State of Louisiana Versus Terrance Darnell Calloway ( 2019 )


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  • STATE OF LOUISIANA                                   NO. 19-KA-335
    VERSUS                                               FIFTH CIRCUIT
    TERRANCE DARNELL CALLOWAY                            COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
    NO. 16-4811, DIVISION "F"
    HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ, JUDGE PRESIDING
    December 30, 2019
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON
    JUDGE
    Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
    Marc E. Johnson, and Robert A. Chaisson
    AFFIRMED
    RAC
    FHW
    MEJ
    COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
    Terry M. Boudreaux
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
    TERRANCE DARNELL CALLOWAY
    Gwendolyn K. Brown
    CHAISSON, J.
    Defendant, Terrance Darnell Calloway, appeals the consecutive sentences
    the trial court imposed after a jury convicted him of second degree murder and
    obstruction of justice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant’s
    convictions and sentences.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On September 29, 2016, a Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned an
    indictment charging defendant with second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S.
    14:30.1 (count one),1 and obstruction of justice, in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1
    (count two). On September 30, 2016, defendant pled not guilty at his arraignment.
    Trial in this matter began with jury selection on June 11, 2018, and concluded on
    June 13, 2018, when the twelve-person jury unanimously found defendant guilty as
    charged.
    On June 27, 2018, defendant filed a motion for new trial and a motion for
    post-verdict judgment of acquittal. On the same day, defendant filed a written
    motion for appeal. According to the transcript, on June 28, 2018, the trial court
    denied defendant’s motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal
    and then granted the motion for appeal. After two victim impact statements were
    read, the trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without benefit of parole,
    probation, or suspension of sentence on count one. The trial court also sentenced
    defendant to forty years at hard labor on count two to run consecutively with his
    sentence on count one. Due to defendant’s actions during sentencing, the trial
    1
    Dana Lemar a/k/a Dana Calloway was charged as a co-defendant in count one. She pled guilty to
    manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement and testified against defendant at trial.
    1
    19-KA-335
    court also found him in contempt of court and sentenced him to an additional three
    months.
    In his first appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by imposing his
    sentences consecutively and by proceeding directly to sentencing without first
    obtaining a waiver of sentencing delays. This Court found that based upon the
    transcript, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to sentence defendant after it
    granted his motion for appeal, and defendant’s only assignments of error involved
    sentencing issues. In light of due process considerations, this Court vacated
    defendant’s sentences and remanded the matter for resentencing, noting that once
    defendant was resentenced, he had the right to appeal his convictions and
    sentences. See State v. Calloway, 18-708 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/24/19), 
    271 So.3d 349
    .
    In compliance with this Court’s directive, the trial court resentenced
    defendant on May 30, 2019, to life in prison at hard labor without benefit of parole,
    probation, or suspension of sentence on count one, and forty years at hard labor on
    count two to run consecutively. It also re-imposed the previous three-month
    sentence for the contempt of court. Defendant objected to the excessive and
    consecutive nature of “the sentence” and thereafter filed a motion to reconsider
    sentence, which was denied. Defendant now appeals, challenging the trial court’s
    imposition of consecutive sentences.
    FACTS
    On Sunday, June 26, 2016, Cordaryle Robert (the victim) was reported
    missing from Slidell. Three days later, on June 29, his body was found, with a
    gunshot wound to the head, in a ditch near Boomtown Casino in Jefferson Parish.
    During their investigation, Jefferson Parish police officers learned there was
    an ongoing arson investigation of the victim’s vehicle, which was found burned in
    a sugarcane field in Thibodeaux on June 25, 2016. The vehicle, which was sitting
    2
    19-KA-335
    on cement blocks, was missing its rims and tires. A RaceTrac styrofoam cup and a
    black muscle shirt were collected as evidence by the Lafourche Parish police.
