Richard Benoit Versus Kirt Guerin, Warden Elayn Hunt Correctional Center ( 2023 )

RICHARD BENOIT NO. 22-KH-547
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
KIRT GUERIN, WARDEN ELAYN HUNT COURT OF APPEAL
CORRECTIONAL CENTER
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 12,159, DIVISION "D"
HONORABLE M. LAUREN LEMMON, JUDGE PRESIDING
January 18, 2023
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Liljeberg
WRIT GRANTED, IN PART, FOR LIMITED PURPOSE; WRIT
DENIED, IN PART
SMC
SJW
HJL
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR,
RICHARD BENOIT
Emily Posner
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
KIRT GUERIN, WARDEN ELAYN HUNT CORRECTIONAL CENTER
Honorable Joel T. Chaisson, II
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Jeffrey M. Landry
Grant L. Willis
J. Taylor Gray
CHEHARDY, C.J.
In this writ application, relator, Richard, Benoit, seeks review of the district
court’s September 20, 2022 judgment denying his supplemental application for
post-conviction relief (“APCR”). For the following reasons, we grant relator’s writ
application, in part, for the limited purpose of remanding the matter to the district
court for a ruling on relator’s claims raised in his supplemental APCR, which were
not reviewed on the merits; we deny relator’s writ application, in part, as to his
factual innocence claim.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Relator was indicted by a grand jury on May 8, 2012, and charged with
aggravated rape of a minor under the age of thirteen, a violation of La. R.S.
14:42(A)(4)1, and aggravated incest of a minor under the age of thirteen, a
violation of La. R.S. 14:78.1.2 See State v. Benoit, 17-187 (La. App. 5 Cir.
12/29/17), 237 So.3d 1214, 1216. On April 10, 2014, after a four-day trial, a
unanimous jury found relator guilty of the responsive verdicts of sexual battery, in
violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1 (Count 1) and attempted aggravated incest, in
violation of La. R.S. 14:26 and La. R.S. 14:78.1 (Count 2). On July 30, 2014,
relator was sentenced to fifty years at hard labor, with thirty-five years to be served
without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on Count 1, and
forty-nine and one-half years at hard labor on Count 2, to be served concurrently.
Relator’s convictions, as well as the sentence for sexual battery, were
affirmed by this Court on December 29, 2017. Benoit, 237 So.3d at 1216. Having
determined that relator’s sentence on the attempted aggravated incest conviction
was illegally lenient pursuant to La. R.S. 14:78.1(D)(2), as it was not imposed
without restriction of benefits, this Court remanded the matter for re-sentencing.
1
La. R.S. 14:42 was subsequently amended to rename the offense to first degree rape.
2
Aggravated incest was later re-designated as aggravated crime against nature, La. R.S. 14:89.1.
22-KH-547 1
Id. at 1225-26. Relator did not seek supervisory review by the Louisiana Supreme
Court. On July 24, 2018, the district court re-sentenced relator on Count 2 to forty-
nine and one-half years at hard labor, with twenty-five years to be served without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, to run concurrently with the
sentence imposed on Count 1. Relator did not move for reconsideration of the
sentence pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1, or appeal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art.
914. Accordingly, relator’s conviction and sentence became final thirty days later,
on August 25, 2018.
Relator timely filed his first application for post-conviction relief (“APCR”),
pro se, on July 10, 2020, raising the following claims: (1) ineffective assistance of
counsel (pre-trial and at trial); (2) excessive sentence; (3) Brady violation; (4)
prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) insufficient evidence to support the charge of
aggravated incest. The district court ordered the State to file an answer. On April
25, 2021, the State filed an answer arguing the relator’s claims lacked merit.
