. Dr. Murphy
found that B.F. had reached “focused attachment” with her foster mother, and that
disrupting that attachment could cause her harm, such as regression and
developmental setbacks. Dr. Murphy stated that such things could be temporary
depending on the quality of caregiving B.F. would receive after the change in
placement, depending on both the child and the new caregiver, but that some
children had trouble reforming a secure attachment after a disruption. She
believed, based upon her work with appellants, that they would have “a lot of
trouble” providing B.F. a secure transition and might not be able to help B.F.
sufficiently to recover from the disruption. She felt that the foster mother has
always done what is in B.F.’s best interest, whereas appellants have not
consistently demonstrated that they could prioritize B.F.’s needs over other
people’s needs, such as theirs or their son’s.
Dr. Murphy noted, however, that appellants are very loving towards B.F.
and had attended all clinical services they had been asked to attend, even while not
apparently successfully grasping all of the concepts. She opined that there is no
evidence that being adopted causes harm to a child. If adopted by the foster
23
At one supervised visit with B.F. that her sister A.L. attended, R.L., III introduced A.L. to the parent
educator as “Meet my big little s**t.” Dr. Murphy noted that A.L. appeared uncomfortable and that appellants did
not intervene but only “laughed nervously.”
19-CA-115 18
parents, she believed it would be in B.F.’s best interest to have a relationship with
appellants as grandparents, as it is important for children to know where they come
from. She also noted on cross-examination that T-PEP has, in other cases,
successfully transitioned children to reunify with relatives or parents. When asked
directly by the Juvenile Court judge, Dr. Murphy stated that there was no good
reason to disrupt B.F. from her primary attachment and psychological mother.
Appellants’ expert, Dr. Dickson, testified at the placement hearing on their
behalf as an expert in clinical psychology and infant mental health. She stated that
she had conducted an interview with appellants, and had reviewed the DCFS home
study, two redacted progress reports from T-PEP, and observed two visits between
appellants and B.F. (the second visit included R.L., III and A.L.). She noted that
they were making safety alterations in their home for when B.F. would be walking.
She stated that they were raising their other granddaughter A.L., who was an honor
student. Her review of the two recorded visits was positive, she said, in that B.F.
appeared comfortable with appellants and she observed appropriate behavior
between appellants and B.F. She saw no obstacles to B.F. visiting their home.
Dr. Dickson agreed with Dr. Murphy that the time it takes to transition
custody really depends upon the particular child, and that it was beneficial for a
child in transition to continue to have contact with former foster parents to
understand they have not disappeared. Dr. Dickson stated that psychological harm
can occur in a child who is “permanently separated” from their biological family,
and that many children struggle with abandonment issues and feeling not wanted
by their biological families. She opined that some adopted children do not do well
when there is not a good emotional fit in the adopted home, and that those children
struggle with the fact they were adopted even with “fabulous” adopted parents who
love them very much. She felt that as children get older, it is important for them to
know their whole history and have connections with siblings and extended family.
19-CA-115 19
She believed that with a very thoughtful transition, B.F. could successfully
transition to appellants. She agreed that she could not predict how adoption by the
foster parents would affect B.F.
On cross-examination, Dr. Dickson clarified that her opinion was based
upon review of the items noted above, and that she had not provided any
therapeutic services to this family. She agreed that she had not observed
appellants’ parenting of A.L. except for reviewing one recorded visit where A.L.
was present. She agreed that her recommendation was not who was a better
caregiver, but whether she believed that appellants would be good caregivers. She
agreed that she could not make a recommendation about what was in B.F.’s best
interest, because she did not have all of the information necessary to make that
determination, nor did she receive detailed information regarding R.L., III’s drug
and medical history.
