State of Louisiana Versus Osborne Field Kelson ( 2023 )


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  • STATE OF LOUISIANA                                     NO. 23-KA-274
    VERSUS                                                 FIFTH CIRCUIT
    OSBORNE FIELD KELSON                                   COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
    NO. 21-4976, DIVISION "P"
    HONORABLE LEE V. FAULKNER, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING
    December 27, 2023
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    JUDGE
    Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
    John J. Molaison, Jr., and Scott U. Schlegel
    AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF UNIFORM
    COMMITMENT ORDER AND SENTENCING MINUTE ENTRY
    JGG
    JJM
    SUS
    COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
    Monique D. Nolan
    Thomas J. Butler
    Blaine B. Moncrief
    Matthew Whitworth
    COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
    OSBORNE FIELD KELSON
    Bertha M. Hillman
    GRAVOIS, J.
    Defendant, Osborne Field Kelson, appeals his conviction and sentence for
    sexual battery of a juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1. Defendant was
    sentenced to eight years imprisonment in the Department of Corrections. On
    appeal, he argues that his sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. For the reasons
    that follow, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence. We further remand the
    matter for correction of the Uniform Commitment Order and the sentencing minute
    entry, as noted below in our Errors Patent Review.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On August 25, 2021, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of
    information charging defendant, Osborne Field Kelson, with one count of sexual
    battery of a juvenile, in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1, on or between June 1, 2019
    and October 31, 2019 (count one), and one count of indecent behavior with a
    juvenile, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81, on or between June 1, 2019 and October
    31, 2019 (count two). Defendant pled not guilty at his arraignment on October 20,
    2021.
    On March 6, 2023, the State nolle prossed count two of the bill of
    information. The case proceeded to trial on March 6, 2023, and on March 7, 2023,
    the six-person jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as charged on the
    remaining count. On March 22, 2023, defendant filed a motion for a new trial,
    which was denied on March 27, 2023. On that same day, the trial court sentenced
    defendant to eight years imprisonment in the Department of Corrections.
    Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, and on April 5, 2023, following a
    hearing, the trial court denied the motion to reconsider sentence.1
    1
    The State also filed a habitual offender bill of information against defendant, but
    withdrew the habitual offender bill on May 3, 2023.
    23-KA-274                                       1
    FACTS
    In January 2020, Detective Kristen Hollis responded to a delayed reporting
    of sexual battery. The victim, J.K.,2 was thirteen years old at the time of the
    incident. She was sixteen years old at the time of trial. The incident occurred in
    October 2019 at 6301 Riverside Drive in Metairie.
    At trial, J.K. testified that she and her siblings were at defendant’s apartment
    for a movie night and sleepover. Defendant is her uncle by marriage. J.K.’s aunt,
    Kellie Kelson, had picked up J.K. and her siblings and dropped them off at
    defendant’s apartment, but did not stay there. J.K., her younger sister, defendant’s
    two daughters, her cousin, and her “baby cousin” were all in defendant’s bedroom
    watching a movie. Defendant and the baby cousin were in the bed, and everyone
    else was on the floor. Defendant told everyone that the only people that could be
    in the bed were J.K. and her baby cousin. Because her back was hurting, J.K. got
    into the bed; she was lying with her head towards the “bottom” of the bed, and
    defendant’s head was towards the “top” of the bed. Her baby cousin was on the
    other side of the bed. J.K. felt defendant touch her leg, stop, and then touch her leg
    again. Defendant then went under the covers. J.K. felt defendant’s fingers in her
    “private part,” and he started licking in her “private part.”3 She recalled that
    defendant then gave her money via the Cash App and asked her if she “knew how
    to beat meat.” While this was happening, the other girls were on the floor sleeping
    and her baby cousin was not in the bed anymore. She testified that the incident
    made her feel scared and nervous. J.K. explained that in the summer of 2018, she
    had the “same situation” with her father.
    2
    In accordance with La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(3), the victim, who is a minor, and the victim’s
    mother and sister will be referred to by their initials in order to protect the victim’s identity.