On June 23, 2021, after the State had filed its answer, the district court
granted relator’s unopposed Motion to Enroll and Set Deadline to Supplement
Application for Post-Conviction Relief, and set the filing deadline for October 15,
2021. After several extensions of time were granted, relator, through counsel, filed
a supplemental APCR on June 7, 2022—nearly two years after filing his original
pro se APCR—raising the following additional claims: (1) factual innocence
pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2;3 (2) relator’s confession and inculpatory
statements were false, unreliable, and coerced in violation of his due process
rights; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel, pre-trial and at trial; (4) ineffective
assistance of counsel during sentencing; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal; and (6) cumulative error. As ordered by the district court, the State filed
3
La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2, effective date of August 1, 2021, provides for a freestanding claim of
factual innocence not based on DNA evidence.
22-KH-547 2
numerous procedural objections to relator’s supplemental APCR on September 8,
2022. Specifically, the State argued that relator’s claim of factual innocence failed
to meet the criteria set forth in La. C.Cr.P. at. 926.2, and additionally, that relator’s
remaining supplemental claims were untimely under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A).4
On September 20, 2022, the district court issued a judgment summarily
denying relator’s original and supplemental APCRs. As to relator’s pro se claims,
the district court found that the record failed to establish that relator’s counsel’s
performance was deficient or violated a duty owed to him. The district court also
found that the sentence imposed was not unconstitutionally excessive based on the
facts proven at trial, the details of the pre-sentencing investigation report, the
mitigating factors (including relator’s intoxication), and the age of the victim.
Relator was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifty years (ten years less than the
pre-sentencing report recommended), and forty-nine and one-half years.
According to the district court, neither of these terms was grossly disproportionate
to the severity of the offenses for which relator was convicted.
Additionally, the district court found no evidence of a Brady violation, and
that relator’s claim for such a violation is speculative at best. The district court
further found no merit to relator’s claim that the prosecutor was vindictive towards
him to the extent that it unduly prejudiced him. In particular, the trial court
concluded that relator failed to identify how he was prejudiced or how undue
prejudice affected the judgment of the jury. Relator also failed to demonstrate any
evidence that would support a mistrial pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 770. According
to the district court, the verdict in this case was based on evidence submitted to the
jury, not the comments of counsel.
4
La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o application for post-conviction
relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than
two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final.”
22-KH-547 3
Finally, regarding relator’s claim that the State failed to prove the existence
of a blood or legal relationship between himself and the victim, the district court
found that relator acknowledged the victim as his daughter at trial, the mother
testified that relator was the victim’s father, and the victim testified that relator was
her father. Consequently, the district court determined that relator’s original
application for post-conviction relief was without merit.
The district court next addressed the claims relator asserted in his
supplemental application for post-conviction relief. As to relator’s claim of factual
innocence, the district court held that relator’s claim for relief is procedurally
barred because he failed to meet the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2.
Specifically, relator failed to present any new, reliable, and non-cumulative
scientific, forensic, physical, or non-testimonial documentary evidence that would
be legally admissible at trial and that was not known or discoverable prior to trial.
Further, the district court found that, while the supplemental application noted that
relator claimed that he moved to test “mitochondrial DNA,” no evidence was
submitted indicating that relator had done so or that any as yet unfiled results
demonstrate factual innocence.
The district court also determined that the remaining claims raised by relator
in his supplemental application are procedurally barred as untimely. Specifically,
La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 requires the applicant to file an APCR no later than two
years after the judgment of conviction and sentence become final. Relator’s
conviction and sentence became final on August 25, 2018. Consequently, the
district court determined that relator’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel
during sentencing are procedurally barred because he did not raise the issues
within two years of August 25, 2018. The district court also concluded that the
claims raised in relator’s supplemental application are not supplemental, but are
22-KH-547 4
new and previously unraised claims, and thus, are time-barred by La. C.Cr.P. art.
930.8.
Concluding that the claims raised in relator’s supplemental APCR are new,
the district court found the supplemental application to be in and of itself
successive to the original application pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(E), which
provides that “[a] successive application shall be dismissed if it raises a new or
different claim that was inexcusably omitted from a prior application.”5 According
to the district court, because “[n]one of the new claims raised in the supplemental
application are based on new evidence or constitutional jurisprudence that could
not have been discovered within the time limit for the original application for post-
conviction relief,” the new claims are time-barred.
