Claude Aucoin and Tammie Aucoin Versus Diaz, LLC and Admiral Insurance Company ( 2023 )

CLAUDE AUCOIN AND TAMMIE AUCOIN NO. 23-C-300
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
DIAZ, LLC AND ADMIRAL INSURANCE COURT OF APPEAL
COMPANY
STATE OF LOUISIANA
June 27, 2023
Linda Wiseman
First Deputy Clerk
IN RE STARSTONE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN D.
ENRIGHT, JR., DIVISION "N", NUMBER 809-603
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and Robert A. Chaisson
WRIT GRANTED IN PART; DENIED IN PART
Defendants/Relators seek review of the trial court’s May 15, 2023 judgment
granting Plaintiffs’ motion for an adverse presumption based on spoliation of
evidence in this personal injury suit arising from an accident at a convenience store
and gas station. For the following reasons, the writ is granted in part and denied in
part.
On August 25, 2020, Plaintiffs Claude and Tammie Aucoin, filed suit against
Diaz, LLC and Admiral Insurance Company; and thereafter, in November 2022, filed a
supplemental and amending petition to add Diaz Realty Investments, LLC and Diaz II,
LLC as defendants (collectively “Diaz”), claiming Diaz is liable for damages as a result
of injuries Plaintiff Claude Aucoin allegedly sustained at a convenience store and gas
station owned and operated by Diaz.
On August 31, 2019, Mr. Aucoin stopped at Diaz Market, a convenience store
and gas station located in Kenner, Louisiana, and parked his vehicle near the carwash
23-C-300
and the automobile vacuum cleaner, located on the Diaz Market premises, in order
to clean out his car. According to the petition for damages, Mr. Aucoin approached
the vacuum cleaner and bent down to reach for the vacuum hose when he struck his
head on a piece of metal protruding from a post located behind the vacuum cleaner.
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Aucoin sustained concussive injuries, as well as emotional
and/or psychological injuries, bruising, tingling, and neck pain, for which Diaz is
liable.
On March 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion for adverse presumption based
on the theory of spoliation of evidence. Diaz and codefendant StarStone National
Insurance Company filed oppositions to Plaintiffs’ motion, and a hearing was held
on the matter on April 18, 2023. The trial court took the matter under advisement
and subsequently rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, granting their motion for
adverse presumption, and issued written reasons. Diaz now seeks this Court’s
supervisory review of the trial court’s May 15, 2023 ruling.
In Temes v. Manitowoc Corp., 14-93 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/14), 181 So.3d
733, 740, this Court explained:
The theory of “spoliation of evidence” refers to an intentional
destruction of evidence for the purpose of depriving opposing parties
of its use. The tort of spoliation of evidence has its roots in the
evidentiary doctrine of “adverse presumption,” which allows a jury
instruction for the presumption that the destroyed evidence contained
information detrimental to the party who destroyed the evidence unless
such destruction is adequately explained. Desselle v. Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 04-455 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/12/04), 887 So.2d 524,
534. However, the presumption of spoliation is not applicable when
the failure to produce the evidence has a reasonable explanation. Allen
v. Blanchard, 99-0277 (La. App. 1 Cir. 03/31/00), 763 So.2d 704, 710.
Plaintiffs’ motion complains of Diaz’s failure to preserve: (1) the store’s video
surveillance footage from the date of the accident; (2) the physical piece of metal;
(3) the configuration of the metal piece as it appeared at the time Mr. Aucoin was
injured; and (4) the carwash premises. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs
presented the September 4, 2019 preservation notice they sent to Diaz, instructing
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Diaz “to retain, preserve and protect any and all video of [August 31, 2019,] as well
as all records and physical evidence in anticipation of litigation.” The preservation
letter also attached the incident report and the photographs Tammie Aucoin, Mr.
Aucoin’s wife, took on the day of the accident. Plaintiffs assert that despite Diaz’s
receipt of the preservation notice, Diaz failed to view and preserve the video footage
from the date of the incident, and one week before Dorian M. Diaz’s (“Mr. Diaz”)
scheduled deposition, Mr. Diaz had the carwash portion of the premises demolished,
and with it, the offending metal piece and the post into which it had been embedded
were also discarded.