    3
    J.K. testified that he was touching her where her “hole’s at” in the front.
    23-KA-274                                          2
    J.K. testified that she first told her younger sister about the incident. She did
    not tell her mom right away because she was scared. When her mother learned
    about what had happened, she notified the police. J.K. testified that defendant
    gave her a “a lot” of money and gave her many gifts for Christmas, one of which
    was a promise ring.4
    J.T., J.K.’s younger sister, testified that J.K. told her that defendant had
    touched her while they were having a movie night at defendant’s apartment. She
    explained that J.K. told her “he had licked her down below and he kept asking her
    to beat his meat.” J.T. explained that defendant was married to and lived with her
    Aunt Kellie, her mother’s sister. On the night of the incident, her Aunt Kellie was
    at the apartment earlier, but then left and did not return. J.T. testified that at first,
    everyone was on the floor in defendant’s bedroom. J.T. asked defendant if she
    could get in the bed, and he said no. Defendant then called for the “baby cousin”
    and J.K. to get in the bed with him. J.T. testified that in 2018, J.K. was “touched”
    by her father.
    J., J.K.’s mother, testified that she had four children—an eighteen-year-old,
    twin sixteen-year-olds (one of which is J.K.), and a fifteen-year-old. She testified
    that two traumatic events had recently happened to J.K: J.K. was touched by her
    father and touched by defendant. J.K.’s father was arrested and was in jail. After
    that incident with her father, J.K. was homeschooled until she returned to school in
    person for basketball season. J.K. did not want to be around people and became
    withdrawn. J.K. would spend time with J.’s sister Kellie, defendant, and their
    children who were around J.K.’s age. J. allowed her daughters to spend the night
    at their Aunt Kellie and defendant’s home in Metairie.
    4
    J.K. testified that her Aunt Kellie gave the ring to her at a Christmas party, but it was
    from both defendant and her Aunt Kellie.
    23-KA-274                                        3
    On the night of the incident, Kellie picked up the girls from their home in
    LaPlace. J. did not find out that anything had happened to J.K. that night until
    around Christmas. J. then alerted the authorities and participated in a recorded
    statement with Detective Hollis. J. told Detective Hollis that she made a surprise
    visit to defendant’s apartment the evening defendant touched J.K. When she
    arrived, the boys were downstairs, and the girls were in the bedroom with
    defendant on a pallet on the floor. J. did not like that Kellie was not present with
    the girls, and she took them home. J. testified that she told Detective Hollis that as
    far as she knew, “no one else saw anything that night.”
    J. also told Detective Hollis that for Christmas, defendant bought J.K. a
    promise ring, a laptop, and toys, and bought J.T. a hoverboard. J. explained that
    defendant used his money for the gifts because he was the one working, and Kellie
    bought the gifts and gave them to J.K. J. informed Detective Hollis that Kellie and
    defendant told J. that J.K. could live with them and go to school with their
    children. They offered to buy her clothes for school.
    Detective Hollis testified that because of the victim’s age, an interview was
    scheduled with the Children’s Advocacy Center. Captain Renee Kinler, a certified
    forensic interviewer with the St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office, conducted the
    forensic interview of J.K. J.K.’s account of the incident during the forensic
    interview was consistent with her trial testimony.
    Detective Hollis explained that they were unable to interview the others
    present when the incident occurred and J.K.’s Aunt Kellie. Detective Hollis
    confirmed that in her police report and affidavit, it did not state that defendant
    asked J.K. to get into the bed. Detective Hollis learned through the course of her
    23-KA-274                                  4
    investigation that defendant gave J.K. gifts like a laptop and a promise ring and
    sent money to J.K. via Cash App.5
    Kellie Kelson testified at trial that although she was still married to
    defendant, she was currently separated from him. She testified that she received a
    new set of wedding rings for Christmas, and she put one of her old rings in a
    stocking for one of the games for the kids on Christmas. J.K., her niece, ultimately
    got the ring, and it was a gift from her to J.K. J.K. received a laptop that she
    purchased and other gifts, but J.K. was not the only child to receive a laptop and
    other gifts.
