Ronald's Lawn Service, LLC Versus St. John the Baptist Parish School Board ( 2019 )

RONALD'S LAWN SERVICE, LLC NO. 19-CA-244
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL COURT OF APPEAL
BOARD
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE FORTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 67,520, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE J. STERLING SNOWDY, JUDGE PRESIDING
December 11, 2019
MARC E. JOHNSON
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson,
Robert A. Chaisson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
AFFIRMED
MEJ
JJM
DISSENTS WITH REASONS
RAC
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
RONALD'S LAWN SERVICE, LLC
DaShawn P. Hayes
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL BOARD
Kevin P. Klibert
JOHNSON, J.
Plaintiff/Appellant, Ronald’s Lawn Service, LLC (hereinafter referred to as
“RLS”), appeals the summary judgment that dismissed its petition for breach of
contract in favor of Defendant/Appellee, St. John the Baptist Parish School Board
(hereinafter referred to as “the School Board”), from the 40th Judicial District
Court, Division “C”. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 6, 2015, RLS filed its “Petition for Breach of Contract.” In its
petition, RLS alleged that it entered into a contract with the School Board on July
15, 2013 for ongoing services, labor, and materials for lawn care and maintenance
of several school campuses. The petition stated that the amount owed for all of its
services rendered was $149,832 per 12-month period beginning on June 7, 2013
and ending on March 31, 2016. RLS further alleged that the School Board
terminated the contract on September 5, 2013 without any cause or written notice
within 30 days of the termination. It contended the School Board was liable to it
for the full sum of the contract. The School Board answered the petition on April
28, 2015, admitting that the amount of the contract for all services rendered as
contracted was $149,832 per 12-month period beginning on June 7, 2013 and
ending on March 31, 2016 and that the termination date of the contract was
September 5, 2013. It then denied RLS’s allegation that it performed all services
and work or lawn care and maintenance in accordance with customary industry
standards with the contract. The School Board then raised the affirmative defense
that RLS failed to perform its obligations under the contract, which was the cause
of the termination.
Two years later, the School Board filed its “Motion for Summary Judgment”
on April 28, 2017. In its motion, the School Board asserted it was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because a release of all claims for ground maintenance
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(hereinafter referred to as “the Agreement”) was executed between the parties, and
the settlement of $2,400 was a full and final payment. The School Board filed an
ex parte motion on May 1, 2017 to supplement its motion for summary judgment
with a copy of the Agreement, which was granted by the trial court. RLS opposed
the motion on April 4, 2018, and argued it had a “fixed-term” contract with the
School Board that was terminated without just cause. Thus, RLS averred the
Agreement did not compensate it or release and/or discharge any of its claims
remaining through March 31, 2016. RLS also objected to the supplementation and
admission of the Agreement.
The hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on April 4,
2018. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court admitted the Agreement into
evidence and orally granted the summary judgment. The trial court reasoned that
the Agreement covered all of the claims contemplated in RLS’s lawsuit. A written
judgment granting the summary judgment in favor the School Board and
dismissing RLS’s lawsuit with prejudice was rendered on April 27, 2018. The
instant appeal followed.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In its sole assignment of error, RLS alleges the trial court erred in granting
the School Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment based simply upon the
Agreement. It argues that its petition alleged the employment contract term with
the School Board was from June 7, 2013 through March 31, 2016, and the
Agreement only discharged duties and obligations owed for a three-month period
out of the nearly three-year contract; thus, all of its claims against the School
Board were not discharged in that document. As a result, RLS contends there are
genuine issues of material fact remaining in this matter. It further argues that the
School Board did not present competent evidence in support of its motion because
the Agreement was not accompanied by an affidavit.
19-CA-244 2
In opposition, the School Board avers that the Agreement signed was
unambiguous and contemplated the same claims asserted by RLS in its lawsuit. It
argues that the claims in RLS’s petition are the same claims contemplated and
released in the Agreement by use of the inclusive language “claims, demands,
damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind in nature.” The School
Board further avers no evidence that supports RLS’s claims of the contract is in the
record. Therefore, the School Board contends the trial court correctly concluded
there were no genuine issues of material fact, and it was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Here, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the School
Board, reasoning that the Agreement covered all of the claims contemplated in
RLS’s lawsuit. The Agreement, entitled “Release of all claims for grounds
maintenance work performed beginning on June 7, 2013 and ending on September
5, 2013,” states,
For the sole cause and consideration of two thousand four
hundred dollars ($2,400.00), the receipt and sufficiency of which is
acknowledged, I release and forever discharge St. John the Baptist
Parish School Board, its administrators, agents, and assigns, and all
other persons, firms, or corporations liable or who might be claimed
to be liable, none of whom admit any liability to the undersigned but
all expressly deny any liability, from any and all claims, demands,
damages, actions, causes of action, or suits of any kind or nature, and
particularly on account of all claims for reimbursement for grounds
maintenance services (grass cutting) performed beginning on June 7,
2013 and ending on September 5, 2013 on schools, sites, and locations
owned by St. John the Baptist School Board.