Relator now seeks review of the district court’s September 20, 2022 ruling,
maintaining that the district court abused its discretion by procedurally barring
relator’s supplemental APCR claims as untimely and successive.6 Relator also re-
urges his claim of factual innocence.
DISCUSSION
Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the prescriptive period does not initially begin
to run until the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the
provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. Under Article 914, a district court’s
5
Although the district court cites La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D) in denying relator’s claims as
successive, the district court quotes the language of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(E).
6
Following a thorough review of relator’s writ application, we find that relator has not challenged
the district court’s ruling on the claims he raised in his original July 10, 2020 APCR. Instead, we find
that relator only challenges the district court’s denial of his claims filed in his supplemental APCR, as no
mention is made of relator’s pro se claims that were denied by the district court. Uniform Rules–Courts
of Appeal, Rule 1–3 states:
The scope of review in all cases within the appellate and supervisory
jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal shall be provided by LSA-Const.
Art. 5, §10(B), and as otherwise provided by law. The Courts of Appeal
will review only issues which were submitted to the trial court and which
are contained in specifications and assignments of error, unless the
interest of justice clearly requires otherwise.
On the showing made, we find that relator’s writ application presents no issues or assignments of
error concerning the district court’s rulings on the claims relator raised in his original APCR.
22-KH-547 5
judgment in a criminal case becomes final if no motion for appeal is made within
thirty days after the rendition of the judgment. Pursuant to Article 922, an
appellate court’s judgment becomes final if no application for rehearing or review
by the Supreme Court is filed within fourteen days of rendition of the appellate
court’s judgment.
Here, there is no dispute regarding the district court’s calculation of
timeliness for the filing of relator’s pro se APCR. Specifically, the district court
found that relator’s convictions and sentences became final on August 25, 2018,
following relators July 26, 2018 resentencing on Count 2, which relator did not
move to reconsider or file an appeal. Thus, according to the district court, relator’s
pro se APCR filed on July 10, 2020, was timely under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8.
As a general matter, resentencing alone does not restart the prescriptive
period for filing an APCR. See State ex rel. Rushing v. Whitley, 93-2722 (La.
11/13/95), 662 So.2d 464.7 As previously stated, on appeal, this Court remanded
relator’s sentence on Count 2 for resentencing because the sentence was illegally
lenient, specifically noting that “the language of the sentencing provision gives the
trial court discretion in determining the exact length of time that benefits are to be
restricted.” Benoit, 237 So.3d at 1225. Consequently, this Court’s remand was not
based on a non-discretionary and ministerial correction of sentence, but rather, an
actual resentencing thereby triggering the post-conviction prescriptive period.
There is, however, a disagreement as to the timeliness of the claims relator
raised in his supplemental APCR. According to relator, these post-conviction
claims are not time-barred because he “had obtained leave of court to supplement
his initial [timely filed] pro-se application with an application written by an
7
For example, a non-discretionary and ministerial correction of a sentence is not a resentencing
and is not accompanied by the right to be present in court, the right to counsel, the right to appeal, or the
reinstatement of the two-year delay from finality of conviction after correction. See State v. Littleton,
43,609 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/7/08), 982 So.2d 978, 980, writ denied sub nom. State ex rel. Littleton v. State,
08-1408 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 135.
22-KH-547 6
attorney.” To the contrary, the district court found that relator’s claims were not
“supplemental,” but rather, consisted of “new and previously unraised claims,”
thereby rendering the claims not only untimely, but successive as well.