    On cross-examination, Kellie testified that her nieces slept at her house
    often. She was not aware of the occasion when “the girls” had a movie night with
    a pallet on the floor. When defendant was arrested for the instant charge, she did
    not speak to any detectives about the incident, was not aware that the incident had
    occurred, and was already separated from defendant. She explained that after they
    separated, she continued to pick up and drop off her nieces for sleepovers at
    defendant’s apartment. Defendant’s daughters were present for the sleepovers as
    well. She confirmed that she would have not been present “at the sleepover”
    because it was after the separation.
    LAW AND ANALYSIS
    In his only assignment of error, defendant argues that although his eight-year
    sentence was within statutory limits, it is nevertheless unconstitutionally excessive.
    Defendant avers that seventeen aggravating circumstances of La. C.Cr.P. art.
    894.1(B) do not apply to him. Defendant argues that he was gainfully employed
    and married to the mother of his children at the time of his arrest. Defendant
    contends that the trial court failed to note these mitigating factors.
    5
    Detective Hollis explained that she was unable to receive documentation of the Cash
    App. transaction because J.K. did not know the username and did not have her phone.
    23-KA-274                                      5
    At the sentencing hearing on March 27, 2023, victim advocate Melanie
    Villemarette read a victim impact statement submitted by J.K. In the statement,
    J.K. thanked God for getting her through the depression and pain she went through
    due to these events. She thanked her parents for making her strong. She expressed
    that she was very proud of herself for how far she had come since she thought that
    she would never get over the trauma and be happy. She realized that this is
    something that will be with her forever. Experiencing this incident made her lose
    trust in people, and it is hard for her to trust again. She expressed that her brother
    was always there for her, and she would always go to him for anything. She stated
    that she did not go around defendant much at first because she was shy. Defendant
    knew what had happened to her in the past and still took advantage of her trust.
    She explained that she realized everything happened for a reason, and she has to be
    strong and keep pushing. She concluded by thanking the court.
    After hearing the victim impact statement, the trial court sentenced
    defendant to eight years imprisonment in the Department of Corrections. The trial
    court did not provide reasons for imposing the sentence. The defense noted its
    objection to the sentence and notified the trial court that it would be filing a motion
    to reconsider.
    Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence on March 27, 2023. In the
    motion, defendant stated that pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1, the sentence
    imposed was excessive and should be reconsidered, and a lower sentence “more in
    keeping with fairness and state and federal constitutional standards” should be
    imposed. At the motion hearing on April 5, 2023, the defense submitted the matter
    on the written motion. The State objected to the motion to reconsider, and the trial
    court denied the motion to reconsider without reasons, noting the defense’s
    objection to its ruling. This appeal followed.
    23-KA-274                                  6
    As an initial matter, on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court failed to
    take into consideration the mitigating factors of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(B). The
    record does not reflect, however, that defendant raised this issue in either his
    written motion to reconsider sentence or at the hearing on the motion. The law is
    clear that the failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence, or to state the
    specific grounds upon which the motion is based, limits a defendant to a review of
    the sentence for unconstitutional excessiveness only. State v. Smith, 16-406 (La.
    App. 5 Cir. 8/30/17), 
    227 So.3d 337
    , 363, writs denied, 17-1643 (La. 9/14/18), 
    252 So.3d 481
    , and 17-1660 (La. 9/14/18), 
    252 So.3d 482
    . Indeed, this Court has held
    that when the specific grounds for objection to the sentences, including alleged
    non-compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, are not specifically raised in the trial
    court, then these issues are not included in the bare review for unconstitutional
    excessiveness, and the defendant is precluded from raising these issues on appeal.
    State v. Clark, 19-518 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/24/20), 
    296 So.3d 1281
    , 1291, writ
    denied, 21-62 (La. 3/9/21), 
    312 So.3d 585
    . Accordingly, we find that defendant is
    not entitled to a review of whether the trial court complied with La. C.Cr.P. art.
