Edith Terry as the Designated Heir to the Survival Action Concerning Rosie Tardieff's Injury and for the Wrongful Death of Rosie Tardieff Versus Notre Dame Health System D/B/A Wynhoven Health Care Center, Wynhoven Health Care Center, Notre Dame Health System and Chateau De Notre Dame ( 2023 )


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  • EDITH TERRY, ET AL                                     NO. 23-CA-68
    VERSUS                                                 FIFTH CIRCUIT
    NOTRE DAME HEALTH SYSTEM D/B/A                         COURT OF APPEAL
    WYNHOVEN HEALTH CARE CENTER, ET
    AL                                                     STATE OF LOUISIANA
    ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
    NO. 823-313, DIVISION "K"
    HONORABLE ELLEN SHIRER KOVACH, JUDGE PRESIDING
    October 31, 2023
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    JUDGE
    Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
    Robert A. Chaisson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
    AFFIRMED
    JGG
    RAC
    JJM
    COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
    EDITH TERRY
    Louis A. Gerdes, Jr.
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
    NOTRE DAME HEALTH SYSTEM D/B/A WYNHOVEN HEALTH CARE
    CENTER, WYNHOVEN HEALTH CARE CENTER, NOTRE DAME HEALTH
    SYSTEM AND CHATEAU DE NOTRE DAME
    Lorraine P. McInnis
    GRAVOIS, J.
    Plaintiff, Edith Terry, appeals the trial court’s October 12, 2022 judgment
    which sustained defendants’ exception of no cause of action and dismissed
    plaintiffs’ claims against defendants with prejudice. For the reasons that follow,
    we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In June of 2020, Rosie Tardieff, then 90 years old, was admitted to
    Wynhoven Health Care Center located at 1050 Medical Center Boulevard in
    Marrero, Louisiana, for rehabilitation after being hospitalized for falling in her
    home. Ms. Tardieff had a history of hip fractures and suffered from Alzheimer’s
    disease and dementia. While at Wynhoven, Ms. Tardieff had limited mobility and
    used a wheelchair. On June 14, 2020, Ms. Tardieff fell allegedly while unattended
    as she moved from her wheelchair to her bed. She was transferred to West
    Jefferson Medical Center. As a result of the fall, Ms. Tardieff suffered a fractured
    collar bone, a severe cut to her head, and a broken nose. After treatment at West
    Jefferson Medical Center, she returned to Wynhoven. At a later date, Ms. Tardieff
    died.
    On December 2, 2021, plaintiff, Edith Terry, filed a petition for damages on
    behalf of Ms. Tardieff, her deceased mother.1 Plaintiff named as defendants, Notre
    Dame Health System d/b/a Wynhoven Health Care Center, Wynhoven Health Care
    Center, Notre Dame Health System, and Chateau de Notre Dame. Plaintiff alleged
    that Ms. Tardieff fell at Wynhoven after being left unattended. She claimed that
    the injuries Ms. Tardieff suffered as a result of her fall and her eventual death were
    caused by defendants’ “gross and wanton negligence” in the following respects:
    1
    In her petition, plaintiff stated that she filed the petition as “the designated heir to the
    survival action pursuant to La. CCP Art. 2315.1.” She further stated that she did file this matter
    with the Patient’s Compensation Fund, and that all parties waived their right to a Medical
    Review Panel by not naming an attorney-chairman within one year from the date of filing.
    23-CA-68                                          1
    A. Failure to consider the safety of its patients;
    B. Failure to provide adequate medical treatment to Ms. Tardieff;
    C. Failure to dispense the proper treatment to petitioner;
    D. Negligent for not properly supervising petitioner;
    E. Negligent for allowing an inexperienced and unskilled individual to tend
    to Ms. Tardieff; and
    F. All other acts of negligence which may be proven at or prior to the trial
    of this matter.
