Paulette Cooper Versus City of Kenner ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • PAULETTE COOPER                                      NO. 19-CA-383
    VERSUS                                               FIFTH CIRCUIT
    CITY OF KENNER                                       COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    ON APPEAL FROM THE CITY OF KENNER CIVIL SERVICE BOARD
    PARISH OF JEFFERSON, CITY OF KENNER, STATE OF LOUISIANA
    NO. 18-1, DAVID RICHARDSON, CHAIRMAN PRESIDING
    April 28, 2020
    FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER
    JUDGE
    Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
    Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Stephen J. Windhorst
    APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED
    FHW
    SMC
    SJW
    COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
    PAULETTE COOPER
    Clement P. Donelon
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
    CITY OF KENNER
    C. A. Fleming, III
    WICKER, J.
    Defendant, the City of Kenner, appeals from a ruling of the City of Kenner
    Civil Service Board (the Board), granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff,
    Paulette Cooper. For the following reasons, we dismiss Kenner’s appeal without
    prejudice and remand this matter, as the ruling sought to be appealed is not a final
    judgment in this matter.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On December 6, 2017, Ms. Cooper was terminated from her employment
    with the City of Kenner Mayor’s Court. On January 5, 2018, Ms. Cooper
    instituted this action by filing a Petition for Appeal to the City of Kenner Civil
    Service Board (the Board), requesting that the Board hear her appeal and
    revoke my termination, reinstate me back to my position as Court Manager
    at my rate of pay (as of 12/6/17), reinstate my tenured service without
    penalty and all back pay which may be owed to me. I also would request to
    be compensated for any and all COBRA costs; expenses and/or co-pays.
    And that this matter be redacted from my permanent file as it was never
    brought forth.
    Ms. Cooper apparently filed a motion for summary judgment as the record
    contains a memorandum in support of a motion for summary judgment dated May
    8, 2018 and a supplemental memorandum in support of a motion for summary
    judgment filed on June 1, 2018.
    The City filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Cooper’s petition for appeal and also
    a motion for summary judgment on June 4, 2018.
    Also on June 4, 2018, the Board rendered judgment on Ms. Cooper’s motion
    as follows:
    Accordingly, it is ordered that the Motion for Summary Judgement be, and
    same is hereby, GRANTED. Disciplinary action against the Appellant is
    overturned and seniority and backpay (sic) awarded. Per Civil Service Rule
    II, Section 2.09(8), in cases in which back pay is awarded, the appellant shall
    be required to file with the Finance Director a notarized statement of all
    monies earned by appellant during the period of absence from the City
    payroll, and such earnings shall be deducted in computing the amount of the
    back pay award.
    19-CA-383                                  1
    There is no written judgment pertaining to the City of Kenner’s motion for
    summary judgment.
    On June 15, 2018, the City filed an Application for Reconsideration or
    Rehearing and Motion for Stay, contending that Ms. Cooper’s motion for summary
    judgment should not have been granted. The Civil Service Board denied the
    Application on January 10, 2019.
    On February 8, 2019, the City filed an appellate brief with the City’s Civil
    Service Department. The City filed the identical brief in this court. There is no
    motion for appeal, grant, or setting of return date in the record. Nevertheless, the
    record was prepared and lodged in this Court on August 8, 2019.1
    However, we dismiss this appeal and remand the matter, because the
    judgment at issue is not final for purposes of immediate appeal and therefore is not
    a final, appealable judgment.
    Our review of the record in this matter reveals the following issues. First,
    the Civil Service Board did not address and determine all of Ms. Cooper’s claims.
    In this regard we could deem these claims are denied. When a judgment is silent
    as to a claim or demand that was litigated, it is presumed to be deemed denied by
    the trial court. Cambre v. St. John the Baptist Parish, 12-590 (La. App. 5 Cir.
    05/16/13), 
    119 So.3d 73
    , 81, writ denied, 13-1415 (La. 10/11/13), 
    123 So.3d 1227
    .
    However, because there is no transcript, we cannot determine whether her
    additional claims were litigated or waived for failure to present evidence to support
    them, or whether the Board even considered them. In brief to this court, the City
    contends that the Board did not consider its motion for summary judgment.
    1
    On September 3, 2019, Ms. Cooper filed a motion to dismiss appeal in this court, arguing that this Court
    does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of the Kenner Civil Service Board. In a per
    curium opinion issued by this court on October 30, 2019, Ms. Cooper’s motion to dismiss was denied.
    19-CA-383                                           2
    In addition, the Board did not issue a ruling on the City’s motion to dismiss
    or cross motion for summary judgment, and therefore the judgment in favor of Ms.
    Cooper is not final for purposes of immediate appeal. La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B).2
    Both parties treat the granting of Mrs. Cooper’s motion for summary
    judgment as a ruling denying the City’s Motion. The City, in its appellate brief,
    states that its motion was orally denied, without consideration, at the summary
    judgment hearing. An oral ruling is not appealable. “[W]here there is no signed
    judgment in the record, there is no final judgment from which appeal to a Court of
    Appeal can be taken, the appeal is premature, and the Court of Appeal is required
    ex proprio motu to dismiss the appeal. Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Hebert, 
    398 So. 2d 632
    , 634 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1981).
    This court may not determine the merits of an appeal unless our jurisdiction
    is properly invoked by a final judgment. Tomlinson v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 15-
    0276, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16), 
    192 So.3d 153
    , 156.
    The judgment in this case does not dismiss any party from the suit and does
    not decide all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories in the original action and
    reconventional demand. Therefore, it is a partial summary judgment which cannot
    be appealed unless it has been designated as a final judgment by the trial court after
    an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. There is no such
    determination in the judgment on appeal in this case.
    There has been no certification of the partial judgment as final pursuant to
    La. C.C.P. art. 1915, and therefore, we have no appellate jurisdiction to review it.
    2
    La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) provides:
    (1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part,
    as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party, whether in
    an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment
    shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an
    express determination that there is no just reason for delay.
    2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any such order or decision shall not constitute
    a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior to rendition
    of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
    19-CA-383                                            3
    In addition, because there is no transcript of the proceedings below, we are unable
    to review some of the assignments of error raised by appellant, the City of Kenner.
    Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal without prejudice, and remand this matter for
    further proceedings. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the City of
    Kenner.
    APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED
    19-CA-383                                 4
    SUSAN M. CHEHARDY                                                              CURTIS B. PURSELL
    CHIEF JUDGE                                                                    CLERK OF COURT
    MARY E. LEGNON
    FREDERICKA H. WICKER
    CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    MARC E. JOHNSON
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON                                                             SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
    STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
    FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
    HANS J. LILJEBERG
    JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.                           FIFTH CIRCUIT
    MELISSA C. LEDET
    JUDGES                                  101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
    DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
    POST OFFICE BOX 489
    GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054               (504) 376-1400
    (504) 376-1498 FAX
    www.fifthcircuit.org
    NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
    I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
    IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
    APRIL 28, 2020 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
    19-CA-383
    E-NOTIFIED
    CITY OF KENNER CIVIL SERVICE BOARD (CLERK)
    CLEMENT P. DONELON (APPELLEE)          C. A. FLEMING, III (APPELLANT)
    MAILED
    DAVID RICHARDSON                        TODD MCDOWELL
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-CA-383

Filed Date: 4/28/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/21/2024