At the conclusion of the placement hearing, the Juvenile Court judge made
the following comments and rulings, to-wit:
This Court is well aware that relative placement is preferred
over foster care. I’m also well aware that because the intervenors
came in some six months after the inception of [B.F.’s] case - - this
case has been open since September, as it relates to [R.F.], of ‘17 and
December of ‘17 as it relates to [R.L., III] - - that I have information
regarding the baby and what is in her best interest through the history
of this case that the intervenors are not privy to. …
I have already ruled that it is the Court’s position that adoption
is in the best interest of this child in terms of the permanency plan.
And I have ruled that the department is to proceed with termination of
parental rights.
In looking at the totality of the circumstances of this case and
all of the evidence, and I do take judicial notice of my own record on
[B.F.’s] case which began December the 12th [of 2017] when custody
was granted to [DCFS] after relative placement was ruled out. I take
into account the entire history of what this child went through with
[the foster parents], went through medically, went through
emotionally, went through with T-PEP from the inception of the case,
not just when [the foster parents] got involved, but since December of
2017. And I look at what I firmly believe to be the best interest of this
baby. I take into account the testimony today of the expert witnesses,
the lay witnesses, and CASA and the recommendations thereof.
19-CA-115 20
***
The testimony was very clear, there is no good reason to disrupt
the placement of this child from [the foster parents]. It’s not a
question of what’s in [L.L. and R.L., Jr.’s] best interest, of what’s in
[R.L., III’s] best interest, or what’s in [R.F.’s] best interest. It’s not a
question of that. It is a question of what is in this child’s best interest
in terms of her physical and emotional development right now. Not
one witness, let alone an expert witness, could tell me that it is in this
child’s best interest to remove her from [the foster parents] and place
her with [L.L. and R.L., Jr.].
It’s not that she can’t know her grandparents. She certainly
can. … I don’t think it’s going to be harmful for this child to
maintain a relationship with her grandparents, provided the
grandparents can respect the placement with [the foster parents] and
respect the needs of the child.
***
But for today’s purpose, … it is clear and convincing to this
Court from the entire record that it is in [B.F.’s] best interest to remain
with [the foster parents] and I am so ordering.
***
At this point, there will be no more involvement under the
intervention other than my allowing continued contact between [L.L.
and R.L., Jr.] and the baby in terms of visits, as I previously
discussed. All other intervention is hereby stayed. I’m not doing
anything else in terms of this intervention.
Upon review, considering the totality of the circumstances presented herein,
we find no manifest error in the Juvenile Court judge’s ruling which denied
appellants’ intervention as to placement with them and maintained B.F.’s
placement with her foster family as in her best interest. The Juvenile Court judge
clearly considered all of the evidence and testimony highlighted above. It is clear
that the Juvenile Court judge considered appellants’ “suitability” and not merely
the time frame in which appellants sought custody. The record is clear that no
witness, expert or lay, testified that it would be in B.F.’s best interest to be
removed from her current placement and be placed with appellants. These
assignments of error are without merit.
19-CA-115 21
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Juvenile Court committed legal error on June 5, 2018 and November 27,
2018 when it was ordered that placement of the child could not be changed
“under any circumstances” without court approval.
In this assignment of error, appellants argue that ultimately, DCFS has the
final say on where children in need of care are placed, and that the Juvenile Court
judge’s orders, given at both the June 5, 2018 and November 27, 2018 hearings,
exceeded the judge’s statutory authority and usurped the authority of DCFS.
Appellants argue that La. Ch.C. art. 672, both the version that applied prior to
August 1, 2018 and the version in effect afterwards, gave DCFS “exclusive
authority” for placement decisions and prohibited the court from ordering DCFS to
return to court prior to moving a child from a placement.24 Appellants argue it was
not until they expressed desire for placement that the Court then made these rulings
overreaching its authority.
The statutory scheme found in the Louisiana Children’s Code, Title VI,
which sets forth the criteria and procedures for children in need of care cases, is
clear that the juvenile court has the ultimate authority over a child’s placement.
