State Of Louisiana v. Jason L. Robinson ( 2019 )


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  •                                 STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2018 KA 1441
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    VERSUS
    JASON L. ROBINSON
    JUDGMENT RENDERED:     NOV.. 2 0 2019,
    Appealed from the
    Twenty -Second District Court
    In and for the Parish of St. Tammany • State of Louisiana
    Docket Number 573067 • Division " G"
    The Honorable Scott Gardner, Judge Presiding
    Jane L. Beebe                                             ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Louisiana Appellate Project                               DEFENDANT— Jason Robinson
    New Orleans, Louisiana
    Warren L. Montgomery                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    District Attorney                                         The State of Louisiana
    Butch Wilson
    Assistant District Attorney
    Covington, Louisiana
    BEFORE: MCCLENDON, WELCH, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.
    11 tesik 1 F,
    WELCH, I
    The State of Louisiana charged the defendant, Jason L. Robinson, by felony
    bill of information with one count of hit and run driving, when death or serious
    bodily injury is a direct result of the accident, a violation of La. R. S. 14: 100( C)( 2).
    He pled not guilty. Following a trial by jury, the jury found the defendant guilty of
    attempted hit and run driving, when death or serious bodily injury is a direct result
    of the accident, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 27 and 14: 100( C)( 2).       The trial court
    sentenced the defendant to five years at hard labor, but suspended the sentence and
    placed him on supervised probation for a period of three years, subject to certain
    special conditions.
    The defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the
    evidence.   For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On July 28, 2015, at approximately 5: 45 a.m., the victim, Mario Granado,
    left his house in Mandeville to commute over the Causeway for his job.            Because
    the weather was " beautiful,"   he chose to drive his motorcycle.       Granado testified
    that he was struck from behind twice while he was on the Causeway in St.
    Tammany Parish. He testified that the motorcycle went out from under him, and
    he flipped over the back of the bike and landed on the Causeway, where his body
    began rolling, flipping, sliding, and skidding across the pavement.       Granado stated
    he attempted to roll and flip his body into a position on the Causeway to avoid
    being run over by the other cars and an eighteen -wheeled tractor -trailer nearby
    him.
    Another driver, Michael Earls, saw the accident occur and noticed that a red
    Camaro had struck Granado and accelerated after the accident. Earls pursued the
    red Camaro and turned on his lights to signal the red Camaro to stop.             The red
    Camaro then pulled over in front of Earls, stopped, and turned its hazard lights on.
    Earls called 911 to report the incident and that he had stopped the red Camaro on
    2
    the side of the roadway.
    Corporal Tyrone Banks with the Causeway Police Department was stopped
    at mile marker 12. 4 awaiting a red Camaro to reach that crossover, as witnesses
    had reported a red Camaro travelling at a high rate of speed and weaving in and out
    of traffic.   After receiving a dispatch that someone had stopped the red Camaro,
    Corporal Banks drove to the scene and discovered the defendant and Earls stopped
    at mile marker 12. 8.
    The rear end of Granado' s motorcycle was damaged, with the exhaust pipe
    pushed out and the license plate " pushed in."        Because the frame was bent and
    twisted, the motorcycle was totaled, and the damage indicated the bike had flipped
    end to end multiple times. Tire marks from the defendant' s Camaro' s left tire were
    found on the tailpipe of the motorcycle.            The defendant' s Camaro sustained
    significant damage," primarily to its left front end.
    Ultimately, Granado sustained a number of injuries from the crash, including
    a broken left foot; a broken right ankle; a broken wrist; an injured shoulder blade;
    injuries to his lower back, including a herniated disc; and " road rash," a condition
    similar to second or third-degree burns, down his back. He underwent surgery on
    his wrist, skin graft surgeries on his back and nose, and physical rehabilitation.
