Troy Templett v. State of Louisiana through Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Louisiana State Penitentiary ( 2019 )


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  •                                 STATE OF LOUISIANA
    COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST CIRCUIT
    2019 CA 0037
    TROY TEMPLET
    VERSUS
    STATE OF LOUISIANA
    THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS;
    LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY; AND SERGEANT JESSIE LOFTON
    Decision Rendered.. '   NOV 1 5 2099
    APPEALED FROM THE
    20TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    WEST FELICIANIA PARISH, LOUISIANA
    DOCKET NUMBER 22, 719, DIVISION B
    HONORABLE WILLIAM G. CARMICHAEL, JUDGE
    Donna U. Grodner                             Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana                       Troy Templet
    Jeff Landry                                  Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellee
    Attorney General                             State of Louisiana, Department of
    and                                          Public Safety and Corrections
    Christopher N. Walters
    Assistant Attorney General
    Baton Rouge, Louisiana
    BEFORE:      WHIPPLE, C. J., McDONALD, and CRAIN, JJ.
    McDONALD, J.
    A former inmate filed a tort suit against the State of Louisiana, Department of
    Public Safety and Corrections ( DPSC), for injuries he sustained while in prison.                    DPSC
    filed a peremptory exception claiming the former inmate' s claims were prescribed.                    The
    district court granted the exception and dismissed the suit. The former inmate appeals
    from the adverse judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter
    to the district court.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On November 26, 2013, Troy Templet,' an inmate housed at the Louisiana State
    Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, was a member of a crew working on a ferry landing
    located on prison property.         It was raining that day.            While the crew was unloading
    angle iron from a trailer, a piece of the iron struck Mr. Templet, knocking him from the
    ferry landing into the Mississippi River below.           Mr. Templet received a blow to his head
    and     lost consciousness.       He was      retrieved from       the    river and   received     medical
    treatment for his injuries, which included head, leg, back, and eye injuries.
    Mr. Templet was apparently released from prison in January 2014. On July 5,
    2016, Mr. Templet filed this tort suit against DPSC in the 20th Judicial District Court; he
    later amended his petition to add Sgt. Jessie Lofton, the prison official supervising the
    work crew at the time of the accident, but Sgt. Lofton is not a party to this appeal.                   In
    his petition, Mr. Templet essentially alleged that Sgt. Lofton ordered the work crew to
    work in unsafe, rainy conditions on the -ferry landing, and that DPSC was vicariously
    liable for his actions;       he also claimed DPSC breached its duty to provide a safe
    workplace when it was foreseeable that an inmate working in the rain with heavy
    equipment would be injured.            Alternatively, Mr. Templet claimed he was repeatedly
    denied appropriate medical treatment after the accident.
    DPSC ultimately filed a prescription exception, claiming Mr. Templet's tort suit
    was untimely.     According to DPSC, Mr. Templet was injured on November 26, 2013; he
    filed   an   administrative     remedy     procedure (     ARP)    on     December    3,   2013,    which
    1 Although the petition' s caption states the plaintiff's surname is spelled " Templett," documents in the
    record bearing his signature show the correct spelling is " Templet."
    2
    suspended the running of prescription on his tort claim; the administrative process was
    completed"      on July 28, 2014, and prescription again began to run; Mr. Templet had
    until July 22, 2015 to file his suit; he did not file his suit until July 5, 2016; hence, his
    suit was prescribed.       DPSC filed no evidence documenting any of the dates referenced
    in its exception.     Mr. Templet apparently filed an opposition to DPSC' s exception, but
    such is not in the appellate record.      He then filed a " Motion to Supplement," requesting
    that the court allow him to supplement his opposition with his own affidavit, to which
    two exhibits were attached: his handwritten ARP dated November 27, 2013,                and an
    unsigned, undated copy of DPSC's purported " First Step Response Form" denying his
    ARP.       The district court signed an order, and Mr. Templet filed the affidavit and
    attachments into the record.
    In due course, the district court held a hearing on DPSC' s prescription exception.
    Neither party introduced evidence at the hearing nor presented argument supporting
    their respective positions; the district court orally granted DPSC' s prescription exception
    from the bench without explaining the basis for its ruling.        On November 19, 2018, the
    district    court signed    a judgment,    granting DPSC' s exception and dismissing Mr.