The record evidences that on May 4, 2021, attorney Randy Lewis filed a
Motion to Enroll for a Limited Purpose in relator’s case, stating that he was
seeking to enroll solely to obtain an extension of time in order to allow relator to
retain counsel to represent him and “file pleadings on his behalf.” When this
motion was filed, the State, on April 25, 2021, had already filed its answer to
relator’s pro se APCR filed on July 10, 2020. On May 17, 2021, the district court
granted the Motion to Enroll for Limited Purpose and gave relator ninety days to
obtain counsel. On June 21, 2021, relator’s newly retained counsel, Emily Posner,
filed a Motion to Enroll and Set Deadline to Supplement Application for Post-
Conviction Relief. In her motion, quoting State v. Smith, 21-110 (La. 4/7/21), 313
So.3d 260 (per curiam), counsel requested “a reasonable opportunity to prepare
and file expeditiously a supplemental application for post-conviction relief.”8
Additionally, counsel suggested an October 15, 2021 deadline, explaining that she
needed time to review relator’s file, investigate the underlying facts of the case,
and consult with any necessary experts. On June 23, 2021, the district court
granted counsel’s Motion to Set Deadline to Supplement Application for Post-
Conviction Relief. According to relator, following several extensions granted by
the district court related to COVID-19 delays and issues locating relator’s file,
relator’s counseled supplemental APCR was filed on June 7, 2022.
8
In Smith, supra, the Supreme Court issued the following per curiam:
Writ granted; case remanded. The district court’s judgment denying
applicant’s pro se application for post-conviction relief is vacated, and
the district court is directed to give counsel reasonable opportunity to
prepare and file expeditiously a supplemental application for post-
conviction relief. See State ex rel. Hampton v. State, 00-2523 (La.
8/31/01), 795 So.2d 1198.
22-KH-547 7
It is undisputed that relator’s counseled supplemental APCR was filed with
the district court after the expiration of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8’s time-bar. Except as
provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the district court has no authority to extend
those limits beyond the delays set forth by the legislature. See State v. Daigle, 593
So.2d 676, 677 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 604 So.2d 980 (La. 1992).
Nevertheless, the district court has discretion to determine whether the interests of
justice require that a defendant be allowed to amend and supplement his timely
filed APCR. See State ex rel. Duhon v. Whitley, 92-1740 (La. 9/2/94), 642 So.2d
1273. Such is the case even when the supplementation arises after the expiration
of the time-bar provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. State v. Sampson, 02-909 (La.
2/14/02), 841 So.2d 747 (per curiam).
While relator’s counseled June 7, 2022 filing—standing alone—appears to
be time-barred, we find the district court properly exercised its discretion pursuant
to Duhon v. Whitley, supra, by granting relator time to retain counsel and
supplement his pro se application. We find that relator’s case is similar to the
circumstances presented to this Court in State v. Brown, 21-643 (La. App. 5 Cir.
10/22/21), 2021 WL 4943475, wherein relator filed a Motion for an Extension of
Sixty Days and/or Motion to Stay Post-Conviction Application, along with a
uniform APCR, in which he listed his claims. In Brown, the district court gave
relator forty-five days in which to supplement his APCR. The relator subsequently
filed a memorandum in support of his APCR and a supplement to his APCR. The
district court, however, denied relator’s APCR as untimely pursuant to La. C.Cr.P.
art. 930.8. On supervisory review to this Court challenging the district court’s
denial of his APCR as untimely, given that his original filing was within La.
C.Cr.P. art. 930.8’s prescriptive period, we found the relator’s argument
persuasive, stating:
22-KH-547 8
In the present case, it appears from the district court’s
August 18, 2021 Order denying relator’s APCR as
untimely, that the district court used March 26, 2021, the
date relator filed his memorandum in support of his
APCR, instead of January 7, 2021, the date relator filed
an APCR along with a motion for extension, when
calculating the time delays for filing post-conviction
relief. As such, relator’s argument has merit.
Accordingly, we grant relator’s writ application and
remand the matter to the district court for the limited
purpose of determining whether relator’s writ application
was in fact timely, and if so, we direct the district court to
rule on the merits of the application.
Brown, 2021 WL 4943475, at *2 (internal footnote omitted).9
Similarly, in the instant case, it appears the district court based the finding of
untimeliness on the date that relator filed his counseled, supplemental APCR (June
7, 2022), rather than the date relator filed his original pro se APCR (July 10, 2020).