    894.1 in this appeal and is limited to a review of his sentence for unconstitutional
    excessiveness.
    The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the
    Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. State v.
    Calloway, 19-335 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/19), 
    286 So.3d 1275
    , 1279, writ denied,
    20-266 (La. 7/24/20), 
    299 So.3d 69
    . A sentence is considered excessive, even if it
    is within the statutory limits, if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
    offense or imposes needless and purposeless pain and suffering. State v. Woods,
    18-413 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/19/18), 
    262 So.3d 455
    , 460. According to La. C.Cr.P.
    art. 881.4(D), the appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if
    the record supports the sentence imposed. In reviewing a sentence for
    23-KA-274                                   7
    excessiveness, the reviewing court shall consider the crime and the punishment in
    light of the harm to society and gauge whether the penalty is so disproportionate as
    to shock the court’s sense of justice, while recognizing the trial court’s wide
    discretion. Calloway, supra. The relevant question on appeal is whether the trial
    court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
    have been more appropriate. See State v. Dixon, 19-7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/19),
    
    289 So.3d 170
    , 174, writ denied, 20-143 (La. 7/17/20), 
    298 So.3d 176
    . The
    sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest
    abuse of discretion. State v. Hankton, 20-388 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/3/21), 
    325 So.3d 616
    , 623, writ denied, 21-1128 (La. 12/7/21), 
    328 So.3d 425
    .
    In reviewing a trial court’s sentencing discretion, three factors are
    considered: (1) the nature of the crime; (2) the nature and background of the
    offender; and (3) the sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and
    other courts. Woods, 
    262 So.3d at 460
    ; State v. Allen, 03-1205 (La. App. 5 Cir.
    2/23/04), 
    868 So.2d 877
    , 880. However, there is no requirement that specific
    matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. Woods, 
    262 So.3d at 460-61
    .
    Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual battery in violation of La.
    R.S. 14:43.1. The sentencing provision of the statute applicable in the instant
    appeal, La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(1), provides, “Whoever commits the crime of sexual
    battery shall be punished by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, without
    benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, for not more than ten
    years.” The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years imprisonment in the
    Department of Corrections.
    In State v. Badeaux, 01-406 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/25/01), 
    798 So.2d 234
    , 236,
    writ denied, 01-2956 (La. 10/14/02) 
    827 So.2d 414
    , cited by the State, the trial
    court sentenced defendant to ten years at hard labor for his conviction of sexual
    battery and seven years at hard labor for his conviction of indecent behavior with a
    23-KA-274                                 8
    juvenile, with the sentences to run consecutively. This Court found that the
    sentences were not excessive, noting that defendant established a relationship of
    trust with the victim by giving her candy and abused the relationship by molesting
    the vulnerable victim. Id. at 240. This Court stated that while generally,
    maximum sentences were reserved for cases involving the most serious violations
    of the charged offense, the jurisprudence indicated that maximum or near
    maximum terms of imprisonment may not be excessive when the defendant has
    exploited a position of trust to commit sexual battery or indecent behavior with a
    juvenile. Id. at 239.
    In State v. Rubio, 22-205 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/22), 
    357 So.3d 413
    , writ
    denied sub nom. Southland Engine Co, Inc. v. State through Dep’t Transportation
    & Dev., 23-67 (La. 3/28/23), 
    358 So.3d 518
    , also cited by the State, this Court
    found that an eight-year sentence for sexual battery was not excessive. The
    defendant in Rubio was the live-in boyfriend of the victim’s mother and like a
    stepfather to the fifteen-year-old victim. The defendant touched the victim’s
    vagina on multiple occasions and took inappropriate photographs and videos of the
    victim without her knowledge. The victim suffered emotional harm as a result of
    the incidents. This Court noted despite the defendant being a first-time offender,
    he exploited his position of trust. Id. at 423-24.
