State of Louisiana Versus Jonathon Brown ( 2023 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 22-KA-562
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
JONATHON BROWN COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 19-6214, DIVISION "B"
HONORABLE R. CHRISTOPHER COX, III, JUDGE PRESIDING
June 21, 2023
ROBERT A. CHAISSON
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and Robert A. Chaisson
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES ON COUNTS ONE AND
TWO AFFIRMED; SENTENCE OF COUNT THREE VACATED;
MATTER REMANDED
RAC
FHW
JGG
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Monique D. Nolan
Thomas J. Butler
Laura S. Schneidau
Brittany Beckner
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
JONATHON BROWN
Lieu T. Vo Clark
CHAISSON, J.
Defendant, Jonathon Brown, appeals the sentences imposed for his
attempted second degree murder and obstruction of justice convictions. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the seventy-year enhanced sentence imposed for
defendant’s attempted second degree murder conviction; however, we vacate the
forty-year sentence resulting from defendant’s obstruction of justice conviction and
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 6, 2019, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of
information charging defendant with attempted second degree murder, in violation
of La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count one), possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count two), and obstruction of
justice, in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (count three). At his arraignment on
December 10, 2019, defendant pled not guilty.
On August 22, 2022, the matter proceeded to trial before a twelve-person
jury. On August 25, 2022, after considering the evidence presented, the jury
unanimously found defendant guilty as charged on all three counts. Defendant
filed a motion for new trial, which was denied on September 23, 2022.
Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to fifty years imprisonment at
hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count
one; twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence on count two; and forty years imprisonment at hard labor
on count three. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently with each
other.
Immediately after sentencing, the State filed a multiple offender bill of
information pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, alleging defendant to be a third felony
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offender as to the attempted second degree murder conviction (count one).
Defendant denied the allegations of the multiple offender bill, and the matter
proceeded to a hearing on October 21, 2022. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
trial court adjudicated defendant a third felony offender, vacated the original
sentence on count one, and sentenced defendant to an enhanced term of seventy
years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence. The trial court ordered defendant’s sentence to run
concurrently with his original sentences on counts two and three. Defendant filed
a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied.
Defendant now appeals and specifically seeks review of the sentences
imposed for his convictions of attempted second degree murder and obstruction of
justice.
FACTS
This case stems from a shooting incident that occurred in the early morning
hours of September 3, 2019, at 3J’s Bar & Grill located on Lapalco Boulevard in
Jefferson Parish. Justin Wade, the owner of the bar and victim of the shooting, and
Patrice Savoy, his wife, detailed the encounter at trial.
Ms. Savoy relayed that on September 2, 2019, at around 10:30 or 11:00
p.m., she arrived at the crowded bar and visited with her friend near the front
entrance of the establishment. After her friend left, Ms. Savoy was approached by
an unknown male who “leaned in” to say something to her. She immediately put
up her hand and told him she was married. This man, later identified as Matthew
Brown, then slapped her “behind” hard enough to make her stumble.1 Ms. Savoy
called security, but Matthew had already disappeared into the crowd. Feeling
uncomfortable, Ms. Savoy proceeded to the back of the bar and ran into Mr. Wade,
1
Since this individual has the same last name as defendant, he will be referred to by his first name,
Matthew, throughout this opinion.
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who realized she was upset. As they stood talking, Matthew approached and again
grabbed Ms. Savoy. Matthew was asked to leave the bar and was escorted outside.
Once outside, Matthew started “going off” on Mr. Wade because he made
him leave the bar. Matthew started cursing and then threw a cigarette at Mr.
Wade’s feet and spit in his face. Thereafter, Mr. Wade punched Matthew, and a
physical altercation ensued. At some point, while Matthew was on the ground, Mr.
Wade turned around to head back into the bar when shots were fired by a man
standing a few feet behind him. Mr. Wade was shot several times and fell to the
ground.