The motion points out that Kevin Glidewell, the insurance adjuster who
investigated the claim within two weeks of the incident, including a site inspection,
testified during his deposition that he was not aware of the preservation letter and
had he known about it, he would have made efforts to ensure preservation of the
metal piece. Additionally, the motion states that “but for the pictures from [Mrs.
Aucoin’s] cell phone, there would be no evidence of the actual placement of this
dangerous condition” because Mr. Diaz “[tore] down the entire scene and [threw]
away the evidence, 1 week before this [sic] deposition.” Plaintiffs further assert that
their purpose for seeking an adverse presumption is “to ensure any defense [Diaz]
may claim blaming Aucoin, or others are cut off by the presumption.”
Opposing the motion, Diaz and StarStone argued that Plaintiffs are not
entitled to an adverse presumption because by the time Diaz received the notice of
preservation, the video footage had already been overwritten as part of the standard
operating practices of the business. Likewise, Diaz and StarStone averred that the
discarding of the offending metal piece does not prejudice Plaintiffs’ case in that the
photographs taken by Mrs. Aucoin and Mr. Glidewell sufficiently demonstrate what
the piece of metal looked like and where it was located. They also contend that the
demolition of the carwash occurred over three years after the accident, and therefore,
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Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to inspect the premises. Furthermore, Diaz and
StarStone maintain that the demolition of the carwash was a business decision based
upon storm related damages to the premises.
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court issued a blanket
ruling granting an adverse presumption on the basis of spoliation of the evidence.
The trial court judgment states, “[Plaintiffs] are entitled to an instruction to the jury
on the adverse presumption of spoliation due to Defendants’ conduct.” In its written
reasons, the trial court concluded that “Defendants were on notice as of Sept[sic] 9,
2019 to preserve the physical evidence. It is undisputed that Mr. Diaz later went on
to destroy the evidence without first notifying Plaintiffs’ counsel to determine if
there was any further need to preserve said evidence.”
In that the trial court’s judgment makes no distinction as to the individual
items and categories of evidence raised in the motion, it appears the trial court
granted an adverse presumption as to all the evidence. Because we find Plaintiffs
are not entitled to an adverse presumption based on spoliation of the evidence in
every instance raised in Plaintiffs’ motion, we address each one separately.
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing on the motion that it
was possible that the failure to preserve the video footage was unintentional because
Diaz received the preservation notice on September 9, 2019, and based on testimony
presented, the time for recovering the video footage would have already lapsed. The
hearing transcript suggests that upon this concession, Plaintiffs abandoned their
spoliation argument as to the video footage. To the extent, however, that the trial
court granted an adverse presumption pertaining to the video footage, the trial
court’s ruling was in error.
Plaintiffs, however, maintain their argument with regard to the metal object
embedded on the post on which Mr. Aucoin struck his head, arguing that Diaz’s
failure to preserve the physical evidence was intentional. Plaintiffs argue that Diaz
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destroyed the physical evidence for the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of its use at
trial. In opposition to the instant writ application, Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he issue
is the loss and destruction of the evidence that hurt Mr. Aucoin within two (2) weeks
after the event, while [Diaz] was on notice of the request, and decided to alter and
eventually lose the evidence.” In this regard, Plaintiffs’ argument, regarding the
spoliation of the piece of metal, is two-fold.
First, Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to an adverse presumption because Diaz
removed the metal piece from its original location and, as a result, altered the
configuration and placement of the protruding piece of metal as it appeared when
Mr. Aucoin was injured. While the parties do not dispute that the metal piece itself
was still available when Mr. Glidewell conducted his investigation on September
13, 20191, Plaintiffs failed to present evidence to establish when the protruding piece
of metal was dislodged and removed from its original location as it appeared on
August 31, 2019. Unlike the video footage, it is unclear if the piece of metal was
removed from its original location before or after Diaz received notice to preserve
the physical evidence. Assuming Diaz removed the metal piece before receiving
Plaintiffs’ preservation notice on September 9, 2019, it is arguable that Plaintiffs are
not entitled to an adverse presumption for Diaz’s failure to preserve the offending
piece of metal in the same state it appeared on August 31, 2019. Because at this
point there is no evidence to establish when the metal piece was removed, and thus
altering the configuration of the injury site, we find the granting of an adverse
presumption based on Diaz’s removal of the metal piece is premature.