    In State v. Toups, 
    546 So.2d 549
     (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989), the defendant was
    sentenced to eight years for the sexual battery of a five-year old child who was the
    daughter of his girlfriend. The child testified that the defendant had touched her
    private place and forced her to rub his. Although the defendant had no prior felony
    convictions, the appellate court found that the sentence close to the maximum was
    not excessive.
    In State v. Hubb, 97-304 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/30/97), 
    700 So.2d 1103
    , 1106,
    this Court found that sentences of six and one-half years and seven years were not
    23-KA-274                                  9
    unconstitutionally excessive for two defendants who pled guilty to sexual battery.
    The defendants “French kissed” both juvenile victims on multiple occasions, and
    showed one victim photographs of nude women. One defendant exposed his
    genitals to both children and forced one of the children to fondle him. One of the
    defendants had no criminal history, and the other defendant had only misdemeanor
    offenses.
    In the instant case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
    imposing an eight-year sentence. Considering the nature of the crime and the
    nature and background of the offender, the record indicates that defendant was
    J.K.’s uncle. J.K. was thirteen years old at the time of the incident. J.K., J., and
    J.T. all testified that J.K. had previously been touched by her father who was
    facing criminal charges for the offense. J. testified that after the incident with her
    father, J.K. became withdrawn and did not attend school for some time. After the
    sexual abuse by her father, defendant held the sleepover in his room and sexually
    abused his niece, again victimizing her. J.K.’s testimony provided that defendant
    put his finger and tongue in J.K.’s “private part.” J.K. also testified that defendant
    asked her if she knew how to “beat meat.” According to J.K. and her sister’s
    testimony, other children were present in the bedroom. J.K.’s forensic interview
    was consistent with her testimony in court. J.K. expressed in her victim impact
    statement that defendant took advantage of her trust in him. She also expressed the
    trauma she faced because of the incident. This Court takes into consideration
    J.K.’s young age and vulnerable state, having been a recent victim of sexual abuse
    by her own father.
    While the record provides that defendant was married to J.K.’s aunt and had
    children of his own, the record also provides that defendant gave money to J.K.
    after the incident. J. testified that defendant and J.K.’s Aunt Kellie gave J.K. more
    gifts than the other children for Christmas.
    23-KA-274                                 10
    Regarding sentences imposed for similar crimes by this Court and other
    courts, the above jurisprudence reflects that courts have imposed similar sentences
    for similar crimes. Further, like the cases previously discussed, defendant in the
    instant matter exploited his position of trust when he sexually abused his thirteen-
    year-old niece. In addition to the victim’s young age, we find that she was even
    more vulnerable because of the recent alleged sexual abuse she had been subjected
    to by her own father.
    Furthermore, defendant faced a maximum sentence of ten years and was
    sentenced to eight. As such, we find that the record adequately supports the
    sentence and clearly indicates that the sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive.
    This assignment of error is without merit.
    ERRORS PATENT REVIEW
    The record was reviewed for errors patent according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920,
    State v. Oliveaux, 
    312 So.2d 337
     (La. 1975), and State v. Weiland, 
    556 So.2d 175
    (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).
    Sentencing Delays
    Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 873 requires a twenty-four-hour
    delay in sentencing after the denial of a motion for a new trial unless the defendant
    waives the delay. When a defendant challenges the penalty imposed and the
    imposed sentence is not mandatory, the failure to observe the twenty-four-hour
    delay mandated in La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 cannot be considered harmless error. State
    v. Nicholas, 10-866 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 
    67 So.3d 610
    , 617. Generally, when
    a defendant challenges a non-mandatory sentence and the delay is not waived, the
    defendant’s sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.
    State v. Cummings, 10-891 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/11), 
    79 So.3d 386
    , 404, writ
    denied, 11-2607 (La. 4/9/12), 
    85 So.3d 693
    .
    23-KA-274                                11
    Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Kisack, 16-797 (La.
    10/18/17), 
    236 So.3d 1201
    , 1205-06, cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 
    1385 S.Ct. 1175
    , 
    200 L.Ed.2d 322
     (2018), stated that a defendant’s pronouncement of his readiness for
    sentencing may operate as an express waiver of the twenty-four-hour sentencing
    delay, but a defendant’s mere participation in the sentencing hearing is insufficient
    to constitute an express waiver as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 873.