    Thereafter, Lafourche Parish police officers went to the RaceTrac store between
    Slidell and Thibodeaux and viewed a surveillance video from around the time they
    believed the victim’s vehicle had been driven to the field. On the video, the
    officers observed a black male, wearing a black muscle shirt,2 purchasing a
    fountain drink in a cup that appeared similar to the RaceTrac cup found near the
    burned vehicle.
    In the meantime, in connection with the missing person report, Slidell police
    examined the victim’s cell phone records and discovered contact with one number
    continuously around the time of his disappearance. Their investigation led them to
    discover Dana Lemar3 as the person who had been in touch with the victim. It was
    further discovered that Lemar lived with defendant in a trailer park in Houma.
    Lafourche Parish police sent the RaceTrac surveillance video to the Houma police,
    and officers were able to positively identify the black male as defendant.
    Thereafter, Houma police executed a search warrant in tandem with the
    Jefferson Parish police, the Slidell police, and the Lafourche Parish police on
    defendant and Lemar’s mobile home. During the search, a gas can4 and a glove
    holding twenty-four lug nuts of the same size and dimensions5 were seized.
    2
    The black muscle shirt was seized from the gas spout of the victim’s vehicle. It is noted that defendant’s
    DNA was found on the black shirt.
    3
    After work on Friday, June 24, the victim went to his friend and co-worker, Brandon Johnson’s,
    apartment. At that time, the victim showed Brandon text messages from a woman the victim intended to
    go meet with in New Orleans that night.
    4
    A receipt for the gas can was also found during the search. The receipt reflected it was purchased at the
    Walmart in Boutte at 5:13 a.m. on June 25.
    5
    Later, Jefferson Parish police fitted the twenty-four lug nuts to the victim’s vehicle and found that they
    fit.
    3
    19-KA-335
    Dana Lemar, defendant’s wife, pled guilty to manslaughter for her
    involvement in the murder of the victim. In accordance with the terms of her plea
    agreement, Lemar testified at trial as to the circumstances surrounding the victim’s
    murder. According to Ms. Lemar, she was Facebook friends with the victim, and
    he had expressed an interest in her. Defendant was aware of the messages the
    victim had sent to Lemar as he had access to her Facebook account. After seeing
    posted pictures of money and of the victim’s vehicle on his Facebook page, Lemar
    and defendant wanted to rob him. Lemar thereafter made arrangements to meet the
    victim at Boomtown Casino under the guise it was a date. Lemar and defendant
    drove to Boomtown Casino in their Chevrolet Tahoe and waited for the victim to
    arrive.
    When the victim arrived to the Boomtown Casino parking lot, Lemar got in
    his vehicle, and they drove to a Burger King. Defendant had previously told
    Lemar to see if the victim had any cash when he pulled out his wallet, but she was
    only able to see that he had a card. To lure the victim back to the vicinity of
    Boomtown Casino where defendant waited, Lemar told the victim that her aunt’s
    vehicle had broken down nearby on the side of the road. The victim drove to the
    area where Lemar directed him, and defendant waited there near the Tahoe to rob
    the victim. When Lemar and the victim pulled over on the side of the road, the
    victim exited his vehicle and went to look under the hood of the Tahoe. Lemar
    exited the victim’s vehicle to look for defendant and then heard gunshots. She
    turned to see defendant holding a gun and standing over the victim’s body as he
    fell into the ditch.
    Lemar detailed that after defendant shot the victim, she drove their Tahoe
    away from the scene while defendant followed in the victim’s vehicle. She
    4
    19-KA-335
    provided that she followed defendant to the spot where he burned the victim’s
    vehicle to get rid of evidence of the murder.
    IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
    In his only assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
    imposing consecutive sentences.
    At the resentencing hearing conducted pursuant to this Court’s remand, the
    State adopted two victim impact statements read during defendant’s first
    sentencing and urged the trial court to reconsider them in imposing the sentences.