Bairn Hartman, one of the security guards on duty, recalled at trial that when
he heard the gunshots, he crouched down in order to figure out the direction of the
gunfire. Once Mr. Hartman saw a person shooting from the grassy area, he took
out his gun and fired back. After the gunfire ceased, the man, who was shooting,
ran across Lapalco Boulevard. Mr. Hartman then left in his vehicle because he
was scared.
At trial, Mr. Hartman testified that earlier that evening, prior to the shooting,
he had an encounter with a group of three men. Mr. Hartman relayed that during a
pat-down for entry into the club, he felt a weapon on one of the men and instructed
him to put the weapon in his car. The three men then walked off, and upon their
return, they were searched again and, when no weapons were found, they were
admitted into the bar. Mr. Hartman testified that he recognized the man who was
shooting from the grassy area as one of the three men from the earlier pat-down.
Police officers with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office arrived on the scene
of the shooting in response to a 9-1-1 call. At trial, Detective Zachary Idrogo
testified that upon his arrival, he observed the victim lying on his back in the
entrance area with multiple gunshot wounds. When Detective Idrogo asked the
victim who shot him, he replied that he did not know the shooter. The officers
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secured the scene, took photographs, collected evidence, and tried to locate
witnesses as many bystanders were in the area; however, their attempts at finding
witnesses were unsuccessful. In the meantime, EMS arrived and transported Mr.
Wade to the hospital, where he remained for several months.2
During the course of the investigation, Detective Sergeant Keith Dowling,
the lead detective, received a photograph taken at 3J’s on the night of the incident.3
He subsequently showed the photograph to the victim and his wife. Ms. Savoy and
Mr. Wade identified the third person from the left in the photograph as the person
Mr. Wade was fighting with prior to the shooting. Ms. Savoy also identified the
second person from the left in the photograph as the shooter4. Detective Dowling
testified that by using a facial recognition program, the individual in the third
position from the left in the photograph was identified as Matthew Brown. Based
on this identification, the detective was able to identify two of the other subjects in
the photograph as defendant and Victor Brown. Detective Dowling thereafter
obtained an arrest warrant for defendant.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In his first assigned error, defendant contends that his forty-year sentence for
obstruction of justice is illegally excessive as it exceeds the statutory maximum
sentence. We agree.
La. R.S. 14:130.1(B) sets forth the penalty provisions for obstruction of
justice and reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
B. Whoever commits the crime of obstruction of justice shall be
subject to following penalties:
2
Mr. Wade suffered gunshot wounds to the lungs, liver, kidney, and bladder, as well as a graze wound to
his heart. As a result of this shooting, Mr. Wade was paralyzed.
3
The detective explained that the photograph was taken by a photographer hired by 3J’s.
4
At trial, Mr. Hartman looked at this photograph and identified the person fighting with Mr. Wade and
the shooter. He also identified defendant in court as the person he saw shooting and then running across
Lapalco Boulevard. Likewise, Ms. Savoy identified defendant in court as the person she saw standing a
few feet behind Mr. Wade “with his gun pointed out” shooting.
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(1) When the obstruction of justice involves a criminal proceeding in
which a sentence of death or life imprisonment may be imposed, the
offender shall be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars,
imprisoned for not more than forty years at hard labor, or both.
(2) When the obstruction of justice involves a criminal proceeding in
which a sentence of imprisonment necessarily at hard labor for any
period less than a life sentence may be imposed, the offender may be
fined not more than fifty thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more
than twenty years at hard labor, or both.
In the present case, the trial court sentenced defendant to the maximum
sentence of forty years at hard labor under La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(1). However, the
obstruction of justice charge in the instant case did not involve a criminal
proceeding in which a sentence of death or life imprisonment could be imposed.5
Therefore, as acknowledged by the State, the trial court applied the improper
penalty provision to defendant for his obstruction of justice conviction. Rather,
defendant should have been sentenced pursuant to La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(2), which
provides for a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars, or imprisonment for not
more than twenty years at hard labor, or both.
Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 882, an appellate court can correct an illegal
sentence at any time. However, an appellate court is authorized to correct an
illegal sentence when the exercise of sentencing discretion is not involved. State v.