    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    In his sole assignment of error, the defendant contends that the evidence was
    insufficient to convict him of attempted hit and run driving, when death or serious
    bodily injury is a direct result of the accident.    The defendant claims that the State
    presented conflicting witness testimony to prove the defendant knew he caused the
    accident and failed to stop and/ or tried to flee. The defendant acknowledged that
    he has never denied that he caused an accident on the Causeway or that the victim
    suffered serious bodily injuries. Instead, the defendant claims that he did not flee
    the scene of the accident and that there was no criminal intent.         The defendant
    3
    claims he stopped his car and put on his hazard lights at mile marker 12. 8, which is
    0. 2 miles from the accident, and 0. 4 miles from the first turnaround point on the
    Causeway past the accident location.
    Further, the defendant claims the evidence does not support Michael Earls' s
    assertion that he " pulled Mr. Robinson over."    He argues that Earls was parked
    behind his car on the Causeway and in the police video, only he, and not Earls, had
    hazard lights flashing. The defendant also points to allegedly conflicting testimony
    from Corporal Banks and Earls regarding the location of the defendant' s keys after
    the accident,   Earls' s testimony regarding the defendant' s statement he did not
    know he had caused an accident, his cooperativeness with Corporal Banks, and
    expert testimony that Earls' s Ford Escape did not have enough acceleration to
    catch up to the defendant' s Camaro.
    The defendant further points to the allegedly inconsistent testimony from
    two other witnesses, Richard Powers and Anthony Arellano, who both claimed to
    be directly behind the defendant' s car in the right lane when the accident occurred.
    The defendant also claims that in contradiction to Earls' s testimony, Powers
    testified he saw no one chase the defendant' s Camaro.          The defendant also
    highlights the allegedly conflicting testimony regarding whether the victim landed
    on the hood of his Camaro after being struck.
    Finally, the defendant claims the defense and State offered conflicting expert
    testimony.   The defendant claims the conclusions reached by both experts were
    similar and that the expert called by the State on rebuttal, James Evans, did not
    perform as much research on the case as the expert called by the defense, Edward
    Carrick.
    The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, as
    enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789, 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
    , 573 ( 1979), requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for
    11
    any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    La. C. C. P. art. 821; State v. Crowson, 2010- 1283 ( La. App. Pt Cir. 2/ 11/ 11), 
    2011 WL 2135102
    , at * 6 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2011- 0528 ( La. 11/ 23/ 11),     
    76 So. 3d 1146
    .   In conducting this review, we also must be expressly mindful of
    Louisiana' s circumstantial evidence test, which states in part, " assuming every fact
    to be proved that the evidence tends to prove in order to convict," every reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence is excluded.         La. R. S.    15: 438;   Crowson, 
    2011 WL 2135102
    , at * 6.
    When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the
    reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that
    evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence
    is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably
    inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to
    conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every
    essential element of the crime.     State v. Forrest, 2016- 1678 ( La. App. Pt Cir.
    9/ 21/ 17), 
    231 So. 3d 865
    , 870, writ denied, 2017- 1683 ( La. 6/ 15/ 18), 257 So. 3d
    At all times relevant hereto, La. R. S. 14: 100, provided, in pertinent part:
    A. Hit and run driving is the intentional failure of the
    driver of a vehicle involved in or causing any accident, to
    stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, to give his
    identity, and to render reasonable aid.
    B. For the purposes of this Section:
    To give his identity", means that the driver of any
    1) "
    vehicle involved in any accident shall give his name,
    address, and the license number of his vehicle, or shall
    report the accident to the police.
    2) "    Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which
    involves    unconsciousness,   extreme     physical    pain,   or
    protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss
    or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ,
    or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.']
    Reasonable aid within the meaning of La. R.S. 14: 100 is aid that is fair,
    proper, or moderate under the circumstances.           Evidence that a defendant caused an
    accident, left the scene, and failed to render reasonable aid is sufficient to establish
    the requisite general intent necessary to sustain a conviction for hit and run driving.