I declare that the terms of this settlement have been completely
read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose
of making a full and final compromise, adjustment, and settlement of
any and all claims, disputed or otherwise, on account of the injuries
and damages above mentioned, and for the express purpose of
precluding forever any further or additional claims arising out of the
above stated accident, and agree to save, indemnify, defend, and hold
harmless the party released from any claims or actions commenced in
violations of this release agreement. I accept this Check in the
amount of $2,400 as final payment of and cause for the consideration
set forth above.
19-CA-244 3
RLS objected to the admission of the Agreement into evidence in its
opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed on April 4, 2018, the same
day as the summary judgment hearing. According to La. C.C.P. art. 966 (D)(2),
the trial court may only consider those documents filed in support of or in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment and shall consider any documents
to which no objection is made. Any objection to a document shall be raised in a
timely-filed opposition or reply memorandum. Id. The trial court shall consider
all objections prior to rendering judgment and shall specifically state on the record
or in writing which documents, if any, it holds to be inadmissible or declined to
consider. Id.
Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2), any opposition to the motion for
summary judgment shall be filed and served not less than 15 days prior to the
hearing on the motion. Because RLS filed its opposition to the motion for
summary judgment less than 15 days prior to the hearing, the objection to the
admission of the Agreement raised in the opposition was untimely. Therefore, we
find the trial court did not err in admitting the Agreement into evidence over RLS’s
objection, and we will consider the Agreement in our review.
On supervisory or appellate review, the appellate court’s review of a trial
court ruling granting or denying summary judgment is de novo. Yaukey v. Ballard,
18-449 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/20/19); 267 So.3d 183, 186, writ denied, 19-621 (La.
9/6/19), citing Breaux v. Fresh Start Properties, L.L.C., 11-262 (La. App. 5 Cir.
11/29/11); 78 So.3d 849, 852. Thus, appellate courts consider the same criteria
that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is
appropriate: whether there is any genuine issue as to material fact, and whether the
mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.A motion for summary judgment shall be granted—after an opportunity for
adequate discovery—if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show
19-CA-244 4
that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). The mover of the motion
bears the burden of proof; however, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof
at trial, the moving party must only point out that there is an absence of factual
support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). Thereafter, the burden shifts to the non-
moving party to produce factual support to establish that he will be able to satisfy
his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. Yaukey, supra. If the non-moving party
fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id., citing Stogner v. Ochsner
Clinic Foundation, 18-96 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/19/18); 254 So.3d 1254, 1257.
In the case at bar, RLS alleged in its petition that the School breached its
contract for ongoing services, labor and materials for lawn care and maintenance of
several of the school campuses in the district. The essential elements of a breach
of contract are threefold. Bruneau v. Crescent City Cleaning Servs. Corp., 16-17
(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/16); 209 So.3d 286, 290, citing Sanga v. Perdomo, 14-609
(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/14); 167 So.3d 818, 822, writ denied, 15-222 (La. 6/19/15);
172 So.3d 650. First, a plaintiff in a breach of contract claim must prove the
obligor undertook an obligation to perform. Id. Next, the plaintiff must prove that
the obligor failed to perform the obligation, resulting in the breach. Id. Finally,
the failure to perform must result in damages to the obligee. Id.Upon de novo review, we find that the School Board met its burden of
proving it was entitled to summary judgment. In its motion for summary
judgment, the School Board argued that the Agreement settled all of the claims
contemplated in RLS’s lawsuit and supplemented its motion with a copy of the
Agreement to support its argument. The Agreement is clear and unambiguous that
the parties entered into a cash settlement for the work RLS performed between
19-CA-244 5
June 7, 2013 and September 5, 2013. However, that is the only evidence presented
by either party that gives us any indication as to the terms of the contract between
RLS and the School Board. RLS failed to counter the School Board’s burden shift
by presenting evidence, i.e., a contract, an affidavit, or a deposition, of the terms of
the contract between the parties beyond September 5, 2013—the date both parties
admitted the contract was terminated—or that the Agreement did not settle all of
its claims. As a result, RLS failed to present evidence that it would be able to
satisfy its evidentiary burden of proving the first essential element of its breach of
contract action. See, Bruneau, supra.Without any further evidence of the terms of the contract, we find that the
Agreement satisfied the School Board’s obligation to RLS for the services it
performed through September 5, 2013. Therefore, we find that there is no genuine
issue of fact remaining, and the School Board is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we find that St. John the Baptist Parish School
Board is entitled to summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s April 27, 2018
judgment that dismissed Ronald’s Lawn Service, LLC’s lawsuit with prejudice.
Ronald’s Lawn Service, LLC is assessed the costs of this appeal.
AFFIRMED
19-CA-244 6
RONALD’S LAWN SERVICE, LLC NO. 19-CA-244
FIFTH CIRCUIT
VERSUS
COURT OF APPEAL
ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH
SCHOOL BOARD
STATE OF LOUISIANA
CHAISSON, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
The majority opinion finds that RLS failed to present any evidence of the
terms of the contract it alleges in its petition, and that “as a result, RLS failed to
present evidence that it would be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proving
the first essential element of its breach of contract action.” I respectfully disagree
with the majority’s finding that at this stage of the proceeding, in response to the
particular motion for summary judgment filed by the School Board, that it was
RLS’s burden to present evidence that it would be able to satisfy its evidentiary
burden of proving the terms of the contract.