State in Interest of G.H., supra, 265 So.3d at 965. While the court may not order a
specific placement under Article 672, it nonetheless can find a specific placement
not in the best interest of a child and order that a child be moved. In any event, any
alleged overreaching by the Juvenile Court judge’s June 5, 2018 and November 27,
2018 orders would be to the derogation of DCFS’s statutory authority, who has not
contested the Juvenile Court judge’s orders and, in this case, never expressed that
B.F. should be placed with appellants. This assignment of error is without merit.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Juvenile Court erred by failing to hear appellants’ motion and
incorporated memorandum to continue the permanency hearing and for
failing to grant a continuance when DCFS again failed to timely disseminate
24
Appellants note that an amendment to this article, effective August 1, 2018, appears to “slightly” broaden
the trial judge’s authority regarding placements. See Act 189 of the 2018 Ordinary legislative session, amending La.
Ch.C. art. 672.
19-CA-115 22
reports and proceeding with a permanency hearing while excluding
appellants.
Appellants argue in this assignment of error that on November 21, 2018,
they filed, via fax, a motion to continue the permanency hearing on the basis that
again, T-PEP and DCFS had failed to timely disseminate reports to them in
violation of local rules. Appellants argue that they were “participants” in their
son’s case plan, and that the trial court erred in proceeding with the permanency
hearing while excluding appellants from the hearing.
The appellate record does not contain a copy of the motion to continue that
appellants allegedly fax-filed on November 21, 2018. The transcript of the
proceedings on November 27, 2018 does not refer to or discuss a motion to
continue made on this basis.25 The transcript also shows that appellants did not
object when they were ordered to step out of the permanency hearing.
Appellants’ claim that they were “participants” in their son’s case plan is
without any legal foundation. The trial court’s grant of their intervention was
limited to issues of B.F.’s placement, as per the court’s authority found in La.
Ch.C. art. 707, and did not include any provision making appellants “participants”
their son’s case plan.26 This assignment of error is without merit.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Juvenile Court erred in proceeding on November 27, 2018 with both the
permanency and placement hearings without conducting a hearing on
appellants’ motion for expedited hearing to vacate order of continued
custody of B.F. and declare such judgments an absolute nullity and by
afterwards denying the motion as moot.
In their final assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred in
proceeding on November 27, 2018 with the permanency and placement hearings
25
Appellants note in brief that for “reasons unknown,” the motion does not appear in the appellate record,
but they have attached a copy of this motion to their writ application, 19-C-144. The attached motion shows a filing
date of November 26, 2018, the day before the permanency hearing.
The transcript does refer to another late-filed motion by appellants, a motion to continue the permanency
hearing based upon the child’s attorney’s lack of qualifications, which is the subject of the next assignment of error.
26
Copies of the case plans are found in the appellate record. The case plans do not include appellants as
participants and do not require any action by appellants.
19-CA-115 23
without conducting a hearing on appellants’ motion for expedited hearing to vacate
the order of continued custody of B.F. This motion alleged that all prior judgments
should be declared absolutely null because the attorney for B.F., Mr. Jesse George,
did not appear on the Supreme Court’s list of attorneys approved to represent
children in foster care.27 For the following reasons, we find no merit to this
assignment of error.
Counsel for appellants filed this motion on November 27, 2018, the morning
of the permanency hearing. Therein, appellants noted that the attorney for B.F.
failed to appear on the list promulgated by the Supreme Court identifying those
attorneys qualified to represent children in foster care. Appellants argued that the
failure to have qualified legal counsel represent B.F. resulted in violation of her
due process rights under both federal and state law, and thus that all prior
judgments in the case should be found absolutely null, such judgments having been
obtained by “fraud or mistake sufficient to justify vacating the adjudication,” per
La. Ch.C. art. 667.28
At the permanency hearing, the Juvenile Court judge refused to consider the
motion, finding that it was filed untimely as to the permanency hearing.29 The
Juvenile Court judge noted that Mr. George had been representing children before
the Juvenile Court for many years. Mr. George also explained that he had
complied with the Supreme Court rule and did not know why his name did not
appear on the list submitted by appellants’ counsel. The trial judge stated that she
considered Mr. George well qualified. On December 10, 2018, Mr. George filed a
27
See La. Ch.C. art. 607 and Section 3 of La. Sup. Ct. Rule 33.