Second, Plaintiffs also seek an adverse presumption based on Diaz’s
discarding of the actual physical piece of metal. Diaz received the preservation
1
The instant writ application states that Mr. Glidewell performed his investigation within days of Diaz’s receipt of
the September 2019 preservation notice and within two weeks of the accident. Photographs taken by Mr. Glidewell
as part of his report indicate his investigation took place on or about September 13, 2019; however, in StarStone’s
writ application, in affiliated case no. 23-C-300, StarStone states that Mr. Glidewell performed his investigation in
September 2021, two years after the accident.
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notice via certified mail on September 9, 2019, which Giselle Diaz Eastlick, the
general manager of Diaz, LLC, testified was “turned …over to the insurance
company.” Mr. Glidewell testified in his deposition that he was not aware of the
preservation letter, nor was he ever informed that a request to preserve physical
evidence was made. Mr. Glidewell stated that if he had known of the preservation
letter or the need to preserve the evidence, he would have instructed Diaz to keep it.2
The preservation notice specifically instructed Diaz to retain and preserve any
and all physical evidence and informed Diaz of the potential for litigation. The letter,
sent less than two weeks after the accident, included the photographs taken by Mrs.
Aucoin on August 31, 2019, and the incident report, which indicated Mr. Aucoin
struck his head on a protruding piece of metal. The specific request to preserve any
physical evidence; Diaz’s knowledge that the alleged dangerous condition was the
protruding piece of metal, as evidenced by the photographs attached to the notice;
and Plaintiffs’ notice that they were considering filing suit, reasonably put
Defendants on notice that the offending piece of metal would be relevant evidence
to the instant litigation. Therefore, despite Diaz having previously removed the
metal piece, Diaz had a duty to preserve the physical piece of metal and failed to do
so. Inasmuch as the trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for an adverse presumption
for the discarding of the actual metal piece, we find no abuse of the trial court’s
discretion.
However, while Plaintiffs argue, in part, that they are seeking an adverse
presumption instruction in order to bar Diaz from asserting a contributory negligence
defense, as to Mr. Aucoin or others, it is imperative to acknowledge, as highlighted
by the concurrence, that the spoliation instruction has no bearing on whether the trial
court allows or disallows any specific defense at trial.
2
Mr. Glidewell’s deposition testimony is not attached to the instant writ application; however, we take judicial notice
of the fact that in affiliated case no. 23-C-300, StarStone’s writ application includes as an attachment Mr. Glidewell’s
deposition testimony.
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Lastly, Plaintiffs’ claim that they are entitled to an adverse presumption based
on Diaz’s demolition of the carwash. The accident occurred on August 31, 2019,
and that same day Mrs. Aucoin took photographs of the scene including the
offending piece of metal and the vacuum cleaner, which was a stand-alone unit
adjacent to, rather than attached to the carwash. Less than two weeks after the
accident, Mr. Glidewell also inspected and photographed the site. Moreover,
Plaintiffs’ counsel visited the accident scene in May 2022 to take photographs and
videos of the site. Although Diaz did not inform Plaintiffs of its decision to tear
down the carwash, the demolition of the carwash did not take place until January
2023. The only fact tending to suggest that the demolition of the carwash was for
the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs from inspecting the premises or discovering
evidence detrimental to Diaz’s case is that the demolition occurred one week before
Mr. Diaz’s scheduled deposition. However, this fact alone is insufficient to prove
Diaz intended to deprive Plaintiffs’ access to the evidence considering, Plaintiffs had
nearly four years to photograph, video, and inspect the subject property and were
permitted to so on multiple occasions. Furthermore, it is unclear what relevancy, if
any, the carwash has in this case. The parties do not dispute that the injury-causing
condition was the piece of metal protruding from behind the standalone vacuum
cleaner unit, which was an entirely separate entity from the carwash building.