    In addition, both the State and defendant articulated their position on whether
    defendant’s sentences should be imposed consecutively. Thereafter, the trial court
    sentenced defendant, stating that he was doing so in accordance with La. C.Cr.P.
    art. 894.1, to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation,
    or suspension of sentence on count one, and forty years at hard labor on count two
    to be served consecutively.
    Defendant now challenges these sentences as excessive based on their
    consecutive nature. He argues that the two offenses were clearly part of a common
    scheme or plan, and thus, the imposition of consecutive sentences required
    particular justification from the trial court. He contends that the trial court’s failure
    to provide any justification for the imposition of consecutive sentences requires
    this Court to find that his sentences are unlawful and to remand for resentencing.
    The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the
    Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. A
    sentence is considered excessive, even if it is within the statutory limits, if it is
    grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or imposes needless and
    purposeless pain and suffering. State v. Woods, 18-413 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/19/18),
    
    262 So.3d 455
    , 460.
    5
    19-KA-335
    According to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D), the appellate court shall not set aside
    a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed. In
    reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, the appellate court must consider the
    punishment and the crime in light of the harm to society and gauge whether the
    penalty is so disproportionate as to shock the court’s sense of justice, while
    recognizing the trial court’s wide discretion. State v. Pearson, 07-332 (La. App. 5
    Cir. 12/27/07), 
    975 So.2d 646
    , 655-56.
    When two or more convictions arise from the same act or transaction, or
    constitute parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be
    served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or all be served
    consecutively. La. C.Cr.P. art. 883; State v. Yelverton, 12-745 (La. App. 5 Cir.
    2/21/13), 
    156 So.3d 53
    , 66-67, writ denied, 13-629 (La. 10/11/13), 
    123 So.3d 1217
    . If the trial court elects to impose consecutive sentences for crimes arising
    out of the single course of conduct, it must articulate the reasons it feels
    consecutive sentences are necessary. State v. Cornejo-Garcia, 11-619 (La. App. 5
    Cir. 1/24/12), 
    90 So.3d 458
    , 465. Although the imposition of consecutive
    sentences requires particular justification when the crimes arise from a single
    course of conduct, consecutive sentences are not necessarily excessive. State v.
    Bradley, 02-1130 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/03), 
    844 So.2d 115
    , 118.
    A trial judge retains discretion to impose consecutive sentences on the basis
    of factors such as the offender’s past criminal acts, the violent nature of the
    charged offenses, or the risk that the defendant may pose to the safety of the
    community. State v. Williams, 08-556 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/13/09), 
    8 So.3d 3
    , 9, writ
    denied, 09-330 (La. 11/6/09), 
    21 So.3d 298
    . The failure to articulate specific
    reasons for imposing consecutive sentences does not, however, require remand if
    6
    19-KA-335
    the record provides an adequate factual basis to support the consecutive sentences.
    State v. Cornejo-Garcia, 
    supra.
    In the present case, the evidence presented at trial indicated that defendant’s
    convictions arose from a common scheme that occurred over the span of one night.
    Although La. C.Cr.P. art. 883 suggests that concurrent sentences would have been
    warranted under the circumstances presented herein, the trial court imposed
    defendant’s two sentences consecutively. At the resentencing hearing in this
    matter, the trial judge did not articulate any definitive reasons or identify any
    specific facts particular to defendant for justification that his sentences be served
    consecutively. Rather, the trial judge merely referenced that he was sentencing
    defendant in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1.6
    Despite the trial court’s failure to articulate its reasons for the imposition of
    consecutive sentences, a remand for resentencing is not warranted as the record
    clearly supports the sentences imposed. The facts adduced at trial indicate that
    defendant and Lemar lured the victim to Boomtown Casino with plans to rob him.
    After defendant and Lemar persuaded the victim to park on the side of the road
    under the pretense he was assisting Lemar’s aunt with her broken down vehicle,
    defendant came upon the victim and shot him in the head. Defendant then left the
    victim’s body on the side of the road in a ditch and drove the victim’s vehicle to
    Lafourche Parish where he burned it to conceal the victim’s murder.