28
La. Ch.C. art. 667(A) provides, in pertinent part:
On motion of the child or the parent, an adjudication shall be vacated and a new adjudication
hearing ordered if, after contradictory hearing, the court finds that:
(1) The adjudication was obtained by fraud or mistake sufficient to justify vacating the
adjudication.
29
In the record, the order accompanying the motion contains a handwritten notation denying it as “moot”
based on the hearing of November 27, 2018.
19-CA-115 24
response into the court record, documenting his compliance with the Supreme
Court rule. He also submitted a letter from the Supreme Court, dated December 3,
2018, acknowledging that he had completed the necessary requirements in order to
represent children under Supreme Court Rule 33. Thus, Mr. George specifically
refuted the occurrence of any fraud or mistake that might justify nullifying the
judgments previously rendered in this case.
Upon review, we find no error in how the Juvenile Court judge handled the
late-filed motion, nor on the ultimate decision to deny the motion. The record is
clear that Mr. George was duly qualified to represent B.F., and that no due process
violation or fraud occurred in this case, notwithstanding that Mr. George’s name
was not included on the Supreme Court’s list.
Further, this Court notes that neither La. Ch.C. art. 607 nor Supreme Court
Rule 33 states that any adjudication or judgment of disposition shall be “absolutely
null” if a child’s attorney is not duly qualified.30
Appellants further allege, for the first time in their appellate brief, that the
first attorney assigned to represent B.F., Alexandra Kamp, who appeared at one
hearing on her behalf on December 14, 2017, was also similarly unqualified to
represent children in child in need of care cases. However, this issue was not first
raised in the Juvenile Court, and thus is not preserved for appellate review.
This assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION AS TO THE APPEAL
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to appellants’
assignments of error and no manifest error in the November 27, 2018 judgment of
30
As noted above, La. Ch.C. art. 667 states that, “on the motion of the child or the parent,” an adjudication
shall be vacated and a new adjudication hearing ordered if, after contradictory hearing, the court finds that an
adjudication was obtained by fraud or mistake sufficient to justify vacating the adjudication. By its own clear terms,
this article does not apply to any action brought by appellants.
19-CA-115 25
the Juvenile Court judge that denied appellants’ intervention in terms of placement.
The judgment is thus affirmed.
REVIEW OF WRIT APPLICATION NO. 19-C-144
In their writ application, appellants/relators allege that following the ruling
on November 27, 2018, and despite the trial court’s recognition that appellants and
B.F. had established a loving relationship and that continued visitation between
them was in B.F.’s best interest, DCFS “unilaterally” terminated all scheduled
visitation. Appellants/relators allege that instead, DCFS allowed future visitation
to be at the complete discretion of the foster parents with no oversight by DCFS,
and that the foster parents allegedly advised relators that they felt it was
inappropriate for B.F. to visit with them.
Because of these alleged actions of DCFS and the foster parents, on
February 5, 2019, relators filed in the Juvenile Court a pleading entitled “Paternal
Grandparents’ Expedited Motion to Lift Stay of Intervention, Motion for Fixed and
Unsupervised Visitation, and Motion for Immediate Implementation of a
Transition Plan.” Therein, relators sought the lifting of the stay on their
intervention, fixed and unsupervised visitation with B.F., and immediate
implementation of a transition plan to transfer custody of B.F. from the foster
parents to appellants. The Juvenile Court judge summarily denied relators’
motions to lift the stay of their intervention and for immediate implementation of a
transition plan, despite, relators argue, the testimonies of Drs. Murphy and Dickson
at the November 27, 2018 placement hearing that B.F. could safely transition to
appellants in around six weeks. The trial court granted a hearing on the issue of
visitation. Herein, relators seek review of the trial court’s rulings that denied
relators a hearing on their motions to lift the stay of their intervention and for
immediate implementation of a transition plan.