    State v. Craig, 2012- 1262 ( La. App. Pt Cir. 3/ 22/ 13),            
    2013 WL 1189433
    ,         at *   4
    unpublished),       writ denied, 2013- 0902 ( La. 11/ 8/ 13), 
    125 So. 3d 444
    .         The failure
    to stop to render aid must be an intentional act. To intentionally fail to stop, the
    driver must be aware than an accident has occurred. State v. Guidroz, 2007- 1548
    La. App. 1St Cir. 2/ 8/ 08), 
    2008 WL 426071
    , at * 2 ( unpublished).
    The      defendant' s     contentions   regarding     the   weakness     of   the    witness
    testimony of Earls are without basis in the record.                Although Earls was parked
    behind the defendant on the Causeway, the positioning of the cars indicates only
    that the defendant voluntarily pulled over to the side of the road.              With regard to
    the defendant' s argument that the police video contradicts Earls' s testimony that he
    thought he flashed his lights at the defendant to force the defendant to stop, we
    note Earls testified he put on his flashers and " brights" when he was approaching
    the defendant' s Camaro.         We note, however, that Earls did not testify as to whether
    he kept his flashers on after he and the defendant pulled over. Further, a review of
    Corporal Banks' s dashcam video reveals that neither the defendant nor Earls had
    his flashers on, but Corporal Banks arrived on the scene after Earls had pulled the
    defendant over to the side of the road.               Thus, the dashcam video              does not
    contradict Earls' s testimony for the simple reason that it does not show the time
    frame during which Earls testified he turned on his flashers.
    1 While not applicable to this appeal, we note that in 2019, the Louisiana Legislature repealed the
    definition of " serious   bodily injury" found in La. R.S.   14: 100( B)( 2),
    in order to provide a
    universal definition of that term for purposes of Title 14 of the Revised Statutes. See 2019 La.
    Acts No. 2, §   3 ( eff. Aug. 1, 2019).
    C
    The defendant claims that various alleged inconsistencies in the testimony
    adduced at trial established that he neither fled the scene nor had " any criminal
    intent."      Although Earls' s testimony differed from that of Corporal Banks
    regarding the location of the defendant' s keys— whether the keys were on top of
    the car, as Earls testified, or in the Camaro, as Corporal Banks testified— that
    testimony does not prove that the defendant did not flee the scene. Similarly, the
    conflicting     witness   testimony   from   Powers     and   Arellano— that   both   were
    directly" behind the defendant in the right lane when the crash occurred— does
    not show that the defendant either did not flee the scene or did not have criminal
    intent.
    The defendant also points to the differing testimony regarding whether the
    victim flipped over the hood of the Camaro. Earls testified that the victim flipped
    over the hood of the Camaro. Arellano testified the victim fell off his motorcycle
    and onto the ground and did not land on the Camaro.              The victim testified that
    when he fell off his motorcycle, he felt as though he hit the pavement with his
    helmet, but he was not sure if he hit the car also because he went up in the air and
    went backwards.       He felt himself " spinning around, sliding and rolling."    Whether
    the victim flipped over the defendant' s hood or not does not establish the defendant
    did not flee or did not have criminal intent.       Finally, the fact that Powers testified
    he did not see another vehicle chase the defendant' s Camaro does not establish that
    no vehicle did so; indeed, Earls testified that he pursued the defendant and parked
    behind the defendant on the Causeway.             Testimony from Arellano, Powers, and
    Earls establishes that after they saw the defendant' s Camaro strike the victim, the
    defendant kept traveling down the Causeway and, according to Arellano and Earls,
    even continued to accelerate.      The victim also testified that after the accident, he
    never met the person who struck him on the road.
    The defendant is correct that Earls testified the defendant immediately stated
    11
    he did not know he had hit anyone, and that another responding Causeway Police
    Department officer, Corporal Tristan Thomas, testified the defendant stated he did
    not know that he had hit anyone.         Corporal Banks added the defendant was
    cooperative and nervous, but made no attempt to flee the scene.        The defendant
    omits,    however,   the rest of Corporal Thomas' s testimony, in which Corporal
    Thomas explained that after he arrived on the scene, the defendant first said he did
    not know what had happened and did not do " whatever everybody said he did."