    In their Answer and Affirmative Defenses, defendants pled the affirmative
    defense of immunity, pursuant to the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act, La.
    R.S. 29:770, et seq. Defendants asserted that at the time of Ms. Tardieff’s fall, a
    public health emergency was declared due to the SARS-CoV-2 (“COVID”) virus
    global pandemic. Under the provisions of La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i), during a
    state of public health emergency, no health care provider shall be civilly liable for
    causing the death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any property “except in
    the event of gross negligence or willful misconduct.” Defendants denied that Ms.
    Tardieff suffered any injury as a result of gross negligence or willful misconduct
    on their part.
    Subsequently, on August 19, 2022, defendants filed a Peremptory Exception
    of No Cause of Action, arguing that the conclusory allegations contained in
    plaintiff’s petition are not sufficient to establish a cause of action for gross
    negligence and willful misconduct. Defendants argued that they are considered a
    “health care provider” under the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act.2 On
    March 11, 2020, Governor John Bel Edwards declared a public health emergency
    in Proclamation No. 25 JBE 2020 due to COVID. The public health emergency
    2
    Louisiana Revised Statute 29:762(4) of the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act
    defines “health care provider” as a clinic, person, corporation, facility, or institution which
    provides health care or professional services by a physician, dentist, registered or licensed
    practical nurse, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, psychologist,
    or psychiatrist, and any officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his
    service or employment.
    23-CA-68                                          2
    remained in place until March 2022. During this time, Ms. Tardieff’s alleged
    injuries occurred. Defendants argued that they are provided immunity under La.
    R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i) and the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act during a
    state of public health emergency, except in the event of gross negligence or willful
    misconduct. Because plaintiff’s allegations in her petition do not rise to the level
    of gross negligence or willful misconduct, defendants argued that they cannot be
    held civilly liable and are immune from the claim for damages.
    In response, plaintiff filed an opposition to the Peremptory Exception of No
    Cause of Action and an Amended Petition. In her Amended Petition, plaintiff
    asserted that defendants were aware of Ms. Tardieff’s extensive medical history
    upon her arrival at Wynhoven. Plaintiff included excerpts from Ms. Tardieff’s
    medical records which stated that Ms. Tardieff had a history of frequent falls,
    COVID, strokes, hip fractures, chronic lower back pain, Alzheimer’s disease,
    dementia, anemia, hypothyroidism, osteoarthritis, coronary artery disease, diabetes,
    high blood pressure, Vitamin B-12 deficiency, and increased hallucinations and
    delusions.3 Upon Ms. Tardieff’s arrival at Wynhoven, she was weak and required
    two or more assistants to shower or use the toilet. In an “initial assessment” by
    Occupational Therapy, it was noted that in terms of self-care, a dependent-helper
    did “all of the effort.” Her mobility was by wheelchair, and on June 8, 2020, she
    could only stand for 15 seconds. Without therapy, she was at risk for further
    functional decline and falls. She could not follow simple instructions, had little
    interest or pleasure in doing things, was low energy, and short tempered.
    Plaintiff claimed in the Amended Petition that defendants ignored these
    conditions and left her alone in her room in her wheelchair. Plaintiff claimed that
    defendants’ attempt to keep Ms. Tardieff safe by putting a call bell on her wheel
    3
    Plaintiff also attached Ms. Tardieff’s medical records to the Amended Petition as
    exhibits.
    23-CA-68                                           3
    chair was insufficient given her conditions, and defendants should have taken more
    stringent measures to ensure her safety. Plaintiff claimed that defendants did “very
    little” to ensure Ms. Tardieff would not fall again, and their conduct amounted to
    gross negligence as it shows a continuous pattern of lack of care.
    Following a hearing on defendants’ exception of no cause of action on
    October 12, 2022, a written judgment was signed that same day sustaining
    defendants’ exception of no cause of action and dismissing plaintiff’s claims
    against defendants with prejudice. This timely appeal followed.