Relators frame the issues presented in their writ application as follows:
19-CA-115 26
(1) Whether it is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to deny a hearing to
grandparents on lifting a stay of intervention without hearing any reasons
in support of lifting the stay, while simultaneously granting a hearing
regarding their rights to visitation, particularly in a matter never before
heard by the trial judge, and procedurally closing the door in the trial
court to any possibility that these grandparents could ever obtain custody
of or adopt their granddaughter as the delays are swiftly approaching to
allow the child to be adopted by non-related foster parents.
(2) Whether it is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, in this case that was
only recently transferred to a new division wherein no hearings in the
matter had ever been held, to summarily deny a Motion for Immediate
Implementation of a Transition Plan filed by Intervenors, the paternal
grandparents, when the record supported that fact that all experts agreed
transition to the grandparents could be safely done in about six weeks
with no harm to the child.
Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the Juvenile Court judge’s
ruling which denied relators a hearing on their motions to lift the stay of their
intervention and for immediate implementation of a transition plan, and the denial
of their motions. A thorough reading of the writ application shows that in these
motions filed in the Juvenile Court after they appealed the November 27, 2018
judgment, relators are attempting to secure the same relief they sought in their
appeal of the November 27, 2018 judgment, which is a reinstatement of their
intervention and ultimately custody of B.F. Relators’ arguments in favor of relief
in their writ application are substantively and substantially the same arguments
they make in their appeal, that DCFS violated state and federal law to provide them
notice, that the Juvenile Court judge erred holding them to “time limits” in which
to seek custody, and that the Juvenile Court judge ultimately erred in not finding
them a “suitable relative” for placement of B.F.31 Their arguments in the writ
application concern the same proceedings that led up to the November 27, 2018
judgment, except for alleged cancellation and/or denial of visitation with B.F. that
occurred following the November 27, 2018 judgment, and for which the trial court
did grant relief by setting the motion for visitation for hearing. Relators’ motions
31
The vast majority of the attachments to the writ application are also found in the appellate record.
19-CA-115 27
essentially asked the new Juvenile Court judge assigned to handle the case, who
was not the same judge that had previously rendered judgment,32 to effectively
overturn the November 27, 2018 judgment that they had appealed but without
appellate review and in a summary proceeding. There is no provision in the
Children’s Code, in either Title VI concerning Child in Need of Care proceedings,
or the general articles on appeals found in Title III, that allows an aggrieved party
who has a pending appeal of a child in need of care judgment to circumvent the
appellate process in this way. Appellants/relators are not entitled to the relief
requested in their writ application. Their writ application is accordingly denied.
CONCLUSION AS TO THE APPEAL AND THE WRIT APPLICATION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment under review in this appeal is
affirmed and relators’ writ application is denied.
AFFIRMED; WRIT DENIED
32
The Juvenile Court judge who rendered the November 27, 2018 judgment under review retired prior to
the subject motion being filed.
19-CA-115 28
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY MARY E. LEGNON
CHIEF JUDGE INTERIM CLERK OF COURT
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
AUGUST 9, 2019 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
19-CA-115
C/W 19-C-144
E-NOTIFIED
JUVENILE COURT (CLERK)
HON. ANDREA PRICE JANZEN (DISTRICT JUDGE)
ELIZABETH G. LINCOLN (APPELLEE) JENNIFER G. WOMBLE (APPELLEE) KRISTINE K. SIMS (APPELLANT)
LISA P. HARELL (APPELLEE)
MAILED
JESSE S. GEORGE (APPELLEE)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
935 GRAVIER STREET
SUITE 1340
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70112