Moreover, here, the district court found relator’s counseled, supplemental claims
were successive, apparently faulting relator for failing to raise those claims in his
pro se APCR, despite having granted relator leave to retain counsel and to
supplement his timely filed APCR.10
Pro se filings are subject to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
filed by lawyers. State ex rel. Egana v. State, 00-2351 (La. 9/22/00), 771 So.2d
638 (per curiam). A pro se petitioner is not to be denied access to the courts for
review of his case on the merits by the overzealous application of form and
9
On remand, the State conceded the timeliness of the relator’s APCR in its response filed with the
district court.
10
The district court excluded relator’s claim of factual innocence from its finding of untimeliness
and successiveness, presumably in reliance on La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2(A), which provides, in part:
A petitioner’s first claim of factual innocence pursuant to this Article that
would otherwise be barred from review on the merits by the time
limitation provided in Article 930.8 or the procedural objections
provided in Article 930.4 shall not be barred if the claim is contained in
an application for post conviction relief filed on or before December 31,
2022, and if the petitioner was convicted after a trial completed to
verdict. This exception to Articles 930.4 and 930.8 shall apply only to
the claim of factual innocence brought under this Article and shall not
apply to any other claims raised by the petitioner.
22-KH-547 9
pleading requirements or hyper-technical interpretations of court rules. Id. In
regard to relator’s additional claims challenging counsel’s effectiveness raised in
his supplemental APCR, we find that relator laid the groundwork for those claims
in his pro se APCR, which included a detailed list of counsel’s alleged errors.
While relator’s supplemental claim of involuntary confession was not raised in his
pro se APCR, the underlying argument appears in his pro se claim challenging
counsel’s ineffectiveness. Specifically, in relator’s pro se APCR, he argued that
counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statement on the basis that his
statement was a product of coercion. Additionally, relator’s claim of factual
innocence also rests, in part, on relator’s claim of coerced confession. Given that
relator’s original pro se filing on July 10, 2020, was construed as a timely filed
APCR by the district court, and in light of the fact that relator’s request to retain
counsel and to file a supplemental APCR was granted without objection from the
State, we find that relator’s counseled APCR filed on June 7, 2022, is, in essence,
an amendment to his July 10, 2022 APCR, rather than an entirely new filing.
Accordingly, we find that relator’s supplementation of his prior pro se
APCR was, in fact, timely, and thus, grant relator’s writ application for the limited
purpose of remanding the case to the district court for a ruling on the merits of the
claims raised in relator’s supplemental APCR (with the exception of relator’s claim
of factual innocence).11
11
See Sampson, supra, in which the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court order finding that
the relator’s application was time-barred and remanded to the district court for further proceedings,
stating:
Whatever the words used in its order, the district court was acting within
its discretion when it in effect ordered supplementation of the timely-
filed application for post-conviction relief, even if the supplementation
were not to arrive until after the expiration of the prescriptive period.
State ex rel. Duhon v. Whitley, 92-1740 (La. 9/2/94), 642 So.2d 1273; cf.
Muntz v. Lensing, 96-0230 (La. 3/8/96), 668 So.2d 1147.
22-KH-547 10
As to relator’s claim of factual innocence, we find that this claim is subject
to review in light of the district court’s finding that relator failed to meet the
requirement of La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2(B), which provides, in pertinent part:
A. A petitioner who has been convicted of an offense may
seek post conviction relief on the grounds that he is
factually innocent of the offense for which he was
convicted. A petitioner’s first claim of factual innocence
pursuant to this Article that would otherwise be barred
from review on the merits by the time limitation provided
in Article 930.8 or the procedural objections provided in
Article 930.4 shall not be barred if the claim is contained
in an application for post conviction relief filed on or
before December 31, 2022, and if the petitioner was
convicted after a trial completed to verdict. This
exception to Articles 930.4 and 930.8 shall apply only to
the claim of factual innocence brought under this Article
and shall not apply to any other claims raised by the
petitioner. An application for post conviction relief filed
pursuant to this Article by a petitioner who pled guilty or
nolo contendere to the offense of conviction or filed by
any petitioner after December 31, 2022, shall be subject
to Article 930.4 and 930.8.