In its petition for breach of contract, RLS alleged that on or about
July 15, 2013, it entered into a contract with the School Board for ongoing lawn
care and maintenance services at several school campuses. It further alleged that
the amount of the contract was $149,832 per twelve-month period beginning on
June 7, 2013, and ending on March 31, 2016. In its answer to RLS’s petition, the
School Board specifically admitted both of these allegations.
In its motion for summary judgment, the School Board again acknowledged
that it entered into a contract with RLS on July 15, 2013, specifically citing to the
19-CA-244 7
paragraph of RLS’s petition that recites the terms of the contract. Nowhere in its
motion for summary judgment did the School Board raise any issue or contest the
terms of the contract as alleged in RLS’s petition. Rather, the School Board
maintained that the parties terminated the contract on September 5, 2013, and that
in connection with the termination, RLS executed a release of “all claims for
ground maintenance work performed on June 7, 2013 and ending on September 5,
2013.” The School Board further maintained that “this settlement was a ‘full and
final compromise, adjustment, and settlement of any and all claims, disputed or
otherwise.’”
Consequently, in this particular motion for summary judgment, the School
Board did not point out the absence of factual support for the existence of the
contract or the terms of that contract. Rather, the School Board maintained that
there was a compromise of all claims under the contract. Having raised the
affirmative defense of compromise, the burden was on the School Board to prove
the compromise and that it was a compromise of all claims under the contract.
In order to carry its burden, the School Board submitted the September 20,
2013 Agreement that it contends released all claims under the contract. I agree
with the majority that this Agreement was properly admitted and considered by the
trial court on the School Board’s motion for summary judgment. I also agree with
the majority that “[t]he Agreement is clear and unambiguous that the parties
entered into a cash settlement for the work RLS performed between June 7, 2013
and September 5, 2013.” However, for the following reasons, I find the
Agreement unclear and ambiguous as to whether the intent of the parties was to
release any claims for the period from September 6, 2013, to March 31, 2016, the
acknowledged ending date of the contract. Furthermore, because the burden was
on the School Board to prove that the compromise Agreement was a compromise
19-CA-244 8
of all claims under the contract, the terms of which were admitted to by the School
Board in its answer, I disagree with the majority that the burden shifted to RLS to
prove the (undisputed) terms of the contract.
First, the Agreement is titled “Release of all claims for grounds maintenance
work performed beginning on June 7, 2013 and ending on September 5, 2013.”
Nowhere in the Agreement is the July 15, 2013 contract, which the School Board
has acknowledged in this litigation, alluded to or even mentioned. Second, the
omnibus phrase “any and all claims” that the School Board now maintains releases
all claims under an unmentioned contract, specifically refers to work performed
during the June 7, 2013, to September 5, 2013 period, and further purports to
release all claims arising out of an “accident.”
This ambiguous Agreement was the only evidence submitted by the School
Board in an attempt to carry its burden to show that all claims under the
acknowledged July 15, 2013 contract were compromised. No other evidence was
submitted by the School Board to establish the intent of the parties regarding this
ambiguous Agreement. I therefore conclude that at this stage of the proceedings,
the School Board has failed to carry its burden of proof as to its specific allegations
in this particular motion for summary judgment, i.e., that there was a compromise
of all claims under the contract sued upon.
Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(D), the burden of proof rests with the mover
on the motion for summary judgment. It is only when “the mover will not bear the
burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for
summary judgment,” that the mover can meet its burden by pointing out the
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim. The burden does not shift to the adverse party until the mover carries its
initial burden. In this case, the School Board had the burden to proof a
19-CA-244 9
compromise of all claims under the contract, which it failed to do. Under the
summary judgment procedure, the burden never shifted to RLS.
La. C.C.P. art. 966(F) provides that “[a] summary judgment may be
rendered or affirmed only as to those issues set forth in the motion under
consideration by the court at that time” (emphasis added). The only issue set forth
in the School Board’s motion for summary judgment is the issue of a compromise
of all of the acknowledged terms of the contract between the parties. In my
opinion, the result of the majority opinion is to require the non-mover on a motion
for summary judgment, who will not carry the burden of proof on the issue raised
in the motion, to respond to the motion by submitting evidence that it will be able
to carry its burden of proof as to all essential elements of his claim, regardless of
whether a particular element of his claim was placed at issue by the motion or not.
The implication of such a requirement is that a non-moving party on a motion for
summary judgment is well-advised, even where the mover has only pointed to the
absence of a single element essential to the non-mover’s case, to try his entire case
to the court in response to the motion for summary judgment.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand
the matter for further proceedings.
19-CA-244 10
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
MARY E. LEGNON
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 11, 2019 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
19-CA-244
E-NOTIFIED
40TH DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE J. STERLING SNOWDY (DISTRICT JUDGE)
DASHAWN P. HAYES (APPELLANT) KEVIN P. KLIBERT (APPELLEE)
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