    On appeal, plaintiff argues that the petition, amended petition, and
    supporting exhibits present a cause of action for gross negligence. She asserts that
    the facts alleged show repeated and consistent neglect by defendants in light of Ms.
    Tardieff’s extensive physical and mental impairments, and accordingly such
    allegations are sufficient to state a valid cause of action against defendants for
    gross negligence.
    LAW AND ANALYSIS
    The purpose of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the
    legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy
    on the facts alleged in the petition. Gaudet v. Jefferson Parish, 12-707 (La. App. 5
    Cir. 3/27/13), 
    116 So.3d 691
    , 693. The exception is triable on the face of the
    petition and any attached documents, and for purposes of resolving the issues
    raised by the exception, the well-pled facts in the petition must be accepted as true.
    I E C I, LLC v. S. Cent. Planning & Dev. Comm’n, Inc., 21-382 (La. App. 5 Cir.
    2/23/22), 
    336 So.3d 601
    , 611. No evidence may be introduced to support or
    controvert an exception of no cause of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931.
    The mover has the burden of demonstrating the petition states no cause of
    action. The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to the
    plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in the plaintiff’s behalf, the petition states a
    23-CA-68                                   4
    valid cause of action for relief. Pinegrove Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. Cat Key Const.,
    Inc., 11-660 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/12), 
    88 So.3d 1097
    , 1100. Whether the plaintiff
    can prove the allegations set forth in the petition is not determinative of the
    exception of no cause of action. New Orleans Craft Temple, Inc. v. Grand Lodge
    of Free & Accepted Masons of the State of Louisiana, 13-525 (La. App. 5 Cir.
    12/19/13), 
    131 So.3d 957
    , 962.
    In reviewing the judgment of the trial court relating to an exception of no
    cause of action, appellate courts should conduct a de novo review because the
    exception raises a question of law and the lower court’s decision is necessarily
    based solely on the sufficiency of the petition. Kitziger v. Mire, 19-87 (La. App. 5
    Cir. 9/24/19), 
    280 So.3d 302
    , 306, writ denied, 19-1858 (La. 1/28/20), 
    291 So.3d 1055
    .
    It is undisputed that at the time of Ms. Tardieff’s fall, a public health
    emergency was declared due to COVID and that defendants are healthcare
    providers. As stated supra, as part of the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers
    Act, La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i) provides that “During a state of public health
    emergency, no health care provider shall be civilly liable for causing the death of,
    or injury to, any person or damage to any property except in the event of gross
    negligence or willful misconduct.” (Emphasis added.) The tort immunity provided
    by La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i) is an affirmative defense that must be properly pled
    pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1005. Welch v. United
    Medical Healthwest-New Orleans, L.L.C., 21-0684 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/24/22), 
    348 So.3d 216
    , 221-22. An affirmative defense raises a new matter that, assuming the
    allegations in the petition to be true, constitutes a defense to the action and will
    have the effect of defeating plaintiff’s demand on its merits. Id. at 221.
    Louisiana jurisprudence has held that an affirmative defense may not form
    the basis of a peremptory exception when the asserted defense goes to the merits of
    23-CA-68                                     5
    the case. See Jackson v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., 21-260 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/2/22),
    
    336 So.3d 561
    , 565-66; White v. New Orleans Center for Creative Arts, 19-213
    (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/25/19), 
    281 So.3d 813
    , 822, writ denied, 19-1725 (La.
    12/20/19), 
    286 So.3d 428
    ; Mouton v. Hebert’s Superette, Inc., 10-787 (La. App. 3
    Cir. 12/8/10), 
    53 So.3d 561
    , 564. When an exception of no cause of action is
    based on an affirmative defense, the exception should not be sustained unless the
    allegations of the petition exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the
    premise on which the defense is based. Adams v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
    04-1296 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/23/05), 
    921 So.2d 972
    , 976, writ denied, 05-2501 (La.