    Templet's suit with prejudice.
    Mr. Templet appeals from the adverse judgment, contending the district court
    erred in dismissing his suit as prescribed.          He argues that his affidavit shows that he
    timely filed his ARP while in prison, he was released from prison on January 10, 2014,
    and DPSC did not contact him any time after his release.              He contends there is no
    evidence that DPSC delivered its purported July 28, 2014 denial of his ARP to him, and
    as such, prescription on his personal injury claim was suspended when he filed suit.
    APPLICABLE LAW
    The Louisiana Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure Act ( CARP), La. R. S.
    15: 1171- 1179,     allows DPSC to adopt administrative remedy procedures to address
    complaints by an offender against DPSC that arise while an offender is in DPSC's
    custody.      See La. R. S. 15: 1171A and B.   All complaints, including traditional tort claims
    seeking      monetary relief, are subject to administrative procedures.           See La.   R. S.
    3
    15: 11726.     An offender shall initiate his administrative remedies for a delictual ( tort)
    action for injury within 90 days from the day the injury is sustained.                          See La. R. S.
    15: 11726( 1).     Subsequent release from custody does not excuse an offender from
    exhausting the applicable administrative procedure.                 See La.       R. S.   15:    1171D and
    1174( 2).    The filing of an ARP for any delictual action suspends the tolling of liberative
    prescription from the date the ARP is filed until the final DPSC decision is delivered. See
    La. R. S. 15: 1172E.
    Ordinarily, the party urging prescription bears the burden of proving such at the
    trial of the exception; however, if the petition is prescribed on its face, the burden shifts
    to the plaintiff to show his action is not prescribed.     Quinn v. Louisiana Citizens Properly
    Insurance Corp., 12- 0152 ( La. 11/ 2/ 12), 
    118 So. 3d 1011
    ,           1017.       When the plaintiff is
    contending there is a suspension of prescription, he then has the burden of proving the
    suspension.      Shannon v. Vannoy, 17- 1722 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 1/ 18), 
    251 So. 3d 442
    , 448.
    Thus, under La. R. S. 15: 1172E, Mr. Templet had the burden of proving the dates during
    which prescription of his suit was suspended.
    Appellate review applicable to a prescription exception depends on the manner in
    which the exception is heard.           Shannon, 
    251 So. 3d at 448
    .          Evidence may be
    introduced to support or controvert the exception of prescription when the grounds
    thereof do not appear from the petition.            La. C. C. P.    art.   931.      In the absence of
    evidence, the exception must be decided on the facts alleged in the petition, which are
    accepted as true. Accord Quinn, 118 So. 3d at 1017; Shannon, 
    251 So. 3d at
    448- 49.                        In
    this case, neither DPSC nor Mr. Templet introduced evidence at the exception hearing.
    For the following reasons, our review is limited to the facts alleged in Mr. Templet's
    petition.
    At the hearing on the prescription exception, the district court specifically asked
    the parties' counsel if they had anything to add " other than what's in the record?," and
    both answered ' ono."      This exchange may have misled the parties to the assumption
    that the trial court would decide the exception on evidence that had been filed into the
    record — that     is, Mr. Templet's affidavit and attachments.         Under well- settled Louisiana
    4
    law, however, such procedure is not allowed.              A hearing or a " trial" of an exception of
    prescription    is just that:   a trial   at which       competent,   relevant evidence should be
    presented for the district court's consideration.           See La. C. C. P. arts. 929- 931; Kirby v.
    Field, 04- 1898 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 23/ 05), 
    923 So. 2d 131
    , 137 n. 8; also see Burnett v.
    Lee, 18- 0319 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 17/ 18),, 
    2018 WL 3455994
    . A sworn affidavit is hearsay
    and is not competent evidence unless its use is specifically authorized by statute.
    Michael F. Smith, CPA v. Alford, 04-0586 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 24/ 05), 
    906 So. 2d 674
    , 676.
    If hearsay affidavits are admitted into evidence without objection, they may properly be
    considered part of the record in an appeal from a judgment granting a prescription
    exception.      See Green v. Regions Bank, 13- 0771 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 19/ 14), 
    2014 WL 3555820
     * 1 n. 5;    Kirby, 923 So. 2d at 137 n. 8. But, simply filing such an affidavit in the
    record does not serve to make the affidavit competent evidence for trial or appeal
    purposes.      Id.; In re Montgomery, 07- 0429 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 2/ 07), 
    2007 WL 3229145
    1 n. 1.    Thus, we do not consider Mr. Templet's affidavit and attachments in our review
    of the district court's judgment, because this evidence was not admitted at the hearing
    on DPSC' s prescription exception, and the affidavit's mere presence in the record does
    not make it competent evidence.