Mason, 10-284 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 59 So.3d 419, 430, writ denied, 11-306
(La. 6/24/11), 64 So.3d 216. Since sentencing discretion is involved in the instant
matter, we vacate the forty-year sentence imposed for defendant’s obstruction of
justice conviction and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing pursuant
to the provisions of La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(2).
5
As previously stated, defendant was charged with attempted second degree murder, in violation of La.
R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count one), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation
of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count two). These offenses are not punishable by a sentence of death or life
imprisonment.
22-KA-562 5
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS TWO AND THREE
In his next two assignments of error, defendant contends that his enhanced
sentence of seventy years for his attempted second degree murder conviction is
unconstitutionally excessive and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
reconsider sentence.
In the present case, defendant was found guilty of attempted second degree
murder and was subsequently adjudicated a third felony offender on this count.
Based on the applicable sentencing provisions, defendant was exposed to a
sentencing range of not less than twenty-five years and not more than one hundred
years. See La. R.S. 14:30.1, La. R.S. 14:27, and La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3).6 The
trial court imposed a sentence of seventy years at hard labor without benefit of
parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
Prior to imposing the enhanced sentence, the trial judge referenced the
sentencing guidelines of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and incorporated the reasons for
sentencing set forth at the time of defendant’s original sentencing on the attempted
second degree murder conviction.7 In addition, the trial court detailed defendant’s
criminal history, noting that defendant has four felony convictions and that
defendant committed the instant crimes a little more than three months after his
release from prison. The trial judge lastly noted, “In sum, as reasons for the Court,
there is an undue risk that [defendant] will return to his pattern of criminal activity
6
Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) and La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a), the sentencing range for attempted second
degree murder was imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. As a third felony offender pursuant to La. R.S.
15:529.1(A)(3), defendant was subject to a term of imprisonment for not less than one-half of the longest
possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for
a first conviction.
7
When originally sentencing defendant on September 23, 2022, the trial court carefully considered the
sentencing guidelines of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. The judge stated on the record that a sentence of
imprisonment was appropriate because there is an undue risk that defendant will commit another crime,
defendant is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment, and a lesser sentence will
deprecate the seriousness of the crime. The trial court further noted that defendant’s conduct manifested
deliberate cruelty to the victim, that defendant knowingly caused a risk of death or great bodily injury to
more than one person, that he used threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense, that the
offense resulted in a significant permanent injury to the victim, and that defendant used a dangerous
weapon in the commission of the offense.
22-KA-562 6
upon release from custody; and, furthermore, a lesser sentence would deprecate the
seriousness of [defendant’s] crime.” Defendant objected to the excessive nature of
the sentence and filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was subsequently
denied by the trial court.
Defendant now contends that his seventy-year enhanced sentence is
excessive and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider
sentence. In arguing that his sentence is excessive, defendant notes his age, lack of
violent criminal history, and the fact that the sentence imposed is effectively a life
sentence. In response, the State contends that the sentence is not unconstitutionally
excessive, noting that the trial court considered the factors set forth in La. C.Cr.P.
art. 894.1, the sentence is well within statutory guidelines, and the sentence is not
grossly disproportionate considering the nature of the crime.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20
of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. A
sentence is considered excessive, even when it is within the applicable statutory
range, if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense or imposes needless and
purposeless pain and suffering. State v. Melgar, 19-540 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/30/20),
296 So.3d 1107, 1114. In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, the appellate
court must consider the punishment and the crime in light of the harm to society
and gauge whether the penalty is so disproportionate as to shock the court’s sense
of justice. State v. Diaz, 20-381 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/17/21), 331 So.3d 500, 519,
writ denied, 21-1967 (La. 4/5/22), 335 So.3d 836.
A trial judge is afforded wide discretion in determining sentences, and an
appellate court will not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports
the sentence imposed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D); State v. Melgar, 296 So.3d at
1114. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. In reviewing a trial
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court’s sentencing discretion, the reviewing court should consider the nature of the
crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentence imposed for
similar crimes by the same court and other courts. State v. Diaz, 331 So.3d at 520.