    4/17/06), 
    926 So.2d 514
    .
    In Welch, this Court found that the defendants met their burden and proved
    that the alleged negligence that occurred during a state of public health emergency
    did not rise to the level of gross negligence, triggering immunity. This Court
    affirmed the sustaining of an exception of no cause of action filed by the
    defendants. 
    Id.,
     348 So.3d at 221-22.
    Plaintiff asserts that the facts set forth in her petition are sufficient to state a
    cause of action under gross negligence. In Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dep’t
    Ambulance Serv., 93-3099 (La. 7/5/94), 
    639 So. 2d 216
    , 219-220, the Supreme
    Court provided the following definitions of “gross negligence”:
    Gross negligence has been defined as the “want of even slight care
    and diligence” and the “want of that diligence which even careless
    men are accustomed to exercise.” State v. Vinzant, 
    200 La. 301
    , 
    7 So.2d 917
     (La. 1942). Gross negligence has also been termed the
    “entire absence of care” and the “utter disregard of the dictates of
    prudence, amounting to complete neglect of the rights of others.”
    Hendry Corp. v. Aircraft Rescue Vessels, 
    113 F.Supp. 198
     (E.D.La.
    1953) (applying Louisiana law). Additionally, gross negligence has
    been described as an “extreme departure from ordinary care or the
    want of even scant care.” W. Page Keeton, et. al., Prosser & Keeton
    on the Law of Torts, § 34, at 211 (5th ed. 1984); 65 C.J.S. Negligence,
    § 8(4)(a), at 539-40 (1966 & Supp. 1993). “There is often no clear
    distinction between such [willful, wanton, or reckless] conduct and
    ‘gross’ negligence, and the two have tended to merge and take on the
    same meaning.” Falkowski v. Maurus, 
    637 So.2d 522
     (La. App. 1st
    23-CA-68                                    6
    Cir.), writ denied, 
    629 So.2d 1176
     (La. 1993) (quoting Prosser &
    Keeton, supra, at 214)). Gross negligence, therefore, has a well-
    defined legal meaning distinctly separate, and different, from ordinary
    negligence.
    Upon de novo review, accepting the facts alleged in the petitions as true, we
    find that plaintiff’s petitions fail to state a cause of action for gross negligence or
    willful misconduct. Though plaintiff does allege in her Amended Petition that Ms.
    Tardieff suffered from a number of physical and cognitive impairments, we find
    that the facts alleged in plaintiff’s petitions fail to rise to the level of gross
    negligence or willful misconduct by defendants relative to Ms. Tardieff’s fall.
    Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that defendants did “very little” to ensure that Ms.
    Tardieff was safe and would not sustain another fall is insufficient to state a valid
    cause of action against defendants for gross negligence or willful misconduct.
    Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in sustaining defendants’
    exception of no cause of action.
    DECREE
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment which
    granted defendants’ exception of no cause of action and dismissed plaintiff’s
    claims against defendants with prejudice.
    AFFIRMED
    23-CA-68                                     7
    SUSAN M. CHEHARDY                                                              CURTIS B. PURSELL
    CHIEF JUDGE                                                                    CLERK OF COURT
    SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
    FREDERICKA H. WICKER
    CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    MARC E. JOHNSON
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON                                                             LINDA M. WISEMAN
    STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
    FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
    JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
    SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL                            FIFTH CIRCUIT
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    NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
    I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
    IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
    OCTOBER 31, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
    23-CA-68
    E-NOTIFIED
    24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
    HONORABLE ELLEN SHIRER KOVACH (DISTRICT JUDGE)
    LOUIS A. GERDES, JR. (APPELLANT)     L. DAVID ADAMS (APPELLEE)         LORRAINE P. MCINNIS (APPELLEE)
    MAILED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-CA-68

Judges: Ellen Shirer Kovach

Filed Date: 10/31/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/21/2024