B. (1)(a) To assert a claim of factual innocence under this
Article, a petitioner shall present new, reliable, and
noncumulative evidence that would be legally admissible
at trial and that was not known or discoverable at or prior
to trial and that is either:
(i) Scientific, forensic, or nontestimonial documentary
evidence.
(ii) Testimonial evidence that is corroborated by
evidence of the type described in Item (i) of this
Subparagraph.
(b) To prove entitlement to relief under this Article,
the petitioner shall present evidence that satisfies all of
the criteria in Subsubparagraph (a) of this Subparagraph
and that, when viewed in light of all of the relevant
evidence, including the evidence that was admitted at
trial and any evidence that may be introduced by the state
in any response that it files or at any evidentiary hearing,
proves by clear and convincing evidence that, had the
new evidence been presented at trial, no rational juror
would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of either the offense of conviction or of
22-KH-547 11
any felony offense that was a responsive verdict to the
offense of conviction at the time of the conviction.
In support of his claim of factual innocence, relator submitted the reports of
two experts: Dr. Richard A. Leo, an expert in false confessions, who concluded
that the police used “psychologically coercive” interrogation techniques, which
caused relator “to make and agree to psychologically involuntary statements;” and
Dr. Alicia Pellegrin, an expert in child sexual abuse cases, who opined that
improper protocol was followed during both the forensic interview and the
evaluation of the victim.
Regarding relator’s claim of a false confession, it appears that, at trial, part
of the defense strategy rested on challenging the voluntariness of relator’s
confession wherein he made statements explaining his self-diagnosed sexual
addiction and drinking problem as an explanation as to how he may have come to
commit the charged offenses. In particular, during the defense’s opening
statement, counsel described how relator was interrogated for over three hours in a
cold room while dressed only in a paper gown. Counsel also referred to how
relator made “97 denials’ during the interrogation. Next, relator’s counsel cross-
examined Detective Walter Banks about relator’s interrogation, specifically
inquiring as to its duration, the temperature of the room, the paper gown relator
was required to wear, the repetitive content of the questions, and relator’s repeated
denials of guilt. Additionally, relator testified at trial that:
[H]e never sexually abused or touched L.B.
inappropriately. He first learned about these allegations
in February 2012, when he was confronted by J.A. and
J.B. On the five or six occasions he told police that he
was drinking and had no knowledge of what happened,
L.B. had only stayed with him for one of those times.
When further confronted with his acknowledgment of
how the abuse could have happened, he testified that he
only said what he thought he should say so he could go
back to his cell. When he was brought to the jail, he was
placed on suicide watch and put in paper clothes. The
interview room was cold and he was “ready to get out of
22-KH-547 12
the room” because he was “tired of discussing this with
them.”
Benoit, 237 So.3d at 1218-19. Finally, the defense counsel’s closing argument
focused on false confessions and the coercive nature of relator’s own statement.
Considering that relator’s own testimony and the defense strategy of
characterizing relator’s statement as a false confession, we find that Dr. Leo’s
findings to that effect are not new nor noncumulative evidence as required by La.
C.Cr.P. art. 926.2(B)(1)(a). Dr. Leo’s report relied on relator’s testimony about the
interrogation in concluding that relator’s confession was a product of
“psychological coercion.” Further, Dr. Leo opined that “[n]umerous
interrogation/false confession experts were available to consult with Mr. Benoit’s
counsel, and/or testify on behalf of, Mr. Benoit at the time of his trial in 2014.”
Thus, we find that relator is now hard-pressed to show that expert testimony
regarding false confessions “was not known or discoverable at or prior to trial” as
required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2(B)(1)(a).