    In the present case, defendant filed a motion for a new trial on March 22,
    2023. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial on March 27, 2023, and
    imposed defendant’s sentence thereafter on the same day after a victim impact
    statement was heard. At the hearing, after the trial court denied the motion for a
    new trial, the trial court asked the defense if they were ready to go forward with
    sentencing, and the defense answered, “Uh, yes.” Accordingly, we find that
    defendant expressly waived the requisite sentencing delay.
    Advisal of Post-Conviction Relief
    The record reflects that the trial court failed to advise defendant of the two-
    year prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief.
    Accordingly, by way of this opinion, defendant is advised that no application for
    post-conviction relief, including an application which seeks an out-of-time appeal,
    shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of
    conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts.
    914 or 922. See State v. Barnett, 18-254 (La. App. 5 Cir, 4/3/19), 
    267 So.3d 209
    ,
    235.
    Imposition of Sentence without Benefits
    The sentencing hearing transcript and the sentencing minute entry reflect
    that defendant’s sentence was imposed without a restriction of benefits as required
    by La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(1). The Uniform Commitment Order (“UCO”) is also void
    23-KA-274                                  12
    under the column labeled, “Amount of time to be served without benefit, if
    applicable (8).”
    Under La. R.S. 15:301.1 and State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 
    800 So.2d 790
    , a statute’s requirement that a defendant be sentenced without the
    benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is self-activating.
    Therefore, the trial court’s failure to impose defendant’s sentence without the
    benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence requires no corrective
    action. However, to ensure accuracy of the record, we remand this matter for
    correction of the sentencing minute entry and UCO to show that defendant’s
    sentence is to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
    sentence.
    Sex Offender Registration Designation
    The UCO also fails to include as a “Sentence Condition” pre-printed on the
    form that defendant shall comply with the Sex Offender Registration statute under
    the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 895 and La. R.S. 15:541, et seq. The UCO
    specifically contains an unchecked box next to a statement that defendant shall
    comply with these requirements.
    To ensure accuracy in the record, on remand, the trial court shall also correct
    the UCO to reflect that defendant shall comply with the sex offender registration
    statute.
    We further direct the Clerk of Court for the 24th Judicial District Court to
    transmit the corrected UCO to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La.
    C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2) and to the Department of Corrections’ legal department. See
    State v. Carriere, 19-366 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/26/19), 
    289 So.3d 149
    , 153.
    23-KA-274                                 13
    DECREE
    For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
    The matter is remanded for correction of the Uniform Commitment Order and
    sentencing minute entry, as noted above.
    AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF
    UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER AND
    SENTENCING MINUTE ENTRY
    23-KA-274                                  14
    SUSAN M. CHEHARDY                                                                CURTIS B. PURSELL
    CHIEF JUDGE                                                                      CLERK OF COURT
    SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
    FREDERICKA H. WICKER
    CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
    JUDE G. GRAVOIS
    MARC E. JOHNSON
    ROBERT A. CHAISSON                                                               LINDA M. WISEMAN
    STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
    FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
    JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
    SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL                               FIFTH CIRCUIT
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    23-KA-274
    E-NOTIFIED
    24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
    HON. LEE V. FAULKNER, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
    MONIQUE D. NOLAN (APPELLEE)                THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)     BERTHA M. HILLMAN (APPELLANT)
    MAILED
    BLAINE B. MONCRIEF (APPELLEE)            HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
    ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY              (APPELLEE)
    JUVENILE COURT                           DISTRICT ATTORNEY
    1546 GRETNA BOULEVARD                    MATTHEW WHITWORTH (APPELLEE)
    HARVEY, LA 70058                         ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
    TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    200 DERBIGNY STREET
    GRETNA, LA 70053
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-KA-274

Judges: Lee V. Faulkner

Filed Date: 12/27/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/21/2024