    Accordingly, based solely on the facts alleged in Mr. Templet's petition, which we
    accept as true, we find that the trial court properly dismissed his suit as prescribed.           Mr.
    Templet's tort claim against DPSC was subject to a liberative prescription of one year,
    which began to run from the day his injury was sustained.                  See La. C. C. art. 3492;
    Shannon, 
    251 So. 3d at 448
    .         In his petition, Mr. Templet alleges that the accident on
    the ferry landing occurred on November 26, 2013.               His suit was filed in the 20th Judicial
    District Court on July 5, 2016, over two years after the date of the accident.              Although
    his petition alleges that he exhausted his administrative remedies, it does not allege
    when his ARP was filed nor when the final DPSC decision was delivered. Under La. R. S.
    15: 1172E, these dates are required to show that prescription on Mr. Templet's tort
    claim was suspended during the administrative process.                   Mr. Templet's inadmissible
    hearsay affidavit and the attachments thereto were the only means by which he
    5
    attempted    to    prove    this   suspension.     As   explained,    we    do    not   consider these
    documents.       Thus, because Mr. Templet's petition was not filed within one year of the
    date of the accident, the petition is facially prescribed, and Mr. Templet has failed to
    prove that prescription was suspended when he filed suit.               Our review, however, does
    not end here.
    When the grounds of a peremptory exception,                 such   as   prescription,   may be
    removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall
    order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court.                       La. C. C. P. art. 934
    emphasis     added);    Breland v. Willis Knighton Medical Ctn, 51, 150 ( La.              App. 2 Cir.
    2/ 15/ 17), 
    212 So. 3d 724
    , 727.       Here, the judgment is silent on whether Mr. Templet's
    petition could be amended to remove the grounds of prescription; we interpret this
    silence as the district court's refusal to allow the amendment.             See Wheelahan v. State
    through Louisiana State Claims Review Bd., 
    376 So. 2d 576
    , 578 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 1979).
    It appears that       Mr.   Templet could remove the grounds of DPSC' s exception by
    amending his petition to allege specific relevant dates during which prescription was
    suspended on his tort claim.          Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 934 is liberally
    applied in cases involving prescription, and where the plaintiff has raised allegations in
    argument that might be sufficient to overcome a prescription exception, he should be
    allowed time to amend his petition.              Whitnel/ v. Menville, 
    540 So. 2d 304
    , 309 ( La.
    1989);   Faubourg Saint Charles, LLC v. Faubourg Saint Charles Homeowners Assn., Inc.,
    18- 0806 ( La.    App. 4 Cir. 2/ 20/ 19),   
    265 So. 3d 1153
    , 1159- 60; Breland, 
    212 So. 3d at 727
    .     Mr. Templet has raised sufficient argument in this case to warrant an opportunity
    to amend his petition.         Therefore, in accordance with La. C. C. P. art. 934, we must
    reverse that portion of the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Templet's suit with
    prejudice and remand this matter to allow Mr. Templet an opportunity to do so.                    Carr v.
    Sanderson Farm, Inc., 15- 0953 ( La. App.          1 Cir. 2/ 17/ 16), 
    189 So. 3d 450
    , 457; Wesley
    v. Our Lady of Lake Hoso., Inc., 15- 1649 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 3/ 16), 
    2016 WL 3127004
    4.
    2
    CONCLUSION
    For the above        reasons,   we affirm the district court's November 19,    2018
    judgment insofar as it granted the State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and
    Corrections' exception of prescription.     However, we reverse the judgment insofar as it
    dismissed Troy Templet's petition with prejudice. We remand this matter to the district
    court for the issuance of an order granting Troy Templet the opportunity to amend his
    petition, if he can, within a delay the district court deems reasonable.    We assess no
    costs in this pauper suit.
    AFFIRMED        IN     PART;      REVERSED     IN   PART;    REMANDED         WITH
    INSTRUCTIONS.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2019CA0037

Filed Date: 11/15/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024