As to Dr. Pellegrin’s report, her findings critiqued the investigation
conducted by the forensic interviewer and the nurse who examined the victim—
findings which may raise credibility issues about the State’s witnesses, but do not
present newly available evidence of factual innocence. Furthermore, on the
showing made, we find that relator has failed to establish that expert testimony
concerning the proper investigation of child sexual abuse “was not known or
discoverable at or prior to trial” as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2(B)(1)(a), but
instead appears to fall within the ambit of trial strategy. See State v. Allen, 06-778
(La. App. 5 Cir. 4/24/07), 955 So.2d 742, 751, writ denied sub nom. State ex rel.
Allen v. State, 08-2432 (La. 1/30/09), 999 So.2d 754 (the decision to call or not to
call a particular witness is a matter of trial strategy and not, per se, evidence of
ineffective assistance of counsel). According to Dr. Pellegrin’s expert report, such
22-KH-547 13
an omission of expert testimony lies with relator’s trial counsel for failing to retain
an expert witness on this subject.
Considering the above, we find no error in the district court’s ruling that
relator’s claim of factual innocence falls short of the requirements set forth in La.
C.Cr.P. art. 926.2.
Alternatively, relator submits the district court should have stayed its ruling
on his factual innocence claim until after a ruling on relator’s Motion for DNA
Testing was made. La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.1(A)(1) permits a defendant convicted of a
felony to seek DNA testing of evidence that was “secured in relation to the offense
for which he was convicted.” As part of his factual innocence claim, relator
indicated his intent to request DNA testing of the hair found on the bottle of green
dish soap that was admitted into evidence at trial by the State.12 Nonetheless,
relator fails to provide any legal support for his request for a stay of his factual
innocence claim while he pursues DNA testing. Specifically, La. C.Cr.P. art.
926.1(B) provides that an application shall allege the following:
(1) A factual explanation of why there is an articulable
doubt, based on competent evidence whether or not
introduced at trial, as to the guilt of the petitioner in
that DNA testing will resolve the doubt and establish
the innocence of the petitioner.
(2) The factual circumstances establishing the timeliness
of the application.
(3) The identification of the particular evidence for which
DNA testing is sought.
(4) That the applicant is factually innocent of the crime
for which he was convicted, in the form of an affidavit
signed by the petitioner under penalty of perjury.
12
At trial, the victim indicated that relator put green dish soap on her “private part.” During the
search of relator’s trailer, detectives found a “half empty, apple-scented Palmolive green … dishwashing
soap” under the sink. At trial, Sergeant Richard Dubus, the officer who executed the warrant, explained
that when he found the soap bottle, hair follicles were on top of the container. The hair follicles were sent
to the crime lab for analysis. However, because the root of the hair, which contains the epithelial cells,
was not present, DNA analysis could not be performed. Benoit, 237 So.3d at 1217-18 n.8. Nevertheless,
Mr. Mai, the State’s serology expert, testified that testing for mitochondrial DNA of the hair could be
possible but that type of analysis was not conducted at the St. Charles Parish laboratory.
22-KH-547 14
To date, as relator has not moved for DNA testing under the statute, on the
showing made, we find that relator’s request for a stay lacks merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we grant relator’s writ application, in part, for the
limited purpose of remanding this case to the district court for a ruling on the
merits of the claims raised by relator in his counseled supplemental APCR, which
were not reviewed by the district court. As to his claim of factual innocence, on
the showing made, relator’s writ application is denied.
WRIT GRANTED, IN PART, FOR LIMITED
PURPOSE; WRIT DENIED, IN PART
22-KH-547 15
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
JANUARY 18, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
22-KH-547
E-NOTIFIED
29TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE M. LAUREN LEMMON (DISTRICT JUDGE)
EMILY POSNER (RELATOR) GRANT L. WILLIS (RESPONDENT) J. TAYLOR GRAY (RESPONDENT)
MAILED
HONORABLE JEFFREY M. LANDRY HON. HONORABLE JOEL T. CHAISSON, II
(RESPONDENT) (RESPONDENT)
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