State Of Louisiana v. Christopher Bell, Jr. ( 2024 )

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2023 KA 1138
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
CHRISTOPHER BELL, JR.
Judgment Rendered:
MAY 3 1 2024
Appealed from the
22nd Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
State of Louisiana
Case No. 1217-F- 2019
The Honorable Vincent J. Lobello, Judge Presiding
J. Collin Sims Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Butch Wilson
Assistant District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
Gwendolyn K. Brown Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Christopher Bell, Jr.
BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.
LANIER,J.
The defendant, Christopher Bell, Jr., was charged by bill of information with
second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1. He pied not guilty, and,
following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. He filed a combined motion for
new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. The
trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years imprisonment at hard labor and
denied his subsequent motion to reconsider sentence.
The State filed a habitual offender bill of information seeking to enhance the
sentence, and the defendant denied the allegations therein. The trial court
subsequently adjudicated the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender, vacated
the original sentence, and resentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor
without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant
filed another motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.
The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the constitutionality of the
enhanced sentence and the denial of his subsequent motion to reconsider sentence.
We affirm the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about May 27, 2019, after midnight, Corporal Ryan Robin, the intake
supervisor at the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office, was advised that an altercation
took place in a holding cell. Surveillance footage showed the defendant, who had
been arrested the previous night, repeatedly strike Benjamin Lacombe, another
arrestee placed in the same holding cell. Lacombe was lying on the cell floor, resting
at the time of attack. As a result of the attack, Lacombe suffered a broken jaw, lost
three ofhis teeth, and underwent multiple procedures and surgeries for facial injuries.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE
In assignment of error number one, the defendant argues that the trial court
erred in imposing an excessive sentence. He contends the trial court failed to
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consider mitigating factors or articulate sentencing factors in denying his request to
deviate from the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. In assignment of error
number two, he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider
sentence.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, §20,
of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive
punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive.
A sentence is considered unconstitutionally excessive if it is grossly
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered
grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light
of the harm done to society, it shocks one's sense of justice. State v. Anderson,
2022- 0587 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/22), 357 So.3d 845, 852, writ denied, 2023-
00352 ( La. 9/6/23), 369 So.3d 1267.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for
the trial court to consider when imposing a sentence. While the entire checklist of
Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately
considered the criteria. The sentencing judge should review the defendant's
personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the
likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential for rehabilitation
through correctional services other than confinement. The articulation of the
factual basis for a sentence is the goal of Article 894.1, not rigid or mechanical
compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate
factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has
not been full compliance with Article 894.1. Anderson, 357 So.3d at 852.
Further, the failure to articulate reasons as set forth in Article 894.1 when imposing
a mandatory life sentence is not an error since articulating such reasons or factors
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would be an exercise in futility as the court has no discretion. State v. Dickerson,
2016-1336 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 633, 642, writ denied, 2017- 1147
La. 8/ 31/18), 251 So.3d 1062.
The defendant's fourth-felony habitual offender status is based on the
following convictions: three counts of aggravated battery in 2005; illegal
possession of stolen things and possession of cocaine in 2013; and aggravated
battery and aggravated criminal damage to property in 2014. As the instant
offense, second degree battery, and the defendant's prior convictions of aggravated
battery in 2005 and 2014 are defined as crimes of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(B),
the defendant's life sentence under the habitual offender bill of information was
statutorily mandated. See La. R.S. 15:529.l(A)(4)(c). However, the defendant
argues on appeal that the trial court failed to consider or mention his employment
background, educational background, or family history when imposing the
sentence and that the conduct being punished is insufficiently egregious to justify
the sentence imposed.
In State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280-1281 ( La. 1993), the Louisiana
Supreme Court opined that if a trial judge were to find that the punishment
mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 makes no " measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment" or that the sentence amounted to nothing more than " the
purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and is " grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime," he has the option, and indeed the duty, to reduce such
sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. In State v. Johnson,
97-1906 ( La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676-677, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reexamined the issue of when Dorthey permits a downward departure from the
mandatory minimum sentences in the Habitual Offender Law. A sentencing court
must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under
the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. A court may only depart from the
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mmimum sentence if it finds clear and convmcmg evidence rebutting this
presumption of constitutionality. Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676.
To rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence IS
constitutional, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he IS
exceptional, which means, because of unusual circumstances, this defendant is a
victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored
to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances
of the case. Given the legislature's constitutional authority to enact statutes such as
the Habitual Offender Law, it is not the sentencing court's role to question the
legislature's wisdom in requiring enhanced punishments for multiple offenders.
Instead, the sentencing court is only allowed to determine whether the particular
defendant before it has proven that the mandatory minimum sentence is so
excessive in his case that it violates the constitution. Departures downward from
the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law should occur only in rare
situations. Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676-677.
In asking the trial court to consider deviating below the minimum sentence
allowed under the law, defense counsel noted that the defendant's first crime of
violence occurred almost two decades before the sentencing, with another one
occurring roughly ten years after that. Defense counsel further stated that the
victims involved " were not model citizens." In response, the State noted that the
defendant had been under supervision for violent crimes throughout his adulthood
and continued to commit crimes of violence while in jail.
In imposing the mandatory life sentence, the trial court found there was no
evidence to compel a downward deviation. In subsequently denying the
defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, the trial court reiterated the facts of the
instant offense, noting that it could not be considered a typical jailhouse fight, as
the defendant essentially jumped a sleeping inmate. Given the defendant's history
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of criminal conduct and the severity of the offense, the trial court concluded that
the mandatory life sentence is appropriate in this case. Likewise, we find nothing
unusual or unique about the defendant's circumstances that would justify a
downward departure from the mandatory life sentence.
As noted by the trial court, Lacombe was lying on the floor in a vulnerable,
sleeping position at the time of the attack. According to expert medical testimony
at trial, " a right mandible fracture of the jaw," inflicted upon Lacombe by the
defendant during the attack, takes a considerable amount of force, due to the
mandible being " the toughest bone in the face." Further, Lacombe's CAT scan
showed " obvious increased intercranial pressure." As a result of the mandible
fracture, Lacombe had a condition called " Trismus[,]" the inability to fully open
his mouth, and a temporary wiring apparatus was inserted prior to two separate
surgeries.
We find that the defendant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence
that he is exceptional such that the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender
Law was not meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of
the offense, and the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, no downward
departure from the presumptively constitutional mandatory minimum sentence is
warranted in this case. See Anderson, 357 So.3d at 853-854. Thus, we find the
sentence imposed is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, and
therefore, is not unconstitutionally excessive.
The record before us establishes an adequate factual basis for the sentence
imposed. We find no error in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
reconsider sentence. The assignments of error are without merit.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant' s conviction, habitual
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offender's adjudication, and sentence.
CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND
SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
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Under La. Code Crim P. art. 920(2), all appeals are reviewed for errors discoverable by a mere
inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence. In our review,
we have found no reversible errors. However, the record reflects the trial court failed to advise
the defendant of the prescriptive period for applying for post-conviction relief under La. Code
Crim. P. art. 930.8(C). Nonetheless, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the
limitation period has no bearing on the sentence. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-1143, writ denied, 2006-2621 ( La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158.
Out of an abundance of caution, we note for the record and advise the defendant that Article
930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is
filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under
the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. Id. at 1143.
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