    The defendant then advised Corporal Thomas that he did not believe he had done
    anything, but he did see " the guy" flipping in his mirror, but because he did not
    believe he had done anything wrong, he continued down the road.              Corporal
    Thomas testified the defendant' s " third story" was that he left the scene because he
    panicked.     The defendant' s final explanation to Corporal Thomas was that he
    denied " anything, everything. That he didn' t do anything."
    The expert in engineering and vehicle accident reconstruction called by the
    defense, Edward Carrick, worked on the case.     Carrick heard or read the testimony
    of the other witnesses at trial and added he could find no written rules dictating the
    proper procedure for drivers to follow if they are involved in a crash on the
    Causeway and that the research he performed on the issue yielded multiple
    answers,    depending on the circumstances involved.     Carrick also indicated that
    there was no written policy regarding what to do on the Causeway if someone is
    involved in an accident, but the car is able to move.     In preparing his report, he
    relied upon the police crash report, which indicated the crash occurred at mile
    marker 13,    but did not perform any physical testing because he did not have a
    Camaro or a motorcycle to test.        Carrick further testified he believed it was
    impossible for Earls' s Ford Escape to catch up to the defendant' s Camaro unless
    the Camaro was already braking before the Ford approached because the Camaro
    had a more powerful engine and had a " head start" on the Ford Escape. We also
    8
    note that in contradiction to Carrick' s testimony on cross- examination that the
    driver of a Camaro could feel the impact of a dog, but it was possible for the driver
    of a Camaro not to feel the impact of a human being, Carrick concluded in his
    report that it was more likely than not that the defendant immediately felt the
    impact of striking the victim. In support of this conclusion, we further note that the
    victim' s motorcycle was totaled as a result of flipping from end to end several
    times, that it had tire marks from the defendant' s Camaro on the tailpipe, and that
    the defendant' s Camaro sustained " significant damage."
    James Evans, the expert in accident reconstruction offered by the State on
    rebuttal, listened to the testimony of Carrick, reviewed photographs of the crash,
    used measurements from Google Earth and satellite image programs,                   and    a
    drawing he made using AutoCAD, in addition to performing " some testing with
    some similar vehicles"     to illustrate the damage sustained in the crash. Evans also
    reviewed a copy of the police report, two dashcam videos taken from police cars,
    an "   expert report written by the other side," some testimony from the witnesses
    that testified at trial, and photographs of the vehicles taken at the scene of the
    accident.   When asked, Evans stated he could not determine any error in Carrick' s
    calculations because Carrick did not include enough of his " work" for Evans to
    determine his accuracy.          Evans used a " pro version" of Google Earth that has a
    history of being " very          accurate"   to measure the width of the roadway and
    dimensions, and to double check its information, he found a publication on the
    Causeway      from   a   civil    engineering magazine to    check   the   widths   of   the
    Causeway' s lanes.       We note that in contrast to Carrick, Evans recreated the
    accident scene in a park using a Camaro and motorcycle that had similar
    dimensions to the defendant' s Camaro and the victim' s motorcycle.           We further
    note that, consistent with the testimony from Arellano, Powers, and Earls— that the
    defendant did not slow down on the Causeway after striking the victim— Evans
    6
    testified the defendant must have continued to travel after striking the victim
    because the distance the Camaro traveled was not " normal," and if the defendant
    had pulled over, he would have stopped sooner than the 12. 8 mile marker. Evans
    agreed      with    Carrick' s   conclusion     that     more     likely than not,   the    defendant
    immediately perceived an impact with the victim' s motorcycle when the accident
    occurred, and disagreed with Carrick' s conclusion that the Ford Escape was unable
    to surpass the defendant' s Camaro in the timeframe available. Evans testified he
    believed the accident occurred north of mile marker 13 because of where the
    vehicles came to rest.           When questioned why he believed the accident occurred
    north of mile marker 13 in spite of the lack of testimony regarding such, and as to
    what the police report meant when it stated the accident occurred at mile marker 13
    or " just   before," Evans acknowledged that although it could mean the accident
    occurred at mile marker 12. 9 or 12. 95, it would not matter because all the distances
    involved in this case are very large ranges. He explained that he and Carrick could
    have reached different conclusions if they had used different impact points for the
    crash.
    Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits
    an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his
    object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be
    immaterial         whether,      under    the   circumstances,        he   would     have    actually
    accomplished his purpose.                La. R.S.      14: 27( A).    In State ex rel. Elaire v.
    Blackburn, 
    424 So. 2d 246
    , 251 ( La. 1982), cert. denied, 
    461 U.S. 9595
     
    103 S. Ct. 2432
    , 
    77 L. Ed. 2d 1318
     ( 1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the
    legitimacy of a " compromise verdict,"                 i.e.,   a legislatively approved responsive
    verdict that does not fit the evidence, but that ( for whatever reason) the jurors deem
    to be fair, as long as the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the
    charged offense.        If the defendant timely objects to an instruction on a responsive
    10
    verdict on the basis that the evidence does not support that responsive verdict, the
    court overrules the objection,      and the jury returns a verdict of guilty of the
    responsive offense, the reviewing court must examine the record to determine if
    the responsive verdict is supported by the evidence and may reverse the conviction
    if the evidence does not support the verdict. However, if the defendant does not
    enter an objection ( at a time when the trial judge can correct the error), then the
    reviewing court may affirm the conviction if the evidence would have supported a
    conviction   of the   greater   offense,   whether or   not the   evidence    supports   the
    conviction of the legislatively responsive offense returned by the jury.          State ex
    rel. Elaire, 424 So. 2d at 251.
    In this case, there was no objection to the instruction on the responsive
    verdict of attempted hit and run driving, when death or serious bodily injury is a
    direct result of the accident.      The jury' s ultimate reasoning for returning this
    responsive verdict is unclear, but it is possible that this verdict represented a
    compromise."     Regardless of the jury' s ultimate reasoning, because the evidence
    presented at trial was sufficient to convict the defendant of the charged offense, it
    was also sufficient to support the defendant' s conviction for the responsive offense
    of attempted hit and run driving, when death or serious bodily injury is a direct
    result of the accident.
    The conviction reflects that the jury accepted the victim' s testimony, as well
    as that of the eyewitnesses to the crash— Arellano, Powers, and Earls— and of the
    expert called by the State, James Evans, and rejected the defendant' s attempts to
    discredit them.   Their testimony established that the defendant caused an accident
    on the Causeway by striking the victim' s motorcycle, then left without rendering
    aid.   This court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence
    to overturn a fact finder' s determination of guilt.      Rather, the trier of fact may
    accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness.         When there is
    11
    conflicting testimony, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the
    credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its
    sufficiency.   Craig, 
    2013 WL 1189433
    , at * 5.
    When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably
    rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls,
    and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a
    reasonable doubt.    State v. Dyson, 2016- 1571 ( La. App. Pt Cir. 6/ 2/ 17), 
    222 So. 3d 220
    , 228, writ denied, 2017- 1399 ( La. 6/ 15/ 18), 
    257 So. 3d 685
    .       No such
    hypothesis exists in the instant case. In reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that
    the jury' s determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented
    to them.   See State v. Ordodi, 2006- 0207 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 
    946 So. 2d 654
    , 662. An
    appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility
    of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the
    basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to,           and rationally
    rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 
    1 So. 3d 417
    ,
    418 (   per   curiam).   In accepting   a   hypothesis   of innocence   that was   not
    unreasonably rejected by the fact finder, a court of appeal impinges on a fact
    finder' s discretion beyond the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental
    protection of due process of law. State v. Mire, 2014- 2295 ( La. 1/ 27/ 16), 
    269 So. 3d 698
    , 703 ( per curiam).    Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.
    Accordingly, the defendant' s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
    CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018KA1441

Filed Date: 11/20/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024