Given these circumstances, particularly the nearly four-year delay in
demolishing the carwash and the fact that the scene was photographed and
documented on multiple occasions prior to its demolition, Plaintiffs have not shown
that an adverse presumption, based on the theory of spoliation evidence, from Diaz’s
demolition of the carwash, is warranted. See Critton v. State, Dep’t of Transp. &
Dev., 43,328 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08), 989 So.2d 207, 210 (finding no adverse
presumption was warranted where the subject roadway was resurfaced almost two
years after suit was filed and a year after notice of the resurfacing was posted);
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Constans v. Choctaw Transp., Inc., 97-0863, 97-0864 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/97),
712 So.2d 885, 902 (adverse presumption did not apply where truck bumper was
photographed and investigated in the weeks following the accident, but thereafter
not examined for at least one year and a half before it was eventually replaced in the
normal course of business); and also Everhardt v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 07-
0981 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/20/08), 978 So.2d 1036 (finding adverse presumption did
not apply in wrongful death action brought by wife of dump truck operator who died
when his truck flipped over on the highway, where wife sold the truck for scrap
materials a year after the accident and after defendant served, no attempt was made
to examine the truck before it was sold, and no evidence suggested that wife disposed
of the truck in order to deprive defendant of discovering evidence detrimental to her
case).
In light of the foregoing, we find the trial court abused its discretion when it
rendered a broad-brush judgment, granting Plaintiffs’ motion for an adverse
presumption based on spoliation of the evidence. Inasmuch as the trial court granted
the motion for Diaz’s failure to preserve the video footage, removing the metal piece
and altering the configuration of accident scene as it appeared on August 31, 2019,
and demolishing the carwash premises, the trial court’s ruling is reversed; however,
to the extent the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion based on Diaz’s discarding of
the physical piece of metal, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed. Accordingly, the writ
is granted in part and denied in part.
Gretna, Louisiana, this 27th day of June, 2023.
FHW
JGG
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CLAUDE AUCOIN AND TAMMIE AUCOIN NO. 23-C-300
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
DIAZ, LLC AND ADMIRAL INSURANCE COURT OF APPEAL
COMPANY
STATE OF LOUISIANA
CHAISSON, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS
The sole issue before the trial court on Respondents’ Motion for Adverse
Presumption on Spoilation (sic) is whether Respondents are entitled to a jury
instruction on the law regarding application of an adverse presumption for
Realtors’ intentional spoliation of evidence. Because Mr. Diaz intentionally
discarded the piece of metal on which Mr. Aucoin was injured, in violation of its
known obligation not to do so and without advance notice to Respondents, there is
sufficient evidence upon which the jury could determine that the adverse
presumption is applicable in this case to the extent that the detached piece of metal
could assist the jury in its liability determination. I therefore agree with the
majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Respondents are entitled to the requested jury charge. Whether the jury chooses to
apply that adverse presumption in this case is a determination for the jury based
upon the facts as the jury finds them at trial.
To the extent that Respondents contend that their entitlement to this jury
charge will “ensure any defense [Diaz] may claim blaming Aucoin, or others are
(sic) cut off by the presumption,” and Respondents’ concern that the trial court will
“use the presumption to exclude any evidence/defense that Aucoin was negligent
or failed to observe what he should have observed, i.e., an open and obvious
condition,” there is nothing in the trial court’s judgment that indicates that its
decision to allow the requested jury charge is a determination that the trial court
will exclude any defenses raised by Relators and/or not allow testimony and
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evidence in support of those defenses. I find that these arguments are not pertinent
to the sole issue that was before the trial court on Respondents’ motion. I therefore
respectfully concur with the majority disposition.
RAC
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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
CORNELIUS E. REGAN, PRO TEM FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 06/27/2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
23-C-300
E-NOTIFIED
24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Stephen D. Enright, Jr. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Andrew D. Weinstock (Relator)
Melvin A. Eiden (Respondent)
Laura L. Pousson (Relator)
James M. White, III (Respondent)
J. Patrick Connick (Respondent)
MAILED
Lewis O. Unglesby (Respondent) Yul D. Lorio (Respondent) Christian B. Bogart (Relator)
Attorney at Law Attorney at Law John F. Herrick (Relator)
112 Founders Drive 1228 Camellia Boulevard Attorney at Law
Baton Rouge, LA 70810 Suite A 433 Metairie Road
Lafayette, LA 70508 Suite 600
Lance C. Unglesby (Respondent) Metairie, LA 70005
Attorney at Law
607 St. Charles Avenue
Suite 300
New Orleans, LA 70130