Having considered these factors, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
broad discretion in sentencing defendant to seventy years imprisonment at hard
labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. With regard
to the nature of the crime, the evidence reflects that defendant shot Mr. Wade
multiple times and that Mr. Wade suffered tragic consequences from defendant’s
actions. After he was shot, Mr. Wade fell to the ground and immediately lost all
feeling in his leg. The bullets hit Mr. Wade’s lungs, liver, kidney, and bladder, and
another bullet grazed his heart. Mr. Wade had to stay in the hospital for three
months following the shooting and then went to a rehabilitation facility. Mr. Wade
is paralyzed as a result of this incident and ultimately had to close his business. In
addition, defendant’s actions were senseless and unprovoked as he was not the
individual involved in the previous altercation with the victim. Further,
defendant’s dangerous actions of shooting the gun jeopardized the lives of Ms.
Savoy, Mr. Hartman, and other individuals located outside and inside the bar.
With regard to the nature and background of the offender, the record reflects
that defendant has a criminal history as evidenced by the two prior convictions for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon listed in the multiple bill. In addition,
defendant was previously convicted of possession of cocaine. Further, as noted by
the trial court, defendant committed the instant offenses a little more than three
months after he was released from prison and committed some of the previous
offenses while he was on probation or parole.
Lastly, our review of sentences imposed for similar crimes supports our
conclusion that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not excessive. In State
v. McClure, 15-237 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/23/15), 176 So.3d 730, 733-34, the
22-KA-562 8
defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder and was sentenced as
a third felony offender to sixty years imprisonment. In that case, the record
reflected that the defendant pursued the victim and shot him six times, resulting in
substantial injuries to the victim. Further, the defendant had a criminal history,
including theft and simple burglary. After reviewing similar cases, this Court
affirmed defendant’s sentence, finding that the mid-range, sixty-year sentence was
not excessive and did not “shock our sense of justice.”
See also State v. Tyler, 01-1038 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/26/02), 815 So.2d 205(sixty years at hard labor for second felony offender was not excessive for a
defendant convicted of attempted second degree murder for repeatedly stabbing his
girlfriend); State v. Martinez, 09-1057 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1113(ninety-nine years at hard labor for second felony offender convicted of attempted
second degree murder was not excessive, where the defendant stabbed his
employer eighteen times and then left him to die in a yard); and State v. Hills, 98-
507 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/20/99), 727 So.2d 1215 (one hundred-year sentence
imposed upon twenty-year old defendant as a second felony offender for attempted
second degree murder was not excessive, where the defendant shot the victim
multiple times with a rifle).
In the present case, considering the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of defendant, sentences imposed for similar crimes, and the trial
court’s evaluation of appropriate factors before imposing sentence, we find that
defendant’s sentence of seventy years is not excessive and that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing such a sentence. Further, we find no error in
the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence.
ERRORS PATENT REVIEW
We have reviewed the record for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art.
920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d
22-KA-562 9
175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). Our review of the record reveals no errors that
require corrective action.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, we affirm defendant’s
convictions, his multiple offender adjudication, and his sentences on counts one
and two; however, we vacate his sentence on count three and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED;
SENTENCES ON COUNTS ONE
AND TWO AFFIRMED; SENTENCE
OF COUNT THREE VACATED;
MATTER REMANDED
22-KA-562 10
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
CORNELIUS E. REGAN, PRO TEM FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
JUNE 21, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
22-KA-562
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE R. CHRISTOPHER COX, III (DISTRICT JUDGE)
DARREN A. ALLEMAND (APPELLEE) MONIQUE D. NOLAN (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)
LIEU T. VO CLARK (APPELLANT)
MAILED
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(APPELLEE)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
LAURA S. SCHNEIDAU (APPELLEE)
BRITTANY BECKNER (APPELLEE)
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053