    Further, Louisiana jurisprudence supports the trial court’s decision to impose
    consecutive sentences. See State v. Roberson, 40,809 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/19/06),
    
    929 So.2d 789
    , 803-05, and State v. Royal, 03-439 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 857
    6
    At the resentencing hearing, the State adopted the two victim impact statements read during defendant’s
    first sentencing hearing and urged the trial court to reconsider them in imposing the sentences. In these
    statements, the victim’s sister and the victim’s fiancée described the victim’s warm-hearted and hard-
    working nature and detailed the devastating effect his death has had on their families.
    7
    19-KA-
    335 So.2d 1167
    , 1169, 1175, writ denied, 03-3172 (La. 3/19/04), 
    869 So.2d 849
     (where
    courts have upheld consecutive sentences for the defendants’ convictions of second
    degree murder and obstruction of justice resulting in the same total period of
    incarceration as defendant herein).
    In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. Although the trial judge did not
    articulate reasons for the consecutive nature of the sentences, the record clearly
    supports the sentences imposed. Further, even assuming that defendant’s
    sentences are excessive because of their consecutive nature, a remand for
    resentencing would be “an academic exercise which has no practical benefit to
    anyone.” State v. Funes, 11-120 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/11), 
    88 So.3d 490
    , 510,
    writ denied, 12-290 (La. 5/25/12), 
    90 So.3d 408
    . Second degree murder carries a
    mandatory life sentence. See La. R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant received a life sentence
    without benefits for his conviction of second degree murder, so the imposition of
    the forty-year consecutive sentence has “no practical effect as defendant will be in
    jail for the rest of his life unless he is pardoned.” See Funes, 
    supra.
    Accordingly, the arguments raised by defendant in this assigned error are
    without merit.
    ERRORS PATENT REVIEW
    We have reviewed the record for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art.
    920; State v. Oliveaux, 
    312 So.2d 337
     (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 
    556 So.2d 175
     (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). Our review reveals that the trial court failed to advise
    defendant of the time delays for filing post-conviction relief as set forth in La.
    C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. While the minute entry from the May 30, 2019 resentencing
    proceedings indicates that defendant was advised of the time delays for filing post-
    8
    19-KA-335
    conviction relief, the transcript does not so reflect.7 It is well settled that if a trial
    court fails to advise, or provides an incomplete advisal, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art.
    930.8, the appellate court may correct this error by informing defendant of the
    applicable prescriptive period for post-conviction relief. See State v. Wilmot, 13-
    994 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/14/14), 
    142 So.3d 141
    , 150. Thus, in accordance with this
    Court’s routine practice, we advise defendant pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8
    that “no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an
    out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the
    judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of
    Article 914 or 922.”
    Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, we affirm defendant’s
    convictions and sentences.
    AFFIRMED
    7
    In addition, the transcript from defendant’s original sentencing on June 28, 2018, does not reflect that he
    was advised of the time delays during that proceeding.
    9
    19-KA-335
    SUSAN M. CHEHARDY                                                               CURTIS B. PURSELL
    CHIEF JUDGE                                                                     CLERK OF COURT
    MARY E. LEGNON
    FREDERICKA H. WICKER
    CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    MARC E. JOHNSON
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON                                                              SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
    STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
    FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
    HANS J. LILJEBERG
    JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.                        FIFTH CIRCUIT
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    NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
    I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
    IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
    DECEMBER 30, 2019 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
    19-KA-335
    E-NOTIFIED
    24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
    HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ (DISTRICT JUDGE)
    TERRY M. BOUDREAUX (APPELLEE)          GWENDOLYN K. BROWN (APPELLANT)   THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)
    MAILED
    HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
    (APPELLEE)
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY
    TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    200 DERBIGNY STREET
    GRETNA, LA 70053
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-KA-335

Judges: Michael P. Mentz

Filed Date: 12/30/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/21/2024